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SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN HEALTH REFORM
Wendy K. Mariner
In the United States, calls to expand access to health care, when not
simply ignored, typically result in bills or legislation to reform health
insurance. We are in the midst of just such a cycle today. Several states
have adopted reform laws to make insurance available to most of their
residents.1 Presidential candidates are offering their own proposals for the
nation’s health care system.2 Former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill even
declared that health care should be a right, adding that wealthier people
should help pay for those who will never be able to afford their own care.3
Most Americans cannot afford to pay for more than minor medical
procedures out of their own pockets. Insurance is the vehicle that finances
the rest.4 Thus, insurance has come to stand for health care. 5

1. See, e.g., An Act to Provide Affordable Health Insurance to Small Businesses and
Individuals and to Control Health Care Costs, 2003 Me. Laws 469 (codified in scattered
sections of ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 2, 5, 22, and 24); An Act Promoting Access to Affordable,
Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2006 Mass. Acts 58 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS 6A, 10, 17, 26, 29, 32, 62, 111, 111M, 118E, 118G, 118H,
149, 151F, 175, 176A, 176B, 176G, 176J, 176M, 176N, and 176Q.): Act Relating to Health
Care Affordability for Vermonters, 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 191 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of VT. STAT. ANN 2, 3, 8, 18, 32, and 33); Act Relating to Catamount
Health 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 190 (amending 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 191). See John
McDonough et al., The Third Wave of Massachusetts Health Care Access Reform, 25
HEALTH AFF., Sept. 14, 2006, at w420, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w420
(describing the Massachusetts law and its development); State of Maine, Dirigo Health –
Working for Maine, http://www.dirigohealth.maine.gov (describing Maine’s program). See
generally Alice Burton et al., State Strategies to Expand Health Insurance Coverage:
Trends
and
Lessons
for
Policymakers
(2007),
available
at
http://www.cmwf.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=461903.
2. For summaries of the candidates’ proposals, see Farhana Hossain, The
Presidential
Candidates
on
Health
Care,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/us/politics/HEALTH_POSITIONS_2.html.
3. David Wenner, O’Neill Advocates Health Care as a Right, The Patriot-News
April
19,
2007;
available
at
http://www.pennlive.com/printer/printer.ssf?/base/business/117694502191220.xml&coll=1.
4. See generally, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF
UNINSURANCE, COVERAGE MATTERS: INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE (2001). Here I use the
concept of insurance rather liberally to include government health benefit programs, such as
Medicare, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq., Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq., and the State
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Yet buying health insurance is not the same thing as buying health
care. Conflating the two can exacerbate disagreements about the
responsibilities of government, business, and individuals for health and
health care.6 Health reform proposals reflect different philosophies about
who should be responsible for certain health conditions—society at large,
employers, or the individual herself. Current health insurance reform
proposals borrow from both camps, combining provisions promoting social
solidarity with provisions based on actuarial fairness.
This essay argues that amalgamating reforms that serve inconsistent
goals can perpetuate, rather than resolve, conflict. Part I suggests that
joining social insurance with commercial indemnity insurance provisions
forges a contract for traditional indemnity coverage plus discretionary
personal services—an “insurance + services” contract—which pulls the
system in opposite directions, forcing insurers to act as both insurers and
service providers. Part II examines a recent example of the service side of
this insurance + services contract—coverage of so-called “wellness
programs,” which offer rewards for meeting specific standards of behavior.
Often justified on grounds of actuarial fairness, they foster the idea that
certain health conditions are matters of personal responsibility. Yet there
has been virtually no discussion of what principles ought to govern the
choice of conditions targeted by wellness programs. Experience to date
suggests that such programs are likely to disadvantage those most in need
of social assistance.
I conclude that the use of commercial insurance to provide access to
care encourages reforms based on actuarial fairness instead of social
solidarity. In the context of rising health care costs, the renewed emphasis
on personal responsibility for health may unravel the social solidarity that
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa et seq., which also
finance care.
5. Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN.
INS. L. J. 11, 34 (1999/2000).
6. See, e.g., ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO
THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE (1980) (proposing competing health maintenance
organizations); REGINA HERZLINGER, WHO KILLED HEALTH CARE? (2007) (arguing for a
consumer-oriented system, with mandatory health insurance for all, subsidies for lowincome people, and consumers choosing private plans with better information); MICHAEL E.
PORTER & ELIZABETH OLMSTED TEISBERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE (2006) (arguing for
value-based competition); JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS:
HOW WE GOT INTO IT AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT (2005) (arguing for gradually
expanding Medicare eligibility as a second best but politically feasible approach); Paul M.
Ellwood et al., The Jackson Hole Initiative for a Twenty-First Century American Health
Care System, 1 HEALTH ECON. 158 (1992).
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prompted reform in the first place, especially for certain disfavored
conditions or groups.7 These reforms may return us to the days before
health insurance, and have the potential to undermine social solidarity
beyond the insurance sphere.
I.

SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN HEALTH INSURANCE

When Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) proposed federal legislation to
cover all Americans with insurance in December 2006, he was hoping to
break “60 years of gridlock on a desperately needed overhaul of the
nation’s health care system.”8 Like several recent state reforms, his
proposal offered both universal coverage and more personal responsibility
in making health care choices.9 Yet, without greater clarity about whether
insurance should reflect social solidarity or personal responsibility, or
which health conditions deserve social insurance coverage and which do
not, gridlock is likely to continue.10
Underlying much of the political disagreement are very different views
about the nature of health care. At one end of a wide spectrum is the view
7. Stone, supra note 5 at 46 (“Insurance is a social institution that helps define norms
and values in political culture, and ultimately shapes how citizens think about issues of
membership, community, responsibility, and moral obligation.”). See Tom Baker, Risk,
Insurance, and the Social Construction of Responsibility, EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 27 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds. 2002)
(how insurance reflects and influences cultural norms of accountability).
8. Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Proposes Historic New Health Care
Plan
(Dec.
13,
2006),
available
at
http://wyden.senate.gov/media/2006/12132006_Healthy_Americans_Act.htm (announcing
proposal of The Healthy Americans Act).
9. News Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Leads Federal Debate on Health Care
Reform
(Jan.
16,
2007),
available
at
http://wyden.senate.gov/media/speeches/2007/01162007_Healthy_Americans_Act.html.
10. For a selection of explanations why the United States has never adopted a system
for universal access to health care, much less national health insurance, see, e.g., JACOB
HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE (2002); JACOB S. HACKER, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE:
THE GENESIS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON’S PLAN FOR HEALTH SECURITY (1997); DAVID
MECHANIC, THE TRUTH ABOUT HEALTH CARE: WHY HEALTH REFORM IS NOT WORKING IN
AMERICA (2006); JILL QUADAGNO, ONE NATION, UNINSURED: WHY THE U.S. HAS NO
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (2005); JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH
CARE MESS: HOW WE GOT INTO IT AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT (2005). See also
Mark A. Peterson, The Congressional Graveyard for Health Care Reform, in HEALTHY,
WEALTHY & FAIR: HEALTH CARE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 205, 211-17 (James A. Morone &
Lawrence R. Jacobs eds., 2005) (describing barriers to coalition building in Congress).
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a person is (or ought to be) responsible for her own health and pay for her
own medical care like other ordinary consumer goods.11 At the other end
are those who find health is somehow special so that society should be
responsible for ensuring everyone access to care, regardless of ability to
pay.12 The difficulty of reconciling these opposing views of health care
and the purpose and function of insurance has undoubtedly stymied
agreement on reform.
Recent trends in health insurance in the United States reflect both of
these competing views. On one hand, there are several signs that the
country is moving toward universal health insurance coverage for reasons
of social solidarity. Public opinion polls report that a large majority of
Americans favor universal access to care.13 Health care is no longer
affordable for most Americans without insurance.14 Employment-based
health insurance covers a slowly declining proportion of nonelderly
Americans.15 This decline has been offset by expansions in state Medicaid

11. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? (1997) (arguing against redistribution of income and regulated markets); CLARK C.
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH
REFORM (1995); NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: WHAT NOW? WHAT LATER? WHAT NEVER?
(Mark V. Pauly ed. 1980) (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of national health
insurance).
12. See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985) (arguing that health care is
special because it promotes equality of opportunity within the meaning of Rawls’ theory of
justice); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE,
INSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH (2004); Proposal of the Physicians’ Working Group for
Single-Payer National Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798 (2004).
13. See, e.g., CBS News & New York Times, Poll, U.S. Health Care Politics, Feb. 2327, 2007, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/CBSNews_polls/health_care.pdf
(last visited March 2, 2007); Frank Newport, Prescription for Healing Healthcare from the
People,
The
Gallup
Poll,
April
26,
2007,
available
at
http://www.galluppoll.com/content/Default.aspx?ci=27322&VERSION=p (last visited
March 2, 2008).
14. See Aaron Catlin et al., National Health Spending in 2006: A Year of Change for
Prescription Drugs, 27 HEALTH AFF. 14 (Jan/Feb 2008) (reporting on public and private
national expenditures, which total about $2.1 trillion); A. Bruce Steinwald, Director, Health
Care, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Health Care Spending: Public Payers Face
Burden of Entitlement Program Growth, While All Payers Face Rising Prices and
Increasing Use of Services, GAO-07-497T (Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives, Feb. 15, 2007).
15. Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured:
Analysis of the March 2007 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 310 (Oct.
2007), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10-20073.pdf; Marsha
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and SCHIP programs, but those public programs risk future cutbacks.16
Recognizing these trends, several states have adopted or are considering
legislation to increase insurance coverage.17 But state level reforms are
limited by ERISA preemption,18 and recent proposals for national reform at
the federal level suggest that momentum for universal coverage is
building.19 Even employers may support reforms that include universal
coverage.20
Gold, Commercial Health Insurance: Smart or Simply Lucky?, 25(6) HEALTH AFF. 1490,
1490 (2006).
16. See Paul Fronstin, Uninsured Unchanged in 2004, But Employment-Based Health
Coverage Declined, 26 EBRI Notes 2, October 2005, available at
www.ebri.org/pdf/noptespdf/EBRI_Notes_10-20051.pdf; Stephen Zuckerman, Gains in
Public Health Insurance Offset Reductions in Employer Coverage Among Adults, 8
III,
Sept.,
17,
2003,
available
at
SNAPSHOTS
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310850_snapshots3_no8.pdf; Sara Rosenbaum, The Proxy
War—SCHIP and the Government’s Role in Health Care Reform, 358 NEW ENGL. J. MED.
869 (2008).
17. See supra note 1. See generally MARGARET TRINITY ET AL., STATE COVERAGE
INITIATIVES,
STATE
OF
THE
STATES
2008,
available
at
http://www.statecoverage.net/pdf/StateofStates2008.pdf (describing past and present statebased attempts at health care reform).
18. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Section
514(a), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), generally preempts state laws that require private
employers to provide health benefit plans for their employees, Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud,
633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981) (holding that ERISA
preempted Hawaii’s Prepaid Health Care Act requiring employee benefit plans with
prescribed health coverage), as well as reforms that alter the benefit structure or
administration of such plans, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) (a state
law relates to an ERISA plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."). Two
recent lower court decisions found that ERISA preempts employer pay-or-play legislation in
Maryland, Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder, 475 F. 3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007), and
the city of San Francisco, Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco,
No. C 06-06997 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2007), stay granted pending appeal, No. 07-17370 (9th
Cir. Jan. 9, 2007). But see N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (surcharges imposed on commercial health plans for hospital
bills not preempted, because they do not preclude uniform benefits or administrative
practices).
19. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, INSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2004); and supra notes 3 and 9. But see Uwe Reinhardt, Uninsured
Americans and the new Democratic Congress, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 1133, 1135 (2006)
(arguing that the current “flurry of activity” will produce “big talk” but “little action”).
20. See Robert S. Galvin & Suzanne Delbanco, Between A Rock and A Hard Place:
Understanding The Employer Mind-Set, 25(6) HEALTH AFF. 1548 (Nov./Dec. 2006)
(arguing that employers are looking for ways to get out of the health benefits business but
reluctant to have government control costs); Jonathan Cohn, What’s the One Thing Big
Business and the Left Have in Common?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE 45, April 1, 2007
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At the same time, a competing trend has emerged favoring increased
personal responsibility for health and health insurance. The beginning of
the twenty-first century saw a return to more traditional indemnity health
insurance following the late 1990’s backlash against managed care.21
Although most health insurance plans still include procedures for managing
care, most private insurance companies see their plans as a commercial
insurance product covering specified losses, rather than a mechanism for
financing universal access to care.22 Continuing health care cost increases
also put pressure on insurers, government, and employers to reduce the
need for care, tie premiums to claims experience, and shift more costs onto
insureds. 23 Health savings accounts are popular among some employers,
because they make employees responsible for a portion of their health care
expenses.24 A recent innovation, wellness coverage, offers discounted
(describing a business leader’s cooperation to develop a federal reform bill); Jordan Rau,
Healthcare Reform’s Unlikely Ally: Big Business, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2007 (describing a
coalition of 26 large companies including insurers to advocate for universal health insurance
in California). If true, this represents a change in business attitudes. See Jon R. Gabel,
Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Thomas Rice, Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Are They More
Than Talk Now? HEALTH AFF., Nov. 20, 2002, at w395 (survey results finding general lack
of interest among insurers and employers in insurance divorced from employment), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.239v1.pdf.
21. See, e.g., James C. Robinson, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost Sharing in
Health Benefit Design, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 20, 2002, at w139, at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.139v1.pdf; Marc A. Rodwin, Backlash
as Prelude to Managing Managed Care, 24 HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1115 (1999)
(describing the “backlash” of consumer objections to limits imposed by managed care);
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Consumer Choice under “Private Health Care Regulation,” in
REGULATING MANAGED CARE: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND FUTURE OPTIONS 91-116 (Stuart H.
Altman et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that employees resisted such limits in part because they
perceived their care as free in the past). For a more personalized description of objections to
managed care, see GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOS AND THE
BREAKDOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST (1996).
22. This picture can be complicated by managed care practices, such as preferred
provider networks and referral requirements, that limit services covered by claims. See
generally MICHAEL MORRISEY, HEALTH INSURANCE 131-145 (2007).
23. Insurance premiums also continue to rise (6.1% from 2006 to 2007). Gary Claxton
et al., Health Benefits in 2007, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1407 (2007); KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION
& HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2007
ANNUAL SURVEY, available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf (last
visited March 1, 2008).
24. See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients?
Problems with Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 485
(2004) (describing consumer-driven plans and arguing that they effectively ask patients to
ration their own care) [hereinafter Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients?].
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premiums or rewards for employees who participate in programs to prevent
health risks, such as smoking cessation programs, exercise programs, and
blood pressure and cholesterol screening programs. These programs can
expand personal responsibility beyond financial liability to responsibility
for one’s own health status. 25
Social Solidarity
Given the complexity of medicine and disease, there may be good
reason to create health insurance structures that aim for both universality
and some degree of personal responsibility in coverage.26 Nonetheless,
those two goals pull insurance in opposite directions. This tension affects
both private commercial insurance and public benefit programs, like
Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans and military health benefit programs that are
not formal insurance plans.
The concept of social solidarity embodies goals of mutual aid and
support.27 The idea is that we are all in this together, and no one should be
abandoned. Such aspirations inspired early mutual aid societies to create
insurance systems.28 Where people are considered to be equally and
randomly at risk for all types of medical problems, it makes sense for
everyone to chip in and make sure that, when injury or illness occurs, help
is available to anyone who needs it.29 To fulfill their responsibilities to their
populations, governments often adopt social insurance systems to finance
health care.30 The principle of mutual aid and support is evident in rules
25. See Part II infra.
26. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Americans’ Views of the Uninsured: An Era for
AFF.
w3-405,
Aug.
27,
2003,
at,
Hybrid
Proposals,
HEALTH
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w3.405v1/DC1 (reporting on public
opinion surveys finding ambivalent views).
27. The concept of social solidarity may have originated with Émile Durkeim and his
1893 book, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, describing social cohesion.
28. DAVID MOSS, SOCIALIZING SECURITY: PROGRESSIVE ERA ECONOMISTS AND THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY (1996); Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard, supra note 5 at
23-24; CAROL WEISBROD, FAMILY, INSURANCE AND THE STATE (2006).
29. See Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 287 (1993); Francois Ewald, The Return of Descartes’s Malicious Demon:
An Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution, EMBRACING RISK 273 (Tom Baker & Jonathan
Simon eds. 2002).
30. See generally IN SEARCH OF RETIREMENT SECURITY: THE CHANGING MIX OF
SOCIAL INSURANCE, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY (Teresa
Ghilarducci et al. eds., 2005); STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY: SOCIAL INSURANCE IN A
DIVERSE AMERICA (Kathleen Buto et al. eds., 2004); Western European countries have well-

206

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:2

for universality of coverage and community rating. Most systems bar
medical underwriting that excludes people from coverage and prohibit or
limit segmented markets and risk classification. The defining feature is that
people are not excluded or asked to pay more because of their own health
status, health risks or medical claims experience.
Even in the absence of universal social insurance, state and federal
laws move commercial insurance toward social solidarity goals. For
example, laws requiring guaranteed issue preclude insurers from excluding
certain people from the pool.31 State laws requiring coverage of specific
services (mandated benefits) embody social policies about what coverage
must be available to all (except self-insured employee group plans
exempted under ERISA). Most state laws forbid charging higher premiums
to women, even if women are more likely than men to use medical care, at
least during the child-bearing years.32 Many states also prohibit premium
discrimination on the basis of genetic information.33
The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA)34 prohibits certain group health plans from discriminating in
eligibility or premiums on the basis of health status factors, such as medical
condition and claims experience.35 More general anti-discrimination laws
also foster social solidarity. For example, the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination solely on the basis of disability in
employee health insurance.36 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
known social insurance systems, with most using either a Bismarck model or a Beveridge
model. Because they were created before private commercial health insurance developed a
significant market, commercial insurers adapted their products to the goals of the
government program. In contrast, American commercial health insurance established a
strong commercial market largely independent of social insurance programs. See RICHMOND
& FEIN, supra note 6.
31. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (guaranteed availability for employers in small
group market and requirement to accept all eligible individuals in the small employer’s
group).
32. Most states also prohibit coverage exclusions or risk adjustment for women who
are victims of domestic violence. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 20-448G; Fla. Stat. Ann. §
626.9541(g)(3); N.Y. Ins. Law § 2612. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(1)(G).
33. State law definitions of genetic information vary. See National Conference of
State Legislatures, Genetics & Health Insurance State Anti-Discrimination Laws, June
2005, http://wwww.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndishlth.htm (last visited July 6,
2007).
34. 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996), as amended (codified in scattered U.S.C.
sections).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1182. See note 81 infra and accompanying text.
36. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 328, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
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prohibits discrimination in employee benefits on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.37 Employee group health plans generally
offer the same premium rate to all employees, regardless of age, health
status, or claims experience.38 Offering the same coverage for the same
premium regardless of age is a significant example of solidarity, since
health costs tend to increase with age and increase substantially among the
elderly.39
Personal Responsibility
Commercial insurance captures the concept of personal responsibility
in efforts to achieve actuarial fairness. Here, the idea is that each person
should pay for his own risks and no others. In contrast to social solidarity,
the personal responsibility principle is that people are different and we
should not be responsible for those who are different from us. Actuarially
fair insurance policies classify and segregate insureds into groups
according to the type and amount of risk they represent, with different
coverage, exclusions, and premiums.40 In health insurance, this means that
the market for insurance is segmented into multiple categories with distinct
products and pricing.
Commercial insurers may use medical underwriting and risk rating to
classify people. Medical underwriting, used primarily in individual and
small group policies in the United States, avoids insuring specific
individuals or groups for non-fortuitous risks.41 They must have their own
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
38. But see Part II infra, discussing discounted premiums for participating in wellness
programs.
39. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention & The Merck Company
Foundation, State of Aging and Health in America 2007 Report, at 5 (2007) (reporting that
the “cost of providing health care for one person aged 65 or older is three to five times
greater than the cost for someone younger than 65”), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/aging/saha.htm; Christine Borger et al., Health Spending Projections
Through 2015: Changes on the Horizon, 25 HEALTH AFF. w61 (2006). But see Uwe E.
Reinhardt, Does the Aging of the Population Really Drive the Demand for Health Care?,
22(6) HEALTH AFF. 27, 34-35 (2003), (arguing that research shows that a gradually
increasing elderly population is not likely to cause disproportionate national cost increases,
and that labor and administrative costs may play more important roles in raising costs).
40. ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (2d ed. 1996); MALCOLM
CLARKE, POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE 256-57 (1997).
41. Medical underwriting may include investigating an applicant’s medical history,
using information submitted on the application, medical claims, and prescription drug use.
Insurers can deny the application entirely, refusing to cover the person. More commonly,
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personal resources to pay for their most likely health problems. For
coverage of other risks, actuarial fairness aligns premium rates with the risk
profile of the person or group. Other payments, like the cost-sharing
devices of deductibles and co-payments, serve both to discourage
unnecessary medical care (and claims) and to engage the insured in
effectively “insuring” her own losses to some degree.42 Coverage limits,
which restrict the number of covered services, such as inpatient hospital
days or specialist visits, can also discourage unnecessary care and claims.43
Caps on paid claims, such as annual or lifetime limits on the dollar amount
of health care expenditures covered, provide a ceiling on the insurer’s risk.
The complicated terms of commercial health insurance policies may be
an inevitable consequence of the difficulty of determining what should
count as a covered loss. While a broken limb or heart attack presents an
unmistakable need for medical care, other health conditions are more
ambiguous. What, if any, care is needed can often be debated, making the
insurer’s risk more difficult to calculate.44 Moreover, the cost of care varies
significantly around the country.45 Such concerns may not be unique to
health insurance, but are undoubtedly more intense in assessing health
insurance claims.

insurers exclude coverage for specific medical conditions (rider out those conditions) or
increase premium rates to cover the conditions. They may also postpone coverage for preexisting conditions. See Milliman, INDIVIDUAL MEDICAL UNDERWRITING GUIDELINES, AND
SMALL GROUP MEDICAL UNDERWRITING GUIDELINES (updated periodically).
42. See, e.g., Herzlinger, supra note 6; John C. Goodman, National Center for Policy
Analysis, Characteristics of an Ideal Health Care System, Policy Report No. 242 (April
2002), available at http://www.ncpa.org/pub/st/st242/.
43. See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk
Selection, 9 CONN. INS. L. J. 371 (2002/2003) (arguing that insurers can practice a form of
adverse selection).
44. Examples include disputes over what services are “medically necessary” or
“experimental.” Peter D. Jacobson et al., Defining and Implementing Medical Necessity in
Washington State and Oregon, 34 INQUIRY 143 (1997); Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice
Plans Satisfy Patients?, supra note 24 at 537-38 (collecting studies).
45. John E. Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care
Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 1102 (1973). For a recent collection of articles on variation in
medical practice, see Variations Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 7, 2004,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.var.1/DC1.
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Insurance Policies and Service Contracts
Fundamental to the concept of insurance is the premise that covered
risks should be fortuitous—that is, unplanned and unanticipated.46 State
laws and market demand, however, have introduced exceptions to the
fortuity principle in many health insurance policies. The result may be
confusion about what counts as an insurable risk.
The best known exception is coverage of preventive services, such as
immunizations, disease screening (e.g., mammograms), dental cleaning,
prenatal care, well baby visits, and annual physical examinations. There are
undisputed social policy reasons for these exceptions; such services can
prevent disease and keep people healthy.47 Statutory requirements for
insurance coverage are generally based on concerns that many people,
especially in low-income groups, would not obtain such services if they
had to pay for them out of pocket. Insurance coverage encourages
prevention by paying for it.48 Moreover, preventive services typically cost
less than treatment for the disease they prevent.49 These are sound
rationales for encouraging prevention, but they do not fit insurance well.
46. Classic elements of an insurable risk are a measurable probability of loss
(predictable within a defined population) and individual uncertainty of loss (the fortuity
principle). ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, 1 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE §1.4 (2d
ed. 1996) (“The fortuity principle is central to the notion of what constitutes insurance. The
insurer will not and should not be asked to provide coverage for a loss that is reasonably
certain or expected to occur within the policy period.”); GEORGE J. COUCH, 2 COUCH ON
INSURANCE 2D § 2:7 (rev. ed. 1984) (“Risk . . . is the very essence of insurance. . . . It should
relate to a possibility of real loss which neither the insured nor the insurer has the power to
avert or hasten.”); LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE §101.2 (3d
ed. 1997 & Supp. 1999) [hereafter “COUCH”] (“In general, the loss must occur as a result of
a fortuitous event, not one planned, intended, or anticipated.”). See also Stephen A. Cozen
& Richard C. Bennett, Fortuity: The Unnamed Exclusion, 20 FORUM 222 (1985) (noting that
the fortuity principle is so essential to insurance that it does not explicitly appear in the text
of insurance policies).
47. See generally HANDBOOK OF HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION (James
M. Raczynski & Ralph J. DiClemente eds., 1999); U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, I HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING HEALTH AND
OBJECTIVES
FOR
IMPROVING
HEALTH
(2000),
available
at
http://www.health.gov/healthypeople/document/.
48. The alternative to requiring everyone to obtain or pay for their own preventive
services would undoubtedly provoke a public outcry, especially in light of the individual’s
well-settled right to refuse medical treatment of any kind. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE
RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 277-8 (3d ed. 2004).
49. But see Pieter H. M. van Baal et al., Lifetime Medical Costs of Obesity:
Prevention No Cure for Increasing Health Expenditure, 5(2) PLOS MEDICINE e29 (2008)
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The use of insurance to achieve desirable public policy goals
challenges the nature of commercial insurance. Preventive care is not a
typical insurable risk, because it is predictable and under the control of the
insured.50 The specific services are explicitly paid for whenever the insured
chooses to obtain them. Insurers can predict the cost of such coverage, but
assume no risk, removing the agreement from of the realm of insurance.
Instead, the insurance payments to health providers function like assets of
the insured to pay for a defined set of services. The result looks more like a
service contract than an insurance policy.
Health reimbursement accounts (HRAs) expand the service contract
concept beyond preventive care.51 A particular type of HRA, the health
savings account (HSA), has become more attractive to individuals and
employee group health plans since receiving favorable tax treatment.52
Although not yet widespread,53 HRAs and HSAs are the current paradigm
(lifetime health care expenditures were higher for “healthy-living” persons than for
overweight and obese persons and smokers, because the former lived longer).
50. See, e.g., SCA Servs. Inc. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 419 Mass. 528, 532, 646
N.E.2d 394, 397 (1995) (explaining that a risk that the insured knows is likely to happen
“ceases to be contingent and becomes a probable or known loss”). See generally 7 COUCH
§102.9 (p. 102).
51. A health reimbursement account is a dedicated fund (from the employer and/or
employee contributions) that can be used by a plan participant to pay certain medical
expenses. For a description of such plans, see Paul Fronstin & Sara R. Collins, The 2nd
Annual EBRI/Commonwealth Fund Consumerism in Health Survey 2006: Early Experience
with High-Deductible and Consumer-Driven Plans, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 300 (Dec. 2006),
available at www.ebri.org/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibDisp&content_id=3769.
52. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. 108-173, §101, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003), allows taxpayers to exclude from taxable
income funds placed in an HSA, provided that it is coupled with a high deductible health
plan (HDHP). See also Revenue Ruling 2002-41, 2002-28 I.R.B. 75 (employer’s
contribution to HSA is not taxable if funds are used to pay certain medical expenses). See
Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health
Care, 31 AM. J. L. & MED 395 (2005).
53. See America’s Health Insurance Plans, HSAs and Account-Based Health Plans –
An Overview of Preliminary Research, June 2006 (reporting 3.2 million people enrolled in
HSA-qualified
plans
in
January
2006),
available
at
www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/HSAsOverviewJun2006.pdf ; and Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et
al., Consumer-Directed Health Care: Early Evidence About Effects on Cost and Quality,
HEALTH AFF. Web Exclusive w516, w518 (Oct. 24, 2006) (reporting 2.9 million enrolled in
HRAs in January 2006). Together, the 6.1 million may account for “about 3 percent of the
commercial insurance market”. Id. at w518. But see Fronstin & Collins, supra note 51
(finding 1.3 million nonelderly adults enrolled in consumer-directed health plans); Gary
Claxton et al., Health Benefits in 2006: Premium Increases Moderate, Enrollment in
Consumer-Directed Health Plans Remains Modest, 25 HEALTH AFF. Web Exclusive w476
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for so-called “consumer-directed” care, described as giving consumers
more choice than they had with regular health insurance, primarily
managed care plans. Both supporters and critics agree that such accounts
are designed to make consumers more cost-conscious by forcing them to
pay for a portion of their care.54 Although there is as yet little data about
how most individuals spend their account funds, it is likely that most are
spent on preventive care and less expensive, less costly, discretionary
medical services, such as treatment for colds and influenza. 55 Shifting this
kind of care out of the defined benefit package trims health plans of their
coverage of some non-fortuitous risks. While there are limits on the type of
care for which the funds can be used, HRA accounts move responsibility
for choosing and paying for care back onto the individual.
Health reimbursement accounts embody the view of some health
economists and policy analysts that health insurance is a personal financial
asset that can be used to buy medical care at the consumer’s discretion, a
view at odds with that of insurance purists. In this economic view,
insurance distorts the market for health care by enabling, even encouraging,
individuals to buy more care than they need, or at least more care than is
economically efficient for the country.56 Here, the focus of analysis is the
purchase of health care; insurance is merely a source of funds for payment.

(Sept.
26,
2006),
available
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w476?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&R
ESULTFORMAT=&author1=Claxton&andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=1&FIRSTINDE
X=0&resourcetype=HWCIT.
54. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients?, supra note 24. See also
Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health Insurance Is Failing: Now What?, HEALTH
AFF. May 28, 2003, at w3-237, w3-239 (“The popular ‘consumer-driven’ or ‘defined
contribution’ models are no more than a cover for high deductibles, intended to make
consumers
cost-conscious
shoppers.”),
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hltaff.w3.237v1.pdf; and Vanessa Fuhrmans,
Health Savings Plans Start to Falter, WALL STREET J. D1, June 12, 2007 (reporting 2.7
million enrolled in 2006, and lower satisfaction with such plans among participants).
55. See Buntin, Consumer-Directed Health Care, supra note 53 at w519 (reporting on
studies showing that people who enroll in high-deductible consumer-directed plans are
healthier and have higher incomes than those who remain in more traditional plans); U.S.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH P LANS: EARLY
ENROLLEE EXPERIENCES WITH HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND ELIGIBLE HEALTH P LANS
(2006) (younger and higher income federal employees joined CDHPs in the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program).
56. See, e.g., Herzlinger, supra note 6; CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE
CHOICES, supra note 11; Joseph P. Newhouse, Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare
Loss?, 6(3) J. of ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 321 (1992).
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In contrast, the traditional insurance industry view is that its product is
a promise to pay only for specified losses. In this view, an insurance policy
is not a cash equivalent to pay for whatever the insured chooses to buy.
Therefore, HRAs, like coverage of preventive services, distort insurance.
While health economists argue that consumers should be deliberate,
rational purchasers of care, insurers expect to pay only for fortuitous losses.
Pairing HRAs with defined benefit insurance policies couples very
different conceptions of the function of insurance.
Some economists concerned about national health expenditures object
to generous insurance policies on the ground that they buy too much care.57
But, the reason we have insurance is to pay for losses that we could not
otherwise afford. If health care is a consumer good, freely bought and sold
in the marketplace, then it should not matter what resources consumers use
to buy it. Wages, daddy’s trust fund, and health insurance are all cash
equivalents. Moreover, if health care is a consumer good, who cares what
people buy? Why not let the market determine what services people value?
Of course, the main reason for objecting to unrestrained spending is that it
raises the price of care so that not everyone can afford it.58 Yet
unaffordability matters only if health care is something more than an
ordinary consumer good, something that should be available to everyone
regardless of ability to pay.59 Thus, the economic argument against buying
too much care supports the idea of social solidarity in ensuring access to
57. See generally THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED (2d ed.
2003). Some commentators argue that consumers should buy insurance that limits their
freedom to choose expensive care. See, e.g., MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING
DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS (1997).
58. Some commentators argue that insurance creates moral hazard, encouraging too
much care. Peter Zweifel & William G. Manning, Moral Hazard and Consumer Incentives,
1A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds.,
2000); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531
(1968). But moral hazard addresses the effects of insurance, not ordinary consumer
contracts. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
Moral hazard may corrupt insurance claims for property losses, but is probably less
significant in health insurance than in other types of insurance.
59. For arguments that health care is special in this sense, see supra note 12. Although
an insurance policy may be a consumer product, the insurer’s purchase of services to pay an
insurance claim differs from the consumer/patient’s direct purchase of services. The latter
may come into play for the deductible amount in a high-deductible plan or HRA. See Sara
R. Collins, Consumer-Drive Health Care—Why It Won’t Solve What Ails the United States
Health System, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 53 (2007) (summarizing studies finding that higher cost
sharing discourages people from getting care, with people with incomes lower than $50,000
twice as likely to avoid or delay care as those in other plans).
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care for everyone.60 Paradoxically, however, the solution offered to rising
health care costs—making people responsible for more of their care—
weakens social solidarity.
Summary
The exceptions to traditional indemnity insurance for insurable risks
are usually justified on one of two grounds: cost (to society at large,
government or private insurers, or employers who contribute to premiums);
or social policy (to improve health, encourage “good” behavior or
discourage “bad” behavior). In many cases, both reasons are intertwined, so
that is difficult to disentangle one from another, as may be seen in the
example of wellness programs discussed below. Adding exceptions for
these reasons may make some sense in a universal social insurance system,
where everyone is in the pool, to remove financial barriers to important
services. Adding them to private insurance sold in the commercial market
outside the context of a universal social insurance system, however, may
simply widen the sphere of personal responsibility.
Neither social solidarity nor personal responsibility principles, by
themselves, can explain or justify the package of health insurance reforms
put forward today. Coverage of some conditions and services reflect social
solidarity, while other provisions encourage personal responsibility and
treat health care as a consumer good. Implicit in this division of reform
provisions is the idea that some conditions are socially acceptable, such
that all society ought to share (at least financial) responsibility for their
prevention or consequences, while other conditions are socially
unacceptable, such that individuals should shoulder the burden
themselves.61 Yet there has been little debate about what principles ought to
govern classifying particular health conditions as either an individual
responsibility or a social responsibility.

60. See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in
American Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 38-39 (2006) (arguing that the goal of
reducing consumer demand for health services might have been better met by capping the
“tax subsidy” or issuing government vouchers).
61. It brings to mind the concept of the “deserving poor,” used to distinguish those
who deserved charity or government benefits from those who did not. See JOEL F. HANDLER
& ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH, THE DESERVING POOR (1971); CHARLES E. ROSENBERG,
THE CARE OF STRANGERS 23 (1987).
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II. THE PECULIAR CASE OF WELLNESS PROGRAMS
The most recent examples of allocating health conditions to the
personal responsibility side of the equation are wellness programs. When
offered as part of a health insurance plan, such programs fall on the
services side of the insurance + services contract, with the individual
earning rewards for performing specific tasks or incurring a loss for failing
to do so. For example, those who get screened for hypertension or high
cholesterol might receive a discount on their health plan premium. Those
who attend regular exercise programs might avoid paying the plan’s
deductible. Those who take medication as prescribed might have their drug
co-payment waived. Those who fill out a personal health history and agree
to be called by a disease management company may get cash prizes. The
specific conditions for which financial differences are allowed offer some
insight into what we hold people personally responsible for.
First adopted by a small (now growing) number of employee group
health plans, wellness programs are intended to keep employees healthy
and productive and to reduce health insurance costs. 62 It is not clear which
goal takes precedence. Private employers who support health goals may
also need to see a financial return in order to sustain wellness programs.63
Some employees welcome the programs, while others object that they are
intrusive and unrelated to job performance or consider them a mechanism
to get rid of the employees most likely to incur expensive medical claims.64
Even the Wall Street Journal worried that employers who monitor their
employees’ health may be overreaching.65

62. See Susan Okie, The Employer as Health Coach, 357 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1465
(2007); Ellen Simon, Survey: Large Firms to Offer Health Care, WASH. POST, April 19,
2007 (reporting survey finding that 63% of 448 large companies plan to cut costs by
improving employee health); available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/04/19/AR2007041800103.html. Anecdotal reports suggest that
some companies save money on hospital and productivity costs. M.P. McQueen, Wellness
Plans Reach Out to the Healthy, WALL STREET J. D1, March 28, 2007.
63. Patty Enrado, ROI on Health Management Programs Difficult to Measure,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS, June 22, 2007 (reporting that 70% of employers surveyed believe
that programs must produce a financial return on investment greater than break-even to be
acceptable), available at http://www.healthcareitnews.com/story.cms?id=7321.
64. Tresa Baldas, Wellness by Decree, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL at 1, 18, Nov. 26,
2007; Workers Penalized on Issues of Health, BOSTON GLOBE at E3, Sept. 10, 2007.
65. M.P. McQueen, Look Who’s Watching Your Health Expenses, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Sept. 25, 2007.
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Public health agencies generally support programs for smoking
cessation, screening for diseases, losing weight, and regular physical
exercise for general health goals.66 However, such groups are not
responsible for offering or regulating insurance. State Medicaid and
commercial insurance reform laws that allow financial incentives for
wellness programs might have been adopted for either health or financial
goals.67
Whether wellness programs can justify themselves with cost savings
remains to be seen. Estimates of financial savings are often based on
general population data.68 Research on the costs and savings from specific
preventive measures is limited.69 Recent reports find that most
interventions produce little or no reduction in total health care spending,
while many increase costs.70 Some well constructed health promotion
programs that positively engage individuals and some specific preventive

66. See, e.g., Press Release, American Public Health Association (APHA), APHA
Encourages All to Participate in Take a Loved One for a Checkup Day (Sept. 18, 2006),
available at http://www.apha.org/about/news/pressreleases/2006/06checkup.htm. See
generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF OBESITY IN CHILDREN
AND YOUTH, PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESITY: HEALTH IN THE BALANCE (2005); Michael
McGinnis, The Case for More Active Policy Attention to Health Promotion, 21 HEALTH
AFF. 78 (Mar.-Apr. 2002); Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health: Beyond Emergency
Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH L. 247, 259 (2005) (noting increased support for health
promotion among public health professionals).
67. See, e.g., 2006 Mass. Acts 58, §54 (authorizing the Massachusetts Medicaid
program to create wellness programs and to reduce MassHealth premiums or co-payments
for “enrollees who comply with the goals of the wellness program”); §§ 76-79 (requiring
community rating for commercial insurance without regard to health status but permitting
premiums to vary based on wellness program usage, tobacco usage age, group size,
industry, participation rate, geographic area, and benefit levels). However, the Medicaid
program does not charge premiums to enrollees, so the legislature may consider alternative
mechanisms for encouraging compliance.
68. See Paul Fronstin, Can “Consumerism” Slow the Rate of Health Benefit Cost
Increases?, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, No. 247, July 2002 (reporting that 10% of the population
accounted for 58% of health expenditures).
69. See generally PREVENTION EFFECTIVENESS: A GUIDE TO DECISION ANALYSIS AND
ECONOMIC EVALUATION, 2d ed. (Anne C. Haddix et al. eds., 2003).
70. Joshua T. Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care Save Money? Health Economics
and the Presidential Candidates, 358 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 661, 662-3 (2008); Louise B.
Russell, Prevention’s Potential for Slowing the Growth of Medical Spending (National
Coalition on Health Care, Oct. 2007), available at www.nchc.org/nchc_report.pdf; Matthew
G. Marin & Jessica Nutik Zitter, Expenditures Associated with Preventive Health Care, 39
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 856 (2004).
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measures, like immunizations, can save medical expenses.71 However, the
promise of broader wellness programs may not be realized without a longterm investment. Set up costs are concentrated in the early years, with
savings beginning years later when (and if) participants avoid expensive
services. Full benefits to the insurer or employer depend on long-term
enrollment by individual participants. In private health plans, about 17
percent of participants change plans every year.72 This weakens the
financial incentive to offer wellness programs, unless competing plans have
similar programs.73
While wellness programs may produce better health, one probably
ought not to expect financial miracles. Unless such programs stave off
illnesses that are more expensive than other diseases not targeted, they may
simply shift the causes, not the costs, of illness.74 Preventive measures

71. S.G. Aldana, Financial Impact of Health Promotion Programs: A Comprehensive
Review of the Literature, 15 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 296 (2001); Sheila Leatherman et
al., The Business Case for Quality: Case Studies and an Analysis, 22(2) HEALTH AFF. 17, 21
(2003) (reporting total expenditures of $330 per patient and $405 in savings over a 9-year
period in a diabetes management program); Reducing Health Care Costs Through
Prevention – Working Document, Prevention Institute and The California Endowment with
The
Urban
Institute
(2007),
available
at
www.preventioninstitute.org/documents/HE_HealthCareReformPolicyDraft_091507.pdf.
72. Peter J. Cunningham & Linda Kohn, Health Plan Switching: Choice or
Circumstance?, 19(3) HEALTH AFF. 158, 159 (2000) (also finding that more that 2/3
changed plans because they changed employment or their employer changed the plans
offered; 16% switched to a less expensive plan and about 8% moved to a plan they liked
better).
73. Since patients change physicians less often than they change health plans,
wellness programs might improve their results by rewarding physicians (instead of patients)
who educate their patients about prevention and manage medical conditions well. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts Blues Expanding Incentives for Preventive Care, Disease Management, 11(1)
BNA’s HEALTH CARE POLICY 22 (Jan. 6, 2003) (describing providing information to
primary care physician groups about their patients, such as mammograms conducted, and
paying higher fees to groups that provide preventive services).
74. Targeting particular conditions may have unintended consequences. See, e.g.,
Steven E. Nissen & Kathy Wolski, Effect of Rosiglitazone on the Risk of Myocardial
Infarction and Death from Cardiovascular Causes, 356 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2457 (2007)
(meta-analysis of studies, concluding that a drug widely used to treat type 2 diabetes may
slightly increase the risk of risk of myocardial infarction and death from cardiovascular
disease); ‘Diabulima’: Some Diabetic Girls Skip Insulin in Dangerous Effort to Lose
Weight,
APA
OnLine,
June
17,
2007,
available
at
http://psycport.apa.org/showArticle.cfm?xmlFile=ap%5F2007%5F06%5F17%5Fap%2Ewor
ldstream%2Eenglish%5FD8PQO2HG0%5Fnews%5FFap%5Forg%2Eanpa%2Eew%2Exml
&provider=Associated%20Press.
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cannot guarantee good health or immortality.75 Nor do they affect the cost
of care that is provided, which continues to rise.76 Indeed, there is some
evidence that the lifetime costs are greater for healthy people than for
smokers or obese people.77 The best that may be hoped for is disease
compression—postponing debilitating illness to very short period before
death at a ripe old age.78
Wellness Programs within Health Insurance Plans
The key difference between indemnity insurance and wellness
programs is how risk information is used. Insurers typically use risk data to
set rates. A risk-rated insurance policy would base the premium on the
individual’s risk factors or, in the case of a group policy, on the group’s
overall risk. A wellness program uses risk data to selectively modify rates
for individuals who are already in the risk-rated pool. In theory, it is the
insured, instead of the insurer, who changes the rate—by complying with
the program’s requirements. Generally, however, everyone in the group
who does not have a particular risk factor, like smoking or diabetes,
receives a discount or reward. The effect is to charge higher rates to
individuals based on their personal health risks.
A well-publicized example was the plan adopted by Clarian Health, an
Indiana hospital system, to charge employees bi-weekly fees if they failed
75. See SARA ALLIN et al., MAKING DECISIONS ON PUBLIC HEALTH: A REVIEW OF
EIGHT COUNTRIES (2004) (finding little empirical evidence on the effectiveness and costs of
prevention programs); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE
ON DISEASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS (Oct. 2004); David Ogilvie, Interventions to Promote
Walking: Systematic Review, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 1204 (2007) (finding that the sustainability
and clinical benefits of walking programs are uncertain); LOUISE B. RUSSELL, IS PREVENTION
BETTER THAN CURE? (1986) (questioning broad prevention claims).
76. David Leonhardt, Free Lunch on Health? Think Again, N.Y. TIMES 1, 9 (Aug. 8,
2007) (quoting former New York state health commissioner as saying preventive care
“reduces costs, yes, for the individual who didn’t get sick. But that savings is overwhelmed
by the cost of continuously treating everybody else.”). See also HENRY J. AARON &
WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE (1984)
(describing the role of technology in increasing costs and the need for rationing care).
77. Van Baal, supra note 49 (estimating lifetime expenditures for health care for three
groups of people, with healthy having the highest costs, obese medium costs, and smokers
lowest costs).
78. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE 123 (1993) (“To be mortal
is to live a life that will be marked by illness, injury, aging, decline, and death. . . . We can
reasonably hope that the decline of our bodies that will come with age can be lessened,
delayed, and compensated for. . . . Though we will and must die, we can hope that we will
not die sooner than necessary. . . .”).
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to meet target health standards, beginning in 2009:79 US$10 if BMI ≥ 30;
$5 for blood pressure >140/90; $5 for glucose levels > 120; $5 for low
density lipoprotein cholesterol > 130; $5 for smoking; and $5 for not
completing a health assessment. After public opposition to its plan, Clarion
made the program voluntary and withdrew the penalties on those who fail
to meet the targets. Instead, it will offer the same amounts as bonuses to
those who voluntarily meet the targets.80 The effect, however, may be the
same.
Laws forbidding medical underwriting and basing premium rates on
individual health risks would seem to prohibit this result. Nevertheless, as
discussed below, wellness programs have joined preventive services as an
exception to the fortuity principle in many health insurance plans.
However, unlike coverage of preventive care, wellness program coverage
costs participants different amounts depending upon their behavior. The
specific conditions for which financial differences are set offer some
insight into what we hold people personally responsible for.
Discrimination on the Basis of Health Factors and the HIPAA
Wellness Exception
The tension between rewarding wellness and banning discrimination
based on health risks may be reflected in the fact that it took the federal
government more than a decade to issue final HIPAA regulations
governing group health plan wellness programs.81 Like several health
insurance reform proposals, the Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of
health factors while simultaneously allowing group health plans to offer
financial rewards for “adherence to programs of health promotion and

79. Jena McGregor, Being Unhealthy Could Cost You—Money, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug.
5,
2007,
available
at
www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/aug2007/db2007081_804238.htm?chan=s
earch.
80. Clarian Won’t Dock Workers Who Fail to Meet Health Standards, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Nov. 1, 2007, available at www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2007/11/01/3064048.htm.
81. Dept. of Treasury, Dept. of Labor, Dept. of Health and Human Services,
Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market; Final
Rules, 71 FED. REG. 75013 (Dec. 13, 2006). The final rules add parallel provisions to
regulations implementing the Internal Revenue Code, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and HIPAA requirements for certain small group and
individual plans added to the Public Health Service Act. Id.
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disease prevention.”82 Health factor is broadly defined and includes health
status (physical or mental), claims experience, receipt of health care,
medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, or
disability.83 Forms of discrimination include rules imposing waiting
periods, coverage exclusions and limits, benefit restrictions, premium
contributions, and cost-sharing mechanisms (such as coinsurance, copayments, and deductibles), as well as exclusions from participation in a
plan.84 The final regulations, issued in December 2006, attempt to reconcile
the exception for wellness programs with the general prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of any health factor.85 The difficulty of doing so
can be seen in the examples of acceptable programs described in the
regulations and discussed below.
A wellness program (defined as “any program designed to promote
health or prevent disease”) will qualify for the exception if “none of the
conditions for obtaining a reward under a wellness program is based on an
individual satisfying a standard that is related to a health factor” as long as
“participation in the program is made available to all similarly situated
individuals.”86 Among the rule’s examples of acceptable wellness
programs are those that reimburse all or part of fitness center membership
fees or smoking cessation programs; provide rewards for participating in
diagnostic testing programs (and do not base rewards on test outcomes) or
monthly health education seminars; and waive co-payments or deductibles
for prenatal care or well-baby visits.87
Nonetheless, programs that do base rewards on an individual satisfying
a health-related standard can still qualify for the exception if they meet four
criteria: (1) the value of the reward is not more than 20 percent of the
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (prohibiting group health plans from conditioning eligibility
on a health factor); 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (b)(1) (forbidding group health plans from requiring
“any individual (as a condition of enrollment or continued enrollment under the plan) to pay
a premium or contribution which is greater than such premium or contribution for a
similarly situated individual enrolled in the plan on the basis of any health status-related
factor”); and 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (b)(2)(B) (providing that paragraph (1) shall not be construed
“to prevent a group health plan, and a health insurance issuer offering group health
insurance coverage, from establishing premium discounts or rebates or modifying otherwise
applicable copayments or deductibles in return for adherence to programs of health
promotion and disease prevention.”).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (a).
84. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702.
85. Id.
86. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f)
87. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f)(1).
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premium for the participant (including both employer and employee
contributions); (2) the program must be “reasonably designed to promote
health or prevent disease”; (3) eligible individuals must be able to qualify
for the reward at least once a year; and (4) the program must be available to
all similarly situated individuals.88 Even this exception to the exception has
its own exception. Individuals cannot be required to meet the health
standard if to do so is “unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition”
or “medically inadvisable”.89 Such individuals must be given “a reasonable
alternative standard.”90
The rules’ examples indicate that it should be easy to qualify for these
exceptions, even if the program requires participants to achieve specific
health targets. Two examples approve wellness programs that require
patients to obey a physician’s recommendations in order to qualify for
discounts. In one example, a wellness program offers a 20 percent premium
discount to employees who achieve a cholesterol count under 200. The plan
offers to “work with” employees who are unable to achieve that goal. One
employee, “D”, begins a diet and exercise program, but his physician
determines that D cannot lower his cholesterol below 200 without taking
prescription medication. The plan “accommodates D by making the
discount available to D, but only if D follows the advice of D’s doctor
regarding medication and blood tests.”91 The rules conclude that this
program qualifies for the exception and is permissible.
A second example describes a wellness program that waives the $250
annual deductible for participants who have a body mass index (BMI)
between 19 and 26. Those who are unable to lose enough weight for
medical reasons can earn the reward by walking 20 minutes a day 3 days a
week. A medical condition prevents individual E from meeting either
standard. The rules approve a result in which the “plan agrees to make the
discount available to E if E follows the physician’s [unspecified]
recommendations.”92
It is hard to argue that these examples do not discriminate on the basis
of a health factor. The conclusion that they are not discriminatory appears
to rely on the assumption that, if all else fails, health plans can force
participants to follow a physician’s recommendations. Although it is
doubtful that employers could require employees to obey their physicians
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f)(2).
29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f)(2)(A).
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f) Example 3.
29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f) Example 4.
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as a general condition of employment, some employers are refusing to hire
smokers on the ground that they have higher health insurance claims than
non-smokers.93 The same reasoning could be applied to similarly costly
conditions, such as obesity.94 Conditions like hypertension are not likely to
be considered disabilities for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities
Act to preclude employers from not hiring individuals with those
conditions.95 Nonetheless, they are certainly considered health conditions
for purposes of wellness programs.
One might argue that these examples simply involve eligibility for
rewards (in the form of discounts) that would not otherwise be available.
The distinction between rewards and penalties, however, is often in the eye
of the beholder.96 Moreover, some programs do impose penalties. The
HIPAA rules approve the example of a wellness program that imposes an
explicit financial penalty—a surcharge of 20% of the premium—on
participants who do not certify that they have not used tobacco products in
the past year.97 The surcharge can be avoided if a participant is addicted to
nicotine and participates in a smoking cessation program.98
93. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. The Scotts Company, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, CA 07-101104GAO (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2008) (denying company’s motion to dismiss claims of invasion of
privacy under state law and discrimination under ERISA § 510 by employee who was fired
for smoking off the job); WHO Extinguishes Smokers’ Job Prospects, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED,
Dec.
2,
2005,
available
at
http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/news/archives/2005/12/02/who_extinguishes_smokers_job_pros
pects.html; Jeremy W. Peters, Company’s Smoking Ban Means Off-Hours, Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2005, at C5. See also Daniel M. Warner, “We Do Not Hire Smokers,” 7 EMP. RESP.
& RTS. J. 129 (1994) (explaining discrimination against smokers as both legal and good
policy). But see Leonard Glantz, Smoke Got in Their Eyes, WASH. POST at B07, Dec. 18,
2005 (criticizing WHO’s decision not to hire smokers as endorsing the principle that
“employers can impose job requirements based on what employees do off the job”).
94. See Truls Ostbye, Obesity and Workers’ Compensation: Results from the Duke
Health and Safety Surveillance System, 167 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 766 (2007)
(finding that obese workers had higher medical costs and worker compensation claims than
non-obese employees).
95. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
96. Daniel I. Wikler, Persuasion and Coercion for Health: Ethical Issues in
Government Efforts to Change Life-Styles, 56 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 303 (1978).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (f) Example 5.
98. One might ask what counts as addiction and how long a participant will be
allowed to avoid the surcharge in practice. The majority of smokers enrolled in smoking
cessation programs fail to quit. Leatherman et al., The Business Case for Quality, supra note
71 at 21 (describing quitting rates of 25 to 30% among smokers in a well regarded smoking
cessation program). See also H.A. Tindle et al., Cessation among Smokers of “Light”
Cigarettes: Results from the 2000 National Health Interview Survey, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1498 (2006) (finding that 53% of smokers quit, while 37% of light cigarette smokers quit).
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Much of the justification for these programs depends on the idea that
rewards and penalties are equally available to “all similarly situated
individuals.” Yet rewards are available only to people who do not have the
health condition at issue and to people who conform to the program’s
requirements.99 Thus, they function as incentives to conform to specific
standards as a condition of employment or as a condition of obtaining
insurance coverage. In principle, it is only the price of coverage, not
coverage itself, that is conditional on compliance. Yet, if the costs of
coverage depend on satisfying specific health standards, then costs are
based on health factors. They are the same risk factors that insurers would
ordinarily take into account in determining premium rates, absent the
statutory prohibition against discrimination. In effect, therefore, wellness
programs reintroduce the very risk rating that legislation aimed at social
solidarity initially forbade.
Implications for Social Solidarity
In addition to introducing selective personal responsibility into
insurance pools, the focus on wellness programs’ ability to save costs has
two disadvantages. First, as noted above, such programs may not save
significant sums, especially if healthy people cost more in the long run.
More importantly, it discounts improved health and wellbeing as valuable
for their own sake. This may discourage independent initiatives to promote
health unless they prove financially rewarding.
Wellness programs depart from social solidarity in at least two other
ways. First, to the extent that they succeed in improving health and
reducing costs, they may benefit the federal government more than the
private sector, further dividing the country along lines of coverage.
Although employers and insurers may take short-terms health care costs
into account, government may pay closer attention to total lifetime costs of
all benefits.100
Current wellness programs target risk factors for chronic diseases,
which account for about three-quarters of the costs of medical care in the

99. After non-smokers took up smoking to get paid for stopping, one employer was
quoted as saying, “It was not our intention to encourage people to start smoking. It was
aimed at people who already had a bad habit.” M.P. McQueen, Wellness Plans Reach Out to
the Healthy, WALL ST. J. at D1, March 28, 2007.
100. Timothy Westmoreland, Can We Get There from Here? Universal Health
Insurance and the Congressional Budget Process, 96 GEO. L. J. 523, 529 (2008).
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U.S.101 In 2004, 62 percent of adult respondents, age 50 to 64, reported
having at least one of six chronic conditions (hypertension, heart disease,
cancer, diabetes, arthritis, or high cholesterol).102 National data for the same
year show that the percentage of adults with three or more chronic
conditions was 7 percent for those age 45 to 54, and 36 percent for those
over 75 years of age.103 Because the incidence of chronic conditions
increases with age, older adults face higher medical costs. Moreover, the
percentage of adults between 45 and 75 years of age with chronic
conditions rose as their income declined.104
Type 2 diabetes, a current target of wellness programs, is expected to
generate rising costs, accounting for almost 92 billion dollars in public and
private health care spending in 2003.105 About 6.5 percent of Americans
over age 20 have diabetes,106 which is now the sixth leading cause of death
in the U.S.107 The federal government pays about 61 percent ($77 billion)
of national health care expenditures for diabetes treatment, most through
Medicare ($61 billion).108 In general, chronic diseases and disabilities are
more prevalent among populations who are low income, uninsured, or
101. See Catherine Hoffman, Dorothy Rice & Hai-Yen Sung, Persons with Chronic
Conditions: Their Prevalence and Costs, 276 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1473 (1996) (reporting
that 76% of direct medical care costs in the U.S. are for chronic conditions); Martin Sipkoff,
Health Plans Begin to Address Chronic Care Management, MANAGED CARE MAG., Dec.
2003, 24, 25 (reporting approximately 78% of health care spending is on behalf of
individual’s with chronic conditions).
102. SARA COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH COVERAGE FOR
AILING BABY BOOMERS, PUBL’N NO. 884 (Jan. 2006) available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/884_Collins_hlt_coverage_aging_baby_boome
rs.pdf?section=4039.
103. National Center for Health Statistics, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2006 42 (2006);
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf#088 (last visited July 16, 2007).
104. Id. at 42.
105. MARSHA GOLD ET AL., STUDY OF FEDERAL SPENDING ON DIABETES: AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE 1, 21-22 (Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., June 2007)
(monograph report of study also finding that the federal government expenditures on
diabetes care accounted for “12 percent of the $645 billion in total federal health spending”
in
2005),
available
at
http://www.mathematicampr.com/publications/PDFs/FederalSpending.pdf.
106. Catherine C. Cowie et al., Prevalence of Diabetes and Impaired Fasting Glucose
in Adults in the U.S. Population: National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 19992002, 29 DIABETES CARE 1263, 1265 tbl. 1 (2006).
107. Melanie P. Heron & Betty L. Smith, Deaths: Leading Causes for 2003, 55 (10)
NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 1, 7 (Mar. 15, 2007) (reporting 74,214 deaths from
diabetes in 2003, the latest year for which final data were available); available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55_10.pdf.
108. Id. at 21.
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covered by Medicaid or Medicare (including the elderly), than among those
with commercial insurance.109 This suggests that government has a larger
financial stake in reducing the cost of diabetes and other chronic conditions
than the private sector.110 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid and
presidential candidates are already emphasizing disease prevention over
expanding insurance coverage.111 If these efforts do not reduce costs,
government may consider more direct measures to ensure compliance with
health standards, such as mandatory participation in wellness programs.112
Wellness programs also depart from social solidarity by targeting risk
factors that are more prevalent among disadvantaged populations than
among those of higher socio-economic status. Health status is strongly
109. Services for people with disabilities account for a disproportionately large share of
Medicaid spending. Anna Sommers & Mindy Cohen, Medicaid’s High Cost Enrollees: How
Much Do They Drive Spending? 6, 8 (The Kaiser Family Foundation, Kaiser Commission
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Issue Paper 7490, March 2006), available at
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7490.pdf (3.4% of all Medicaid enrollees were
institutionalized and accounted for 31.6% of expenditures; non-institutionalized enrollees
with disabilities represented 14.2% of enrollees and 30.6% of expenditures).
110. See Linda Blumberg & John Holahan, Government as Reinsurer: Potential
Impacts on Public and Private Spending, 41(2) INQUIRY 130 (2004). See also Ron Z.
Goetzel et al., Can Health Promotion Programs Save Medicare Money?, 2(1) CLINICAL
INTERVENTIONS IN AGING (2007) (concluding that well-designed health promotion programs
for older people could save Medicare money). But see The Care of Patients with Severe
Chronic Illness: A Report on the Medicare Program by the Dartmouth Atlas Project (John E.
Wennberg & Elliott S. Fisher eds., 2006) (finding that Medicare could reduce chronic care
costs by up to 30% by reducing the variability and inconsistency of services provided),
available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/atlases/2006_Chronic_Care_Atlas.pdf
111. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Senior Risk Reduction
Demonstration,
www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/Senior_Risk_Reduction_Solicitation.
pdf (experimental program of health promotion services for Medicare beneficiaries) (last
visited Mar. 1, 2008); Joshua T. Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care Save Money? Health
Economics and the Presidential Candidates, supra note 70; David S. Broder, A Route to
Better Care, WASH. POST at B7, June 3, 2007 (describing the candidates’ statements). See
also
West
Virginia
Medicaid
Member
Agreement,
www.wvdhhr.org/bms/oAdministration/bms_admin_WV_SPA06-02_20060503.pdf (tiered
benefit packages based on compliance with health goals).
112. See Anderson v. City of Taylor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38075 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(city fire department’s mandatory fitness program, requiring employees to submit to blood
draws to check cholesterol levels, was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth
Amendment). See generally SYLVIA N. TESH, HIDDEN ARGUMENTS: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
AND DISEASE PREVENTION POLICY 46 (1988) (arguing that state laws targeting individual
conduct were prompted by a need to reduce health care costs or to lower mortality rates);
DEBORAH LUPTON, THE IMPERATIVE OF HEALTH: PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE REGULATED BODY
(1995).
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correlated with income.113 Chronic conditions are more common among
lower income populations.114 Diabetes disproportionately affects African
Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Alaska Natives.115 Smoking
is also more prevalent among lower income groups.116 Thus, the people
most likely to be subject to wellness program requirements may be those
who need insurance the most and can least afford higher costs.117 While
such groups may benefit from the improved health promised by such
programs, their circumstances raise questions about whether their
participation is truly voluntary.
Risk factors that wellness programs target can be seen as conditions for
which society holds individuals personally responsible. Such conditions
change as science identifies new sources of risk and society alters its norms
of behavior.118 For example, smoking moved from a relatively common
habit to pariah status in a few decades.119 The fact that obesity is now called
an epidemic suggests little public tolerance for the overweight.120 Diabetes,
113. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF
UNINSURANCE, A SHARED DESTINY: COMMUNITY EFFECTS OF UNINSURANCE (2003); SOCIAL
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH (Michael Marmot & Richard G. Wilkinson eds., 1996); RICHARD
G. WILKINSON, UNHEALTHY SOCIETIES: THE AFFLICTIONS OF INEQUALITY (1996); National
Center for Health Statistics, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2006, at 32-41 (2006).
114. National Center for Health Statistics, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2006, at 42 (2006);
M.K. Islam et al., Social Capital and Health: Does Egalitarianism Matter? A Literature
Review, 5 INT. J. EQUITY HEALTH 3 (2006); Mererdith Minkler et al., Gradient of Disability
Across the Socioeconomic Spectrum in the United States, 355 N. ENGL. J. MED. 695 (2006).
115. GOLD ET AL., STUDY OF FEDERAL SPENDING ON DIABETES, supra note 105 at 1.
116. See Elizabeth M. Barbeau et al., Working Class Matters: Socioeconomic
Disadvantage, Race/Ethnicity, Gender, & Smoking in NHIS 2000, 94 AM. J. PUB. H. 269
(2004) (reporting smoking is associated with working class jobs, low educational levels, and
low income).
117. See Shiriki Kumanyika, Obesity, Health Disparities, and Prevention Paradigms:
Hard Questions and Hard Choices, 2 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE 1, 6 (Oct. 2005),
available at www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2005/oct/05_0025.htm (arguing that it is unfair “to put
the burden entirely on consumers to foster the shift in the demand-supply curves that relate
to obesity, particularly for consumers in disadvantaged communities where the range of
choices may be especially unfavorable and where most of the economic and political forces
are far beyond their personal control”).
118. See generally ARTHUR J. BARSKY, WORRIED SICK: OUR TROUBLED QUEST FOR
WELLNESS (1988) (arguing that as population health improves, Americans focus on lesser
risks).
119. See SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLICY & CULTURE 3-21 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen
D. Sugarman eds., 1993) (describing how public perceptions of personal responsibility for
risk creation affect policy choices).
120. See Alison A. Hedley et al., Prevalence of Overweight and Obesity Among US
Children, Adolescents, and Adults, 1999-2000, 291 JAMA 2847 (2004). But see Katherine
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once considered out of anyone’s control, also appears to be moving into the
realm of personal responsibility. One might ask whether wellness programs
will target other health risk factors, such as job stress and shift work.121
It is instructive to examine the conditions that are not (yet) considered
suitable for personal responsibility. Among the health factors on which
HIPAA prohibits discrimination is “evidence of insurability,” which is
defined to include “(i) conditions arising out of acts of domestic violence;
and (ii) participation in activities such as motorcycling, snowmobiling, allterrain vehicle riding, horseback riding, skiing, and other similar
activities.”122 Victims of domestic violence may be encouraged to seek
medical care (and obtain help) if they are not charged higher premiums. It
is not clear whether sports enthusiasts use less medical care or less costly
care than people with chronic diseases.123 One might suspect that their
exclusion from risk calculations is based more on social preference than on
financial considerations. Making sure that victims of injuries are covered
for medical care seems like simple justice, even if they assume the physical
risk of injury. But, then, why single out other conditions, especially those
that are less likely to be voluntarily assumed? The most plausible reason
would be the comparative cost of coverage. Yet, if cost is the real reason,
then any comparably expensive condition, regardless of how acquired,
should be treated in the same manner.124 Of course that would return the
entire enterprise to classifications based on health risks.

M. Flegal et al., Excess Deaths Associated with Underweight, Overweight, and Obesity, 293
JAMA 1861 (2005) (finding obesity, but not overweight, associated with excess mortality).
121. See Ichiro Kawachi, Injustice at Work and Health: Causation or Correlation?, 63
OCCUP. ENVIRON. MED. 578 (2006) (analyzing the literature); Bruce S. McEwen, Protective
& Damaging Effects of Stress Mediators, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 171 (1998) (explaining the
physiologic response to stress and its links to obesity and hypertension).
122. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f); 45 C.F.R. § 146.121(f).
123. See, e.g., List of Top 10 Summer Sports with Most Injuries Provides Warning for
MED.
NEWS,
Sept.
1,
2000,
Olympic
Enthusiasts,
MEDSCAPE
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/412143 (listing the top 10 summer recreational
activities, with number of injuries, and total costs of injury, including medical, legal and
other costs: Basketball (1,633,905; $19.7 billion); Bicycles (1,498,252; $28.6 billion);
Baseball (492,832; $6.6 billion); Soccer (477,647; $6.7 billion); Softball (406,381; $5.1
billion); Trampolines (246,875; $4.1 billion); Inline Skating (233,806; $4.2 billion);
Horseback riding (196,260; $4.9 billion); Weightlifting (189,942; $2.7 billion); Volleyball
(187,391; $2.1 billion).
124. See Gar L. Olin & Jeffrey A. Rhoades, The Five Most Costly Medical Conditions,
1997 and 2002: Estimates for the U.S. Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, Medical
Care Expenditure Panel Survey Statistical Brief No. 80 (AHRQ, May 2005).
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The absence of empirical support for distinguishing among conditions
on the basis of costs and savings suggests that wellness programs may rely
on unstated, perhaps unrecognized, bias against disadvantaged groups of
people. There is a remarkable lack of empathy for people who are believed
to be personally responsible for their medical conditions. For example,
when asked to choose among seven options for reducing health care costs,
41 percent of people in a Sacramento (California) Healthcare Decisions
discussion group chose “requir[ing] patients to pay higher rates if they do
not follow medical advice that will keep them healthier”.125 Similar
attitudes can be seen in the policies of private organizations that refuse to
hire individuals who smoke or are overweight. It is not clear whether such
attitudes reflect assumptions that such behaviors and conditions generate
higher costs of care or prejudice against certain behaviors and conditions.
In either case, they encourage segmenting the population on the basis of
health risks not only in insurance pools, but also in society at large.
III. CONCLUSION
The peculiarly American mix of entitlement and personal responsibility
in today’s health reform proposals may be evidence of our ambivalence
about social solidarity and personal responsibility for health. It may also
mask deep divisions in beliefs about whether society or the individual
ought to be responsible for health. Trying to have it both ways may make it
impossible to agree on sustainable reform.
What is missing from current health reform debates is serious
discussion of the role of insurance in defining responsibility for health. Is
insurance a way to spread specific risks or a mechanism for financing
health care for all? The use of market-based private insurance to provide
universal access to care has encouraged reforms based on actuarial fairness,
which make everyone responsible for his own risks. A focus on medical
care costs confuses the use of insurance with the purchase of consumer
goods. Attempts to cabin the cost of medical services by selectively
inserting elements of risk-based cost-sharing into insurance policies chip
away at the general goal of universal coverage. Increased cost sharing

125. Marjorie Ginsburg, Rearranging the Deck Chairs, HEALTH AFF. Web Exclusive
w537,
w539
(Oct.
24,
2006),
available
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w537 (the 3 options with more support were:
restricting coverage of treatment that is not effective or is not critical for basic functioning
and longevity, and limiting the use of expensive care with little benefit.).
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encourages the belief that health is the personal responsibility of
individuals, and not the responsibility of all society.
So far, increased cost sharing has been applied selectively, like
redlining. People are slotted into the actuarial fairness side of the equation
ostensibly for reasons of public health or social costs. But, an underlying
motivation may be prejudice against historically disenfranchised groups.
Combining wellness programs with insurance tends to disadvantage those
most in need of assistance, undermining social solidarity. In the long run,
people may be excluded not only from affordable premiums, but also from
jobs or government services and benefits. In the absence of a defensible
standard for selecting the conditions subject to higher payments, there is no
principled limit to the scope of personal responsibility for one’s health. If
the standard is cost, then efforts to insert personal responsibility for health
into social insurance reforms may presage the return to an era in which
everyone was responsible for his own costs. After all, the original argument
for coverage based on cost was actuarial fairness.
Alternatively, if services to prevent illness and promote health and
fitness become an accepted part of health insurance coverage, the role of
insurance may be converted from risk spreading into financing personal
services. In such circumstances, it will be difficult to place any boundaries
on the demand for services or their costs. If preventive measures push
expensive illness to later ages, then the federal government will have a
strong incentive to bring younger, healthier people into its risk pool to
spread the costs of the population it finances. That case would produce a
final paradox: efforts to increase personal responsibility may ultimately
yield a form of government-sponsored social insurance.

ADAM, MARTIN AND JOHN:
ICONOGRAPHY, INFRASTRUCURE, AND AMERICA’S
PATHOLOGICAL INCONSISTENCY ABOUT MEDICAL
INSURANCE
Jeffrey W. Stempel٭
INTRODUCTION
Following the ongoing health care and insurance debate, which has
once again moved toward center stage in American politics, one might
 ٭Jeffrey W. Stempel, Doris & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas. © Copyright 2008. Jeffrey W. Stempel.
Special thanks to Symposium authors Mary Anne Bobinski, David Hyman, Tim
Jost, Wendy Mariner, Dayna Bowen Matthew, whose contributions to this Symposium grew
out of their participation in the 2007 AALS Annual Meeting Insurance Law Section
Program, Health Insurance: Crossroads or Gridlock, Jan 7, 2007, Washington, DC. Thanks
also to commentator Amy Monahan and to Seth Chandler, Nan Hunter, Angie Johnson, and
Ann McGinley. Regarding the title of this comment, my apologies of course extend to
Dick Holler and Dion DiMucci, respective author and performer of the 1968 hit song
Abraham, Martin & John memorializing the assassinations of Presidents Abraham Lincoln,
John Kennedy and civil rights activist Martin Luther King as well as to readers too young to
remember either the song or its bygone era of optimism and enthusiasm for government
activity and infrastructure. In perhaps some evidence that the 1960s are not completely
eradicated, DiMucci, who also performed pop hits such as Teenager in Love, Run-Around
Sue and The Wanderer, subsequently overcame a heroin addiction and continues to record to
favorable reviews. See, e.g., Son of Skip James (Verve Forecast Records 2007). See also
Patrick Reardon, Keepsakes of Lincoln, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2005, p. 1, col. 1 (original sheet
music for Abraham, Martin & John on display at Lincoln presidential library in Springfield,
Illinois); Kevin O’Hare, Singer Dion still romas around-around-around, NEW ORLEANS
TIME-PICAYUNE, July 11, 2004, p. 10.
In this article, I shall use the terms “medical insurance” and “health insurance”
interchangeably. But my preferred term (in contrast that of most everybody else) is medical
insurance. What is popularly and euphemistically labeled health insurance of course does
not assure health. One can be fully covered and experience horrendous health. Similarly,
coverage does not assure that medical care received will be adequate, competent, or
successful (no matter how adequate or competent). More precisely, what we generally label
health insurance is simply insurance that provides coverage for medical care expenses
(however defined and restricted under the terms of a medical insurance policy). As
becomes apparent in this article, I find the nomenclature unfortunate in that it helps to feed
the subconscious misconception that people have some significant control over their own
health. The best we can do is to reasonably maximize sound preventive care and assure that
when adverse health events strike, the victim will be accorded reasonable medical care
without regard to personal wealth.
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understandably get the impression that the most important names in the
area are politicians such as Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, John Edwards,
John McCain, or Mitt Romney.1 Similarly, public intellectuals and pundits
1. All of these persons are, of course, presidential candidates who have each
proposed various solutions for the perceived deficiencies of American health care and
medical insurance. Democrats Clinton, Obama and Edwards have suggested quite similar
plans modeled to some degree upon the mandated private coverage plan adopted by
Massachusetts in 2006. Republicans McCain and Romney, have proposed less regulatory
and government inverventionist models relaying primarily on tax credits and incentives.
See Farhana Hossain, Where The Democrats Stand/Where the Republicans Stand, NEW
YORK TIMES, Sun., Dec. 30, 2007 at 14-15. See, e.g., John Edwards, Building one America
– through tax-funded health care, LAS VEGAS REVIEW, Jan. 18, 2008, at 9B, col. 1. None of
the major candidates has proposed a single payer plan, in spite of earlier predictions to the
contrary. See, e.g., Fred Bannister, November Is Coming And Single-Payer Proposals
Could Follow, NAT’L UNDERWRITER (Life & Health ed.), June 5, 2006, 27. As discussed
herein, this is largely a reflection of the success with which market-based ideology favoring
private insurers has dominated the public policy debate. See Cynthia Crossen, Before WWI
Began, Universal Health Care Seemed a Sure Thing, WALL ST. J., April 30, 2007, B1, col. 1
Ironically, Romney as Governor of Massachusetts supported that state’s plan,
which is quite similar to the major Democratic intitatives, albeit after opposing some
provisions sought by the legislature, which overroad his veto before he signed the final bill
into law. See Sally C. Pipes, Intensive Care for RomneyCare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007,
A19, col. 3 (CEO of conservative policy institute critical of Massachusetts plan identified
with Romney); Steve LeBlanc, Mass. House Overrides Gov. Romney Veto of Health Care
J.,
April
26,
2006,
available
at
Fee,
INS.
www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2006/04/26/67613.htrm
(describing
peculiear
circumstances and limited nature of veto as well as Romney’s overall support for and
advocacy of the law); Edit., Romney Care, WALL ST. J., April 12, 2006, A14, col. 1
(identifying Romney as proponent of plan, which Journal criticized as failing to “measure
up to the political and media hosannas.”).
See also, David Leonhardt, A Health Fix That Is Not a Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, April
12, 2006, at C1, col. 1 (praising Masschusetts plan as prudent compromise between
Canadian-style system and status quo in U.S.); see also Steve Piontek, O Massachusetts!,
NAT’L UNDERWRITER (Life & Health ed.), April 10, 2006 at 4;
Although Massachusetts has received the most attention, the past two years have
seen a number of state-based initiatives to address a perceived shortage of sufficient medical
coverage and federal failure to act. See Joanne Wojcik, Drive to force health coverage
gains traction, 18 states consider measures, BUS. INS., May 29, 2006 at 11. See, e.g., Kevin
Sack, San Francisco to Offer Care For Every Uninsured Adult, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2007,
A1, col. 1; Kan. Governor Calls for Universal Health Care, Tax Cuts, INS. J., Jan. 12, 2007,
available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest/2007/01/12/75813.htm; Tom Breen,
W. Va. Seeks Fix for Soaring Health Insurance Costs, INS. J., Jan. 3, 2007, available at
www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2007/01/03/75544.htm; Bredesen: Tennessee
Health Plan `Opposite’ of Massachusetts, CLAIMS GUIDES, April 19, 2006, available at
www.claimsguides.com/news/southeast/2006/04/19/67413.htm. See also Kevin Freking,
Sen. Kennedy Urges Universal Health Plan, Solicits Recommendations, INS. J., Jan. 11,
2007, available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/natioanl/2007/01/11/75809.htm.
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such as David Broder, David Brooks, Paul Krugman (or at least the New
York Times and Wall Street Journal editorial pages) come to mind.2
Alternatively, health care scholars such as the instant Symposium
participants or other health policy scholars such as Uwe Reinhardt, Troyen
Brennan or Theodore Marmor, although not quite household words in most
of the United States, are well known to even the casual traveler in the
region and might be advanced as important figures in the debate.3
But these people, however accomplished, important or wise they may
be, arguably have less to do with the ongoing health insurance status quo in
American than two dead men. The arguably most important people, at
least iconographically, for American Health Care are John Wayne and
Adam Smith.4 More precisely, the characteristics they have come to
See also Leonhardt, supra, at C1, col. 1 (“To a lot of thoughtful people, the only
way to fix the health insurance crisis is to get the federal government to cover everyone.
Britain, Canada, Japan and a number of other rich countries do so, and they each spend less
many on health care than this country does. They also don’t have major companies, like
General Motors, flirting with bankruptcy in large part because of the cost of health benefits.
It is a pretty good argument, but it has an undeniable flaw. There is almost no chance of
universal coverage happening anytime in the foreseeable future. Health insurers made $100
billion in profits last year, and industries of that size are just not legislated out of
business.”).
2. Broder, Brooks, and Krugman are all syndicated columnists and authors who
frequently write on public policy and health care issues. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Healthcare hybrid connects with officials, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 1, 2006, available at
www.sacbee.com/content/opinion/story (specifically commentiong on Romney’s role in
Massachusetts). Although faceless, the editorial pages of the Times and the Journal, as well
as those of other major American newspapers, arguably are the leading public intellectuals
in the health care debate and politics generally.
3. Reinhardt is a well known economist and health care expert at Princeton. Brennan
teaches at Harvard Medical School and writes frequently on health care issues. Marmor, a
similarly well-known author, is professor of politics, public policy and law at Yale
University. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Troyen A. Brennan, The Swinging Pendulum:
The Supreme Court Reverses Course on ERISA and Managed Care, 5 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y & ETHICS 451,451 (2005); Troyen A. Brennan, et al., Identification of Adverse Events
Occurring During Hospitalization, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 221, 221 (1990); Uwe E.
Reinhardt, The Economist’s Model of Physician Behavior, J.AM. MED. ASS’N, Vol. 281, No.
5, Feb. 3, 199 at 462; Reinhardt, Reforming the Health Care System: The Universal
Dilemma, 19, AM. J. L. & MED., 21, 21 (1993); Theodore Marmor, Wanting It All: The
Challenge of US Health System Reform, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (2007); Theodore R.
Marmor, How Not to Think About Medicare Reform, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 107
(2001).
4. Other now-dead men, many of them largely anonymous, have of course also
played a key role because of past decisions that shaped the current health care status quo.
See Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Is Health Insurance a Bad Idea? The Consumer-Driven
Perspective, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 377 (2008) (hereinafter Jost, Bad Idea?) (noting tax
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embody and personify in the historical and public mind drive much of the
reflexive thinking about American health care and medical insurance –
largely in unfruitful directions. A third long-deceased icon personifies a
different vision, but one that has never taken center stage in the medical
insurance debate.
John Wayne needs little introduction, even to the members of
Generations X & Y. His movies, most of them westerns, continue to
populate cable movie channels. More than thirty years after his death, he
continues to be the paradigmatic representation of the myth of American
rugged individualism and self-sufficiency.5 Under the Wayne model, the
individual is both charged with controlling his own destiny and expected to
succeed in doing so, in spite of long odds, with little or no help from others
(save or a possible gunslinging sidekick or two). This archetype is
expected to engage in effective self-help without hesitation (or
guilt)(what’s a few dead bodies in the service of a greater cause?),
complaint, or self-pity. Even things like being shot are only minor setbacks
to this archetype. Certainly, acute or chronic illness would not break his
stride and he would not expect government to provide him any health care
safety net.
Adam Smith, who needs perhaps even less introduction to readers of a
scholarly journal, was the Eighteenth Century Scottish philosopher and
economist who persuasively argued that largely unregulated private
subsidies for particular types of medical insurance); David A. Hyman, Health Insurance:
Market Failure or Government Failure?, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 307 (2008) (hereinafter
Hyman, Government Failure?) (noting role of World War II wage and price controls, 1943
IRS Ruling, and 1954 legislation, and labor union demands encouraging use of employerprovided medical insurance as fringe benefit that was not taxed when received by workers
but could be deducted by employers as a business expense). Accord, John V. Jacobi,
Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531, 531
(2004) (addressing more recent “path to consumer-driven health care”); David. A. Hyman &
Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
& ETHICS 23, 25-26 (2001) (describing development of employer-provided group insurance
in more detail). As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously observed, a page of history is worth a
volume of logic and outcomes are to a large extent path dependent. See, New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
5. Typically, Wayne portrayed a strong, silent type good guy who when pressed
would fight (with quite deadly force) for his rights and those of anyone oppressed by the bad
guys de jour in his movies, who where most often ordinary criminals or business thugs
along with the occasional Indian (Wayne would never have used the words “native
American”) renegade (e.g., The Comancheros). In occasional forays outside the Western
movie genre (e.g., The Quiet Man), Wayne largely portrayed the same character, albeit
unarmed and less prone to violence.
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markets were the key to economic growth and prosperity. According to
Smith, the pursuit of private gain by individuals and entities throughout
society would, as if guided by an “invisible hand,” lead to the optimal
allocation of goods and services. This, in turn, would create an optimally
efficient state of affairs and maximum aggregate wealth for society.6
Implicit in Smith’s assessment, but underemphasized relative to wealth,
was the inevitability that some market participants would fare better than
others. A tacitly paid price for greater overall wealth and economic growth
was relative poverty and failure for some. During much of post-Smith
history, the “fallout” from his market-oriented approach, which was largely
accepted in Europe and North America, was treated as a necessary evil
required to obtain the benefits of a vibrant mercantile system.
During the Twentieth Century, politics and government moved to
soften the edges of inequality through social welfare programs and
infrastructure designed to foster greater equality of opportunity (e.g., public
schools). In addition, it became recognized that on occasion the invisible
hand faltered and market failure or imperfection justified regulatory
correction.7 Thus, notwithstanding the demi-god status of Smith (to the
intellectual public) and Wayne (to the general public), there is a strong
social justice strand in American thought that emphasized communitarian
norms such as equal access, solidarity against life’s greatest threats, and
assistance to the less fortunate. Arguably, no particular person epitomizes
this school of American thought to the degree Wayne embodies rugged
individualism and Smith market efficiency. As this article argues, that’s
part of the problem: the iconic status of rugged individualism and market
efficiency is so firmly established in the American psyche that it works to
the occasionally unfortunate detriment of social justice and communitarian

6. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Prometheus Books 1991) (1776).
7. This revision to the pure laissez faire or invisible hand ideology that dominated
the U.S during the late 19th Century is most associated with Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
“New Deal,” which established significant regulatory infrastructure for many business
activities. However, the administrations of predecessor Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and
Woodrow Wilson had also made considerable strides in this direction, as had Congress.
After Republican challenges by Wendell Willkie and Thomas Dewey to Franklin Roosevelt
and Harry Truman, respectively failed, many of the basic New Deal principles and
structures were accepted, at least tacitly, by all major political actors, including Dwight
Eisenhower, who succeeded Truman as president. See PAUL KRUGMAN, A LIBERAL
CONSCIENCE Chs. 1-3 (2007); Suzzanne Bilyeu, FDR: how he changed America – and still
affects your life today; no President has had as great an impact on everyday life in America,
N.Y TIMES UPFRONT, Jan. 14, 2008, p. 24.
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values. American resistance to a government-administered single-payer
system of medical insurance is one of those unfortunate occasions.
Perhaps the closest thing to a Wayne or Smith-like secular icon
embodying social justice and community compassion values is Martin
Luther King, although others might prefer Abraham Lincoln, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, Robert Kennedy, some other progressive politician,
military leader (George C. Marshall or Dwight Eisenhower would be
credible candidates), or social welfare advocate (e.g., Marian Wright
Edelman) as the symbol of this segment of national thought.8
8. To (I hope) state the already known: Lincoln was President of the United States
during the Civil War; Kennedy was Attorney General of the United States and U.S. Senator
from New York during the 1960s; Army General Marshall was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff during World War II and the driving force behind the Marshall Plan to rebuild
Europe after the War; Army General Eisenhower was Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe during the War and later President: Edelman is founder of the Children’s Defense
Fund (and a sufficiently iconic figure that Hillary Clinton took pains to mention her status as
Clinton’s first employer after law school during the Democratic candidates’ debate in South
Carolina on Jan. 21, 2008). Certainly, the author of Abraham, Martin and John saw Lincoln
and Kennedy as united in common cause with King as well as by their violent death’s form
assassin’s bullets. See introductory note, supra.
In attempting to identify a personification of social justice and communitarian
values, I am specifically overlooking religious figures. My selection of King as icon for the
social justice school of American thought could be viewed as a religious figure in that King
was a Protestant Minister and frequently invoked religious themes in his speeches. See
Sarah Vowell, Radical love gets a holiday, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, A19, col. 1 (noting
King’s use of biblical themes and comparison of his speeches, particularly “I Have a
Dream” speech, to Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount). See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter
From Birmingham City Jail (April 12, 1963) (making repeated religious references to Jesus
Christ and other religious figures in writing to addressees “as a fellow clergyman and a
Christian brother” hoping to find them “strong in the faith”), reprinted in JAMES M.
WASHINGTON (ED.), A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 289 (1986) and (perhaps more accessible to the legal profession)
STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINOW, MARK S. BRODIN & THOMAS O. MAIN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE AND CONTEXT 149 (2d ed. 2004). See also Walker v.
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (reprinting as Appendix King’s speech in
connection with efforts to stage protest march) (‘We believe in a system of law based on
justice and morality.”).
In spite of this, I view King as primarily a socially secular figure. Certainly, he
tried hard to be inclusive and non-denominational even as he invoked religious themes. For
example, his Letter from a Birmingham Jail takes plain to include reference to his “Christian
and Jewish brothers” and he specifically discusses the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber.
More important, King’s legacy today is a secular one of racial and social justice
founded on rational concepts of fair treatment of individuals and retains little of its once
more overtly religious air or rhetoric. As testament, I am writing this on the national King
holiday (Monday, Jan. 22, 2008), one widely observed in an overwhelmingly secular
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In addition, there is a “professionalism” paradigm for conceiving health
care that competes with an economic/market competition model, a social
justice/rights-based model, and an institutional model.9 Peter Jacobson has
characterized the field as reflecting “an ongoing struggle between market
proponents (a consumer-driven health care system), proponents of a social
justice model (largely governmentally determined), and medical
professionals” with the social justice model in at least temporary ebb while
“the real struggle for doctrinal supremacy in health law is between the
market and professional models.”10
Interestingly and ironically, Adam Smith can perform double duty on
as a representative of the professionalism model as well. Smith supported
professional self-regulation (and substantial remuneration for
manner. In a widely televised CNN Democratic presidential earlier in the day, there was
considerable reference to King, including a concluding Wolf Blitzer question regarding
which candidate King would endorse were he still alive (and not assassinated on April 4,
1967 in Memphis, Tennessee, an event noted in the 1983 U2 song Pride in the Name of
Love), further testament to King’s place in secular popular culture). All of the discussion
was secular and did not mention King’s religious roots or rhetoric. See also Martin Luther
King, III and John Edwards, email from Edwards for President campaign, Jan. 21, 2008
(Democratic presidential candidate attempts to use favorable comments by King’s eldest son
to win votes and contributions in secular manner).
Perhaps the ultimate proof of King’s secular status, albeit kitschy and perhaps
offensive to veterans of the civil rights movement, is an email I received on January 21,
2008 announcing a “Martin Luther King Day Special” on continuing legal education
through which an attorney could pay “only $199 to fulfill your California MCLE” as part of
the vender’s desire to “celebrate [King’s impact on American life.” See Martin Luther
King Day Special: Only $199 to Fulfill Your Entire California MCLE, Law.com CLE
Center, Jan. 21, 2008. Just as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln became associated
with winter furniture sales, King’s legacy has been appropriated, in at least some part, by
commercial interests. Once again, the Smith/Wayne iconography of market and individual
consumerism exhibits an imperialism that attempts to impose itself on social justice and
professionalism.
9. See Peter D. Jacobson, Health Law 2005: An Agenda, J. L. MED. & ETHICS 725,
734-35 (Winter 2005), quoting LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & PETER D. JACOBON, LAW AND THE
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2005). See also PETER D. JACOBON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW
AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA 212 (2002).
10. See Jacobson, supra note 9, at 735. For examples of a social justice perspective
on health care issues, see, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, Assessing Patient Protection Laws,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 302 (2003); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism”
Approach to Medicaid: Empirical Evidence that Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the
States Harms Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973, 934 (2002); Dayna Bowen Matthew,
Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health Insurance: Of markets,
Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1502 (1996) (also
making economic and behavioral analysis of issues).
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professionals) in order to achieve high professional standards and quality
that would in turn redound to the benefit of society.11 In effect, a good part
of the current health care debate can be characterized as one waged by the
ghosts of the Market Smith and the Professionalism Smith.
Regarding the competing paradigms outlined by Jacobson, I am
arguably adding rugged individualism and personal responsibility to the list
rather than treating it solely as a subset of the economic/market model. On
the issue of institutional competence, I accept Jacobson’s assessment that
this is an important framing device in debating health policy, one that (as
discussed later in this article) weighs in favor of a greater government role
in providing medical coverage. But institutional competence as a school of
thought is less prominent in the American psyche. No particular icon of
institutional competence emerges in national folklore, although it is
perhaps personified to an extent by FDR, who popularized government as a
competent institution to respond to economic and social concerns and to
provide a safety net and springboard for the citizenry. Perhaps a better
human representation of the institutional aspect of health policy debate
would be Lyndon Johnson, whose political skill and electoral power in the
wake of his 1964 landslide over Barry Goldwater brought about
Medicare.12
The trio of Smith, Wayne and King, of course, played no direct role in
the development of health care and medical insurance policy. But the
perceptions and attitudes they represent have driven much of American
11. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 111.
We trust our health to the physician; our fortune and sometimes our
life and reputation to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could
not safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. Their
reward must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in the
society which so important a trust requires. The long time and the great
expence which must be laid out in their education, when combined with
this circumstance, necessarily enhance still further the price of their
labour.
Id. (spelling in original).
12. See Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We
Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 660, 725 n.297 (2001). Looking
abroad, Otto von Bismarck, who as chancellor of Germany established social welfare
programs in the late 19th Century would be a similarly apt representative, as would the
political “fathers” of the health care systems in other European countries and Canada. See
Lewis D. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow, Privatization of Social Security: A Legal and
Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 11 (1995).
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opinion that does directly affect the long-running debate and attitudes
toward the status quo and proposed alternatives. Because of Waynian
rugged individualism, there is resistance to communal insurance programs,
even to the point where the old bogeyman of “socialized medicine” remains
a standard part of the stump speeches of at least Republican presidential
candidates (at least during the primary season when preaching to the
faithful).13 This strand of the American character has also given much
rhetorical force to terms like “consumer-driven,” “ownership society,”
Working in tandem with the rugged
“freedom,” and “choice.”14
individualism ethos of “freedom,” Smithian fidelity to private markets
makes even Democrats flinch from advocating a single-payer, government
administered medical insurance system, although this is largely the norm in

13. See Mary Anne Bobinski, The Health Insurance Debate in Canada: Lessons for
the United States?, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 341 (2008) (“The very terms of the debate [in the
U.S.] – `socialized medicine’ and `government bureaucrats’ – reveal more about the
signposts of American political discourse than they do about the reality of the [Canadian]
system they seek to describe”) (footnote omitted). Mitt Romney, in particular, has used the
phrase as a criticism of the proposals of Democratic candidates notwithstanding his support
for significant government intervention in the medical care market when he was governor of
Massachusetts. See Broder supra note 2.
14. See Barry R. Furrow, Access to Health Care and Political Ideology: Wouldn’t
You Really Have a Pony?, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405, 412 (2007) (“Americans love
efficiency and consumer choice”).
As illustrated in Furrow’s article, there is often a substantial tension between the
goals of personal autonomy and the quality and availability of medical coverage. Furrow’s
primary target in that piece is Hyman, who provided the pony metaphor of choice-versushealth safety net in a cartoon published in an issue of the Journal of Health Policy, Politics
and the Law focusing on the FTC’s Report on Health Care and Competition for which
Hyman was a primary author. Id. at 414. (characterizing market choice position on health
care, including HSAs as “plausible in the abstract but flawed for too many Americans who
need health care, yet still appealing to those ideologically blinded to the costs of the market
in health care and the human waste generated by ideology ungrounded in complex reality”).
In this Symposium, Jost and Mariner are not as directly in focused combat with Hyman (a
role that perhaps falls to me) but they reflect a perspective akin to Furrow’s. See also
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Public Insurance for the Poor,
Private Insurance for the Wealthy, Self-Insurance for the Rest, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1091, 1092
(2007) (writing from perspective similar to Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4 (manuscript at 23)); David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
55 KAN. L. REV. 1103 (2007) (writing from perspective similar to Hyman, Government
Failure, supra note 4) (and apparently preferring Clint Eastwood to John Wayne as an icon
of rugged individualism).
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Canada and the Western European societies most analogous to the U.S.,15
societies that seem to be quite productive and free.
Pushing back, with mixed success, against these social and
psychological forces (that also have great political and financial support
from special interests such as private insurers and drug manufacturers) are
the professionalism strand of Smith and King’s social justice perspective.
These push in largely the opposite direction, seeking universal, communitywide medical coverage and greater government involvement to achieve this
goal.16
The iconic pull of market and individualism notions and personas is so
strong that it has prevented full progression of health coverage in the U.S.
and today supports a strong counter-revolution in the form of Health
Savings Accounts (HSAs) and other types of allegedly “consumer-driven”
health coverage as part of an “ownership” society.17 Despite increasing
15. In the field of eight Democratic hopefuls (Clinton, Obama, Edwards, Biden,
Dodd, Richardson, Gravel and Kucinich) prior to the January 2008 Iowa caucuses, only
Kucinich backed a government-administered single payer system. See Molly Ball, Meet the
Candidates: 10th in a Series, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 1, 2008, at B1.
16. As Hyman would undoubtedly note, the professionalism perspective receives
substantial special interest support from doctors and to some extent from other medical
providers. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care
Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liablity Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 893 (2005). But unlike Hyman (at least as I read his work), I do not see
physicians and other medical providers (hospitals, labs, diagnostic services, equipment
makers) as uniformly in lockstep in their drive (strongly emphasized by Hyman) to extract
more money from the pockets of patients or payers (be they government or private insurers).
The relative interests and preferences of medical providers may well diverge. For example,
hospitals might rationally conclude that they will do better under a private insurance regime
than a government single payer regime of medical insurance. As discussed below (TAN 6575, infra), I have a strong suspicion that this is the case given the degree to which private
insurance has not in my view done as much to tamp down hospital charges as it has done to
extract discounts from physicians.
17. See Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4 (observing trend but criticizing concept and
current operationalization); Russell B. Cate, Move Over Managed Care – Health Savings
Accounts, Small Businesses, and Low Wage Earners: Cost, Quality, and Access, 4 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 287, 288 (2007) (praising HSAs and consumer-driven movement
generally); John A. Nyman, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Moral Hazard, the Efficiency
of Income Transfers, and Market Power, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 17 (2006) (taking a critical
stance);. Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care
Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 777 (2006) (expressing interest in concept but finding current
practice unlikely to accomplish goals of consumer-driven movement); Edward J. Larson &
Marc Dettmann, The Impact of HSAs on Health Care Reform: Preliminary Results After
One Year, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1123 (2005) (positing positive but not large
impact of HSAs); Jacobi, supra note 4 (finding consumer-driven initiatives such as Health
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evidence that America would be better off moving toward a single payer
system similar to the Canadian-European models,18 political reality
continues to serve up either market-based or hybrid systems that at best
provide only halting progress and at worst resemble a private-public
bureaucracy seemingly designed by Franz Kafka and Rube Goldberg.19
Savings Accounts apt for relatively inexpensive, predictable, routine medical treatment costs
but not for chronic and catastrophic medical costs); Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The
Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 395
(2005); Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems with
Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 508 (2003)
(expressing concerns regarding efficacy of consumer-driven initiatives for actual
consumers); Comment, Employee Driven Health Care: Health Savings Accounts, More
Harm Than Good, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 219, 236 (2005) (attacking the concept). See
also Mark V. Pauly, Patricia Danzon, Paul Feldstein & John Hoff, A Plan for `Responsible
National Health Insurance’, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 5, 7 (Spring 1991), (early argument in favor
of variant of consumer-driven approach much like mandated private insurance purchases of
Massachusetts plan).
18. Studies consistently show that countries with government-administered national
medical insurance have per capita health care costs of approximately half those in the
United States and that by almost all measure, their populations are at least as healthy as
Americans. See PAUL KRUGMAN, CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL 218 (2007) (2004 per capita
health care spending in U.S. is $6,102, as compared to $3,165 in Canada, $3,150 in France,
$3,043 in Germany, $2,508 in Great Britain); Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4; Justin Lahart,
Rethinking Health Care and the GDP, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at C1 (U.S. spends 16
percent of its gross domestic product on health care, as compared to much lower proportions
for Germany (10.6 percent of GDP), France (10.5 percent), Canada (9.9 Percent), Italy (8.8
percent), the U.K. (8.4 percent), and Japan (8.0 percent) but “Americans don’t seem to be
getting much for the money. In both France and Japan, the average life expectancy is higher
than in the U.S., and the infant mortality rate is lower. This is true in most other
[developed] countries . . . .”). Accord, Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Gerard F.
Anderson, U.S. Health Care Spending In An International Context, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 10,
11 (2004); Gerard F. Anderson, Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan,
It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different From Other Countries, 22
HEALTH AFFAIRS 89 (2003) (contending that “[h]igher health spending but lower use of
health services adds up to much higher prices in the United States than in any other
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] OECD [a/k/a/ developed]
country.”) But see Bobinski, supra note 13 (manuscript at 7-8). (Canadian expenses
recently rising more rapidly than in the past, reaching $4,548 per capita and 10.3 percent of
GNP in 2006); Patricia M. Danzon, Hidden Overhead Costs: Is Canada’s System Really
Less Expensive?, 11 HEALTH AFFAIRS 21, 22 (1992). See also Troyen Brennan, Transcribed
Speech of Troyen Brennan, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 339, Appendices B, C (2006) (U.S.
health insurance premiums nearly doubled between 1999 and 2005, far outpacing both
medical inflation and overall inflation).
19. The 1993 proposal of the Clinton Administration (dubbed “Hillarycare” by critics)
provides perhaps the best example. Diagramming the plan resembled a Jackson Pollock
painting. But other popular proposals such as the Massachusetts plan and those of the
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This comment addresses the legacy of what I term the Wayne-Smith
(market) mindset and its effect on the modern medical coverage debate,
focusing in particular on several misconceptions, overstatements, and
cognitive errors that have prevented the U.S. from embracing a modern,
government-administered universal medical coverage along the lines of the
Canadian-European model. These concepts too greatly dominate American
views on the issue, obstructing progress toward a Canadian or European
model that would dramatically improve the overall cost and quality of
American medical care. A government-administered single-payer system
more consistent with the Smith (professionalism) and King social justice
models would provide more productive templates for expanding,
improving, and streamlining United States medical care.20
The legacy of uncritical acceptance of the Wayne-like individualism
and Smithian world of omniscient markets include: the legal fictions that
individuals consistently best know their own interests and can effectively
shop for insurance coverage and medical care;21 the legal friction or tension

leading Democratic presidential candidates also contain considerable complexity. See
SUSAN ESTRICH, THE CASE FOR HILLARY CLINTON 104 (2005).
20. I use the term “single-payer” both literally (I would prefer a program more like
that of France or an expanded version of Medicare) and as a short-hand reference meaning a
national government mandated system of public medical insurance even if in distribution
multiple loci of payment are used. See Jost, supra note 14, at 1091 (“This model is often
characterized as a single-payer model, although universal public coverage does not, of
course, require a single payer. Many of the world’s social insurance programs in fact have
multiple payers”).
Considering costs and benefits in totality, I operate with the premise that the
quality of care increases if, on the whole, a higher quantum of competent medical service is
provided throughout society. Thus, I would consider a system “better” if it served all people
with B+ level care and eliminated noncoverage and reduced substandard care even if some
persons who formerly received A+ or gold-plated care with shorter waiting times would
have preferred the current system. Taking this broad view, there is almost no question that
the Canadian and Western European systems are “better” than that of the U.S. See
Bobinski, supra note 13, (“In the aggregate, the result is that Canadians fare better than
Americans” and noting that as compared to Canadians, Americans “are one third less likely
to have a regular medical doctors, one fourth more likely to have unmet health care needs,
and more than twice as likely to forego necessary medicines.” (quoting Karen E. Lasser, et
al., Access to Care, Health Status, and Health Disparities in the United States and Canada:
Results of a Cross-National Population-Based Survey, 96 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1300, 1303
(2006).
21. See TAN 27-53, infra. I realize I am using a modified version of the term “legal
fiction,” which most commonly is used to describe a legal rule that, although demonstrably
untrue as an empirical matter, is treated as true under the law in order to achieve a legalsocial end.
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between individualism and communitarian empathy;22 undue veneration of
markets, failure to appreciate the current system’s adverse pressures on
medical professionals;23 failure to realize the degree to which the evolved
status quo already severely compromises market efficiency and medical
professionalism;24 and unduly credulous acceptance of the supposed
efficiency of private insurance as a vehicle for fair cost control.25
In addition, the body politic has paid insufficient attention to the
manner in which private insurers have adversely impacted medical
professionalism and the quality of care while at the same time failing to
provide sufficient cost containment.26 Assessing these aspects of the
current debate leads to rejection of the supposedly consumer-driven
approach and toward support for a national, government-administered
single payer program as the preferred alternative to the private insurance
mandates, markets and tax incentives largely suggested as the means of
reforming the American status quo.

For example, the legal rule that a corporation is a “person” under the law for
purposes of constitutional analysis is factually incorrect. The corporate entity is clearly not
a human being. The law treats it, however,as if it was a human being for purposes of
application of the Due Process Clause and other parts of the law. By contrast, the notion
that people are more rational, energetic, ambitious, intelligent, consistent, and careful than
they really are is a misconception of fact rather than a total rejection of the empirical world.
In the real world, people are negligent more often, lazier, dumber, less rational, and more
inconsistent than is assumed by defenders of the U.S. health care status quo or consumerdriven alternatives. But rather than labeling this a factual fiction, I term it a legal friction
because it has become relatively hard-wired into much of the law reform and public policy
discussion surrounding medical care and insurance issues and is in tension with empirical
reality that would normally be more determinant of public policy outcomes.
22. See TAN 54-58, infra. This friction or tension is explored in Jost, supra note 4,
and Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14
CONN. INS. L.J. 199 (2008). Jost refers to the divide as one of solidarity-vs-individualism
while Marine speaks larges of a social solidarity-vs-personal responsibility dichotomy.
23. See TAN 84-89, infra.
24. See TAN 90-100, infra.
25. See TAN 59-76, infra.
26. See TAN 59-84, infra.
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I. LEGAL FICTIONS AND LEGAL FRICTIONS
A.

THE LEGAL FICTION OF THE CONSISTENTLY-RATIONAL,
EMPOWERED CONSUMER

In reality, of course, the strong American values of rugged
individualism and preference for private markets are often compromised,
so much so that we do not even appreciate the degree to which the
America’s secular church of public opinion has engaged in heretical
behavior. For many Americans, there is already a largely government-run
medical care system – the Veteran’s Administration system of hospitals
and medical care in that arena that is not much different from the socialized
medical system of Great Britain. Similarly, we notice with some alarm
when insurers and their executives earn high profits even if we are hesitant
to raise taxes, stop potentially anticompetitive consolidation or take
regulatory action that might impinge on the profitability of health insurers
or health care providers. Most prominently, through programs like
Medicare and Medicaid (and the Federal Employees Insurance Program),
the government has become deeply involved in medical insurance
notwithstanding purported American fidelity to private markets and
minimalist regulation.
In general, however, the United States has largely resisted CanadianEuropean style universal health care and medical insurance out of
deference to the mythology of rugged individualism and efficacy of
markets. In addition, these perceptions have fueled collateral norms and
beliefs that have impeded any move toward a national single payer
approach to health insurance. First, there is what I regard as the erroneous
legal fiction that people are more discerning about their health care and
insurance choices than is actually the case. In addition, we operate under a
legal fiction that to some extent a large percentage of persons afflicted with
medical problems are themselves responsible for their plight through
personal failure. Both of these presumptions, if not completely erroneous,
are at least far more problematic than acknowledged.
First, the issue of whether prospective patients really know what is best
for them regarding medical care and insurance coverage. A large amount
of psychological research suggests that people in general are not nearly as
good at decision-making as is commonly supposed. Rather than being
consistently wise, calculating, rational decisionmakers, people are subject
to a host of cognitive biases that may often warp their assessments. Among

2008]

ADAM, MARTIN AND JOHN

243

them are self-serving bias, optimism bias, status quo bias, hindsight bias,
and extremeness aversion.27 In addition, various heuristic traits of humans
govern their decisionmaking process, sometimes in ways that make for suboptimal analysis. Among these are the availability heuristic, social
Further, people
influence, anchoring, and case-based decisions.28
sometimes make irrational decisions because of loss aversion and the
“mental accounting” of excessively compartmentalizing money rather than
viewing it as fungible, which impedes good cost-benefit analysis.29
In general, people are only able to focus on one or two salient factors at
a time when making decisions. They are rational, but only have “bounded”
rationality that is shaped to a large degree by the choices presented, the
manner in which the choices are presented, and the overall context of the
Thus, even under the best of
situation requiring a decision.30
circumstances, people are often not optimal decisionmakers. They are
often more Britney Spears than John Wayne or Adam Smith.
This becomes particularly problematic regarding medical care and
insurance because these situations seldom present optimal settings for
sound decisionmaking. The process of seeking and evaluating medical care
and advice is often complexity and usually unfamiliar to laypersons. Most
people are not well educated about either medicine or insurance, both of
which are complex. As a result, they will have inherent difficulty making
assessments about competing medical care or insurance alternatives.
As Wendy Mariner has noted, there exist significant differences
between ordinary consumers engaged in regular retail activity and health
care patients. Consumers are active buyers while patients are often
required to be more passive “recipients” of medical services (if they can
afford the services). Consumer spending is more strictly limited by
personal resources while patient expenditures, at least for the insured, are
not strictly tied to patient wealth. Consumers tend to have something
closer to bargaining equality with vendors while patients have “unequal
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW (Cass R.
Sunstein ed. 2000); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Not-So-Peaceful Coexistence: Inherent Tensions
in Addressing Tort Reform, 4 NEV. L.J. 337, 350-51 (summarizing concepts in condensed
fashion).
28. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 5; Stempel, Coexistence, supra note 27, at 351-52.
29. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 5; Stempel, Coexistence, supra note 27, at 353.
30. See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 19-20
(2004); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of
Managed Care, “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality,
and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999).

244

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:2

skill and knowledge of health care” relative to medical providers.
However, medical providers have at least a quasi-fiduciary duty to the
patient while vendors ordinarily have no fiduciary duty to buyers (but often
do have obligations sounding in statute, regulation or tort law). Most
important, a standard issue consumer makes purchases “based on voluntary
choice” while the medical patient seeks care “based on need.”31
Although they may have tools for mitigating the patients’ informational
disadvantage relative to medical care providers and insurers (e.g., WebMD,
word-of-mouth, local reputation),32 these hardly level the playing field for
obtaining medical care. Particularly if a need for medical care arises
suddenly, the consumer is effectively stripped of even the illusion of
choice. In extreme cases (e.g., an auto accident that disables the
consumer), the choice of medical care is made by others. Even when
making conscious choices, the prospective patient is usually limited by
insurance coverage and the treating physician’s hospital privileges as well
as the availability of facilities. Once admitted to a hospital for care (which
may take hours if arising unexpectedly, the patient is able to change venue
only if he or she has picked up a few tips from watching Prison Break,
Escape from Alcatraz, or similar media fare.
But the problems of shopping for doctors pale in comparison to the
problems of shopping for insurance. Because many medical events are not
serious, consumers have some chance to gain experience that they can
deploy in obtaining medical care. For example, if the first doctor one sees
is uninformed or unfriendly, the patient can go elsewhere for the next office
visit (although this may be difficult in areas with a shortage of physicians
31. See Wendy K. Mariner, Theory and Practice, supra, note 17, at 495 fig.1.
32. Tools such as WebMD and a home copy of the Physician’s Desk Reference can be
wonderful aides in managing one’s own medical care. But self-directed reading and study
alone can of course not even approach the training and expertise of medical professionals.
A consumer can become better informed about medical issues but will never be as
discerning a consumer of medical services as she is of grocery stores, restaurants, or even
more esoteric everyday fare such as auto repair.
Word of mouth and reputation are helpful but suffer a severe limitation in that the
sources of this information usually suffer from the same limitations of expertise that make it
difficult for the instant consumer. In particular, because of the complexity of medical care,
consumers may evaluate medical providers by factors relatively unrelated to the quality of
care. For example, a given medical provider may have an undeservedly good reputation
because of friendly office staff, spacious facilities, and short waiting times even if the doctor
is borderline incompetent as a diagnostician or unwilling to immediately prescribe useful
treatment for fear running afoul of insurers. Conversely, a technically excellent physician
may have only a so-so reputation because weak interpersonal skills or because she is a
woman, member of a racial or ethnic minority, or of foreign origin.
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where doctors are not taking new patients). Routine doctor visits,
prescription fills, or diagnostic tests, although different than a trip to the
supermarket, are not so different that the consumer can not make
observations, gather experience, and adjust “buying” behavior. Where
medical care is urgent, medical events infrequent, and care decisions highly
complex or specialized, consumers have little real chance to perform as
intelligent consumers. But in many situations, they do.
Contrast this with health insurance.
First, for many working
Americans, the choice of health insurer is as a practical matter severely
truncated. The good news is that for workers who receive health insurance
as a fringe benefit, they have health insurance that is “free” or at least
heavily subsidized by the employer.33 The bad news is that they are at the
33. But the cost of group health care is of course anything but free. See Health
Premiums Rise 6.1%; Average Family Coverage Costs $12,000, INS. J., Sept. 12, 2007,
available
at
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/09/12/83416.htm.
(discussing Employer Health Benefits Survey by Kaiser Family Foundation and Health
Research and Educational Trust). Accord, Emily Fredrix, Costs rise for health insurance,
L.V. REV. J., Sept. 12, 2007 at D1, col 4. See also Milt Freudenheim, At a Small Business,
One Illness Can Send Insurance Costs Soaring, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2007, A1, col. 4. Jerry
Geisel, HMO rate hikes to decelerate again in 2007: Survey, BUS. INS., Mar. 15, 2007, p.
25 (HMOs report “seeking rate increases averaging 11.7% for 2007;” despite the doubledigit increase, it was “the forth consecutive year of declining rate increases, according to a
consulting firm’s analysis.”). In addition, the amount employer-subsidized group insurance
in force is shrinking. See Krugman, supra note 18, at 231 (declining from 62.1 percent in
1987 to 59.5 percent in 2005).
Most families, of course, do not realize that they are paying an average of $12,000
per year in insurance premiums because much of the cost is borne by the employer of at
least one of the adult family members. But they “pay,” of course in that the employerfunded portion of insurance is taken out of the employee’s paycheck prior to receipt by the
employee, as is the employee’s portion of the premium payment. As market-oriented
commentators are correct to point out, this has the effect of shielding the true cost of
insurance from workers and consumers, with many thinking of it as a “free” perk that comes
with the job. This in turn undoubtedly makes the worker/consumer less cognizant of price
increases and less reactive than would be the case in a normal over-the-counter market
transaction.
My point, however, is that even if the consumer was slapped in the face with these
premium costs, the market for insurance would be a very imperfect one. First, as discussed
in text, individual consumers are pretty ill-equipped to be intelligent and effective
purchasers of medical insurance. Second, when actually feeling the pain of $1,000 a month
in premiums, many consumers will be reluctant to purchase the type of medical insurance
they need and will often foolishly forgo insurance altogether both because of other pressing
financial needs and because the “endowment effect” of having the money in their pockets
will make it more painful for them to purchase the insurance with after-tax dollars than to
suffer indirectly through the largely employer-funded group health system. In addition,
there is the problem of individual consumer loss of buying power when converted to
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mercy of whatever group health insurer(s) or plan(s) the employer has
arranged.34 At most, the typical employer will have arranged for one or
two HMO options and one or two different preferred provider networks
from which the consumer can choose.35 If the employee is dissatisfied with
the work-related group insurance options, he can in theory go to a different
insurer, but it will cost him foregone benefits (the employer subsidy is
wasted) as well as substantial out-of-pocket costs in addition to significant
search costs spent selecting a competing insurer. As a practical matter,
then, there is no effective choice of insurers for many workers, although
they are the “lucky” ones in the United States because they at least have
medical insurance.
Where the individual consumer is shopping for individual medical
insurance, the problems are daunting. Many insurers will simply not be
interested in serving this market at all. Those that are by definition are not
doing as well as they would like selling more lucrative group insurance or
stop-loss policies to self-insuring employers. The insurance products
offered will be complex and difficult for the average consumer to
understand or obtain information regarding the proposed policy and its
applications.
Consider the matter of pre-existing conditions. By now, most educated
Americans have at least heard about restrictions on coverage for preexisting conditions. But they are unlikely to know how the restriction will
be applied in practice. Even a trained lawyer reading judicial opinions on
purchasing individual insurance rather than participating through an employer-sponsored
group plan.
34. See Charles Duhigg, Aging, Frail and Fighting Insurers to Pay Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2007, A1, col. 3 (describing travails of insured attempting to obtain coverage (to
which she pretty clearly seems entitled) from long-term care insurer); Robert Pear, Loss of
Competition Is Seen in Health Insurance Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Sunday, April 30, 2006, 19,
col. 4; Report Finds Limited Competition In Nation’s Health Insurance Market, INS. J., April
21, 2006, available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/nationa/2006/04/21/67456.htm.
35. And if the employer-provided group health plan is not sufficient for the patient’s
needs, the patient or her family may face substantial uninsured medical bills. See John
Carryrou, As Medical Costs Soar, The Insured Face Huge Tab: Jim Dawson Hit Cap After
Hospital Padding; The $1.2 Million Bill, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2007 at A1, col. 4; Chad
Terhune, Covering the Uninsured, But Only up to $25,000, WALL ST. J., April 18, 2007, A1,
col. 4 (describing limits of Tennessee program to provide private medical insurance to the
uninsured); Milt Freudenheim, The Check is Not in the Mail: Late Payment of Medical
Calims Adds to the Cost of Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006 at C1, col. 2. See also
Benesowitz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 870 N.E.2d 1136 (N.Y. 2007) (enforcing medical
insurance coverage limitation for pre-existing conditions; rejecting insured argument of
violation of state regulation).
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the subject would have difficulty giving a client ironclad advice about
whether his or her prior medical problems make the exclusion or restriction
applicable, much less whether the insurer will force the policyholder to
litigate seeking coverage under various possible scenarios.36
Contingency is of course at the heart of insurance. People buy medical
insurance because of the contingent risk of developing health problems.
Even with the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard (both which tend
to be overstated in this context),37 consumers are unlikely to have any real
idea of whether they will be health “winners” (who have only a few
significant adverse medical events in their lives) or health “losers” (who
have more than their share of health problems or injuries). They are
certainly unlikely to be able to predict the cost of these events and the
outcomes. A buyer of health insurance may skate through life without
more than annual check-ups or may become a regular prescription user
subject to several expensive operations or chronic expensive treatment.
Thus, right at the outset, a prospective purchaser of insurance is at a
practical loss to know what type of coverage and what amount of coverage
is needed.
The consumer thus depends on the insurer to put together and market
an apt product for the contingencies facing the consumer. To the extent the
product is standardized, comparison shopping, at least according to
premiums charged, is facilitated. But where policies differ at the margin
(and medical insurance is less standardized than life, auto, and general
liability insurance), comparison again becomes difficult because the
differences will be hard to detect and hard to decipher when detected.
Unlike large businesses, individuals are far less likely to have the services
of a knowledgeable broker, independent agent, or attorney who can note
and explain the differences.
Most difficult, however, for comparison purposes is that the consumer
will not readily be able to predict the insurer’s behavior in the event of a
claim. Among insurance insiders, certain carriers are known to be more
hospitable, even magnanimous, toward claims while other insurers have a
reputation for fighting many claims on technicalities and even lapsing
toward bad faith too often in an effort to maximize profits at the expense of
the insurer’s fiduciary-like duty to its insureds. But most consumers lack
any such information. Like lambs led to the slaughter, they may joyously
36. See, e.g., Benesowitz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 870 N.E.2d 1136 (N.Y. 2007).
37. See Peter Siegleman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
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march into the arms of an insurer that offers a seemingly comprehensive
product at relatively low cost only to find that if a claim arises (particularly
a big claim), the insurer fights it with a ferocity typically found among
revolutionary guerillas.
Even for sophisticated business consumers of insurance, it is hard to
predict whether the insurer will be difficult or reasonable regarding claims.
Individual claims adjusters may vary. The insurer may have personnel
changes at the top that convert a formerly reasonable insurer to one that
fights every claim tooth and nail. The insurer may decide to outsource its
claims function to a third party administrator (TPA), managing general
agent (MGA), or independent adjuster. The chosen entity may be
competent and reasonable or may be incompetent and excessively stingy,
owing to either its low cost and lack of training/expertise38 or to a
philosophy holding that a tough claims stance will increase insurer profit
and future use of the claims entity. The situation may get better or worse
depending on intervening judicial decisions. A jurisdiction that put
constraints on insurer self-dealing at the beginning of a policy period may
issue a new opinion giving insurers more discretion that may in turn result
in more obstreperous claims stances.
Most important, the insurance contract is aleatory, no matter how
sophisticated the consumer or business purchasing insurance. An aleatory
contract is one in which the exchange is, unlike most contracts, not equal.
The insurance policy could be anything from a great deal to an abysmal
bargain for the participants.39 For example, if the insurer has no claims
38. See, e.g., Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. v. Jeffcoat, 887 So.2d 777, 779-80
(Miss. 2004) (describing independent adjuster retained by insurer and its performance,
which included assigning an individual adjuster to the case who was not licensed in the
relevant state, had no training in matters pertinent to the claim, was unaware of relevant
state law regarding “stacking” of insurance benefits until advised by claimant’s counsel,
failed to obtain necessary legal opinion, misrepresented her efforts to claimant, and failed to
obtain relevant coverage documentation necessary to make determination of claim;
Incredibly, court deems this litany of failing mere negligence as a matter of law and
insufficient evidence of gross negligence necessary to maintain claim against adjuster,
overturning jury verdict finding gross negligence).
39. Regarding insurance policies as aleatory contracts, see JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE. CONTRACTS § 1.06 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2008); EMERIC FISCHER,
PETER NASH SWISHER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, PRINCIPALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 2.02 (Rev.
3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2006); GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE 99 (9th ed. 2005) (“An aleatory contract is a contract where the values
exchanged may not be equal but depend on an uncertain event. Depending on chance, one
party may receive a value out of proportion to the value that is given.”) (emphasis removed);
MARK DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 163 (8th ed. 2005)
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during a policy period, the premium received is almost pure profit that
earns investment income forever more. Alternatively, the insured may be
severely injured the day after becoming subject to coverage. Even if the
insurer behaves dishonorably in response to this type of claim, it will
almost certainly pay far more in benefits and disputing costs than it ever
received in premiums from the particular claimant in question.40
Conversely, the policyholder may in some cases receive coverage far in
excess of premiums paid or in other cases pay premiums for decades and
receive nothing in return. (This is not impossible even though everyone
gets sick once in awhile. The insured may never be sick enough, often
enough to exceed the deductible amount of the policy, which is shouldered
by the insured).
In short, one does not know who wins or loses regarding an insurance
purchase until years or even decades letter. Contrast this to most other
consumer purchases. Even where the good or service bought is complex or
expensive (e.g., a car, a home), the exchange is thought to be equal,
because the parties are able to make a real time comparative evaluation of
value. A resident of Omaha, Nebraska may think the consumer is nuts to
have paid $500,000 for a two-bedroom house in Silicon Valley, but this is
the price the market has set and it may make sense in light of the
consumer’s objectives (e.g., a short commute to Google headquarters in
which he not only works but effectively lives for twenty hours each day),
(“The aleatory feature of insurance policies differs from other [commutative] business
contracts where consideration of equal value is exchanged.”) (emphasis removed).
40. But applied to its book of business as a whole, insurers may find that acting
dishonorably is profitable. Although they may ultimately pay far more in benefits than was
received in premiums for a particular policyholder, the insurer’s war-of-attrition may
succeed in getting insureds to drop meritorious claims or settle them at pennies on the
dollar.
Unless the claim is sufficiently large, the insured will have trouble finding an
attorney willing to take the case on a contingent fee basis (unless the insurer’s position is so
clearly unreasonable that it makes a bad faith suit with punitive damages likely, but caps on
such damages may make a small dollar case of even egregious insurer misconduct
unattractive to plaintiffs’ lawyers). For most people, this means they cannot obtain legal
representation because their budgets preclude them from paying counsel’s normal hourly
rate. In addition, the insurer’s “tough” stance on claims may become sufficiently known to
further discourage lawyers from becoming involved and to prompt early, “lowball”
settlements with policyholders.
Perhaps most important, an insurer-wide policy of stringing out claims payments
as long as possible permits the insurer to reclaim through investment income whatever
underwriting loss it may have suffered in connection with individual instances of insureds
who incur covered medical costs in excess of the amount of premiums paid to insurers.
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which are not contingent in the manner of fortuitous health problems or
other loss events. As a general rule of economics, we do not look past the
observed purchasing preferences of consumers. If a thirteen-year-old
thinks that a Hannah Montana album is worth $14.99, that’s its value, no
matter how much one’s own taste may run in a different musical direction.
The parties can value the exchange as they see fit even if third parties may
question their taste or valuation.
But insurance is different – particularly for the consumer – because it is
an economic transaction centered on risk and contingency. Insurers and
more sophisticated business entities can mitigate the uncertainty of the
aleatory contract by making actuarial calculations based on experience,
comparable population data, or longitudinal studies. Most important, they
pool contingent risks and through the law of large numbers can make
reasonably well-calculated estimates regarding future medical care needs.
By contrast, consumers will either lack access to such information or as
practical matter be unable to expend the money and time necessary for such
evaluations. The typical individual is simply not in a position to be a very
intelligent consumer of insurance, particularly health insurance.
Currently, the private sector provides some counterweight to this
imbalance of expertise through the dominance of employer-provided group
medical insurance. In contrast to the individual insured, the employer has
the resources, experience, and leverage to make better estimates and strike
better bargains with private insurers. But this field-leveling power of the
employer remains less powerful than the accumulated expertise and
resources of the insurance industry.
More important, employers may not have the motivation to fully
deploy their resources on behalf of insured workers. Despite its
responsibilities as a benefits provider, the employer’s zeal will be diluted
by a desire to keep costs down. It will be tempted to spend less for inferior
coverage from a difficult insurer so long as not hard-pressed by the
workforce. Individual workers are unlikely to apply such pressure. Unions
are more likely to be effective advocates for employee group insureds, but
unions have declined in membership to the point where only about 15
percent of the workforce is organized. Employer-provided insurance as a
whole has declined in recent years as well.41
For many employers, minimalist group insurance is their optimal
economic strategy. Prospective workers are looking primarily for a job
rather than medical coverage (which is why the danger of adverse selection
41. See Jost, Health Insurance a Bad Idea?, supra note 4.
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is overstated) and, as discussed above, have only limited expertise about
medical insurance. Consequently, workers and job applicants will not exert
particularly powerful leverage forcing employers to achieve optimal
medical coverage for their workforces. We cannot be completely confident
that employers will be faithful agents of employees concerning the
purchase of medical insurance.
B. THE LEGAL FICTION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROL OF
HEALTH
The second legal fiction, which also becomes part of the legal friction
between individualism and collective solidarity, is the increasing tendency
to implicitly assign fault to persons experiencing adverse health events and
medical costs. More important, the typical consumer will not have much if
any effective control over his or her medical care needs and costs. But
because of the John Wayne mythology of rugged individualism and
personal responsibility, society (and analysts and policymakers who should
know better) act as if the individual has some meaningful control over his
or her health. For example, people frequently refer to someone “beating”
cancer or “battling” illness, as though one’s failure to stay healthy or
recover were solely a function of one’s efforts and abilities.42 In reality,
good or bad health, more than economic success or emotional happiness,

42. See SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1978)(describing her struggles with
breast cancer and noting social tendency to see illness and treatment as analogous to
protagonist in conflict with adverse entity rather than fortuitous circumstances controlled by
genetics or inexorable environmental factors). See also DAVID RIEFF, SWIMMING IN A SEA OF
DEATH (2008) (Sontag’s son chronicles her myriad medical problems and attempts to
overcome them).
One particular example of this tendency in popular culture sticks in my mind.
During the 1970s and 1980s, sportscasters often referred to Jack Pardee, a former Los
Angeles Rams coach and one-time star player (a linebacker for the Rams and the
Washington Redskins) as “beating” black mole cancer, expressing some awe due to the
rareness of recovery from the disease at that time.
This, of course, is an empirically ridiculous way of putting it. Pardee was a great
player and a tough guy. But he did not vanquish his cancer. He recovered from it through
good medical care and luck. His recovery was not a testament to any moral, mental or
physical superiority just as it would not indicate deficiency in these areas had he died from
the cancer. Depending on chance circumstances, the same type of virus might kill Arnold
Schwarzenegger but leave Pee Wee Herman relatively unscathed. Strength, athletic ability,
intelligence, and determination have little or nothing to do with whether one gets sick or
recovers. But we continue to talk about illness in these misleading terms.
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results far more from chance than from personal decisionmaking, conduct,
discipline or effort.43
For years, insurers have waged a semantic and psychological campaign
against the notion of blameless fortuity in adverse events and at least
suggested that many losses are not true accidents of chance but are to a
significant degree the fault of insureds. For example, automobile mishaps
are no longer labeled “accidents” by most insurance personnel. Instead,
they are trained to speak of “collisions” and “crashes” that imply fault on at
least someone’s part (usually the driver covered by another insurer).44 In
health insurance, this more generally takes the form of the suggestion that
while the insured does not knowingly become ill, the insured’s lifestyle and
negligence may have created or contributed to the health problem that now
requires medical care.45 This view, although possessed of some merit in
the aggregate, is generally not a productive way to think about individual
medical needs and insurance claims.
In a large enough group of persons, their lifestyles will at least in some
cases ultimately show significant impact on adverse health events and
consequent medical care. For example, a group of chain smokers will
eventually have much higher rates of heart disease, lung cancer,
emphysema, and related maladies associated with smoking while a similar
group of nonsmokers will, absent other factors, have fewer such adverse
health events and lower medical care costs.
In the aggregate, it therefore makes considerable sense to promote the
reduction of medical risk through encouraging better lifestyles among
insurers. Programs to promote exercise, healthy eating, nonsmoking,
moderation in alcohol use, and avoidance of illegal drugs or unregulated
43. See Jacobi, supra note 4, at 562 (noting that ten percent of population “accounts
for almost 70 percent of the health care costs, and the top 2 percent accounts for almost 40
percent of the costs.”).
44. See RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS
GOVERNANCE Ch. 3 (2003). For one example of the tremendous public relations resources
deployed by the insurance industry, see Peter J. Howe, Firm He Hired to Buff Image is
Suing Mogul; Cambridge PR Shop Says it’s Owed $2M, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2007
(public relations firm eSapience Ltd alleges former AIG CEO and insurance executive
Maurice “Hank” Greenberg owes $2 million for services purchased when he sought to
burnish his image tarnished by then-New York Attorney General and later Governor Eliot
Spitzer’s investigation of AIG; bills ranged as high as $978,000 for a month’s assistance in
presenting Greenberg in “best light and to assure the presence and participation of key
intellectual and public figures” at events involving Greenberg, according to complaint).
45. See Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform,
supra note 22.
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supplements all help group members as a whole, society, the medical
profession, and reduce medical care usage and costs.
Paradoxically, however, the current system of crazy-quilt private
patchwork insurance does little to foster these efforts. Most insurers fail to
cover many potential efforts to enhance prevention of illness through better
lifestyle. Historically, private insurers have been slow to cover preventive
medical care such as annual checkups. This appears to result from a
combination of short-sightedness, concern about overuse of this type of
benefit, and the more calculatingly disturbing but perhaps correct business
decision that paying for prevention in the instant policy period simply
lowers some future insurer’s cost of covered care in subsequent policy
periods.46
But whatever the merits of preventive care and a health lifestyle, I find
it disturbing that so much of modern health care and insurance rhetoric
seems to uncritically accept the notion that much of medical need results
from the insured patient’s own failings of discipline rather than the simply
fortuity of genetics and luck. Although a group as a whole will reflect the
benefits of healthy lifestyle, individuals within the group may or may not
enjoy the benefit. For example, a non-smoker who wins marathons and has
low blood pressure and cholesterol may nonetheless drop dead from a
sudden heart attack. Or he may be stricken with cancer. Or rear-ended by
a truck. Or infected while making a blood donation.
Conversely, the 300-pounder who stands 5’8” tall and smokes two
packs a day may live to be 100. When observers conclude that because
each individual within a group demonstrates the whole group’s
characteristics, they make what statisticians term the “ecological” fallacy.47
For example, it would be erroneous to conclude that every union member
46. This is why also why Hyman is overly optimistic in positing medical insurers will
engage in an optimal level of preventive care in the absence of government regulation. See
Hyman, Health Insurance: Market Failure or Government Failure?, supra note 4. In
addition, as Mariner notes, preventive care and wellness programs raise the prospect of
deviating from the fortuity model of insurance and creating a situation that (like HSAs,
HRAs and other consumer-driven proposals) tends to benefit the upper socioeconomic strata
much more than their lower SES counterparts. See Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal
Responsibility in Health Reform, supra note 22.
47. See Jerry Mashaw, The Economics and Politics the Understanding of Public Law,
65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 150 (1989) (“Behavior found to characterize a population, at the
population level, has been fallaciously assumed to characterize the behavior of individuals
in the population”); Gerald Kramer, The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate-versusIndividual Findings on Economics, Elections, and Sociopolitical Voting, 77 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 92 (1983).
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voting in a Democratic primary supported John Edwards, although it is true
that he enjoyed (at least during the early stages of the 2008 campaign)
considerable support from that group as a whole. Non-statisticians
intrinsically realize that this is incorrect but are often overly casual in
stereotyping based on subconscious application of the fallacy (e.g., looking
at a plumber with a lunch pail on his way to the polls and assuming he is a
vote for Edwards).
Much of the rhetoric about consumer/patient responsibility in health
care comes dangerously close to embracing the ecological fallacy. It
suggests, at least implicitly, that people with health problems are at least
partially responsible and that it is therefore unfair or unwise to pool them
with people who are comparatively free of health problems or the need for
expensive medical treatment. This attitude is simply not rational as applied
to the serendipitous nature of health problems and the need for medical
care.
Only in extreme cases (e.g., the self-destructive risk-taker, the
spendthrift hypochondriac), can it legitimately be said that individual
patients had a significant role in maladies that have afflicted them or the
total amount and cost of treatment. Much of adverse health and medical
experience results from simple bad luck. It is wrong to suggest, even
indirectly, that this results from the patient’s failures and that the patient is
therefore less deserving of adequate medical care and insurance coverage
than those blessed with better medical fortune.48
But the rhetoric in much of the health care and insurance debate, even
if not strictly inaccurate, is slanted in favor of overstating the individual’s
control over her health history and the relative desert of certain individuals.
For example, use of a term such as “personal responsibility” is simply
overdone and misleading for many health issues.49 A person stricken by
48. See Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6
CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 12 (1999).
49. But this terminology is so hard-wired into our discussions of medical issues that it
pervades even scholarly treatments that do not embrace an unrealistic view of an
individual’s ability to control his own health care options. See, e.g., Mariner, Social
Solidarity, supra note 22; Lois Shepherd, Assuming Responsibility, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 445 (2005); Carol A. Heimer, Responsibility in Health Care: Spanning the Boundary
Between Law and Medicine, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 465 (2005); Lois Shepherd, Face To
Face: A Call for Radical Responsibility in Place of Compassion, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 445
(2003). Reading the titles of these articles alone, one might first erroneously assume that
they are part of the John Wayne ethos when they are in fact written from a communitarian
social justice (Mariner, Shepherd) or professionalism (Heimer) perspective. The rhetoric of
market, rugged individualism, and aversion to government programs is so strong in the U.S.
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cancer clearly is not at fault. A person injured in an auto accident or
workplace mishap may have been negligent but this hardly amounts to
personally irresponsibility. As the insurance industry well knows,
everybody is negligent at times but not every instance of negligence results
in damage to self or others. Although behavior may contribute to problems
with diabetes, heart or lung disease, much of medical outcome is a
metaphorical roll of the hereditary and biological dice.
Personal
responsibility rhetoric implicitly blames people more accurately described
as victims and provides a subconscious salve permitting society to overlook
the problem of an inadequate national approach to medical coverage.
A term like “actuarial fairness,”50 although it may be technically
accurate and useful in describing risk populations, is also rhetorically
overloaded with the connotation that sick people have largely been their
own worst enemies (or at least must lump their conditions). Implicitly,
providing coverage to those making higher demands on the medical system
is “unfair” to those at lower risk or presenting fewer current demands. This
nomenclature makes it easier to avoid a sufficiently comprehensive
solution because it implicitly suggests that any government efforts
extending beyond a market-based solution is unfair to the bulk of society
and unfairly subsidizes the medical needs of the undeserving.
The net effect of this type of discourse is to reinforce the traditional
American notions of rugged individualism and the optimal efficiency of
markets, creating a climate where policymakers can implicitly take the
position that doing more for those who are sicker, poorer, or less skilled in
navigating the world carries too high a price tag, both economically (e.g.,
higher taxes, higher premiums, higher medical costs) and socially (e.g.,
enhancement of the “nanny state” in derogation of the preferred ethos of
rugged individualism).
In addition to being an unfair attack on the ill and the risky, the rhetoric
of individualism and market veneration is amazingly unempathetic. John
Wayne was able to achieve his goals in large part because he was never
seriously injured or ill, at least not prior to accomplishing his mission.51
that the immediate connotative reaction (mine, at least) to the term “personal responsibility”
is to assume the speaker is advocating a “let the chips fall” position in which the individual
stands alone, protected only by contract and individual fortitude.
50. See Mariner, Social Solidarity, supra note 22 (using term throughout and also
using term “personal responsibility” throughout).
51. In the 1969 movie TRUE GRIT, for which he won an Oscar, Wayne was wounded
while dispatching the villain but the seriousness of the wound, which ultimately did him in,
did not manifest itself until after the shooting was over. TRUE GRIT (Paramount Pictures
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Today, some health insurance commentators would seemingly be unwilling
to chalk up adverse health events to fortuitous chance and would instead
wonder whether they had instead not brought this upon themselves through
lifestyle factors (e.g., smoking, poor diet, insufficient sleep, poor
hygiene).52 This implicit appeal to the John Wayne iconography of
America is used as a selling point for certain insurance and financial
products by appealing to the public through rhetoric about “consumer
choice” or “freedom” or an “ownership society” when these initiatives will,
for most people, be far less helpful than a government-administered single
payer system.53

1969). Of course, defenders of rugged individualism might suggest this simply
demonstrated will power (such as in the famous Jesse Ventura line (in the movie
COMMANDO, which also starred a similarly macho-iconographic Arnold Schwarzenegger) “I
ain’t got time to bleed” until the mission is completed). COMMANDO (SLM Production
Group 1985). While the laws of biology and physics (e.g., blood escapes rapidly when one
is shot in a vital organ) may be suspended in Hollywood, they very much limit the ability of
ill persons to surmount their maladies through exercises of personal responsibility.
52. See, e.g., NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, MEDICAID REFORM A
PRELIMINARY REPORT FROM
THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION (2005),
http://www.nga.org/cda/files/0506medicaid.pdf (positing need for “incentives and penalties
for individuals to take more responsibility for their health care”); Craig Thomas,
Understanding Rural Health Care Needs and Challenges: Why Access Matters to Rural
Americans, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 255 (2006) (in addressing needed actions on health
care, U.S. Senator Thomas argues that “most importantly, individuals must take personal
responsibility for their health”); Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal
Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36
MCGEORGE L. REV. 535 (2005). But see Shepherd, Assuming Responsibility, supra note 49
(taking different perspective and placing responsibility on society to provide medical care
and alleviate suffering for the ill); Heimer, supra note 49 (focusing primarily on
responsibility of medical professionals to patients and society).
53. See Deborah Stone, Health Law Symposium: The False Promise of Consumer
Choice, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 475, 475 (2007) (“In these times, the new buzzwords for
market reform are `consumer choice,’ `consumer direction,’ ‘consumer empowerment,’ and
‘ownership.’ [T]he rhetorical emphasis on power and control for consumers disguises the
real impact of market reforms, which is primarily to reduce the collective assistance and
medical services that citizens receive.”). See also Monahan, Ownership Society, supra note
17 (finding useful incentive structures in consumer-driven plans but also that consumers are
not particularly adept purchasers of health care).
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The Legal Fiction of the Reliable Responsibility of Individuals (and
the Contradictory Legal Fiction that Individuals Are Louts Who Need
Stern Market and Insurer Discipline)
In addition to the rhetoric about personal responsibility concerning
illness itself, there is also the suggestion in much of the debate that persons
lacking adequate insurance when illness strikes are in this pickle largely
through their own failure to pay the required social toll of insurance. For
example, we are frequently reminded that many who do not receive
medical insurance through a job will go without insurance rather than pay
premiums for an individual policy. Some may even describe this as a
rational decision but one that adversely affects the nation’s ability to
provide medical insurance that is properly funded by those who will benefit
from it. For example, younger persons who are less statistically likely to
have medical problems often fail to purchase insurance. As a result, the
private insurance system is deprived of their premium dollars and the
insurance system as a whole is underfunded. But when a twenty-eightyear-old ruptures an appendix, he will generally be able to obtain treatment
at an emergency room.
The picture painted, with considerable justification, is that people like
this are freeloading on the system. In reaction, even those favoring
continued substantial reliance on private medical insurance urge that such
persons be required to purchase insurance and heavily penalized if they do
not. This is a major underpinning of the well-publicized Massachusetts
plan and the health care proposals of Hillary Clinton and John Edwards.54
This is not the place to discuss mandates at length but it should be
noted that mandates tend to be far less effectual than commonly
supposed.55 Consider auto insurance, where for decades every state has
54. For a summary of the Massachusetts plan, see Elizabeth A. Weeks, Failure to
Connect: The Massachusetts Plan for Individual Health Insurance, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1283
(2007).
55. See Hyman, Good, Bad & Ugly, supra note 14, at 1111 (expressing skepticism
about efficacy of insurance purchase mandates); Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603 , 705 (2006)(noting difficulties with and practical limitations on
suggested liability insurance purchase mandates); Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis:
How The Law Should Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002) (mandates create collateral
problems such as affordability for the poor and lower middle-class); John Jacobi, The Ends
of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 388 (1997) (describing mandated purchase
of health insurance as “politically problematic”); David A. Hyman, Professional
Responsibility, Legal Malpractice, and the Eternal Triangle: Will Lawyers or Insurers Call
the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 370 (1997) (noting lack of success of movement to
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had financial responsibility laws that require, as a condition for licensing a
motor vehicle, that the owner purchase and maintain auto insurance. The
required minimum amounts of such insurance are shockingly low in many
states and the premiums, although non-trivial, are hardly astronomical, at
least for the low policy limits minimally required. However, experience
shows that a large portion of the driving public fails to maintain the
required insurance.56
There is little reason to think that medical insurance mandates will be
significantly more effective. The reason: many people, especially at the
economic margin, will shirk legal obligations that cost money if they can
do so without significant penalty. In response, proponents of mandated
purchase of private insurance seek to use penalties to create sufficient
incentive for citizens to purchase required insurance. Although like auto
insurance financial responsibility laws, this will work to a degree and
improve upon an unfettered free market atmosphere, there is no reason to
think that it will work better overall than auto insurance.
Most likely, it will work less well. At least for a few hours on a given
Tuesday, anyone wanting a license plate will need to have at least some
auto insurance in force. By contrast, there is no similar mandatory event, at
least not one occurring prior to when insurance is needed, which will apply
to all potential policyholders. The twenty-something Starbucks worker and
the impoverished family of four can more easily bypass insurance
mandates than can their driving counterparts. Absent a police state-like
increase in law enforcement infrastructure, they will be seriously
scrutinized and “caught” in their failure to procure insurance only after they
have suffered an adverse medical event.57
mandate malpractice insurance for lawyers); James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and
Comprehensive Federal Health Care, A Call for “Cooperative Federalism” to Preserve the
States’ Role in Formulating Health Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 405, 422 (1994)
(noting that mandates alone do not “provide benefits for the unemployed, indigent, and
uninsurable”); Katherine Pratt, Funding Health Care with an Employer Mandate:
Efficiency and Equity Concerns, 39 ST. LOUIS L.J. 155 (1994). But see Tom Baker,
Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN.
INS. L.J. 371, 380 (2002)(finding potential significant utility in health insurance purchase
mandates).
56. See Rebecca Cathcart, California Taking Aim At Uninsured On the Roads, N. Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, at A22 (Twenty-five percent of California drivers uninsured despite
longstanding requirement of insurance purchase as prerequisite for licensing car).
57. See Jost, Bad Idea?, supra note 4 (noting studies showing reduced use of medical
services by uninsured and failure of younger, healthier demographic groups to purchase
medical insurance).
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But we continue to think of mandated private insurance as
comprehensive solution to the health insurance problem, just as we have
viewed mandated auto insurance as an effective public policy tool. This is
unwise. A sufficiently high number of persons will fail to purchase
medical insurance and pay premiums into the system for funding expanded
health care. Whether this occurs because they are irresponsible shirkers
and slackers or because they are simply too poor, unsophisticated, or
unorganized to make the required purchase is beside the point – or at least
beside my point.
My point is that even the “progressives” or “reformers” in the area of
medical insurance, driven by perceived political pragmatism if not
thorough analysis, have erroneously viewed private insurance purchase
mandates as a near-panacea in large part out of misplaced continued belief
in the legal fiction of the effectiveness of individual personal responsibility.
At a minimum, this legal fiction posits that if required to purchase
insurance, individuals will do so promptly and responsibly in most all
cases. But if this estimate is correct, people would also purchase medical
insurance even in the absence of mandates and would place such purchases
ahead of other desired goods and services. Historical and empirical
evidence is quite to the contrary. Instead, people either consciously or
negligently fail to obtain insurance, even when they could at least in theory
afford it. A more realistic view of human behavior would embrace the
more enforced community solidarity of a government administered single
payer plan.58
In addition, the legal fiction of individual rationality and omniscience
also posits that when purchasing insurance, consumers will do so wisely
and efficiently. But, as discussed above, most laypersons lack the
58. See Stone, False Promise, supra note53, at 478:
[W]hen people live at the margin, they are apt to choose the
option with the lowest short-term costs over the one with the lowest
long-term or total costs. People living at the margin—and that margin
may be well up into the middle class when families face chronic disease,
disability, job loss, income decline, and all the other factors that make
for economic squeeze – are simply not able to behave like the rational
economic actors of consumer choice theory. They cannot afford to take
the long-term view. They are forced to be “penny wise and pound
foolish.
See also id. at 480 (“perhaps the worst feature of the consumer choice
approach” is that “it substitutes lay judgment for professional judgment.”).
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knowledge, experience, training, or sophistication to understand and
differentiate insurance products and providers. In contrast to the prevailing
legal fiction, they are not good consumers of medical insurance. Even
when people dutifully follow mandates to buy medical insurance, they will
frequently make suboptimal choices regarding necessary coverage and
make errors in choosing among whatever options are presented to them by
the private market.59 Consequently, a system premised on the wisdom and
utility of consumer choice via John Wayne-style individualism and
invisible hand market behavior is unlikely to achieve sufficiently
comprehensive and adequate medical insurance or medical care for the
population at large.
C. THE LEGAL FRICTION OF MARKET MYTHOLOGY AND RUGGED
INDIVIDUALISM IN TENSION WITH BOTH ITSELF AND IN
TENSION WITH SOCIAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY
SOLIDARITY
As discussed above, the American ethos has been to erroneously
assume too much understanding and discipline by the consumer of
insurance and to view with distain the consumer who fails to make good
insurance choices. At the same time, empathy is not completely dead in
American society. We worship idealized concepts of rugged individualism
and personal responsibility but are unwilling to adopt a completely
Darwinian approach to the ill or injured. Although there is a substantial
amount of “blaming the victim,” for health problems, Americans do not
completely turn a cold shoulder to the ill or injured. The iconic image of
Martin Luther King and the attendant social justice notion still competes
for the hearts and minds of the public on issues of health care. Similarly,
although the market efficiency wing of Adam Smith’s own writings
dominates much of the discourse, his thoughts on the importance of a
59. The Massachusetts plan and similar initiatives attempt to deal with this problem
by placing some requirements on insurers as to the minimum content and features of health
insurance policies sold. Like mandated private coverage itself, this regulatory effort is
better than nothing, but it will leave many consumers without optimal coverage for their
needs. However, to the extent that government-required minimum features of a medical
insurance policy are effective, this is actually a powerful argument for simply traveling the
extra mile to a government administered single payer system. Logically, if regulators can
design an effective basic medical insurance policy, they can also effectively design the
contours of a fair single payer system. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The New
Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and Experimentation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229
(2007).
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strong, competent, self-regulating professional class also play a role in the
health care debate.
As the politicians continue to remind us during the 2008 election
season, Americans are a compassionate people as well as a group that
worships at the shrines of rugged individualism, personal responsibility and
ambition. As a consequence, despite some rhetorical and social looking
askance at the obese, the slothful, smokers, drunkards, and druggies,
society (even its insurance element) has been unwilling to completely
exclude most such people from coverage they would otherwise receive as
members of an insured risk pool.
The inability of the body politic to adopt either the cold-hearted
approach of letting the health or poor consumer choice chips fall where
they may or the more emphatic communitarian approach of comprehensive
universal health care leads to the legal friction or tension between
allegiance to the norms of rugged individualism and personal responsibility
and the recognition that, at least in the arena of human health, outcomes are
often not within the control of the individual.
The result is, much like American medical insurance itself, a
patchwork of occasionally spotty coverage that for the most part provides
coverage even for the Louie Andersons (overweight) and Humphrey
Bogarts (smoker) of the world but does so in a manner that may impose
additional costs or reduced coverage, particularly when that person is not
part of a group insurance plan. Increasingly, insurers in general have tried
to restrict coverage accorded to insureds engaged in arguably wrongful or
irresponsible activity and have tried to avoid providing medical insurance
in such cases unless they can extract a sufficiently high premium. For auto
insurers, we see this new judgmentalism in the form of clauses that exclude
coverage if a car accident arises out of the policyholder’s intoxicated
driving or criminal act. For health insurers, we see measures such as
broader and longer bans on coverage for pre-existing conditions,
differential premiums rates based on lifestyle factors.
More important for purposes of the health care/medical insurance
debate, the purported fault of patients provides insurers with an argument
against single payer administration of universal coverage even if the
argument is largely made sub silentio. Because of public ambivalence
about how far to take the personal responsibility track in derogation of
compassion, this argument has not been completely successful alone but at
the margin has helped the status quo resist efforts toward universal health
insurance coverage.
But this tension, like most, has strong elements of inconsistency, as
does the so-called consumer driven health care movement. On one hand,
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the theology of market-and-individual driven health care posits that many
people are just too darned undisciplined, lazy and self-destructive and that,
as a result, the costs that they bring upon themselves should not be heavily
subsidized nor should the health consequences of their foibles be borne by
a unified national insurance system. The consumer-driven, market-based
model of medical insurance implicitly belittles individuals as undisciplined
louts who fail to take adequate care of themselves, over-consume expensive
medical care, and fail to exhibit apt discipline in lifestyle, insurance
purchase, or resort to health care.
But on the proverbial other hand, the consumer-driven movement
argues that individuals are sufficiently all-knowing that they don’t need
universal health care and single payer medical coverage and that they can
make shrewd, disciplined insurance purchasing decisions. In addition, the
movement posits that people will be similarly shrewd, disciplined, pricecontrolling consumers of medical services.
The inconsistency is palpable. The problem, of course, is that slothful
slackers and the shrewd consumers are the same people, or at least
comprise the same population pool. Some subgroup of the populace may
meet the implicit John Wayne/Adam Smith assumptions underlying the
consumer-driven health movement (just as every neighborhood has a few
nerds who never unwittingly violate even the most arcane neighborhood
association rules regarding aesthetics). But this subgroup is logically much
smaller than posited by the movement – and too small to sustain movement
health care. People are not completely incompetent in health matters, but
comparatively few have the education, training, time, discipline, and
energy to manage their medical insurance portfolio in the manner posited
by those favoring continued or increased market control over medical
coverage.
II.

THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE MARKET AND OF PRIVATE
INSURER EFFICIENCY

A seemingly stronger arrow in the quiver of the status quo is public
concern that anything but a market-based, private sector model for medical
insurance will be too inefficient and expensive. The Adam Smith legacy of
a belief in omniscient and omnipotent markets has created an unhelpful
mythology positing that private sector health care and insurance is so
dramatically and consistently more efficient than any government-run or
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hybridized model that it should be tinkered with only under the most dire of
circumstances and only to the most limited degree.60
At the risk of picking more of a fight than I have already begun, much
of David Hyman’s scholarship is in this vein, although he is also highly
critical of the role of private insurer payers in the current patchwork system
as well as critical of government single payer plans such as Medicare.61
It’s clever, knowledgeable, insightful and well-written, with occasionally
counterintuitive nuggets of some support for particular types of regulation
or government efforts on behalf of patient rights.62 But regardless of
whether one finds it persuasive, it seems undeniable that it all proceeds
from a Smithian world view exceedingly enamored of markets and
consumer choice.63 (The Smith who advocated for professionals’ financial
60. See Anna Bernasek, Health Care Problem? Check the American Psyche, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, at B3 (noting resistance to government public insurance system based
on American norms).
61. See e.g. Hyman & Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.,
supra note 16, at 959 (2005) (“markets dominated by third-party payment arrangements
function relatively poorly…[p]ayers bear most of the costs of health care; patients enjoy
most of the gains. Payers therefore care about cost more than quality.”); David A. Hyman,
Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong With a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
221 (2001); David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social
Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen”, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531 (2001); David A.
Hyman & Charles Silver, Just What the Patient Ordered: The Case for Result-Based
Compensation Arrangements, 29 J. L. MED & ETHICS 170 (2001); David A. Hyman, DriveThrough Deliveries: Is “Consumer Protection” Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N. C. L.
REV. 5 (1999); David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Imperfect/Future
Shock, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 29 (1998); David A. Hyman, The Conundrum of Charitability:
Reassessing Tax Exemption for Hospitals, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 327, 370 (1990) (“In a world
where patients are relatively ignorant about their medical conditions, a for-profit provider
has a clear incentive to cheat on quality and quantity. Because there are no equity
shareholders, nonprofit hospitals may be safer for the relatively helpless patient.”). See also
David A. Hyman, Medicine in the New Millennium: A Self-Help Guide for the Perplexed, 26
AM. J.L. & MED. 143, 152 (2000) (on the subject of “picking a fight”: relating that his
scholarship was described at one conference as reflecting “the sort of views that caused the
Irish potato famine.”). Presumably, I have not gone this far in my differing.
62. See, e.g., Hyman & Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.,
supra note 61; David A. Hyman, Does Medicare Care About Quality?, 46 PERSP. IN
BIOLOGY. & MED. 55, 65 (2003) (finding that Medicare does care about quality – but
suggesting that it achieves it less well than would private insurer or uninsured markets).
63. For the best example of all these traits of Hyman scholarship, see DAVID A.
HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006) (discussing fictitious memorandum in
the manner of C.S. Lewis’ The Screwtape Letters (1942) revealing Medicare to be diabolic
plot designed to drain Americans of virtues of thrift and truthfulness and lead them into
seven deadly sins of avarice, gluttony, envy, sloth, lust anger and vanity); David A. Hyman,
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success is largely missing in Hyman’s work but, like Smith, he holds
professionals to an implicitly high standard of care and competence).
Hyman is hardly alone, at least outside the academy, where the seemingly
dominant view among policymakers is that any comprehensive program to
effect full medical coverage must involve private insurers and that there
should be no program that effectively eliminates private insurers in favor of
government.64
Notwithstanding its political dominance, the dominant market
paradigm for configuring medical coverage appears substantially incorrect
on a number of grounds. First, despite the supposed marvels of the market
in controlling costs, both health care costs and insurance premium rates are
high and tending higher. Market defenders typically ascribe this to the
effects of government subsidization of group medical insurance, which is
generally a fringe benefit that workers receive as untaxed compensation.
The point has force but not nearly so much as its advocates claim. Even
without tax subsidy, private insurance premiums would likely be high
because of market concentration, generally rising medical costs, strong
demand for coverage, and insurer inability to effectively control costs to
any significantly better degree than the government.
Regardless of whether it is taxed when received by an employee, the
employer’s share of group health insurance premiums costs money for the
employer. Although the cost can be deducted as a business expense, the
corresponding reduction in tax liability is not, for most businesses, the
same as avoiding the expenditure altogether. Health insurance still costs
Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165 (2003) (similar, shorter
version of argument).
64. See Hossain, supra note 1, at 1 (noting absence of even Democratic presidential
support for government single-payer insurance or any plan that does not rely substantially
on purchase of private medical insurance). Further, Hyman, albeit sometimes feeling
embattled among the ivory tower types, is not without at least partial support in the academy
as well. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix
It: An Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537 (2006) (advocating
continued significant role for private insurance along the lines of Massachusetts plan, with
purchase mandates but subsidies for payment). See also Jacobson, supra note 9, at 734-35
(contending that four conceptual paradigms compete for dominance in health law: economic
(market competitive); professional; rights-based (social justice) and institutional, and that
“social justice model is on hold” which is a “euphemism for being dead in the water.
Instead, the real struggle for doctrinal supremacy in health law is between the market and
professional models.”). A soundly administered government single payer system holds the
more promise than the current or market models for achieving professional and institutional
goals as well as social justice and may actually work to enhance meaningful consumer
choice regarding medical services.
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money, which presumably gives employers plenty of incentive to keep
premiums down. In spite of this, premiums consistently rise. Although
this is not necessarily the “fault” of the market for employer-insurer health
care bargaining, it at least demonstrates the strong limitations on this
market as a vehicle for controlling premium costs.
Part of the problem is motivational disconnect between employers, who
see medical insurance as an expensive fringe benefit on which to
economize and workers who get to use the medical care and would like
more, better care. Another part of the problem is that even large employers
may not have as much leverage with insurers as necessary to provide
effective cost control in the face of insurer drive for profit while individuals
are particularly ill-suited to the cost-policing enterprise.65 By contrast, the
65. See Robert Pear, Hard Sell Cited as Insurers Push Plans to Elderly, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2007, at A1; Sarah Lueck, Private Remedy: Insurers Fight to Defend Lucrative
Medicare Business; As Democrats Push Cuts, Trade Group Targets Minority Lawmakers,
WALL ST. J., April 30, 2007, at A1; Milt Freudenheim, A Benefit for Insurers: Medicare
Drug Plan Feeds More Profitable Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at C1. See
also James Bandler, et al., CEO Aims to Halt Stock-Based Pay at UnitedHealth; Move
Comes Amid Scrutiny Of Options Timing, Gains; Suspensions in Vitesse Probe, WALL ST. J.,
April 19, 2006 at A1; George Anders, Health-Care Gold Mines: Middlemen Strike It Rich;
Rewarding Career: As Patients, Doctors Feel Pinch, Insurer’s CEO Makes a Billion;
UnitedHealth Directors Strive To Please ‘Brilliant’ Chief; New Questions on Options;
Selling Trout for 40 Cents a Pound, WALL ST. J., April 18, 2006 at A1. Of course, providers
also try to extract higher prices and maintain or improve their compensation. See Reinhardt,
Economist’s Model, supra note 3. But see Vanessa Fuhrmans, Withdrawal Treatment: A
Novel Plan Helps Hospital Wean Itself Off Pricey Tests; It Cajoles Big Insurer to Pay a
Little More for Cheaper Therapies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2007, at A1 (example of costsaving methods originated and championed by provider. Hyman makes this point well in
Mephistopheles and other writings). See e.g., Hyman, Patient Bill of Rights, supra note 61.
A large part of my problem with Hyman’s analysis is his relative overemphasis on provider
profit (particularly physician compensation) as compared to the problems of private insurer
charges and profiteering, which in my view leave problems of provider compensation
(particularly physician compensation) in the dust.
Even more troublesome from my point of view is the differential human cost of
provider avarice in contrast to insurer avarice. Provider avarice may increase costs but
should mean, at least in theory (and mostly in practice) that patients get more care and more
than adequate care. But see Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, supra note 63, at
1183 (“Shoveling money out the door to purchase health care services is, of course, not the
same thing as purchasing high-quality health care.”). By contrast, insurer avarice is
manifested in claim denial that may lead to severe injury or even death for a patient unable
to obtain coverage; see Jane Zhang, Chronic Condition: Amid Fight for Life, A Victim of
Lupus Fights for Insurance; Lost in U.S. Health-Care Maze, Her Coverage Was Ended As
Her Illness Worsened; Skipping a $2,000 CT Scan, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2006, at A1. But, of
course, Hyman is hardly alone in pinning much of the blame for rising medical costs (in my
view, more of the blame) on providers rather than insurers who fail to control them
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federal government and individual states have bargaining clout exceeding
that of even large companies. Even a small state (e.g., Nevada) has more
employees than even the largest multinational companies. In addition, of
course, insurance administered through a national government or 50 state
administrations would be significantly more streamlined than insurance
purchased through tens of thousands of companies (some large, some
small) and administered by scores of health insurers.
Just as employer-insurer bargaining has not been the anticipated cost
control panacea regarding premiums, bargaining between insurers and
medical providers has not controlled costs to the degree anticipated by
defenders of private medical insurers. It is not at all clear that insurers are
particularly effective at controlling medical costs in a consistent and
rational way.66 In spite of the central role of private insurers in the current
medical care system, medical costs continue to rise, despite some
occasional brief periods of relative stability. By comparison, the health
care systems that stop with the half-measures of the American status quo
and move directly to the government single-payer system have significantly
lower per capita medical costs.67
The evidence on insurer cost control is mixed. For example, insurers
have been effective in negotiating provider discounts, at least this appears
to be the case on the face of benefits explanation statements commonly sent
by insurers to policyholders. A typical one indicates that Doctor X charged
$85 for an office visit but discounted it to $45 in order to receive insurer
payment. Even with my $20 deductible, Doctor X has, at least in theory,
reduced his charges because of the presence of private insurance in this
medical care transaction.68
(particularly the particularly avaricious) and for often establishing economic incentives that
are at least as misguided as anything the government could dream up; see e.g. Bruce C.
Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 22.
66. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Critical Case: How an Email Rant Jolted a Big HMO: A
22-Year-Old’s Tirade Made Trouble for Kaiser; Mr. Deal Got Fired, Famous, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 24, 2007, at A1 (whistleblower notes $1.5 billion annually in alleged waste expenditure
by insurer on misconceived electronic records project); John C. Goodman, Perverse
Incentives in Health Care, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2007 at A13 (noting that Mayo Clinic may
be cheaper than your local hospital).
67. See supra note 18.
68. Random walks through recent family medical bills reflect similarly deep
discounts, at least on paper, for other services. Fore example, one specialist lists a charge of
$220 for a comprehensive new patient visit, but accepts $96.72 from my insurer, “adjusts”
the charges to eliminate $93.28 (effectively eating this portion of the charge and in effect
knocking the $220 charge to $130, leaving $30 as the patient’s portion. For an ultrasound
done separately for the examination, the list price is $175, for which the insurance company
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Alternatively, Doctor Y may be unwilling to discount the retail price of
an office building but has patients who prefer Dr. Y or doctors with a
similar practice style and unwillingness to make deep discounts for
insurers. Dr. Y may simply bill the patient for whatever portion of the bill
the insurer does not cover. In effect, this subjects the patients of Dr. Y
(e.g., me) to a 50 percent co-pay, a financial burden I am happy to bear for
relatively lower cost medical needs of this magnitude. I don’t shop for a
cheaper doctor or one more willing to make the insurer’s proffered discount
because I prefer Dr. Y, who on average spends triple the time with me
during an office visit than my previous family physician and also is willing
to be involved with any hospitalization of patients.
pays $68.54, the doctor absorbs $89.32 and I am billed $17.14. The math looks about right,
but I am not about to verify by taking the time to dig into the fine print of my group policy
nor am I going to call a representative of the TPA that my employer’s plan has retained to
process claims. The final tally of $47.85 billed to me (there were some small lab charges as
well) seems reasonable in relation to the $405 retail price listed on the doctor’s invoice and
leaves me paying the traditional 20 percent co-pay. So much for the power of patient
consumerism. Because I was seeing the doctor over a relatively acute medical issue (an
infection), bypassing medical care was not an option and, knowing that all doctors of this
specialty generally charge roughly the same rates, I was unlikely to price shop as well. Nor
would I be deterred by the 20 percent co-pay. The deterrence was the time and
inconvenience of seeing the doctor. If I had not been previously told (based on a routine
blood test) that I had an infection (accompanied by considerable symptoms of discomfort), I
would gladly have skipped the trip to the doctor. So much for moral hazard.
A less extreme example of discount billing with reduced monopoly money
character of U.S. medical insurance was reflected in a recent family bill for oral surgery,
specifically the extraction of four wisdom teeth from my older son’s mouth. The dentist
charged $1,465 ($285 for general anesthesia, and $295 per tooth. Of this total, the insurer
paid 1,052, I paid $313, and the dentist absorbed $100 in discount.
Again tending to refute the picture of the world painted by market/consumeroriented commentators, I was really pretty indifferent to both the doctor’s suggested retail
price and the degree to which the insurer extracted pricing concessions, even though this
was not emergency surgery. This was the dentist my son and I wanted to use based on the
experience of his siblings (one with this dentist and another having a less successful wisdom
teeth extraction with another well-regarded dentist in town). I did not think $1,400 was a
particularly high price to pay for all this dental work, which required not only the time and
skill of the oral surgeon but also specific and general staff assistance, considerable fixed
office overhead (e.g., special equipment), and variable costs such as general and local
anesthesia, gauze, surgical thread, etc. My $300 payment seemed more than reasonable,
again paralleling the customary 20 percent co-pay, but I would hardly have blinked if the
figure had been $400 or $500.
See also Hyman & Silver, supra note 61, at 966 (largely positing substantial
efficacy of private insurers in controlling prices but castigating them for not caring
sufficiently about quality of care delivered). See also id. at 981 (noting that medical
malpractice insurance is “rarely risk rated”)(footnote omitted).
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According to the market/consumer-oriented approach, I am not enough
of a bargain hunter. In this realm, I am behaving more according to the
professionalism paradigm of medicine than the market competition
paradigm. I value more thorough professional treatment more than a
reduced price tag. Once again, my own experience suggests that much of
the view of patient behavior posited by those promoting the consumeroriented approach does not accurately reflect actual patient behavior, at
least for those with means or insurance.
In addition, something about the deep discounts given by providers to
insurers is uncomfortably reminiscent of the property tax statements we all
also receive as homeowners. A typical such statement gives an assessed
value of the home that, even after the post-2005 housing downturn, is
generally substantially lower than the actual current fair market value of the
house. Thus, a tax rate per $1,000 of value that would seem unduly
confiscatory if the home were valued at current market prices becomes a
sufferable tax burden when applied to an artificially low value carried on
the assessor’s books.
In similar fashion, the net cost of a medical service may be discounted
only as a matter of cosmetics. If provider discounts are a part of the game
of insurer-provider interaction, the situation evolves to one in which the
provider’s list price is intentionally inflated in the knowledge that the
insurer will impose a discount. In order to get his $45 payment from the
medical insurer, Doctor X charges $90 for what would have otherwise been
a $45 charge (or $65 if the patient’s co-pay is viewed as a sort of
subsidizing middleman were eliminated from the equation).
My own view is that $90 for a routine office visit to a family doctor is
high enough to border on the excessive, despite the high overhead of
running a doctor’s office, if the doctor is applying the business school rule
of thumb that a doctor’s “encounter” with the patient should be no more
than seven minutes. Extrapolated, this results in an hourly rate of
compensation for the doctor exceeding $700, a rate comparable with top
partners in commercial law firms, which have high overhead resembling
that of a doctor’s office.
However, if the doctor is seeing each patient for 15 minutes on
average, the doctor’s gross hourly rate is less than $400 per hour, a rate
comparable to that of top business lawyers in many cities and a higher rate
of pay than found in most occupations. However, the net income to the
doctor from this hour of work will be considerably less, perhaps even a
comparative pittance, depending on the doctor’s overhead costs, which may
be substantial, in some part because of expenditures required for dealing
with private and government insurers. Understandably, even the most
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professional of physicians is tempted by the thought of shorter patient
encounters and greater profits. Spending 10 minutes per patient instead of
15 minutes per patient results in a 50 percent increase in gross income (to
$600/hour). But if overhead costs are not too high, doctors can earn quite a
good living and still give each patient on average 15 minutes of their
professional attention.
The case that per-service charges and compensation to medical
providers are on the high side becomes stronger when one examines the
rate of insurer payment for medical procedures, which can involve
thousands or even tens of thousands of dollars for a 45-75 minute surgery.
Much depends on the locality, the procedure, and the insurer. Similarly,
Medicare reimbursement rates vary widely by state.69 In spite of the higher
overhead for surgery (as compared to an office providing patient
examination), these compensation structures can make Wall Street lawyers
look cheap. But it may also be the case that the surgery reimbursement
rates are modest in light of the time, skill, training, and overhead required
for performing a procedure. As previously discussed, one can in my city
get wisdom teeth extracted from a highly regarded oral surgeon for a list
price of less than $300 per tooth. Less prestigious dentists in town may
charge as little as $145 per tooth.70 This is not a lot to spend for an
important, one-time medical-dental event designed to minimize or avoid
future problems.71
Hospital charges are, from my own experience, more problematic.
Hospital charges of $2,000 per day are not uncommon, with much of the
cost of medical care received while staying in a hospital separately billed at
69. See Hyman, Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165, supra note 63, at
1179-81.
70. See supra note 68. As some point, too low a price for wisdom tooth extraction
should presumably raise concerns about patient safety. Unless the doctor charging $145 per
tooth simply has an Albert Schweitzer-like preference for lower income, it is more likely
that he has fewer or less experienced office staff, less modern equipment and facilities, and
a business model that requires greater speed in performing the operation and releasing the
patient. All other things being equal, this has to increase the risk of adverse outcomes for
the patient. The dividing line between safe-but-no-frills extraction and unduly risky
extraction is one best made by trained professionals and competent regulators untainted by
undue financial incentives. But at some point, cheaper medical care becomes less safe
medical care. For example, poorly done wisdom tooth extraction can damage nerves, gums,
other teeth or result in undue bleeding and severe infection as well as a painful “dry socket.”
71. But the medical cost-legal fee dichotomy breaks down somewhat. For example,
expensive lawyers are generally retained and paid by business entities that deduct the cost
from their taxable income. Individuals only have this luxury if medical expenses exceed 7.5
percent of gross income in a given year.
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a separate time. In spite of the cost of physical overhead, nursing services,
and liability insurance that a stay at the hospital somewhat different than
grabbing a hotel room, this is a lot of money to spend for in essence
parking a patient in a spot with access to medical facilities and nursing care
personnel. If private insurers can force doctors to take 50 percent
discounts, one wonders why similar cost reduction has not been imposed
on hospitals.
Viewed broadly, it appears that private insurers standing in for
individuals undoubtedly restrain medical care costs to a significant degree.
But they are hardly great price-busters in this regard. More important for
purposes of the medical insurance debate, there appears to be no reason that
a government entity policing medical charges could not perform the price
control function as effectively as private insurers. In practice, it appears
that the Veteran’s Administration, Medicare, and Medicaid all do
comparably well in this regard as compared to private insurers.
If nothing else, a quilt of private insurance funding much of health care
logically imposes greater expenditures than a government plan simply from
the higher administrative costs associated with documenting services,
claims, and payment involving so many insurers who have different forms,
procedures, and protocols. Typical doctor’s offices devote more than half
their overhead simply to the administrative and paperwork burdens
imposed by the current system. In effect, we have a system that acts as
something of a private full-employment measure by requiring the hiring of
several persons who do not actually provide medical services in order to to
support a single person or handful of persons actually offering medical
services. In the private health insurance world, bureaucracy and paperwork
dominate to a degree that few government agencies can match.72 For

72. Again, to me, personal and shared experience is as telling as any statistical report.
As one example, I have a friend with a spouse in need of mental health care. Although her
group insurance policy clearly covers these services, the claims administrator (which was
retained by the managing general agent (which was retained by the self-insured employer’s
group insurance plan) has repeatedly, erroneously refused treatment, incorrectly claiming
that the spouse must be in an “acute” ready-to-jump-off-a-bridge mental state. After many
hours of phone calls and emails, my friend finally reached someone in the MGA office who
confirmed that indeed there was coverage under the policy. However, to effectuate
treatment, she is again required to go through the same claims administrator that continues
to claim non-coverage even though this issue has been decided favorably to the insured. It
is hard to imagine a government agency doing a poorer, more wasteful job of determining
coverage and policing the receipt of medical benefits. Cynics among us might wonder
whether this is in fact part of a larger conspiracy (tacit or explicit) to delay treatment and
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hospitals, the ratio or medical to administrative expenses is somewhat
lower, but largely only because the cost of medical services at the hospital
(e.g., surgery, intravenous feeding, intensive care) dwarfs the costs of the
less intense medical care administered in a doctor’s office. Further, if one
considers the provision of a basic room and bed to be administrative
overhead rather than medical services, the hospital ratio of overhead to
medical costs would be high. By contrast, government programs offer a
consistency and streamlining superior to that of the current status quo
affecting most insureds.
Reduction of paperwork provides the opportunity to deploy the savings
in administrative costs for most substantive expenditures such as more
useful treatment or better compensation of medical professionals who
payment or to discourage insureds from using mental health services that they literally have
paid for in advance through insurance premiums.
Closer to home is my daughter’s experience with physical therapy after knee
surgery. Pursuant to a doctor’s prescription (actually several over time), she has been
receiving therapy for some months. Throughout this time, I have received scores of form
letters informing me that my insurer cannot determine whether to pay its portion of the cost
until it receives further information. The insurer claims it does not have the prescription(s)
on file while the provider claims it was sent weeks earlier. Eventually, the provider and the
insurer agree that these indeed are properly covered and documented services, although
there has been for me some lost time from work making calls or writing letters.
For example, as this was being written, I received in the mail a thick envelope
from my insurance plan’s claims administrator containing 30 separate forms (plus an
additional two forms arriving under separate cover in the same day’s mail) indicating that,
after all the dust had settled , my insurer was covering the physical therapy. I am course
happy to be covered without dispute and to have my daughter receive needed post-operation
physical therapy. But was it even remotely necessary to kill so many trees and incur so
much administrative expense in coming to that decision and communicating it to me?
In effect, the bottom line is the same. But due to these miscommunications and
delays, approximately 70 of my daughter’s PT sessions have resulted in insurer-generated
letters and “explanation” of benefits that needlessly kill trees, require postage, distract me,
and require filing. Meanwhile, the provider waits weeks or months for payment, which may
explain part of why the cost for a simple physical therapy session is (at least by my
reckoning) shockingly high (both in stated retail terms and after discount). Of course, the
delay and extra expense may be the provider’s fault. But an efficient insurer would
presumably find some way to avoid at least some of this seemingly needless expense.
It is hard to imagine a government single-payer system creating more waste for in
connection with a claim that in the final analysis is covered as part of routine insurer
operations. Nor does the private insurer/claims manager appear to be any better at
communicating than much-maligned government bureaucracies. For example, the typical
letter of this type I have received in connection with my daughter’s physical therapy informs
me that this is a “2nd Notice” (even when it is the first notice) and that I must “[p]lease
respond in 30 days.” A few lines later, I am told that “[n]o action is required of you at this
time.”
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might otherwise be unwilling to perform services for the payment rates
promised by private insurers. For example, an increasing number of
physicians will not accept private insurance (or at least certain types of
private insurance) but will accept Medicaid or Medicare patients. In effect,
this portion of the market of medical providers is refuting market-based
defense of the status quo and demonstrating that for doctors there is
nothing inherently superior about dealing with a private insurer as
compared to a government insurer.
Perhaps the biggest elephant in the room for advocates of increase
market-based, privatized, or consumer-driven health care is the simple fact
that the United States long ago stopped resembling anything close to a pure
market-based model for the delivery of medical care.73 In spite of this
“[t]axpayers . . . don’t get as much bang for their bucks because the
government guarantees coverage for the elderly and the poor, groups that
account for a disproportionately large amount of expenditures.”74
Most obviously, we have Medicare and Medicaid and the VA and the
Federal Employees Insurance Program as well as the de facto insurance of
emergency room care that, for the uninsured, becomes subsidized or even
“free” medical care, the costs of which are externalized on the medical
community and society at large. This coverage accounts for 40 percent or
more of the medical coverage provided in the country (and perhaps even
more of the total expenditures on health care). Medicare is politically
popular and will as only expand as the population ages. Medicaid, like
most programs designed for the needy, has a less powerful political base
but seemingly also one that can withstand attack. The VA enjoys similar
73. See Daniel Gross, National Health Care? We’re Halfway There, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2006, §3, at 4 (stating that 38 percent of medical expenses in U.S. are publicly
funded; “[t]he government spends money as if there were a national health insurance
program. In 2004, government spending on health care equaled 9.6 percent of the gross
domestic product, compared with 6.9 percent in Canada, which has a single-payer universal
health care program,” (quoting Harvard Medical School Professor David Himmelstein);
considering all expenditures “government accounts for about two-thirds of health care
spending” (quoting Princeton University economist Uwe Reinhardt)). Accord, Anna
Bernasek, Health Care Problem? Check the American Psyche, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006
§3, at 1 (in U.S., government share of total medical care spending is 45 percent). See also
Bobinski, supra note 13 (“In 1987, the public and private share of health expenditures were
the mirror image of the distribution found in Candada, with the private sector picking up
70% of the costs of health care and the public sector paying for 30%. The public share of
health care expenditures [in the U.S.] grew to 40% in 2005 and remained stable in
2006”)(footnotes omitted).
74. See Gross, supra note 73 (“A rough rule holds that private insurance covers twothirds of the population and pays for only one-third of all health care”(quoting Reinhardt)).
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support. Although no one likes the use of emergency room visits as a
substitute for regular health care (rather than true, acute emergencies or
medical problems taking place at night or on weekends), political and
social sentiment continues to weigh against giving Hospital ERs the
prerogative to refuse services
In addition, even the supposedly more private and market-oriented half
of American health care is a far cry from ordinary retail selection, purchase
and consumption. Beginning with the use of health insurance coverage as a
means of escaping the strictures of World War II’s wage and price controls,
we have replaced individual fee-for-services purchase of medical care with
not just an insurance-based system but one dominated by large group plans
that are only “chosen” by policyholders at the margin. As this system has
evolved, it has become, as well described by Nan Hunter, into “employer
corporate sovereignty in the formulation and administration of risk pools
for group health insurance in the workplace.”75 Although this may be
“private” (in that it is done by employers and non-government group
insurers), it is not so much a market as a negotiated form of private
legislation.
Advocates of greater efficiency in health care pricing and delivery can
muster a number of good arguments against a greater government role and
against government subsidization. But in addition to the problem of
overlooking the humanitarian concern that adequate health care seems to
many of us more a right than a consumer preference, the conservative side
of the health insurance debate founders on empirical shoals. Political
sentiment will almost certainly prevent any retrenchment of the existing
governmental presence in the medical coverage status quo. Only a
minority of voters seem to get enthused when political candidates rail
against socialized medicine and only a few of even those that do have been
willing to support any significant curtailment of the existing systems. Most
voters want to at least maintain the government presents that already exists.
That sentiment will only grow stronger as more voters reach age 65 and the
total medical costs of the Iraq War and Afghanistan intervention continue
to roll on for years to come.
Because of this political reality, conservatives will never again see an
open market world regarding the purchase and delivery of medical services.
Consequently, many of the proposed conservative remedies for current
health care problems are simply not likely to be effective. They cannot
75. See Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy in Health
Care, 97 GEO. LJ. 1 (2008).
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supplant the current mixture of public and private with a tabula rasa that
permits the purported full flowering of benefits they posit from a private
market model. Consequently, they are reduced to proposing incentives for
more efficient behavior or isolated market-mimicking initiatives such as
health savings accounts.
As Tim Jost persuasively argues, HSAs appear largely a government
subsidized benefit to the healthy and wealthy.76 This is hardly the return of
the free, private market. Rather, it looks instead like successful rentseeking by interest groups (the wealthy, banks, and insurers selling the
high-deductible catastrophic plans that accompany HSAs). Since the
nation is not overrun with wealthy people in good health looking for tax
shelters and humans are not the posited rational option maximers consumed
with financial planning, the predicted boom in HSAs has been slow to
materialize, suggesting that they are not the panacea painted by their
advocates.77
The second empirical shoal upon which the conservative ship founders
is the experience of other industrialized nations. As previously noted,
Canada and Western Europe, after embarking on national government-run
plans for universal coverage, have never retreated from that goal. More
important, as also previously noted, the per capita costs of medical care in
those nations is dramatically lower than the U.S. and their citizenry appears
to be at least as health as that of the U.S.78 Simply put, one must ask the
76. See Jost, supra note 4.
77. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Health Savings Plans Start to Falter; Despite Employer
Enthusiasm for Consumer-Directed Approach, Patients Express Dissatisfaction With How
the Accounts Work, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, at D1.
78. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public Approaches to Insuring the
Uninsured: Lessons From International Experience With Private Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 419, 437-39 (2001) (noting higher costs of U.S. system as compared to those of other
countries); Justin Lahart, Rethinking Health Are and the GDP, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at
C1 (noting dramatically higher costs per capita of U.S. System but U.S. measuring worse
according to life expectancy, infant mortality, and other metrics); But see Tyler Cowen,
Abolishing the Middlemen Won’t Make Health Care a Free Lunch, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
2007, at C3 (contending that full amount of medical overhead costs in Europe and Canada is
systemically understated in cost comparison studies because of failure to consider longer
waiting times for some services in non-U.S. countries, which shifts in-kind overhead cost to
consumer and also arguing that European systems are less responsive to paying for new
treatments and drugs); Froma Harrop, Canada’s the Wrong Model for Universal Health
TIMES,
Feb.
28,
2007,
available
at
Care,
SEATTLE
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2003592432_harrop28.html (referring to
study by Fraser Institute, an organization that “promotes privatization” as finding Canadian
system “wanting” in comparison to others but failing to provide concrete examples).
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question: If movement toward greater privatization, market competition, or
personal choice is so wonderful, why have these other nations not moved in
this direction? And why has there failure to make any such movement not
seemingly harmed health care in those countries relative to the more
privatized, market-based, consumer-driven United States?
III.

THE INEFFICACY OF INSURERS IN ACHIEVING FAIR
COST CONSTRAINT

Another aspect of Adam Smith’s legacy in the U.S. is a widely held
belief that the private sector is always considerably more efficient than the
public sector in accomplishing goals.79 Applied to medical coverage, this
mythology posits that private sector insurers play a vital role in controlling
health care costs that stems from the private sector’s greater talent in
achieving efficiency. A significant fear standing in the way of movement
toward government as single payer is that health care costs, already rising
well faster than inflation, will be even less effectively checked by
government than it has been by the private sector.
The mythology of Smithian invisible hand efficiency is so strong that
its advocates conveniently overlook the degree to which much of the
American economy has implicitly found that in many instances,
Both the Harrop and Cowen op-ed pieces reflect the type of rhetorical shortcut
that often substitutes for analysis in the health care debate. Harrop quotes the Fraser Institute
founder saying that “If people don’t have to dig into their own pockets when they use
medical services” “you find yourself giving universal access to a physician for sniffles and
company.’” Cowen makes a more sophisticated but similar argument that “patients and
doctors will try to get the most out of any system. When they aren’t paying directly,
patients will seek extra care and doctors will be happy to oblige.”) (also analogizing overuse
of medical services as akin to shoplifting items in a retail store).
This is the standard, overblown moral hazard analysis dumbed down to a homey
phrase. But does it really measure the inclination of more than a micro-majority of
consumers? Every person I know (including non-working adults and students) finds going
to the doctor (even when quite sick) to be a great inconvenience that exacts a heavy price in
time and energy even without a co-pay or deductible. They only go to the doctor when they
feel they have a real need. For sniffles, they would rather have the additional time at work
or to rest at home rather than parking themselves in a doctors’ office after breaking up their
day to travel there. On this issue, much of the resistance to comprehensive governmentadministered insurance appears to come from those who hold a warped picture of the real
world. Although over-utilization by a fully insured population is a danger at the margin, it
hardly represents normal patient behavior.
79. Bernasek, supra note 60 (“[c]hanging the minds of so many millions of people
isn’t done overnight. But sooner or later, persuading people to do something that’s in their
own economic interest ought to succeed.”).
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government regulation in derogation of private markets has been necessary
for sound and efficient economic and social policy. Occasionally, even
government operation of certain activities may be more efficient than
regulated or unfettered market activity. For example, we have largely
forsaken the invisible hand in the cases of utility provision (gas, electricity,
water), transportation (roads and mass transit), airports, cargo hauling,
military procurement, and infrastructure generally.
One can view the provision of adequate health care as an infrastructure
problem. Like many such problems, it is best solved by government
intervention (and funding) to create the infrastructure platform, which in
turn decreases administrative costs, provides consistency, and increases
social productivity. Efforts initially perhaps seen as in derogation of
Smith’s invisible hand thus ultimately help create an environment in which
markets and productivity can flourish beyond what would occur in the
absence of adequate infrastructure.
This portion of the health insurance problem also reflects another legal
friction or inconsistency in attitudes. On the one hand, the public wants to
hold down health care cost increases. But on the metaphorical other hand,
the public appears unwilling to embrace many cost-containing measures.
For example, health costs during the 1990s were relatively stable but this
appears to have resulted in significant part from the limitations on care
imposed by HMOs. Many insureds chafed at these restrictions and their
discontent fueled policy measures restricting HMO gatekeeping or
mandating benefits. Although the reining in of HMOs may not have been
the sole or even prime cause, health care costs began to rise again
significantly in the late 1990s and early 20th Century.
Critics of a national medical insurance plan have at least something of
a point: if left to their own devices, consumers will take and take and take
when it comes to medical care, at least if they are not paying sufficiently
directly with their own money. Consequently, they argue, under a
government funded and administered system, individuals will lack
adequate incentive to control themselves and will consistently opt for more
treatment when less would suffice. Hydraulically, this drives up the cost of
health care (quite substantially in the aggregate) unless it is tamped down
by a gatekeeper.
Defenders of the current model argue that the private insurance
industry does this better than government. Although some of the “proof”
for this assertion is essentially a second bare assertion that government is
always more wasteful than the private sector, defenders to the status quo
can point to government reaction to HMO controls as an example of the
government’s greater sensitivity toward consumer sentiment. Insurers
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argue, at least implicitly, that his is bad because it gives government
insufficient backbone to control health care costs, by rationing if necessary
and that by contrast the insurance industry, fueled by the profit motive of
Smith’s invisible hand, has the fortitude to hold the line on costs (or at least
hold the line better than the government).
This is not an unpersuasive or illogical argument. However, it ignores
two substantial problems. First, advocates of holding the line on costs
appear not to recognize that holding the line is not always a good thing.
Sometimes, some things are worth a higher price in order to better provide
the good or service in question. Sometimes this is for utilitarian reasons:
doing something right will increase productivity further down the line.
Sometimes, this is for humanitarian reasons: doing something right is
worth simply to provide better, more humane treatment to patients.
Government regulation banning “drive-by” deliveries of babies (so
named because insurers would not pay for more than 48 hours of hospital
care after a delivery, and hospitals tended to seek discharge within 48 hours
even if individuals were willing to pay for longer stays) provides a good
example. In his previous writings, David Hyman has attacked these
regulations with a sustained ferocity usually reserved for Red Sox fans
talking about the Yankees.80 In his contribution to this Symposium, he
again makes the argument that these regulations needlessly increased
hospital stays and medical costs, resulting in a corresponding increase in
medical insurance that encouraged shrinkage of coverage.81
I have quite a different view, one formed in large part as a result of my
wife’s experience with three baby deliveries, all by Caesarian section.
Although Hyman would undoubtedly criticize this as argument by
anecdote, I think the points made by reciting my own family experience
make a useful point. Further, although policymaking that is too driven by
anecdote of course is dangerous, it is equally dangerous to lose sight of the
application of policies by paying insufficient attention to personal
experience and giving exclusive focus to aggregate date that may obscure
or minimize the consequences of practices on the ground. Josef Stalin was
not addressing medical insurance when he infamously uttered that “a single
death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic.” But he could just as well
have been. It may be a mistake to legislate on the basis of a single moving
80. See David A. Hyman, Commentary, What Lessons Should We Learn from DriveThrough Deliveries? 107 PEDIATRICS 406 (2001); Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries, supra
note 61.
81. See Hyman, Government Failure?, supra note 4.
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personal story. But it can be just as mistaken to legislate (or refrain from
legislation) based on aggregate data that glosses over the daily operation of
medical care and insurance for real people.
My story (or rather, my wife’s) is not tragic and moving in the manner
of a patient’s needless death due to malpractice or lack of even achieving
patient status because of lack of insurance, but it is instructive. When our
first child was born, there was a long, difficult delivery in which, after 20
hours of labor, the medical professionals concluded (about 12 hours too
late for my taste, but that was the orientation of this practice) that Caesarian
section was necessary for a safe birth. Surgery successfully occurred in the
wee hours of the morning and a healthy baby emerged. Mom was
exhausted, looking and feeling a bit like someone who had been in a
marthon boxing match.
Nonetheless, the hospital gave us the bum’s rush out after a two-day
stay in the hospital.82 We were comparatively young, unsophisticated in
these matters, and probably should have fought harder to stay in the
hospital for two days (perhaps more) of much needed rest and care. I even
made an attempt at offering to pick up the extra care out of personal funds.
The hospital was distinctly uninterested in working with us. If the
insurance would not pay for more than 48 hours of post-op care, it
seemingly wanted us out, in spite of our middle class ability to pay. So
much for consumer-driven health care.
Back home, the consequences of a rushed, abbreviated stay in the
hospital were palpable. The new mother, still physically exhausted from
delivery, was now attempting to recover from the wounds of a C-section at
home while caring for a newborn. Although the dutiful husband did his
semi-competent best to manage care for baby and mother, this was a far cry
from the type of rest and care both would have received from the hospital.
It took weeks for my wife to recover sufficiently to do anything of modest
strenuousness. Anecdotal or not, I remain convinced that she would have
returned to her normal energy, health, productivity much sooner if she
could have only had a few more days in the hospital.
82. Which means that we were accorded less coverage (and less maternal recovery
time in the hospital) than even if we had been subject to a standard “drive-through delivery,”
which Hyman defines as the practice of discharging women and newborns from the hospital
less than forty-eight hours after a vaginal delivery and ninety-six hours after a Cesarean
section. See Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries, supra note 69, at 9. Consequently, our
family medical insurance situation would have been helped significantly with legislation
that did not go as far as the Newborns and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996. 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2003).
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In addition, the newborn in question (our elder son) at age three weeks
developed a viral infection, exhibited meningitis-like symptoms, and was
hospitalized and given considerable medical care for days before
recovering, which of necessity took mom and dad further away from work
and productivity. Although proving a link between my son’s severe
problems at age three weeks and the shortened hospital stay is impossible, I
can’t help but think that his mother’s bedraggled condition on discharge,
which made for lactation and nursing problems, which in turn posed
nutrition and immunity issues for the baby, might have played a role. In
any event, what resulted was a 4-5 week period in which two previously
productive adults were largely out of commission in at least some part due
to the supposedly cost-saving, efficient mechanism of kicking new mothers
to the curb two days after a particularly rough delivery and C-section birth.
When subsequent children arrived, C-section was also required. By
then, we were a little more sophisticated and assertive (and had broader
insurance coverage and better medical care). In addition to performing the
operations much earlier without physically punishing the mother for hours,
additional hospital recovery time was obtained. Maternal recovery and
new baby care proceeded far more smoothly and effectively. Neither of the
children had any post-partum health problems and both Mom and Dad got
considerably more done during the ensuing five weeks after these
deliveries than was the case with the first delivery.
With this personal history, it is understandable that I was never a fan of
drive-by deliveries and was thrilled to see government intervention to stop
them. Notwithstanding Hyman’s cogent (if perhaps overheated) arguments
of net policy detriment, I remain a fan of this regulation. Although it will
not always result in greater family productivity and reduced overall
medical costs, I am convinced that in many cases giving a new mother and
baby a couple more days of hospital care (while the often hapless husband
also has more time to get the home situation under control) will have that
effect. More important, it is simply a more humane way to treat new
mothers and children. American society regularly purports to value
families. Providing an additional increment of medical care – or at least
removing the incentive for hospitals to rush patients home – is a small price
to pay in the service of those values.
A second problem with the conventional wisdom (that the private
sector controls costs much better than the government) is that considerable
evidence exists to suggest the sentiment is overblown or perhaps even
erroneous. At the least, it appears that private insurers do an inconsistent
job of holding the line. More important, it is to me unclear whether private
insurers do any better job of cost containment than does the government.
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Alternatively, if private insurers do too much better than the government in
holding down the price of medical services, this may create incentives that
undermine the availability and provision of sound medical care.
As previously noted, private insurers have been able to extract from
medical providers significant discounts from what the provider otherwise
states as the “list price” for a medical or laboratory service. This may
simply mean that medical pricing has become like automobile shopping.
The “sticker price” exists only as an outside anchor or measuring stick but
no one really pays this list price (except the rare uninsured patient who
actually has independent financial resources). For purposes of argument, I
will give credit to insurers for actually enforcing some type of real price
constraint about medical providers. At the very least, one certainly hears
doctors consistently complain about the low payment rates provided by
insurers.83
The question then becomes: does the private insurer do a better job of
payment-for-services containment than comparable government programs.
Here, the evidence seems mixed. Insurers may be doing a pretty good job
of keeping doctors from charging exorbitant amounts (even if they are also
encouraging doctors to provide assembly-line care). But Medicare and
Medicaid also appear to be effective in tamping down costs-per-medical
service. And the VA, with its system of staff physicians on salary, may be
the most efficient of all in controlling doctor-related costs. Even where the
insurer suppresses provider rates more than does a government payer, this
hardly means the net benefit to patients and society is greater. Excessive
cost cutting may lead to unwanted collateral consequences.84
83. Doctors also differentiate among insurers. Many refuse to see patients insured by
carriers whose payment rates are simply too low. One former internist of mine explained he
rejected patients covered by the HMO then known as US Healthcare because it paid “coolie
wages” for office visits. Whatever the political incorrectness of the comment, it is a pretty
good reflection of the way many doctors today do business. They will work with some
health insurers but not others based on the amounts paid for service, the administrative
burden, and the overall difficulty of working with some providers. Other physicians may
take an “all comers” attitude, assuming that by seeing enough patients fast enough, they can
make more money than if they simply avoid the stingiest, most difficult insurers altogether.
84. The same, of course, can be true for excessive imposition of costs. See Stephen
Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Unintended Consequences, The Case of the Red-Cockaded
TIMES,
Jan
20,
2008
(Magazine)
available
at
Woodpecker,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/20/magazine/20wwln-freak-t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
Dubner & Levitt, in an installment of their now well-known “Freakonomics”
feature in the Times (see also STEPHEN DUBNER & STEVEN D. LEVITT, FREAKONOMICS:A
ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (William Morrow 2005)),
give the example of a deaf patient consulting an orthopedic surgeon and insisting on her
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Clearly there is inherent tension (legal friction once again) between the
goal of making provision of quality medical services economically
attractive to prospective providers and holding back runaway medial costs.
Hyman’s resolution of the tension is largely against medical providers and
in favor of insurers and the posited cost-controlling force of more
empowered consumers. In addition to disagreeing with Hyman about the
actual efficacy of consumer constraint, particularly where the consumer is
too poor or uninsured to have much clout, I question whether excessive
payment to providers, particularly doctors, is the culprit.
Consider my eye doctor, who in addition to being very competent is
also professional in the classic sense. Although he is repeatedly identified
as one of the best doctors in the area in local magazine’s “best of” features,
he carries a comparatively low patient load, spends significant time with
each patient, and has an uncrowded waiting room. He accepts Medicare
but not many private insurers, where he not only has found the
reimbursement rate too low but also has found the private insurers’
paperwork and bureaucratic hassle to be too much for his staff. He also
expresses support for a comprehensive single-payer system along the lines
of Medicare and suspects that a large portion of doctors, particularly
younger doctors less reared on the traditional AMA stances against
“socialized” medicine, agree with him.
right (per the Americans With Disabilities Act) to a sign language interpreter so that she
could better understand the doctor’s diagnosis and recommendation. In the Los Angeles
metro area where this took place, a qualified interpreter generally charges $120/hour with a
two-hour minimum, an amount required to be borne by the physician and which the
patient’s private health insurer refused to cover. Not surprisingly, the good doctor who
initially accepted this needy patient and then was hit with unexpected interpreter charges
made no money on this patient. His solution and that of similarly situated doctors in the
future will be to attempt to avoid taking such patients. Id.
The episode serves of course as a good example of the occasional incidence of
negative unintended consequences from well-meaning legislation. In addition, it serves to
illustrate the degree to which too much of the modern health care burden has been placed on
doctors relative to insurers. Further, it provides additional support for a government single
payer system. Imposing translator costs on a single doctor, or even a medical group or
hospital, has great potential for unfairness simply because of the fortuity of when a deaf
prospective patient may approach a particularly provider seeking medical care. Imposing
mandatory coverage on a single private insurer is a better approach but still may result in
lopsided distribution of the added costs of improving the access and experience of the deaf
seeking medical care. But if the coverage is provided by a national government single payer
system, the added costs of translation are spread as broadly as possible and amortized
among many beneficiaries of the medical-economic system. This optimal risk spreading
seems the fairest solution as well as one efficient in administrative terms and unlikely to
deter any particular deaf patient from seeking and receiving desired care.
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Regarding costs: when he first began performing cataract surgery, he
reports that the Medicare reimbursement rate was approximately $1,200
and that of private insurers was about $1,100. Notwithstanding the
aggregate data about overall increase in medical costs, he has seen the rate
of payment for cataract surgery go down (at least in Las Vegas) to a current
rough range of $600 - $900, depending on the insurer. Medicare pays
about $750. In a world where a visit from the plumber or electrician
routinely results in minimum bills of $125 or more, this hardly seems like
excessive compensation for the doctor. Purchase of cataract surgery
logically should cover not only the doctor’s actual time and skill in
performing the procedure but must provide reasonable contribution to
defraying his overhead and recoupment of investment in human capital
such as medical school and additional training and education.
Successful cataract surgery of course dramatically improves the
patient’s vision and quality of life and probably improves their economic
productivity as well (even though many cataract patients are older and
retired). Compared to other expenditures, particularly those for personal
services,85 paying $750 to the doctor for the procedure does not seem like
price gouging or an otherwise bad deal. More important, if high quality
physicians are reluctant to discount their prices below this amount, trouble
can ensue. Perhaps less competent doctors will be the ones performing the
$600 cataract surgeries. Or perhaps the doctor will make sure he takes on
additional patients and schedules an additional procedure or two on surgery
days, even if this results in more error due to haste or mistakes born of
tiredness.
85. Economies of scale are easier to achieve with manufactured goods than with
delivery of even relatively routine personal services. For example, once the mold has been
established, a manufacturer can crank out I-pods or televisions at a lower cost per additional
unit than even the most rushed, robotic surgeon. Personal services of necessity require
investment of at least a minimum amount of time and present individual variants not found
in manufacturing. Every defective plumbing joint or electric socket is a bit different while
mass-produced goods are not. As a result, an I-pod that lasts for years can be sold for $300
but the same amount of medical care quickly disappears into the mists of consumer
memory. As a result, people tend to see services as overprice relative to hard goods.
Hence, the problem faced by family doctors, pediatricians, dermatologists, and other doctors
whose primary work is seeing patients. By contrast, surgeons and doctors performing
diagnostic procedures are better compensated per minute of their time. Surgical procedures
are a bit of a hybrid in that something like successful cataract removal is a one-time event
with long-lasting, positive consequences. Prescription drugs have elements of both
manufacturing (although research and development costs may be high and harder to recoup
than found for consumer goods) and ongoing personal service because one needs in many
cases to continue purchasing and using the pharmaceutical product for years on end.
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Ultimately, these are empirical questions. My point is that there is
nothing to suggest that Medicare has resolved them less well than a more
tight-fisted insurer. Although government programs might be more
vulnerable to inflationary pressures stemming from politics and public
opinion, private insurers are similarly vulnerable to excessive deference to
the profit motive. If I were having cataract surgery (or most any other
medical procedure), I would rather have the decisionmakers err on the side
of pricing and policies that will make skill service and good treatment
outcomes more likely. This of course may make for higher per service
costs under a government single-payer program. But administrative cost
savings may make up the difference and certainly appear to do so in
Canada and Europe. To the extent that they do not fully do so, this may
simply be the price paid to medical providers by a wealthy nation for high
quality health care that produces collateral economic and social benefits.
In other areas of medical costs, it is similarly hard so see private
insurers doing particularly better than government insurers regarding cost
control. Consider the matter of hospital costs. Again, personal experience
drives my thinking along with aggregate data. In January 2006, I was
stricken with a severe infection, high (105 degrees Fahrenheit) fever,
substantial body aches and pain and a tennis-ball sized cyst on my liver.
After this was detected in an MRI, I was instructed by my doctor to get into
the nearest hospital for further care, which consisted primarily of
intravenous antibiotics. The IV antibiotics worked wonders. Within 36
hours, my fever had abated and I was considered out of danger, although
still feeling weak, horrible, achy, etc. The infectious disease specialist
prescribed a six-week regime of continued IV drugs followed by weeks of
orally taken antibiotics. Eventually (but probably not fast enough), I began
self-administering my IV antibiotics at home with “picc” line in my arm.
The draining of the liver cyst presented more complex and
confrontational issues. At the hospital, it was quickly agreed that the cyst
should be drained. The staff radiologist felt it was too dangerous to do this
without surgery, which the general surgeon was only too happy to perform,
although this would have necessitated a long (6-8 week) recovery period
from the invasive surgery alone. On the good advice of doctor friends, we
located another radiologist who reviewed the CT scan and X-ray film and
concluded that the cyst could be safely drained with the less invasive
insertion of a needle, preferably as an outpatient proceeding but possibly
requiring post-op hospitalization depending on the results. It took days of
wrangling to get discharged from the first hospital. Drainage at the second
hospital (where the second radiologist had privileges) went well but the
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condition of the withdrawn cyst material prompted the doctor to require
hospitalization because of fears of internal bleeding.
All this happened on the Friday before the 2006 Martin Luther King
holiday weekend, which meant that getting physician follow-up was
difficult. Finally, by the ensuing Wednesday, I was discharged. The
situation was made more difficult because my former primary care
physician did not visit patients in the hospital. Instead, the overall
supervision of my care fell to the “hospitalists” or general care internists
that contracted with the hospital. During both my hospital stays (10 days
total), the hospitalists spent a total of about 15 minutes with me (or which
they billed more than $750, a rate that most would agree is unconscionably
high for doctors with this level of skill and comparatively little overhead as
compared to “regular” doctors maintaining an office). During those 15
minutes, they (four different doctors for the hospitalist group were
involved) misstated my record on several occasions. Fortunately, I was
conscious and could correct them. They also were slow to discharge me,
first for the drainage of the cyst and second for home IV care.
During our cumulative 15 minutes together, they asked probing
questions such as whether I raised goats in the back yard and whether that
might be a source of the infection. I successfully suppressed the urge to
remind the doctor in question (a non-native graduated from a non-U.S.
medical school) that we were in Las Vegas, not Waziristan. Subsequently,
I switched to a primary care physician who would (a) visit me in the
hospital to make sure my care was appropriate and (b) did not have an
economic incentive with his hospital client to keep me in the hospital
longer than necessary (a goal that Wayne, Smith and King would
presumably support).
Finally, some weeks after this experience, I received communication
from the hospital and other care providers (although, perhaps
unsurprisingly, the hospitalists lagged, not billing for the services until
more than a year later, without having submitted the bill to my insurer,
even though I had provided them insurance information upon admission to
the hospital). My insurer (or rather the claims administrator that contracts
with the State of Nevada’s self-insured plan) was reasonable.86
86. Our biggest imbroglio was that it did not want to pay for the second
hospitalization because it had not been pre-cleared. In response to the insurer’s original
denial, I explained that the original treatment plan was to perform cyst drainage on an outpatient basis and forgo hospitalization but that, reacting to what he saw during the
procedure, the radiologist, a senior, well-respected doctor in town, required hospitalization
as a precaution out of concern over possible post-drainage internal bleeding. (I suspect he
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When the final bills rolled in, they were substantial, although having
survived, I was more than happy to pay my 20 percent co-pay and move on
with life (which, in cliché-like fashion, I appreciated all the more after this
series of misadventures in the medical system). What continues to bug me,
however, is that there seemed to be lots of fat in this system that could have
been much better controlled by non-avaricious medical professionals and a
more enlightened private insurer/claims management company.
First, there is the absolute cost of hospitalization. It averaged about
$2,000 a day. I realize there is a lot of overhead required for a hospital, but
this seems just too much for ordinary, brand-x rooms and nursing care. As
in many cities, nursing staffs are stretched thin. There were typically only
four nurses on the floor and, judging from my regular sojourns around the
floor, they had many patients in far worse shape than me. They also spent
a considerable amount of their time in record-keeping, even to the neglect
of patients buzzing for assistance. I was ambulatory within a day or so of
the first admission, another sign that it might have been appropriate to have
both hospital stays shortened. (But it was a major boon to be able to walk
to the juice cooler with my IV tower in tow because waiting for the nurses
resembled waiting for Godot.)
Two thousand dollars a day for basic hospitalization? In most cities,
one can get a suite at the Ritz for about a third of that amount. And,
presumably, one could purchase a considerable amount of private nursing
care and rented medical equipment for the other half. Part of the problem,
of course, is that patients like me are not in much of a position to shop
among hospitals, compare prices, and make price-conscious decisions.
Residents of rural areas have even less opportunity for comparison
shopping--another problem with the consumer-driven mythology. Even for
elective surgery, one finds relatively little difference in cost when shopping
around (which I did some years before in connection with a hip
replacement), assuming one can get a hospital or doctor’s business office to
provide straight answers to questions about costs (reticence I suspect comes
from difficulty in talking about their stated rates and discounted rates paid
by insurers). Under these circumstances, one might hope that insurers
could drive a harder bargain with hospitals. In addition, one must again ask
the comparative question: Are the rates paid by private insurers committed
to quality care significantly less than those paid by government programs?
would not have kept me in the hospital as long as the hospitalists and the hospital, who had
an economic interest in my continued stay, did). So informed, my insurer agreed the
hospitalization was apt.
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If not, much of the efficiency-based argument for continuing to cling to a
private insurance model losses its steam.
If nothing else, private insurers (at least judging from my experience)
have not done much to control adverse financial incentives of medical
providers. In fact, one might argue to the contrary. Once the hospitals
discovered that I had good insurance, they wanted to keep me as long as
possible. The hospitalist physicians, when they could be found at all, were
distinctly unhelpful in trying to speed my release even after it became clear
that further hospitalization was not required. The hospitalists also wanted
more and repetitive tests. (I was CT-scanned twice in three days and had to
figuratively stomp my feet in refusing to have a third before getting out of
the first hospital after a five-day stay). The hospitalists and a general
surgeon practicing at the first hospital were only too eager to subject me to
major abdominal surgery without even exploring the possibility that
perhaps my liver cyst could be drained by needle after all. In the end, I had
a feeling akin to a tourist on a desert island with one vendor, who wanted to
exploit this market advantage for all it was worth until the ship to shore
arrived.
My question: why do insurers, who supposedly want to control
runaway costs, not do more to forbid these adverse incentives (more on that
below regarding problematic professionalism) or police them more
aggressively? In my experience, the only real check on price gouging
through churning of services and an excessively extended stay was the
professionalism of some of medical personnel involved87 and my own
nagging (aided by my family), which avoided more expensive surgery and
finally got me released from the two hospitals.
Of course, this latter factor suggests that market cheerleaders are on to
something in wanting to empower consumers. They simply fail to
appreciate the practical limitations on even educated consumers and seem
to forget that the uninsured patient of modest means have almost no
leverage over anything relating to medicine. Perhaps most important, they
87. For example, the invasive radiologist, the infectious disease specialist, the hospital
nursing staff, and the insurance administrator’s case manager were all supportive of an
earlier discharge and transitioning to less expensive outpatient home care as soon as
possible but were delayed by the slowness or mixed motives of the hospitalists. In addition,
my efforts to obtain better, safer, less expensive treatment were aided by doctor friends in
the local medical community, even though they were not my treating physicians. An
impoverished, working class, uninsured, or less educated person would be less likely to
know a helpful doctor through social connections.
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fail to realize the practical limits on my degree of empowerment as a
consumer, at least in this manner with some concrete potential for reducing
medical costs, is no less if I am covered under Medicare or a government
single-payer program rather than a private insurer.
During my time in hospital purgatory, there were other examples of the
insurer being relatively lax in cost control. Consider prescription drugs that
I regularly take. Once admitted to the hospital, I was forbidden to bring my
regular “stash” of pharmaceuticals, which includes cholesterol, blood
pressure, and anti-gout medicine. Instead, the hospital insisted on
administering these prescriptions to me from its stock – at a cost of about
$20 per pill (as compared to the regular cost of about a dollar per dose). I
realize that there can be problems with patients self-medicating. But this
hardly seems to justify a system in which hospitals (who probably get the
drugs for less than I would “on the outside”) are permitted to impose a
2000 percent markup in price – willingly paid by the insurer that is
supposed to be such a stringent guardian of costs.
When I was finally liberated from the hospitals, I was visited by a
wonderfully competent, straight-to-the-point home care nurse who
instructed me in self-administration of the antibiotics and then peacefully
left without looking for any other ways to run up costs (although she was
helpfully available by phone for questions and her company replenished
supplies as necessary). Notwithstanding that this part of my treatment was
sensibly streamlined, the costs for the IV equipment and drugs was
significant, approximately $500 per week. Although this is a lot less than
the $2,000 per day at the hospital (plus itemized charges, including the IV
drugs received at the hospital), it still seems high. I realize that drug
manufacturers need to recoup the cost of research and development as well
as continuing overhead and distribution costs. But I was receiving Zocyn,
a common antibiotic that has been in use for years. One might reasonably
expect a truly efficient private medical and insurance system to be able to
get the costs of such at-home drug care down to something like $200 per
week.
All in all, then, my medical experiences of early 2006 strongly
suggested that the medical community and private insurance does a quite
imperfect job in both treating patients and containing costs. During the
course of 10 days in two hospitals and three months of treatment (including
visits to other specialists recommended in light of possible wear-and-tear
on my liver and kidneys from all this), I was treated by a couple physicians
I came to see as highly competent, with a fairly wide range of empathy and
willingness to explain things to the patient. Overall, my condition was
treated appropriately and successfully, but not very efficiently. However,
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some of the medical professionals cut a less positive figure. The hospitalist
physicians were worse than worthless from my patient’s perspective.
Ironically, this business model of medicine is touted in many quarters as a
more efficient way to deliver services. The primary family physician can
remain in her suburban office park and see more patients more often while
the hospitalist can efficiently attend to the needs of the hospitalized
patients. My experience suggests this theory is seriously flawed.88
To the extent that the private insurer involved attempted to control
costs, it was with fairly crude all-or-nothing measures rather than targeted
attempts to prevent churning or inflated prices. For example, my insurer
initially balked at my second hospitalization before accepting that it was
medically necessary.89 But it readily paid for $20 pills, multiple expensive
tests, fairly expensive IV drugs, and hospital rooms at Helmsley Palace
prices. Could, Medicare and Medicaid really be worse in this regard, as
Hyman argues? If not, there is no reason to fear a national single payer
system on efficiency grounds. The question is not how government
programs compare with perfection. The question is how government
programs compare to their private insurer counterparts.
More to the point of this Symposium: many aspects of medical
treatment and coverage today are intrinsically removed from the consumer.
In my case, I perhaps could have shopped better for a hospital with lower
rates, a more daring or accomplished resident radiologist, or better
hospitalist physicians. But I was running a 105 degree fever at the time and
my primary care physician was counseling immediate hospitalization and
treatment of a rather large liver cyst. Under those circumstances,
comparison shopping and shrewd consumerism is unlikely.
Of course, not all medical situations are acute or time-sensitive. But
even garden variety routine medical care is reasonably esoteric and has
some temporal imperative that prevents consumer choice. If a five-year old
has a fever and joint aches, this is probably just the flu. But what parent
other than Joan Crawford90 will delay treatment while calling doctors for a
88. I have since switched to a primary physician who will visit hospitalized patients
and serve as a check on the quality and expense of care provided by the hospitals and their
associated vendors. What continues to astound me is the popularity of a professional and
business model so rife with conflicts of interest and incentives for more bureaucratic,
expensive, lower quality care.
89. See supra note 86.
90. The parental shortcomings of Crawford, a popular actress in the 1940s and 1950s,
were extensively chronicled in her daughter’s memoir. See CHRISTINA CRAWFORD, MOMMIE
DEAREST (William Morrow 1978).
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price quote? In addition, there are practical problems that likely limit
aggressive consumer cherry picking. What doctor will accept episodic
patients who come to her for flu symptoms, go elsewhere for earache, and
try a third doctor for annual checkups because of lower prices? Even if
doctors had no problem being commodified in this manner, there would
likely be a rise in both the logistical costs of coordinating care and the
substantive quality of care. My experience in the hospital suggested that
doctors seeing patients episodically are overly dependent on patient charts,
which may be inaccurate or misread.
For elective surgery, comparison shopping is equally or more difficult.
Patients can get information, but it is not easy or cost free (all of this takes
time, usually from working parents who lose productivity from this process
as well as the need to nurse a sick family member or themselves back to
health after medical care). Costs will be roughly the same, since they are
driven more by the status quo of government and employer corporate
sovereignty more than any kind of market for services. Even if HSAs and
other consumer-driven initiatives catch on, this will remain the case. In the
real world, away from the drawing boards of the CATO institute and
similar market-utopian think tanks, consumers are not in much of a position
to improve health care or medical coverage.
III.

PROBLEMATIC PROFESSIONALISM

Veneration of the private sector (Smith) also supports the traditional
prestige of physicians. In a less well-know segment of the Wealth of
Nations, Smith argued that professionals entrusted with important social
functions, such as doctors (and lawyers, of course) should be wellcompensated so that they had adequate incentive to provide thorough and
competent care.91 In addition, although Smith did not specifically make
this point, professionals under economic pressure can too often behave in
distinctly unprofessional or sub-professional ways. The current system has
managed to put such pressure on medical providers, particularly doctors,
but at the same time has not provided universal care or adequate
supervision of professional error.
Doctors are perhaps no longer placed on a pedestal or idolized or
iconographic in the manner of the 1970s television series Marcus Welby.
But they enjoy at least the ordinary prestige and deference accorded
successful businesspersons (a legacy of Smith and Wayne) and in addition
91. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 111.
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continued to be venerated for their assistance to patients in time of need.
Other professionals (e.g., lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers) can
only dream of enjoying the prestige and public good will held by doctors.
As a result, the public is resistant to any medical coverage solution that
even appears to reduce patient access to doctors of choice or to restrict the
physician’s professional discretion.
The problem with this aspect of modern medical insurance mythology
is the public does not realize the degree to which doctor discretion and
professionalism has already been severely compromised by the private
sector and overall economic factors. Although the worst excesses from the
era of HMO hegemony (e.g., “drive-by” maternity delivery) have been
curbed, private insurers still have a great deal to say about the manner in
which most doctors practice medicine.
In addition, even where an insurer is not directly choreographing the
physician’s treatment of a patient, other incentives of the current structure
give rise to a situation in which we now have what I term “problematic
professionalism.” Although most doctors continue to perform acceptably
well under adverse circumstances, medical care remains sub-optimal in
spite of its costs due to twisted incentive structures.
Although the health care quilt is a mixture of public and private, forprofit insurers and their agents (e.g., claims administrators) have a central
role in determining the quantity and quality of care received. Employers,
particularly large employers, of course, have some leverage as purchasers
of group insurance in that insurers will want to accommodate them for
business reasons, particularly if the employer is willing to pay a sufficiently
higher premium in return for desired coverage in a group policy.
Employers thus play a key role to the extent they negotiate with insurers
over the parameters of coverage.
But insurers appear to be the real 800-hundred pound gorillas of this
process in that they design the basic menu of standardized medical
insurance options, shape the parameters of negotiation, and largely have the
final say over the contours of coverage.92 To a large degree in the U.S. the
private insurance industry sets the parameters of compensation, treatment
with as much practical force as any government (although Medicare as the
largest insurer is also important). Although really large employers may
92. Once again, I differ with Hyman, who contends that Medicare is the “real” 800pound gorilla in the health care jungle. See Hyman, supra note 63, at 1166 (“Medicare is
the 800 pound gorilla of American health policy.”). But see Hunter, , supra note 75
(employers and insurers in tandem are figurative king of health care beast).
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self-fund their insurance program by collecting funds that in theory will be
adequate for the number of predicted claims, they also typically delegate
policy and claims administration to an MGA or TPA that effectively
operates as an insurer. Employers also typically purchase stop-loss
insurance from a private carrier as well in order to spread the risk assumed
by self-funding.
When the metaphorical dust settles, the insurance industry in effect
operates as a private administrative agency regulating medical insurance
coverage and delivery of medical services. Doctors can avoid this
governance by insurance only if they are willing to forgo accepting
patients’ insurance or membership in an insurer HMO or network of
preferred providers. And once participating in a PPO or HMO, the doctor
must do it the insurer’s way in order to remain in good standing and in
order for services to the patient to be covered. The law to some extent
gives insurers a further leg up by exempting them from antitrust law
(subject to some limitations) per the McCarran-Ferguson Act93 while
doctors remain subject to antitrust law and are forbidden from concerted
action in restraint of trade.
Doctors are now more than ever acting as small (or in the case of some
large practice groups medium) sized businessmen, placing greater emphasis
on cost control, customer volume, marketing, and reduction of costs in
delivering services.94 This can adversely affect the quality of care simply
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000).
94. For clarification: I am not discussing medical practice law and reform, which is
beyond the scope of this article and most likely asserts only a modest direct impact on
overall health costs, notwithstanding claims of cost-escalating defensive medicine and
undue transaction costs spend on frivolous claims. See, e.g., Martha Raffaele, Study:
Malpractice Crisis had Little Effect on Pa. Doctor Supply, INS. J., April 27, 2007, available
at www.insurancejounral.com/news/east/2007/04/27/79016.htm; Jennifer Robison, The
doctor is out – for good: Some LV physicians can’t afford to stay in medicine, LAS VEGA
REV. J., Mar. 25, 2007; Alicia Change, Study: Four Out of 10 Medical Malpractice Cases
J.,
May
11,
2006,
available
at
are
Groundless,
INS.
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2006/05/11/68248.htm; Study Says Wrong-Site
Surgery Is Very Rare and Preventable, INS. J., April 17, 2006, available at
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2006/04/17/67367.htm.
See also Silver &
Hyman, supra note 61; Atul Gawande, The Checklist, NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2007, 86
(noting degree to which relatively simple intensive care protocols can effectively improve
patient odds of survival but medical community slowness in adopting such protocols: “If a
new drug were as effective at saving lives as Peter Pronovost’s checklist, there would be a
nationwide marketing campaign urging doctors to use it.”) (italics in original); Keith
Mattheessen, Cutting Doctors’ Hours May Not Reduce Medical Errors, Studies Find, INS. J.,
Sept.
6,
2007,
available
at
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/09/06/83233.htm; George J. Annas, The
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because of the undue pressure to see many patients as fast as possible in a
typical business day in order to obtain sufficient revenues to earn desired
income.95
patient’s right to safety, TRIAL, Oct. 2006, 38 (Hospitals have been slow to adopt measures
that would prevent medical errors that injure patients.”).
However, the rancor occasioned by this issue and the degree it has driven a wedge
between doctors, lawyers, and policymakers to the benefit of insurers undoubtedly helps to
explain some of the dysfunctional policymaking in the area. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Nevada’s
Med-Mal Changes Help Doctors, Hinder Lawsuits, INS. J., Feb. 9, 2007, available at
www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2007/02/09/76860.htm; Tress Balda, Physician `I’m
sorry’ bills continues to spread, Nine more states debate laws banning apology from use in
litigation, NAT’L L.J., April 30, 2007; Joelle Babula, Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:
Lawyers slam doctors with ad, LAS VEGAS REV. J., July 16, 2002.
95. See JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 97 (2007) (describing financial
and insurance incentives pushing physicians in direction of spending inadequate time with
patients learning of their symptoms and case history); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Economists’
Model, supra note 3; Peter Salgo, The Doctor Will See You for Exactly Seven Minutes, Peter
Salgo, The Doctor Will See You for Exactly Seven Minutes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006.
According to Salgo, a professor at Columbia University’s College of Physicians
and Surgeons, the new assembly line approach to seeing patients is closely linked to
pressure from insurers, business consultants, and particularly HMOs, to which he attributes
the formal requirements that doctors have no more than a seven-minute “encounter” with
patients rather than a more flexible, open-ended interview that is likely to reveal more about
the patient’s condition.
This apparently kept shareholders happy. But it reduced the
doctor-patient relationship to a financial concept in a business school
term paper.
Doctors know you cannot provide compassion in seven-minute
aliquots. But we have felt powerless to change things. The medical
establishment has, many of us feel, simply rolled over and gone along to
get along. It has sacrificed patients’ best interests on the altar of
financial return.
See Salgo, supra. Accord, Reinhardt, Economist’s Model, supra note 3, at 463
(“group medical practices may tie the distribution of income to their members closely to
each physician’s `productivity’ and then unabashedly define productivity in terms of neither
clinical outcomes nor patients’ satisfaction, but strictly in terms of the gross revenue the
physician brought into the clinic.”) (footnote omitted); Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 2006, 82 (“As American turns its health-care system over to the
market, pharmaceutical reps are wielding more and more influence – and the line between
them and doctors is beginning to blur)(italics in original); Vanessa Fuhrmans, Doctors
Assail UnitedHealth’s Threat of Fines: Sanctions would be imposed on physicians sending
patients to out-of-network labs for tests, WALL ST. J., April 10, 2007; Theresa Agovino,
Doctors Suspect Insurers’ Rankings Measure Cost, Not Quality, INS. J., Feb. 9, 2007,
available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/02/09/76830.htm; David
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According to one widely taught business model, a physician who sees
patients as part of her practice (as contrasted to a medical group providing
only procedures) should spend no more than seven minutes with each
patient. As Jerome Groopman has powerfully demonstrated, truncated time
with patients contributes significantly to diagnostic error, especially if the
patient’s problems are atypical or complex. Without taking sufficient time
to learn about the patient’s malady, the doctor has an insufficient data base
for applying her exercise of professional judgment, even if one assumes
that some subset of seven minutes gives the doctor sufficient time to reflect
adequately and reach a considered personal opinion.96

Armstrong, Critical Dose: Aspirin Dispute Is Fueled by Funds of Industrial Rivals; A Cheap
Remedy for Clotting Used by Millions of Patients is Undermined by Research; Bayer’s
Friends Fight Back WALL ST. J., April 24, 2006. But see Vanessa Fuhrmans, Insurers Stop
Paying For Care Linked to Errors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008; Vanessa Fuhrmans, An
Insurer Tries A New Strategy: Listen to Patients, WALL ST. J., April 11, 2006.
However, to some extent, Salgo’s proposed realistic solution to the problem of
assembly line medicine involves a reasonable dose of the consumer-driven, market
competition efficiency championed by Hyman. See id. (“solution to the problem” is “in the
hands of our patients” who should “adopt a business mind-set when shopping for health
care” and refuse to patronize brusque, patient-unfriendly physicians).
The problem, of course, is that it is increasingly hard to find these types of Marcus
Welby-style doctors with room to take on additional patients. The seven-minute, assembly
line doctor increasingly dominates the provider landscape and will continue to do so until
the medical insurance and payment system provides better incentives for better quality care,
including spending adequate time with patients.
This sort of medical consumerism is perfectly consistent with my preferences as
outlined in this article. What separates Hyman and me to a large degree is that Hyman
seems to me to convey the impression that insured patients are morally hazardous louts who
over-consume medical care without acting as a check on cost or quality while I contend that
natural patient desires for good care and experiences with the physician will allow some
consumer policing of medicine – if the patients have the ability to pay. Without it, patients
either skip care altogether, go to the cheapest doctor or the one with the most lenient
collection agency, or rely on inefficient emergency room care for what should be office
visits. See Bobinski, supra note 13, noting that Canadians on whole are much more likely to
get concededly necessary medical care than Americans); Edit., Emergency Room Delays,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008 (attributing much of delay to demands placed by uninsured
patients).
96. See GROOPMAN, supra note 95, at 268. The problem is hardly confined to private
insurance providers. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Cancer Drug Representatives Spelled Out
the Way to Profit, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2007; Dan Stockman, State service’s Medicaid bills
squeeze doctors, FT. WAYNE JOUR.-GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 2006 (describing doctor’s receipt of
$260,000 bill from government because “his pool of Medicaid patients costs too much
money”). In the “haste makes waste” department, see also Shirley S. Wang, Institute Cites
Medication Errors, Suggests Changes to Cut Injuries, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2006.
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The cost-reduction programs for actual delivery of medical care and the
higher office overhead (it takes more office staff to process required
paperwork and haggle with insurers) prompted by insurers pushes against
traditional professional excellent and tends to undermine the quality of
medical care. In a sense, the insurance industry and government programs
like Medicare, Medicaid, and the VA are no different. The question then
becomes which type of entity will provide a better brand of coverage and
medical care regulation when measured along the multiple dimensions of
quality of care, amount of care, and cost.
Assessment of the quality-of-care dimension strongly suggests that
private insurers, driven by profit motive as well as legitimate cost concerns,
has to a large degree made medicine less of a profession and more of an
assembly-line style business. The product dispensed is health care, but the
mass produced health care of a medical Wal-Mart more than Marcus
Welby.
On one level, this may be a positive development for a large category
of consumers with routine medical problems that require only basic
solutions. The Marcus Welby method (which included house calls) made
for heart-warming (if occasionally corny) television but it wasn’t very
efficient. Some cost-benefit sharpening of service delivery under the
traditional model is a positive development. On another level, however,
the assembly line commodification and economy of scale in much current
medical practice is undesirable in that it weakens the accuracy and depth of
diagnosis. It can have particularly serious adverse consequences where
medical problems are less typical or readily apparent and require greater
professional involvement by the doctor.
Even for not particularly esoteric patient problems, the quality of
medical care in this brave new world of medicine-as-a-business seems
suspect. As recounted above in my simple brush with infection, IV
antibiotics, and cyst drainage, the economic pressure placed on the medical
care system by the current medical coverage system appears to produce
suboptimal results, even if one credits the system with some significant
restraint on costs. In my relatively unremarkable case, the supposedly
wonderful system of private sector medical care and insurance produced
primary physicians who don’t go to hospitals or otherwise follow through
with patient care and disengaged, ill-informed, hospitalists who provided
no continuity of care but who appeared to be protecting the economic selfinterest of hospitals at the expense of the patient. It also produced long
waits and needlessly protracted hospitalization; excessive testing to
“churn” my medical insurance portfolio to the benefit of hospitals and
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providers; and exorbitant requests for compensation by doctors with limited
diagnostic skill as well as inadequate motivation.97
In general, much of modern medical care appears organized around the
needs of insurers and medical providers rather than the patient. In addition
to long waits, there are the “banker’s hours” of many physicians and
practices as well as poor response to patients unfortunate enough to be
stricken on evenings and weekends. Outside of the walls of a hospital,
medical service providers appear fragmented and scattered almost as if
intentionally attempting to test the patience of patients. In few medical
practices can the patient be seen by the doctor and take common required
lab tests that are part of shared medical records. The economics of the
current system militate against it. As a result, patients requiring relatively
simple things such as blood work, urine samples, x-rays, a CT scan, an
MRI, or more intrusive scoping, can almost never get this done under the
same roof (and certainly not on the same day or even a reasonably
compressed time frame.
The net result is to require patients, most of who must miss work for
medical care, to spent substantial hours crisscrossing metropolitan (or
worse yet, larger rural) areas for hours or days on end in order to get a basic
diagnosis, which then requires the patient to again relocate and queue in
line for any procedures required to attack a medical problem.98 Add to this
substantial repetitive paperwork and at least some jousting with medical
insurers, all against a backdrop of legitimate quality concerns, and there is
more than a little worth criticizing in the status quo.99
97. See supra notes 84-88.
98. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 61, at 959 (labeling situation “deplorable”). See
also REGINA E. HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES IN
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA’S LARGEST SERVICE INDUSTRY 20-33, 250-51 (1997).
The inconvenience of obtaining care of course pales in comparison to the problems and lost
productivity that occurs when people are uninsured or lack adequate coverage. See
generally Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 307 (2007)
(collecting data regarding lost productivity and value resulting from illness, injury, and
medical treatment).
99. There also appears generally to be inadequate regulation of physicians. It appears,
for example, that a disturbingly large number of doctors relocate their practices to new
states simply to stay a step ahead of regulators in their former state of licensing. Some
doctors are essentially on the lam from one state to another because of past problems in the
prior state. For years, state medical boards have embarrassed themselves by failing to stop
this sort of opportunistic pulling up of stakes and failed to required adequate disclosure of a
doctor’s past problems. In one relatively recent and notorious case, a doctor with a
checkered past who had relocated to Colorado committed egregious malpractice and
seriously injured a boy. In outraged response, the state legislature enacted a law requiring
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The economics of the current system appears to have undermined or
even imperiled professionalism by encouraging an assembly-line like
commodification of medicine and medical procedures. For receipt of
diagnostic testing, lab work, and corrective procedures, including surgery,
the problems appear primarily to be the inefficiency of delay and questions
of competence by the service providers (who may puncture an organ,
amputate the wrong appendage, etc.).
For delivery of physician
consultation, the effect is arguably more pernicious in that it robs
diagnosticians of a precious tool – information – because primary care
physicians, internists and other specialists often are unwilling or unable to
listen effectively long enough due to the pressure of their business models
and income goals.100
Ironically, the financial pressure on doctors and their perceived need to
ramp up the quantity of care delivered to make up for reduced insurer
payments was arguably supported by the inventor of the invisible hand.
Smith wanted professionals to be adequately paid and to have decent
working conditions that would permit the professional to acquire necessary
skill and breathing space for good judgment focused on the instant patient
or client. He saw this as a necessary price to pay to obtain adequate
professional services.101 But misapplication of Smith’s primary faith in
markets, coupled with the perhaps pathological ways in which the U.S. has
deviated from a market model without replacing it with a comprehensive
government model, has produced a status quo Smith would have abhorred:
medical professionals who so scurry to earn what they consider an adequate
income that they devote insufficient time to many patients, thereby
truncating the information they receive, rushing to judgment that is often
erroneous. As a result, diagnostic error is much higher than it should be.
The correct diagnosis may not come until the patient has endured
considerable pain and inconvenience at substantial cost and, in some cases,
may not come at all or only after the patient’s demise.

disclosure of such past events to prospective and current patients. Good doctors should
embrace this type of regulation because it would be both good marketing and diminish the
business of problematic doctors. It appears that only 17 percent of physicians ever are sued
for malpractice and that a relatively small group of doctors create the bulk medical
malpractice claims. As the saying goes, five percent of the people create 90 percent of the
problems But if the regulatory system does not adequately intervene, these five percent can
wreak havoc for years or even decades.
100. See GROOPMAN, supra note 95, at 226-231.
101. See SMITH, Wealth of Nations, supra note 6, at 111.
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Alternatively, it would seem much better to operate a system that was
not so dependent on squeezing doctor income that it produced adverse
collateral impact. One would expect a rational health care system to make
it sufficiently attractive for a high quality treating physician to be
sufficiently compensated for each interaction with a patient to spend
adequate time with the patient.
IV.

THE LIMITS OF CONSUMERISM AS A HEALTH CARE
POLICY AND THE INEXORABLE CASE FOR
COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC MEDICAL INSURANCE

By now, it is obvious that more of my sympathies lie with the social
justice and professionalism paradigms more than market and consumer
choice models. Consequently, my sympathies lie more with Jost and
Mariner, even though I am concerned that even their informative writings
use what I have come to regard as the subtle but misleading nomenclature
of personal responsibility and actuarial fairness. Notwithstanding these
quibbles, Jost’s piece persuasively highlights a major problem with HSAs
and the larger consumer-driven movement. Even if it works for many, the
primary beneficiaries are the largely healthy and wealthy, who hardly need
the tax subsidy/shelter provided by HSAs. Beyond this, the consumerdriven health movement works against the communitarian norm and makes
a universally effective medical coverage program harder to obtain.
Mariner, in addition, to also noting the limitations of the consumer-driven
health care initiative, presents the important insight that even something as
seemingly uncontroversial as “wellness” programs can contribute to the
undesirable erosion of community solidarity and social justice in medical
care and coverage.
Hyman, although as usual raising many excellent points regarding the
operation of government programs, remains too enamored of the market as
a cure-all. This is too unrealistically sanguine a view, even for a Smithite,
in light of the muddled, path-dependent history of American health policy.
Establishment of true market hegemony is both practically feasible and
undesirable in light of the core necessity of medical care, even for the
comparatively impoverished, unwise, and irresponsible. Playing John
Wayne to the more Martin Luther King-like postures of Jost and Mariner,
Hyman also continues to give short shrift to the professionalism wing of
Adam Smith’s writing in that Hyman, although deferring to medical
expertise over consumer preference on some matters (e.g., drive-by
deliveries), often paints a picture of medical providers as greedy
opportunists who would have been at home in the Enron boardroom. My
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own view toward providers, particularly physicians, is more charitable,
although Hyman’s warnings in this regard cannot be totally ignored.102
Ultimately, however, Hyman fails to persuade because his proposed
solution to health care issues favors an impractical return to the pre-World
War II yesteryear of the allegedly pure market-based medical care that
supposedly once existed, accompanied by a presumed shrewd consumer
participation in the market which will, according to Hyman, lower medical
costs and enable patients to receive affordable medical care most pertinent
to their needs. One might as readily believe that the tooth fairy will be
coming to everyone’s neighborhood soon.
First, it is too late to turn back the clock. Better to look forward rather
than back and move from oligarchic medical insurance to true universal
government-funded care.103 Second, Hyman presumes an infallibly
102. Nor can it be ignored that much of Hyman’s scholarship urges increased qualityenhancement efforts directed toward improving the performance of medical professionals.
See, e.g., Hyman & Silver, supra note 61 at 958-59. In this quest, he sees a more effective
role for consumer than I think is realistic while I support more stringent government efforts
in this regard that will not be diluted by the economic incentives of private medical insurers.
103. This increasingly seems to be the position of many commentators. See, e.g.,
KRUGMAN, supra note 18, at 237-43 (proposing that Medicare be expanded to cover entire
population); Peter D. Jacobson & Rebecca L. Braun, Let 1000 Flowers Wilt: The Futility of
State-Level Health Care Reform, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1173 (2007); Maxwell J. Mehlman,
“Medicover”: A Proposal for National Health Insurance, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (2007)
(essentially suggesting expansion of Medicare, “[t]he most efficient administrative system
for health insurance” based on October 2006 conference of health law experts); Artur Davis,
The Health Care We Owe Each Other: Universal Care as the 21st Century Social Compact,
37 CUMB. L. REV. 425 (2006); John A. Nyman, The Efficiency of Equity, 37 CUMB. L. REV.
461 (2006); David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, A National Health Program for
the United States: A Physician’s Proposal, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 102 (1989) (proposing
comprehensive national health care system); Annette Fuentes, What’s wrong with
nationalized health care?, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2007, available at
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/09/what-wrong-wit.html (supporting single-payer
system); Milt Freudenheim, Mayo Clinic Proposing A Universal Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2007, C4, col. 4 (“But Mayo, in a proposal hammered out over 18 months by a
panel of more than 400 health policy experts, is not advocating a government-run singlepayer system. Instead, it suggested that private insurance companies be required to offer
standard plans with many options, like the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan available
to government workers. Applicants for this insurance could not be turned down … Lowerincome people would get government help on a sliding scale.” Ironically, Mayo Clinic cofounder Charles Mayo, then president of the AMA, had during the early 20th Century
warned doctors to be wary of universal health insurance out of fear it would not only reduce
physician incomes but undermine professional judgment and the doctor-patient relationship.
See Cynthia Crossen, Before WWI Began, Universal Health Care Seemed a Sure Thing,
WALL ST. J., April 30, 2007); Robert H. Frank, A Health Care Plan So Simple, Even Stephen
Colbert Couldn’t Simplify It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, C3, col. 1 (noting that “American
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shrewd, disciplined consumer that never was and never will be, at least
where medical and insurance purchases are concerned.104 Third, as
discussed above, Hyman’s perspective, however wonderful it may sound in
theory, fails to square with the practical realities of consumer ignorance,
bounded rationality, heuristic error, reduced choice, lack of time for
investigation, and general lack of meaningful ability to comparison shop
for medical insurance coverage. In addition to the practical limitations on
lay patients, the dominance of group medical plans alone dramatically
distorts whatever chance might otherwise exist to tame medical costs and
excessive use of services through empowered consumerism.
Realistic assessment of the lay citizenry should appreciate that people
are on average normally not sufficiently rational, informed, or disciplined
to be able make the type of consistently intelligent medical treatment
decisions upon which the consumer-driven model depends if it is to be
anything other than a government-subsidized tax break for the rich.
Perhaps more important, nearly half of medical care already is subject to
government funding and substantial regulation. A move toward a more
market based, consumer-driven system would at best produce a hybrid that
continues the inefficiencies of the status quo without much countervailing
efficiency advantage and a redistributive trend toward the already well-off.
All this leads me to the inexorable conclusion that the optimal practical
means to serve both community solidarity and true consumer choice is to
expand Medicare and make it the mandatory medical insurance coverage
for all Americans. This will, according to Hyman, bring cackles of delight
in Hades as another American jumps on his posited road to hell paved with
costs are so high in part because the reliance on private insurance multiplies administrative
expenses, currently about 31 percent of total outlays … Most health economists agree that
government-financed reimbursement is the only practical way to control these expenses,
many of them stemming from insurers’ efforts to identify and avoid unhealthy people.
Canada’s single-payer health system, which covers everyone, spends less than 17 percent on
administrative expenses . . . A move to a single-payer plan would save more than enough to
compensate insurance companies for lost profits.”); Bannister, November is Coming, supra
note 1, at 27 (proposing a “[n]ew nonprofit insurance company … [that] would provide
basic health coverage for all. The nonprofit company might be run by elected citizens that
would use open hearings to design plans and set premiums. One important safeguard against
fiscal irresponsibility would be to prohibit the nonprofit from issuing long-term debt.”)
104. Hyman’s infallibly shrewd consumer must also be independently wealthy, retired,
or otherwise have considerable time on his or her hands. Even if consumers possessed the
tools to function in the market Nirvana posited by Hyman and scholars of similar bent, they
would need more time for researching, making, assessing, and recalibrating their medical
and insurance purchases than one can realistically assume is possessed by normal working
people.
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good intentions105 by giving even more power to the Medicare juggernaut.
I disagree, in part for reasons stemming from Hyman’s own critique of
Medicare, which he describes as a “Ponzi” scheme dependent on the
attraction of new participants (a/k/a “marks” in Hyman’s view) to finance
the benefits of those who entered the Ponzi period at an earlier juncture.
Hyman is correct to point out that Medicare in its current form is too
dependent on the young and healthy subsidizing older persons more
demanding of (and in need of) medical care. As his devilish alter ego put
it:
As you [Mephistopheles] correctly perceived many
years ago, allowing everyone into Medicare would
immediately bankrupt the program because the crosssubsidies that sustain Medicare are only achievable if there
are sufficient marks outside the program to pay the
necessary funds into the program. Program beneficiaries
understand this point perfectly well. The demise of the
[proposed 1993] Clinton plan was inevitable once it
became clear that the plan would “take” from the elderly
and “give” to the uninsured. We are far better off delaying
the day of reckoning by a few years and allowing the
gluttony of Medicare beneficiaries and the passage of time
to increase the number of unsustainable commitments . .
.106
This portion of Hyman’s critique resonates, but does so in favor of
making the move toward expanded Medicare sooner rather than later. To
be sure, moving from a system designed to protect the elderly, and which
as to some extent becomes afflicted with excessive interest group
politics,107 to one covering a larger, more diverse population with differing
105. Although considerably less extreme, Hyman in a sense is an intellectual heir of
Friedrich Hayek, a libertarian who embraced individualism so strongly that he and his
followers not only inveighed against the very real evils of communism and other forms of
totalitarianism but also opposed even the sort of “soft socialism” that can provide the
infrastructure necessary for civilized progress. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM (1944). This also arguably makes Hyman heir to the considerably less intellectual
John Wayne legacy.
106. See Hyman, Mephistopheles, supra note 63, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 1185-86
(emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
107. As Hyman correctly points out, the adverse reaction of so-called “greedy
geezers” (my and the media’s term, not Hyman’s) to the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act of 1988, which merely required Medicare beneficiaries to pay some of the cost of
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incidence of medical needs will require some recalibration of benefits
offered, prices paid, and funds collected (through tax, premiums, co-pays,
and deductibles). But the experience of other nations strongly suggests that
this can be effectively done in a manner that will eventually result in
overall improvement of care at lower cost.
“[C]ritics of the single-payer plan have long railed against the specter
of socialized medicine, suggesting that it means being treated by
government functionaries” the “people who have experienced single-payer
coverage firsthand seem unconcerned.”108 As Cornell economist Robert
Frank relates: “When one of my sons needed surgery for a broken arm
during a sabbatical in Paris, for example, the medical system we
encountered was just as professional as the American one and far less
bureaucratic.”109 My own experience with my son’s attack of bronchitis in
Germany was similar. Seeing a doctor and filling the required prescription
was faster, easier, and cheaper than had the same adverse medical event
occurred in the United States – and my son was of course not even part of
the German citizenry for whose benefit the plan was designed.110 At some
expanded coverage, and the political cowardice of Congress in repealing the act in the face
of these tantrums, illustrates a problem with having government in the insurance business.
See supra note 62. But there is no iron law that Medicare must be under-funded or poorly
administered. More to the point: the occasional electoral pathologies of Mediare seem to
me no worse than the chronic problems besetting system using private insurance. See, e.g.,
supra notes 4, 13, 18, supra (discussing high relative cost of U.S. medical care system);
Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 KAN. L. REV.
73, 152 (2005) (“[P]eople with health problems increasingly are forced to shoulder the load
of their own medical costs. The trend toward consumerism in health coverage shifts not
simply costs, but also insurance risk, to individual insureds, and the results may be
particularly dire for people in poor health.”); Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care:
Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6 YALE J. HEALTH, POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 93, 145
(2006) (discussing problems associated with current system’s private adjudicative
mechanisms for determination of necessity of care); George A. Nation III, Obscene
Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94
KY. L.J. 101, 112 (2005) (noting degree to which current system warps pricing, resulting in
posted retail price inflicted upon uninsured as contrasted to discounted price charged to
insured patients).
108. See Frank, supra note 103, at C3, col. 1.
109. Id. at col. 5 “And [as Frank emphasizes for the slow to grasp] in France, which
spends half as much on health care as the United States and has more doctors and hospital
beds per capita, everyone is covered.” Id.
110. I realize that Germany has a system someone different than the arguably “purer”
government single payer systems of France and Canada in that private insurance plays more
of a role in Germany. But for purposes of this comment, I do not believe it unfair to lump
Germany with what I call “single-payer” countries (because of national government
commitment to and administration of medical insurance), to whom they are far closer
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point, all the ideology and theorizing in the world must yield to the hard
empirical facts suggesting that medical care in Western Europe and Canada
appears to be both cheaper and superior on the whole that that of the United
States.111
Rather than attempting to demonize (in Hyman’s case, quite literally)
government insurance plans as spendthrift bureaucracies, we would be
better off appreciating them as aspects of national infrastructure akin to
roads, police and fire protection, and national defense.112 A comprehensive
medical care program for all (which realistically can only be achieved
through the government-run, single-payer approach), like these other
regarding health care policy. See Jost, Is Health Insurance a Bad Idea? The ConsumerDriven Persepctive, 14.2 CON. INS. L.J. 377 (2008); RICHARD KNOX, GERMANY’S HEALTH
SYSTEM, ONE NATION, UNITED WITH HEALTH CARE FOR ALL (Faulkner and Gray 1993).
Regarding non-U.S. health care systems, see generally ANTONIA MAIONI, PARTING AT THE
CROSSROADS: THE EMERGENCE OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
(Princeton University Press 1998); ); CHRIS HAM (ED.), HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEARNING
FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (Opem University Press 1997) (discussing UK, Sweden,
Netherlands and Germany as well as U.S.); FRANCIS D. POWELL & ALBERT F. WESSEN
(EDS.), HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1993)
(providing a general overview with particular focus on German, Candadian, Swedish and
British systems). But see William P. Gunnar, The Fundamental Law That Shapes the
United States Health Care System: Is Universal Health Care Realistic Within the
Established Paradigm, 15 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 151, 156 (2006) (concluding that the
answer is “no”).
111. See supra notes 4, 13, 18, supra; Jacobi, supra note 4 , at 535-36; Manfred Huber
& Eva Orosz, Health Expenditures Trends in OECD Countries, 1990-2001, 25 HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV. 1 (2003).
112. Of course, the current American government treatment of these infrastructure
issues is not particularly encouraging. See Free Hiatt, She Brakes for Ideology, WASH.
POST, Jan. 23, 2008, A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/20/AR2008012002275.html (“[T]raffic congestion already is
costing the U.S. economy as much as $200 billion a year.”).
My primary point, however, is that there is no doubt that inadequate infrastructure
imposes costs on society. We do not enjoy net savings simply because we spend less (and
do less) regarding roads, bridges, policemen, fireman, soldiers – or health insurance.
Further, many of the current government’s failures concerning the transportation
infrastructure stem not from institutional incompetence but from ideology-based resistance
that recently has trumped sound policy analysis. See Hiatt, supra ([According to the Bush
Administration, the “main reason you are sitting in traffic . . . is not that the purchasing
power of Highway Trust Fund revenue has been dwindling for the past decade, not that
population and freight traffic have been soaring with no government response – but that you
are not being asked to pay enough to use the road you are on.”) Hiatt also notes that the
Bush Administration rejected a bipartisan federal commission‘s “comprehensive, balanced
plan for the next 50 years, calling for maintenance and construction, road and rail, public
and private roads.” Id. (emphasis in original).
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infrastructure programs, provides a platform for greater national
productivity113 as well as social justice and a chance for medical
professionals to practice their craft under a set of incentives more
supportive of quality care.114 Only some small increment of faux
individualism is lost.115
American attitudes toward health care and medical insurance continue
to be unduly dominated by accidents of history and the mythological power
of the nation’s archetypes. The rugged individualism embodied in John
Wayne, and the market efficiency associated with Adam Smith are today’s
dominant archetypes. Although each embodies characteristics that are
desirable in general (who can, as a general proposition, be against
individualism, personal responsibility, ambition, free markets and greater
113. See, e.g., Jennifer Robison, Staffs May Shrink: Plurality of companies say they’ll
thin ranks as costs for health insurance rise, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.lvrj.com/business/13942712.html. For example, employers freed of the burden
of being the nation’s front line source of medical coverage would also be freed of the need
to make personnel and payment decisions based on consideration of the cost of group
medical care.
114. See Furrow, supra note 14, at 417 (“[T]he moral argument of social solidarity
with our fellows, so eloquently put by Timothy Jost in his comparative work on European
systems, pulls in tandem with the conservative argument that more health care is better for
the economy.”) (citing TIMOTHY S. JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING OUR
PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE (Oxford University Press
2003)).
115. In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith made a similar defense of public works
spending as a useful investment to assist the market economy in reaching its full potential.
See SMITH, supra note 6, at 473-85. Thus, there was an “infrastructure” Smith as well as a
professionalism Smith and a market Smith. Although the pro-market, “invisible hand”
Smith is most prominent in his writing, the American adaptation of Smith has tended to
completely ignore Smith’s support of professionalism and infrastructure.
Some see this and the overwhelming American aversion to self-consciously
adopting a government single-payer system as a product of interest group conspiracy. See,
e.g., MICHAEL TOWNES WATSON, AMERICA’S TUNNEL VISION: HOW INSURANCE COMPANIES’
PROPAGANDA IS CORRUPTING MEDICINE & LAW 276 (Horatio Press 2006). Although the
lobbying and public relations campaigns of insurers, drug companies, medical providers,
and other interest groups have undoubtedly all contributed to fostering the “market-uberalles” ethos of the U.S., my own view is that it is largely the organic product of the
historical evolution of American self-identity.
America celebrates markets, personal wealth, and rugged individualism like no
other country in the world. By contrast, Canadian culture gives proportionately greater
celebration to collective national enterprise, such as the building of the Trans-Canadian
railroad. In Canada, the thousands of workers get credit. In the U.S., the CEO of the
railroad company would likely be the hero of the story. This difference in national psyche
goes a long way toward explaining the different national systems of medical care and
insurance.
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economic wealth?), slavish, blind, and inflexible devotion to these
idealized concepts has produced an unwillingness to face basic operational
and empirical facts about the optimal means for maximizing access to
health care and medical coverage for the citizenry.116
Without doubt, a government-administered public insurance plan is the
optimal route. Whatever theoretical uncertainty may exist in thought
experiments or political debate is belied by the empirical evidence.
Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy, Scandinavia and Germany all spent
about half as much per capita on health care as the U.S. and have healthier,
longer-lived populations. Of these countries, only Germany has anything
looking in any way similar to the public-private partnerships urged by the
most liberal of American politicians. The others are all government-run
single payer systems of medical insurance. England actually runs the
medical side as well as the insurance side and has what might accurately be
termed socialized medicine in which the doctors work for the government.
Most important, Medicare has operated successfully as a single-payer form
of public insurance for 40 years. Its imperfections can be improved upon
and its reach extended.
116. See Stone, supra note 53, at 486-87. Deborah Stone’s assessment of the excesses
of this ethos is even more condemning:
The consumer choice approach to social policy represents a
cynical turn in American public philosophy. . . . More often than not,
“consumer choice” and “consumer direction” are glittery wrappings in
which employers, insurers, and politicians package benefit reductions,
program contractions, and budget cuts.
Giving people a budget that is too small for their needs does
not give them the experience of freedom. Instead, they experience
every decision not as free choice but as a terrible trade-off.
*
*
*
Consumer choice theory is thus an ideology. It is a way of
seeing the world, and particularly a way of interpreting social justice. It
is a philosophy that minimizes communal obligations to citizens,
maximizes individually responsibility for one’s own well-being, and
tolerates great inequalities in well-being as morally acceptable. It
replaces a social commitment to meeting needs with commitment to
meeting budgets. It uses the rhetoric of “freedom” and “autonomy” to
justify the abdication of social responsibility and the failure to provide
appropriate and compassionate care.
See Stone, False Promise, supra note 53, at 486-87. See also Stone, Beyond Moral
Hazard, supra note 48.
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The actual operation of health care and insurance in the real world
demonstrates that the single payer system and close equivalents are simply
more efficacious than the American status quo and so-called “consumerdriven” alternatives. It no longer makes sense to shy away from this
approach simply because of the aura associated with Wayne and the market
side of Smith’s persona. After too long a period of the dominance of these
images, the time has come to reassert the professionalism side of Smith
and, more important, the social justice and community solidarity values
embodied in Martin Luther King’s legacy.
CONCLUSION
To be sure, a government can administer a medical coverage system
badly. But it is equally true that a government-run system can be efficient,
probably at least as efficient as the current insurer-dominated, employerdominated system. Greater progress will be made when policymakers
focus on the factors that make for effective government operation of
insurance coverage and free themselves from the tyranny of legal fictions
and mythology about the infallibility of markets, personal fault, consumer
omniscience, medical provider behavior, and private insurer efficacy.
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HEALTH INSURANCE: MARKET
FAILURE OR GOVERNMENT FAILURE?
David A. Hyman1
“A society that does things that are inefficient or
perverse in their effects ought to be told so.”2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Health insurance is once again on the policy agenda, and it is déjà vu
all over again. There are the same troubling statistics -- 47 million
Americans are uninsured, and 20 million Americans are “under-insured”
(whatever that means).3 There are the same anecdotes about the tragic
consequences of being uninsured. There are reports by government
agencies, think tanks, and do-gooder organizations. There are the same
policy entrepreneurs, pushing old wine in new (and not so new) bottles.
There are the same appeals to social solidarity, self-interest, or both. The
interest groups are back in force as well -- each seeking to protect and
advance their own interests, while asserting their deep and abiding concern
for the broader public interest.4 Reform proposals are being pushed by all
the usual suspects, including local, state and federal legislators, and all of
the presidential candidates.
The reform proposals vary in their specificity, but all (either implicitly
or explicitly) identify the source of the problem as “market failure” – and
promise new regulations and more taxes to “fix” the problem. This article
follows a different approach, and makes the case that “government failure”
should occupy center-stage in understanding how things came to look the
way they do. Rather than market failure, it is our inefficient and perverse
1. Richard & Marie Corman Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine, University
of Illinois.
2. GEORGE STIGLER, Are Economists Good People?, in MEMOIRS OF AN
UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 6 (University of Chicago Press 2003) (1988).
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2006 (2007). The claim that someone is underinsured is rhetorically
appealing, but essentially meaningless, absent some shared understanding of “adequate”
coverage. Efforts to define “adequate” coverage typically result in the determination that
everyone should have “gold-plated” coverage. That is exactly what everyone would have if
cost were no object. It isn’t.
4. Strictly speaking, they never left.
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regulation of health insurance that should be the focus of our ire, and of
regulatory reform.
Part II briefly outlines the existing market and regulatory framework
for health insurance. Part III explains the sources of government failure in
the market. Part IV outlines some possible approaches to addressing the
problem of government failure. Part V concludes.
II. ESSENTIALS OF REGULATING THE HEALTH INSURANCE
MARKET
Approximately 61 percent of the non-elderly population (totaling 260
million people) receives health coverage through an employer.5 5 percent
purchase individual coverage.6 16 percent receives government-sponsored
coverage, and 18 percent are uninsured.7
Why do so many Americans obtain health insurance through their
employer – particularly when only 2% of the population had employmentbased coverage in 1930?8 In an earlier article, I explained that this outcome
was a historical accident, fueled by federal labor and tax policy:
The first dramatic increase in employment-based
coverage came during World War II. Wage and price
controls were instituted by the Office of Price
Administration in an attempt to deal with inflation.
Employer contributions to insurance and pension funds
were not counted as wages, and were accordingly excluded
from the wage controls. The freezing of cash wages forced
employers to compete for scarce labor by enhancing their
fringe benefit packages. Health insurance offered a
straightforward way for employers to sweeten their
compensation package in a manner that would be quite
appealing to potential employees.
5. KAISER FAMILY FOUND, The Uninsured: A Primer, Key Facts about Americans
without Health Insurance, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1 (Oct. 2007), available at
http://kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-03.pdf
6. Id.
7. Id. To be sure, how many uninsured there are depends greatly on how long one
must be without insurance to qualify. If one focuses on the hard-core uninsured (those
without coverage for a two year period), the number of uninsured is far smaller.
8. Robert B. Helms, The Tax Treatment of Health Insurance: Early History and
Evidence, 1940-1970, in EMPOWERING HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS THROUGH TAX REFORM 1,
8 (Grace-Marie Arnett ed., 1999).
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The second impetus for employment-based coverage
was the federal tax code. In 1943, the Internal Revenue
Service issued a ruling indicating that the amounts paid by
employers for insurance for employees did not constitute
income to employees, even though employers could deduct
these amounts as ordinary and necessary business
expenses. Ten years later, the IRS withdrew this ruling,
but Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code in 1954
to expressly exclude employment-based coverage from
taxable income. In effect, this asymmetric tax treatment
allows employers to purchase health insurance for their
employees using employees’ before-tax income, rather
than forcing employees to purchase it themselves with
after-tax income. The amount of the subsidy is a function
of the marginal tax rate for any given taxpayer, but its size
is larger for higher-income taxpayers because of the
progressivity of federal taxation. In the aggregate, this
subsidy is worth more than $100 billion in foregone tax
revenue per year, and is the second largest tax expenditure,
after home mortgage interest. The result is a substantial
financial incentive for employees to obtain coverage
through their employer if at all possible.
Labor unions were another factor in the rise of
employment-based coverage. During the late 1940s and
1950s, unions aggressively bargained for richer benefit
packages, with health insurance at the top of their list. In
industries in which unions were strong (e.g.,
manufacturing and public-sector employment), the result
was that many subscribers obtained first-dollar insurance
coverage and medical care at no out-of-pocket cost to
themselves whatsoever. Employers with non-unionized
workforces also offered rich benefits to discourage their
employees from unionizing.9

9. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers For Employment-Based Health
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 23, 25-26 (2001-2002) (footnotes
omitted).
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The linkage between employment and health insurance has significant
distributional consequences. Large and mid-size employers are more likely
to offer coverage, and more likely to offer a choice of coverage than small
employers.10 Employment-based coverage is much less likely to be offered
to those who work in certain industries (e.g., agriculture, retail, and food
service), and those working less than full-time.11
The link between employment and health insurance also has substantial
regulatory consequences. Pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, states
have primary regulatory authority over insurance sold to state residents.12
However, federal preemption of state regulation (with or without direct
federal regulation) is always possible, as long as Congress expressly
indicates its intention to affect the “business of insurance.”13 Thus, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act broadly preempts state
regulation of employment based health insurance -- except to the extent the
employer provides coverage by purchasing a state-regulated health
insurance contract.14 Conversely, employment-based health insurance is
not subject to state regulation if the employer self-funds the coverage it
provides to its employees.15 Of those who obtain health insurance through
their employer, 45 percent are funded by the employer purchasing a health
insurance contract, and 55 percent are self-insured by the employer.16
In practical terms, this framework means that the 71 million Americans
who obtain coverage individually or through an employer’s insured plan
are subject to both state and federal regulation, while the 87 million
Americans who obtain coverage through an employer’s self-funded plan
are subject only to federal regulation.17
How have the federal and state governments exercised this regulatory
authority? At the federal level, there has been relatively limited direct
regulation of health insurance. When ERISA was enacted in 1974, it
focused on pension plans, and imposed no substantive regulations on

10. Employer Health Benefits: 2007 Annual Survey, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. &
HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TR. 4-5, 58 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 Annual Benefits Survey],
available at http://kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf.
11. Id. at 34.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2000).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2000).
14. Such coverage is called an “a “fully insured plan.” See 2007 Annual Benefits
Survey, supra note 10, at 146.
15. Such coverage is called a self-funded plan. Id.
16. Id. at 147.
17. See id. at 1. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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employment-based health insurance.18 Over the intervening 34 years, there
have been a few new substantive regulations, including requirements
prohibiting “drive-through deliveries,”19 requiring parity in coverage of
mental health treatment,20 and imposing limits on the use of preexisting
condition exclusions.21 Because ERISA preempts state law, but does not
impose much in the way of substantive regulation, this framework means
that self-funded employers have operated in a virtual regulatory vacuum.
Self-funded employers are more likely to operate in multiple states, so this
regulatory vacuum has meant such employers can implement uniform
coverage arrangements without worrying about state-by-state regulatory
variation. Stated differently, the current framework provides self-funded
employers with virtually complete freedom to design and implement
whatever health care coverage they desire – including spending as little or
as much as they want.22
At the state level, there has been a massive amount of regulation
affecting every aspect of the relationship between insurers, providers, and
patients. As Figure 1 demonstrates, there are three distinct relationships
that can be regulated: the relationship between the insurer and the
physician/provider (Type I regulation); the relationship between the
physician/provider and the patient (Type II regulation), and the relationship
between the patient and the insurer (Type III regulation).23

18. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 9, at 29.
19. Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §300gg-4
(2000).
20. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. §1185a (2000 and Supp. 111 2004)
and 42 U.S.C. §300gg-5 (2000 and Supp. 111 2004).
21. See 26 U.S.C. §9801 (2000 and Supp. 111 2004); 29 U.S.C. §1181 (2000 and
Supp. 111 2004); 42 U.S.C. §300gg (2000).
22. See Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and Potential
Lessons from Massachusetts, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1203 (2007); Retail Industry Leaders
Assn. v. Fiedler, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
23. There are also regulatory strategies that do not fit neatly into this model, such as
solvency regulation and premium taxes. All states employ such strategies, and impose
premium taxes as high as 3%. JEFF LEMIEUX, AHIP CTR FOR POLICY & RES., PERSPECTIVE:
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS 1 (2005), available at
http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/Administrative_Costs_030705.pdf. Because of ERISA
preemption, self-funded employers are not subject to such taxes.
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Examples of Type I regulation include “any willing provider”
legislation, restrictions on compensation mechanisms, and prohibitions on
“gag clauses.” Type II regulation includes mandated disclosure of
qualifications, results, and incentives to limit care. Type III regulation
includes mandated coverage of certain benefits, such as alcohol treatment,
and post-partum stays, and provisions affecting the circumstances and price
at which insurance may be offered (including guaranteed issue and
community rating).
States have adopted numerous Type I and Type III regulations, but
relatively few Type II regulations.24 The number of Type I and Type III
regulations also appears to have grown dramatically over time.25 The most
common Type I regulations are any willing provider/freedom of choice
legislation covering chiropractors (46 states), psychologists (44 states) and
optometrists (43 states).26 The most common Type III regulations are
mandated coverage of newborns (50 states), alcoholism treatment (45
states) diabetic supplies (47 states), breast reconstruction after mastectomy
(48 states), and mammograms (50 states).27
Proponents of mandates sometimes suggest that they decrease costs.
By and large, this argument is pure sophistry. Proponents are focusing on
the fact that those receiving the mandated services suddenly face lower outof-pocket costs, but this result is a mathematical consequence of spreading
24. See Victoria Craig Bunce et al., Health Insurance Mandates in the States 2006,
COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE (2006) [hereinafter CAHI], available at
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/MandatePub2006.pdf.
25. Compare U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-96-161, HEALTH
INSURANCE REGULATION VARYING STATE REQUIREMENTS AFFECT COST OF INSURANCE 9
(1996) (“On average, states have enacted laws mandating about 18 specific benefits), and
CAHI, supra note 24, (identifying more than 1800 mandates, or 36 per state).
26. CAHI, supra note 24.
27. Id.
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the costs for those receiving the mandated treatment across a larger
population. This result is obviously not the same thing as lower costs
overall.
To the extent private insurance is not already providing the mandated
coverage, the mandate will increase costs – with the magnitude of the
increase affected by a number of factors, including the elasticity of demand
for the mandated services.28 Estimates of these costs vary widely.29
III. JUDGING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
What is there to be said for (and against) this regulatory framework?
There is broad agreement that some regulation of health insurance is
appropriate – but once one moves beyond the core issues of solvency and
externalities, there is considerable disagreement on what should be
regulated and how to do so. In part, the disagreement is attributable to the
use of different analytical frameworks. Those using a neo-classical
economic framework are likely to focus on the problems of adverse
selection, moral hazard, and the fact that health insurance contracts are
28. In theory, a mandate could lower overall costs if broader ex ante use of the
mandated treatment resulted in lower costs ex post. For example, if better screening for and
treatment of hypertension lowered hospitalization rates for heart attacks, mandated coverage
might result in lower costs. But, if ex ante investment resulted in lower costs ex post, it is
unclear why rational insurers would fail to make such investments, unless they did not
expect to internalize the costs of the heart attacks – and voluntary contracts offer a way for
insurers and insureds to handle such “churn.” The fact that insurance is purchased through
intermediaries (usually employer human resources departments) also suggests that this
problem is more theoretical than real.
29. CAHI, supra note 24 (“Based on our analysis presented in this paper, mandated
benefits currently increase the cost of basic health coverage from a little less than 20% to
more than 50%, depending on the state.”); Gail A. Jensen & Michael A. Morrisey,
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and Mandated Benefit Laws, 77 MILBANK Q. 425,
444-445 (1999) (estimating cost of mandates ranging from 4% - 13%). See also Assessing
the Impact of Mandated Health Insurance Benefits on Cost and Coverage, RUTGERS CENTER
ST.
HEALTH
POL’Y
5
(2007),
available
at
FOR
http://www.cshp.rutgers.edu/Downloads/7120.pdf.
[I]t is clear that there is not a consistent and compelling body of
evidence to support the notion that mandates have had a major impact
on health insurance premiums, employer decisions to offer health
insurance, and coverage. While several earlier studies showed greater
impacts of mandates on cost and coverage, more recent studies using
improved methods found only small impacts or, in some cases, no
statistical associations of mandates with cost or coverage.
Id.
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complex and incomplete.30 This lens is likely to lead to regulations
addressing opportunistic behavior by both the insurer and the insured.
Those using a behavioral economic framework are likely focus on the
fact that human beings have better things to do with their time than read
insurance contracts -- and even if they read them, they are likely to
discount or ignore inefficient coverage terms.31 This lens is likely to lead
to the willingness to mandate coverage of terms that individuals would
supposedly want (and be willing to pay for) if they were perfectly
rational.32 Those using this framework typically assume that regulators can
identify inefficient and efficient coverage terms, and only impose the latter
– although they generally offer no evidence to support this assumption.33
Those using a redistributionist framework are likely to focus on their
desire to transfer resources from the more fortunate (healthy and wealthy)
to the less fortunate (sick and poor).34 This lens is likely to lead to
coverage mandates that individuals would not be willing to pay for if they
were perfectly rational – which is, after all, the definition of redistribution.

30. See generally David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with A
Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S.CAL L. REV. 221 (1999-2000).
31. See Id at 234.
Life is short, and reading the fine print in one's insurance
contract is not high on most peoples' list of favorite weekend activities - particularly when they do not perceive that their efforts will have any
effect on the terms of the contract. Even if one is prepared to read the
insurance contract, it does not follow that one will pay attention to the
specific terms which, after the fact, turn out to be important. Against
this backdrop, ‘bounded rationality’ constrains the operation of market
forces which would normally ensure the optimal mix of quality and
price.
Id.
32. Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1999-2000).
33. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IMPROVING HEALTH
CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION 31-32 (2004) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/health_care/24694.pdf:
For mandates to improve the efficiency of the health insurance
market, state and federal legislators must be able to identify services the
insurance market is not currently covering for which consumers are
willing to pay the marginal costs. This task is challenging under the best
of circumstances – and benefits are not mandated under the best of
circumstances.
Id.
34. Hyman, supra note 30, at 247.
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All three of these frameworks share an underlying assumption that
regulation is driven by the public interest. A fourth framework (public
choice) emphasizes that regulation often reflects rent-seeking behavior by
special interests, and accordingly counsels for great skepticism regarding
the merits of most such initiatives.
It would be nice to report that the entirety of the regulatory framework
described above fits neatly into one of these four analytical approaches. As
always, reality is messier than theory – particularly when one tries to apply
oversimplified theories of regulation to the real-world oversight of a
massive industry by more than a hundred potential regulators.35 Indeed, it
would be somewhat surprising if the regulatory framework for health
insurance reflected a single animating theory, since regulation of the health
care sector in general reflects the impact of multiple inconsistent normative
frameworks.36
Thus, individual mandates can result from any one of these regulatory
frameworks, or the combination of more than one of these frameworks.
Despite this heterogenity, in-depth examination of individual mandates
reveals an important commonality: provider lobbying figures in most of
them – often aided by a small group of affected patients and/or relatives of
patients.37 These groups offer legislators pre-packaged salient anecdotes to
support reforms that “fortuitously” result in insulating these providers from
the operation of market forces (Type I regulations), and more and better
coverage of the services these providers wish to deliver (Type III
regulations). The costs of these “reforms” are widely shared (and generally
off-budget), but the benefits are highly concentrated – precisely the
circumstances under which collective action problems can be overcome.38

35. 50 state insurance commissioners plus 50 state legislatures plus Congress equals
more than 100 potential regulators.
36. Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 354-356 (2006) (noting a plethora of competing organizing
principles in the regulation of health care).
37. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN & LAURA A. TOLLEN, TOWARD A 21ST CENTURY HEALTH
SYSTEM: THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROMISE OF PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE 238 (2004)
(“Often these mandates are legislative responses to the demands of narrow interest provider
and consumer constituencies, such as disease specific advocacy groups or nurses
associations, for instance.”); DOJ/FTC, supra note 33, at 24 (“providers of the mandated
benefit are usually the most vigorous proponents of such legislation, making it more likely
that the mandated benefit constitutes ‘provider protection’ and not ‘consumer protection.’
”).
38. ENTHOVEN ET. AL., supra note 37 at 238.
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Although these reforms are styled as “consumer protection,” they are, more
often than not, “provider protection.”39
If legislators were Platonic guardians, the problem would take care of
itself. They aren’t, and it won’t. Legislators have neither the information
nor the inclination to identify only cost-justified/efficient reforms. Indeed,
saliency bias dramatically increases the probability that health insurance
regulation will come to grief, disserving the interests of those the
legislators purportedly intended to protect.40
The problem is easy to state but hard to solve:
Legislators tend to identify “necessary reforms” on the
basis of bad anecdotes and popular appeal. . . Legislators
also tend to discount the trade-offs and costs which result
from their reforms. In a voluntary insurance market, costincreasing consumer protections will predictably price
some people out of the market-and it is hardly self-evident
where the cost/quality/access equilibrium should be set, let
alone whether there should be a single standard for all
39. See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Markets and Collective Action in
Regulating Managed Care, 16 HEALTH AFF. 26, 30 (1997) (“one should be sure that what is
being proposed is consumer protection and not provider protection masquerading as
consumer protection.”); Peter T. Kilborn, Bills Regulating Managed Care Benefit Doctors,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at Al (“The quip going around is that this is physician
protection, not consumer protection.”)
40. See Hyman, supra note 30, at 248:
Coverage and delivery issues that are salient to consumers
will be handled without much difficulty through normal market
mechanisms so long as consumers are actually willing to pay for the
desired services. However, in order for an issue to attract legislative
attention, it must be salient to consumers as well. If the issue is not
salient to consumers, it will have little or no appeal to legislators, who
must allocate their scarce political capital to bills that will be perceived
by their constituents as beneficial. The result is that legislative
initiatives promoting cost-justified contract terms will generally
duplicate contract terms already prevalent in the coverage market. To
the extent the legislation does not duplicate existing contract terms, it is
exceedingly likely that the proposed contract terms will have already
been rejected as non-cost-effective, either by the market as a whole, or,
in a well-differentiated market, by some of the market participants and
their customers. Such contract terms are embraced by the legislature for
their symbolic value or as a political pay-off, and not because they
provide a cost-justified benefit to consumers.
Id.
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coverage. The drafting of consumer protections is also
readily hijacked by entrenched providers, who have their
own interests at heart. Finally, the emotional implications
of these issues ensure that legislators will be reluctant to
embrace the necessary trade-offs.41
Those wishing a concrete example of how this dynamic plays out in the
real world should consider the fuss over “drive-through deliveries” – the
practice of discharging women and newborns from the hospital less than
forty-eight hours after a vaginal delivery and ninety-six hours after a
Cesarean section.42 The issue was ideal from a legislative perspective:
vulnerable mothers and babies exploited by faceless health plans, grieving
witnesses complaining of specifically identifiable (and immensely
sympathetic) victims, suited villains with MBAs, and CPAs overriding the
decisions of selfless physicians in white coats, and a largely off-budget
solution. In relatively short order, an overwhelming majority of the states
and the federal government mandated more extensive coverage.
Prohibiting drive-through deliveries was politically popular, but there is
little or no evidence that extended post-partum stays provide any benefit let alone a benefit worth the substantial associated cost.43 Worse still, the
mandate crowded out alternative arrangements that actually benefitted and
were preferred by new mothers. With successes like this, who needs
failure?
That said, why should anyone care about this particular dysfunctional
corner of the regulatory state? Isn’t setting minimum standards what we
rely on legislators and regulators to do – even if they opt for overly rich
benefit packages some of the time? Unfortunately, such “minimum
standards” can have substantial adverse consequences – with those
consequences compounded by the regulatory monopoly that each state has
pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
These adverse consequences include:

41. Id. at 236.
42. David A. Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is Consumer Protection Just What
the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N.C.L. REV. 5, 24 (1999) [hereinafter Hyman, Just What the
Doctor Ordered]. See also David A. Hyman, Commentary, What Lessons Should We Learn
From Drive-Through Deliveries?, 107 PEDIATRICS 406 (2001).
43. Hyman, Just What the Doctor Ordered, supra note 42, at 9.
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1. Forcing individuals who can’t afford more expensive
coverage to do without insurance entirely – thus increasing the
number of people who are uninsured;
2. Forcing those who can afford more expensive coverage
to purchase it, even though they have better uses for the
money;44
3. Constraining competition on the financing and delivery
of health care services;
4. Taking money from the poor and working class, and
giving to the upper middle class, who provide (and
disproportionately receive) the mandated services.45
The basic problem is that health insurance is a bundled product sold
into a diverse market, to people with varying intensity of preferences for
coverage with different cost-quality-access trade-offs. Mandates are based
on the assumption that there is one right answer to these trade-offs – but the
reality is that all Americans do not want (and some can’t afford) coverage
which incorporates all the bells and whistles. For many consumers,
regulation actually overrides their preferences, instead of protecting them,
and does so at their expense. Stated differently, “people may die or suffer
adverse outcomes if their insurance does not cover ‘everything,’ but they
will also die or suffer adverse outcomes if they are unable to afford health
insurance. . . setting an inefficiently high level of health care quality as the
mandatory minimum ignores both the short-term consequences for price
and access and the long-term consequences of increased price and
decreased access on quality.”46
44. Cf. David Hyman & Charles Silver, And Such Small Portions:
Limited Performance Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access TradeOff, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 959, 978 (1998).
Clients who can afford the best do not necessarily want to pay for
it. They may happily purchase limited legal services and put the money
they save in the bank, the stock market, or whatever else strikes their
fancy. A person wealthy enough to own a Rolls Royce can drive a
Plymouth and keep the change-at least as long as the Rolls Royce
dealers have not put the Plymouth dealers out of business.
Id.
45. See generally Barak D. Richman, Insurance Expansions: Do They Hurt Those
They Are Designed to Help? 26 HEALTH AFF. 1345 (2007).
46. Hearings on Health Services, Regulatory Costs, and the Uninsured Before the
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (2004) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement
of David A. Hyman), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirectsafely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpUi.pdf.
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It is clear that the cost of health insurance is a major factor in why so
many people are uninsured.47 Given that reality, it is far from clear why we
should accept a regulatory framework that offers people the choice between
“nothing but the best and nothing.”48
IV. TREATING THE PROBLEM: A DOSE OF TAX REFORM AND
REGULATORY FEDERALISM
If one wanted to improve on the status quo, there are two obvious
targets: the tax treatment of health insurance, and the elimination of statespecific monopolies on insurance regulation created by the McCarranFerguson Act and ERISA. Each of these targets is addressed in turn.
A.

TAX SUBSIDY

As noted previously, individuals who obtain health insurance through
their place of employment receive a sizeable tax subsidy. In its current
form, the tax subsidy is the source of considerable horizontal and vertical
inequity and allocative inefficiency.49

47. David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, 55 KANSAS L. REV. 1103, 1113, n. 49 (2007); William M. Sage, David A. Hyman &
Warren Greenberg, Why Competition Law Matters to Health Care, 22 HEALTH AFF. 31, 35
(Mar./Apr. 2003) (“When costs are high, people who cannot afford something find
substitutes or do without. The higher the cost of health insurance, the more people are
uninsured. The higher the cost of pharmaceuticals, the more people skip doses or do not fill
their prescriptions.”). See also Posting of David Cutler to Blog for Our Future, available at
http://www.ourfuture.org/blog-entry/adviser-describes-obama-health-plan (June 1, 2007,
4:07 EST).
Let's face it, the major reason that 45 million Americans don't have
health care and many others are going without needed medical care is
not that they don't want it, it's that they can't afford it. . . No matter how
much we tell Americans they should, or even have to, buy health
insurance, the fact is that people will not get coverage unless it is
affordable.
Id.
48. Hearings, supra note 47 (testimony of David A. Hyman) (“We should not place
the poor and less fortunate in the position of choosing between ‘nothing but the best and
nothing’ when it comes to health care coverage – but excessive regulation will do exactly
that.”).
49. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American
Health Care, 69 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 42 (2007); Hyman & Hall, supra note 9.
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There is no shortage of proposals on the best way to fix the problem.50
We should pick one and give it a try. My personal preference is to repeal
I.R.C. §106, and see if we can make health care less expensive by making
it more expensive.51 That said, “leveling up” is likely to prove more
politically feasible than “leveling down,” and if that is the grease for fixing
the some or all of the existing tax inequities, so be it – allocative
inefficiencies notwithstanding. Fixing the tax subsidy may also help
increase portability of coverage, by uncoupling it from a specific employer.
B. REGULATORY FEDERALISM
The framework for regulating health insurance is a mess. Identical
coverage (from the perspective of covered employees) is regulated quite
differently, depending on whether the plan is self-funded or insured. There
are also state-specific regulatory monopolies, with little effective constraint
other than employers and individual citizens exiting from the market
entirely (by relocating) or virtually (by self-funding their coverage or no
longer offering insurance if they are employers, or becoming uninsured if
they are individuals).52 The unsavory combination of regulatory monopoly,
50. Reform options include:
[R]epealing the exclusion outright; continuing to exclude it from
income, but capping its value and allowing it to erode over time;
converting the exclusion to a tax credit; leaving the existing exclusion
alone, but adding tax credits as a subsidy for the poor; making the
exclusion more universal. . . excluding all out-of-pocket spending on
health care; and, so on.
David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come Out Behind: Fixing The
Distributive Injustices of American Health Care, 69 LAW CONTEMP. PROBS. 265,
274 (2007).
51. I.R.C. § 106 (1986) (“Gross income does not include contributions by the
employer to accident or health plans for compensation (through insurance or otherwise) to
his employees for personal injuries or sickness.”).
52. See Hyman, supra note 30, at 230, n. 23:
[A]ny significant regulatory mismatch provides an incentive
to employee benefit plans to become self-funded, in order to avoid the
costs associated with state-level regulation. Thus, the efforts of the
states to regulate in this area have effectively backfired, since they have
become increasingly aggressive at regulating a vanishing market-and
their efforts increase the rate at which the market vanishes.
Id. But see Christina H. Park, Prevalence of Employer Self-Insured Health Benefits:
National and State Variation, 57 MED CARE RES. REV. 340, 343 (2000) (finding no
association between number of state mandates and percentage of employers who are selffunded).
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off-budget costs, and the politics of mandating is also likely to result in
mandate creep.
How should we address this unhealthy dynamic? A number of
approaches
have
been
floated,
including
direct
federal
regulation/chartering, deregulation, association health plans, exclusive state
regulation, and cross-border sales of health insurance.53 I suggest an
alternative strategy that blends certain of these elements, while exploiting
the benefits of jurisdictional competition.54 The goal is to identify the
“Delaware” of health insurance regulation.
There are different ways of creating jurisdictional competition in health
insurance regulation.55 The most comprehensive approach requires
amendment of both McCarran-Ferguson and ERISA. Under this approach,
insurance companies would pick the state they wished each of their
insurance products to be regulated by (“home jurisdiction”). ERISA
preemption would be constrained, and ERISA plans would be required to
designate a home jurisdiction as well.56 Individual states could only
prohibit the sale of insurance policies to their state’s residents if the insurer
had not designated a home jurisdiction. Premium taxes could only be
collected by the home jurisdiction, but they would have to be shared 50:50
with the jurisdiction where the insured resides.
The result of this approach is the creation of a national market for
health insurance coverage. States should compete for the premium taxes
associated with the sale of insurance subject to their regulation – and the
inclusion of ERISA plans ensures that a sizeable amount of new money is
at stake. States would have to take a hard look at the aggregate cost of the
mandates and premium taxes they impose, knowing that the wrong decision
would result in the loss of a sizeable amount of revenue. States would also
be constrained from adopting too lax a regulatory framework by the
knowledge that their own residents will be subject to the same regime. The
sharing of premium taxes allows states to maintain their traditional
53. See generally Amy Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market?
An Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361 (2007).
54. See New State Ice Co. v. Lieberman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country.”).
55. For a different model, see HEALTH CARE CHOICE ACT, H.R. 4460, 110th Cong.
(2007).
56. Although this will make ERISA plans subject to state-level regulation, only one
state will get to regulate them. Thus, the problem of inconsistent state regulatory regimes,
which ERISA was designed to address, is not a problem.
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consumer protection efforts to ensure that health insurers do not misbehave.
Finally, the elimination of the ERISA regulatory vacuum will eliminate the
pressure for Congress to directly regulate in this area.
If states do not want to wait for federal legislation, they can implement
a similar regulatory result by entering into regional compacts. Each state
can agree to allow the sale of any health insurance product that was
acceptable to the other states, and share the associated premium taxes and
enforcement responsibility. Paradoxically, the states whose residents
would benefit the most from jurisdictional competition are the least likely
to participate in such regional compacts. Yet, all it takes is two states to
agree to begin the process of jurisdictional competition – and the results
will tell us a lot about how much individuals and employers actually value
state-level regulation of health insurance.
To be sure, broader markets for health insurance, whether structured on
a national or regional basis, will make life more difficult for states that
wish to regulate inefficiently or hide the costs associated with the use of
regulation to redistribute resources. It is not obvious why more
transparency on the consequences of health insurance regulation should
count as a problem. Stated more bluntly, these effects are a “feature, not a
bug.” If states want to regulate inefficiently, they are certainly entitled to
do so – but they should bear the costs of their inefficiency. Similarly,
states that want to engage in redistribution have no valid objection if
jurisdictional competition forces them to squarely confront the costs of
their largesse – particularly if, as if often the case, the redistribution results
from rent-seeking.
V. CONCLUSION
One could come up with a system for regulating health insurance that is
more perverse than the one we have, but it would take both effort and
creativity. As Bill Simon, former Treasury Secretary once observed, our
tax system should look like it was “designed on purpose based on a clear
and consistent set of principles. . . .”57 The same should apply to our
regulation of health insurance and health insurers. Tax reform and
regulatory federalism offer a strategy for rationalizing the system, by
harnessing the self interest of all involved, and forcing legislators to face
the costs of their decisions.
57. WILLIAM E. SIMON, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/blueprints/forward.pdf.
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Regardless of the manner in which health insurance is regulated,
private insurers will never behave like public insurers. If legislators
actually want public insurance, they should enact it. If they can’t do that,
but they still think the mandated services are important, they should pay the
market clearing price to have them delivered.58 Of course, a world in
which legislators/regulators have to “pay the piper” is a world in which
legislators/regulators are suddenly much more cautious about imposing
such burdens.59
Playing legislative/regulatory whack-a-mole with individual coverage
terms and individual insurers may be making providers, lobbyists and
lawyers rich, but it isn’t doing any favors for the consumers that are its
intended beneficiaries. It is time to change the incentives for everyone
involved.
Finally, although this article focuses on the regulation of health
insurance, we should not ignore the similar pathologies that prevail in the
regulation of health care delivery. That, however, is the subject for another
day, another article, and another journal.

58. States could either pay insurers to include the desired services in their insurance
plans, or they can pay providers for delivering them. Regardless of which approach is
employed, state legislators would suddenly have to internalize the costs of the regulations
they impose.
59. Hyman, supra note 30, at 249 (“Because the government provides coverage for a
minority of those who are insured, the majority of the costs of ‘reforms’ considered by
legislators are off-budget. Predictably enough, the result is more and costlier consumer
protection than would be the case if the costs were on-budget.”).
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HEALTH INSURANCE RISK
POOLING AND SOCIAL SOLIDARITY:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR DAVID HYMAN
Amy B. Monahan*
INTRODUCTION
Historically, Americans have valued social solidarity with respect to
health care. That is, Americans have more or less supported the idea that
health risks are appropriate to be shared within a community.1 There is a
tension, of course. Social solidarity with respect to health care means that
the relatively healthy individuals will pay higher prices for health insurance
in order to subsidize the health insurance of the relatively less healthy.
Americans have generally supported this cross-subsidization. However,
given ever-rising health insurance prices, there is now significant interest in
lessening the extent to which health care risks are shared in our society.2
As several contributors to this symposium have pointed out, instead of
pooling our collective health risks we are creating ways in which
individuals with low health risks can opt out of the risk pool or otherwise
receive preferential treatment.3 This comment seeks to respond primarily
to the regulatory federalism proposal put forward by Professor David
Hyman, which I argue will unnecessarily harm certain risk-pooling
functions of health insurance and therefore undermine social solidarity. I
will begin first with a brief look at what risks are and are not currently
pooled, before examining options for expanding health insurance risk
pooling. I will then turn to Professor Hyman’s proposal, analyzing
regulatory federalism in light of its effect on risk pooling and social
solidarity.

* Associate Professor, University of Missouri School of Law.
1. See John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311,
312 (1997).
2. See generally Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free
Market? An Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361.
3. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Is Health Insurance a Bad Idea? The ConsumerDriven Perspective, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 377 (2008); Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity
and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14.2 CONN. INS. L.J. 199 ( 2008) (describing
the singling out of certain conditions for wellness programs, where the functional result is to
“charge higher rates to individuals based on their personal health risks”).
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Before beginning, a brief note regarding terminology. A theme of this
symposium is “social solidarity” with respect to health care. Social
solidarity, generally speaking, refers to the connections between
individuals within a society.4 “Risk pooling” on the other hand, is an
economic term that refers to individuals joining together, through an
insurance contract, to pool their collective risks.5 I use the terms “social
solidarity” and “risk pooling” interchangeably in this comment because
social solidarity with respect to health risk is expressed through the degree
of risk pooling present in health insurance arrangements.6 As we increase
the degree of risk pooling in health insurance arrangements we are
increasing social solidarity with respect to medical risks.
I.

WHAT RISKS ARE CURRENTLY POOLED?

The extent to which health risks are pooled varies based on the type of
health insurance purchased. The first distinction is between (1) large group
coverage and (2) individual and small group coverage. Large group
coverage, offered by an employer, provides a high level of risk sharing.7 In
such plans, all eligible employees typically pay identical premiums,
regardless of age or health status.8 With respect to covered benefits, risks
are both pooled and cross-subsidized.9 Of course, the extent of the risk
pooling and cross-subsidization varies based on the size of the group. The
larger the group, the more heterogeneous it is likely to be in terms of risk,

4. See A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY (John Scott and Gordon Marshall eds., 3d ed.
2005),
available
at
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t88.e2165.
5. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 1-2 (1986).
6. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1122 (Michael J. Garland & Merwyn R.
Greenlick eds., 3d ed. 2004) (“the insurance compact expresses an underlying solidarity
among insurance pool subscribers”).
7. See ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 1-2.
8. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
prohibits an employer from varying premiums based on health status. See 29 U.S.C. §1182
(1996).
9. Generally, “risk pooling” refers to individuals within the same risk classification
sharing the risk of unexpected losses. This is what takes place when health insurance
premiums vary with health status. “Cross-subsidization” refers to the sharing of risk
between individuals with different risk classification. For example, when young and old
workers pay the same health insurance premium, the risk is cross-subsidized, with the young
workers subsidizing the coverage of the older workers. See ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 95
(describing cross-subsidization).
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providing a greater amount of risk pooling and cross-subsidization.10
However, even in a large group plan with significant risk pooling and
cross-subsidization, an important limitation results from the fact that only
risks associated with the medical benefits covered by the plan are pooled
and cross-subsidized.
Individuals and small groups are susceptible to two related risk-pooling
problems. The individual market is particularly susceptible to adverse
Adverse selection has been defined as “the annoying
selection.11
tendency of people to do what’s best for themselves.”12 In the individual
health insurance context, it occurs when a healthy individual forgoes
coverage.13 If an individual is healthy and does not believe that she will
incur medical costs in excess of health insurance premiums and related outof-pocket costs, she is unlikely to enroll in health insurance.14 Conversely,
if she has reason to believe that her medical expenses will exceed her
health insurance premiums and the related out-of-pocket payments, she is
likely to enroll in health insurance. As a result, individuals who purchase
health insurance generally have greater-than-average risk.15 Premiums for
individual health insurance therefore reflect the greater-than-average risk
level of purchasers. Small groups are at a disadvantage in risk-pooling
because they lack a diversified pool of purchasers.16 Small groups, while
endogenous, do not have size sufficient to reflect community-wide risk

10. Employer groups also have the advantage that they are formed for non-insurance
purposes. See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 23, 32 (2001).
11. Id. (stating that adverse selection is “particularly acute among the newly
unemployed who were previously insured.”).
12. David Mark Tuomala, Panelist, Society of Actuaries, Consumerism and Consumer
Choice-Implications for Health Plans, Dallas Spring Meeting 3 (May 30, 2001), in REC.
SOC’Y ACTUARIES, Spring 2001, at 3.
13. See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Market-Based Reform: What to Regulate
and by Whom, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 109, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/14/1/105.
14. Id. (explaining that “those who expect not to use their coverage are more likely to
drop it.”). See also Hyman & Hall, supra note 10, at 32 (stating that “adverse selection
discourages the purchase of insurance by some people who would otherwise have chosen to
purchase coverage.”).
15. This is particularly true under community rating. See Hyman & Hall, supra note
10, at 32 (noting that “adverse selection is increased by laws, such as community rating, that
require insurers to disregard certain risk factors.”).
16. Troyen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective on Health Care Insurance Reform, 19
AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 39-40 (1993).
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levels and therefore are susceptible to poor experience rating and resulting
high premiums.17
Both the individual and small group markets are further affected by the
different types of state regulation. Some states have community rating
laws, which require insurers to charge each covered individual the same
premium, regardless of their health status.18 Other states allow insurers to
adjust premiums based on risk, but constrain the amount of the adjustment
using so-called rate bands.19 Often, states that have community rating
requirements also have guaranteed issue laws, requiring insurance
companies to offer insurance to every individual who applies for
coverage.20 Other states neither constrain the ability of insurers to adjust
premiums based on risk nor require insurers to issue coverage to each
applicant.21 While differing state regulation affects the degree to which
risk is shared, in all states there appears to be a substantial degree of risk
sharing among a state’s privately insured population with respect to those
benefits covered by the policy of insurance.22
II. WHAT RISKS ARE NOT SHARED?
Health insurance protects against two primary types of risks: macrolevel risk and micro-level risk. Macro-level risk is the risk associated with

17. See Enthoven & Singer, supra note 13 at 109 (noting that small employers are
“too small to spread risks” and “achieve economies of scale in administration…”).
18. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §3231 (McKinney 2008).
19. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. §379.936 (West 2008).
20. See § 3231, supra note 18.
21. See Kaiser Fam. Found., Small Group Health Insurance Market Rate Restrictions,
2007, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=351&cat=7 (last visited Mar. 3,
2008).
22. See Bradley Herring & Mark V. Pauly, The Effect of State Community Rating
Regulations on Premiums and Coverage in the Individual Health Insurance Market, 20
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper 12504, August 2006) (finding significant risk
pooling even in states without risk rating limitations or guaranteed issue requirements, and
noting the “apparent degree of pooling.”). See also Enthoven & Singer, supra note 13 at
109 (stating that “the excess burden of cost from adverse selection in the individual market
must be allocated to someone.”).
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medical expenses generally.23 Micro-level risk is the risk associated with
incurring losses associated with particular medical treatments or services.24
Individuals with health insurance pool their macro-level risk, while
those who lack health insurance of any kind retain the risk of loss
associated with medical expenses. The only way to increase macro-level
risk sharing is to increase the number of individuals with health insurance
coverage.
While individuals with health insurance pool their macro-level risks,
the particular scope of their insurance contracts determines which microlevel risks are pooled. For example, if an individual’s health insurance
policy does not cover cancer treatments, risk of loss associated with cancer
treatments is retained at the individual level and not pooled. By enacting
mandated benefit laws, federal and state governments regulate micro-level
risk pooling by requiring coverage for certain benefits in all contracts of
health insurance.25 The risk of loss associated with any service or
treatment not covered by a standard contract nor mandated by the state or
federal government is retained at the individual level. In order to increase
micro-level risk pooling, the scope of health insurance coverage would
need to be broadened. The section below will briefly examine popular
reform proposals, each of which focuses on increasing macro-level risk
pooling.
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO BROADEN RISK POOLING?
As stated above, the only way to increase macro-level risk pooling is to
increase the number of individuals with health insurance. Nearly 18% of
the non-elderly population in the United States lacks health insurance.26
Unfortunately, while we have many statistics on the uninsured population,
relatively little is known about the factors that determine whether an

23. See, e.g., HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ WITH MELISSA COX, CAN WE
SAY NO? THE CHALLENGE OF RATIONING HEALTH CARE 95 (2005) (stating that health
insurance efficiency is principally intended to protect against the “risk” of large and
burdensome financial losses).
24. See Monahan, supra note 2, at 1365.
25. See id. at 1364-74 (describing state and federal regulation of the substance of
health insurance contracts, as well as the related policy rationales).
26. Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured:
Analysis of the March 2007 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, No. 310 at 4
(Washington, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10a-20071.pdf.
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individual purchases private health insurance.27 We know that many cite
prohibitive cost when explaining why they declined employer-offered
coverage.28 However, there is also significant evidence that demand for
health insurance is not very price elastic.29 In other words, in order to make
significant improvement in rates of coverage, cost would have to decrease
substantially.30 Related to cost is also the issue of individual demand for
health insurance. For example, young adults are significantly more likely
to be uninsured than older adults, suggesting that demand may vary based
on perceived risk.31
There is disagreement with respect to the most effective (and desirable)
way to increase the number of individuals who are covered by health
insurance. The primary reform proposals involve (1) changing the tax
treatment of health insurance premiums, (2) requiring all individuals to
purchase health insurance coverage, (3) requiring all employers to offer
health insurance coverage to their workers, or (4) decreasing micro-level
risk pooling in order to decrease costs.32

27. M. Kate Bundorf et al., Health Risk, Income, and the Purchase of Private Health
Insurance 1(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 11677, 2005) (“[S]urprisingly
little is known about the factors that determine whether an individual obtains health
insurance in private markets.”).
28. See, e.g., Paul Fronstin, Employment-Based Health Benefits: Access and
Coverage, 1988-2005, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, NO. 303 at 8 (Washington, Employee Benefit
Research
Institute,
Mar.
2007),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=973833.
29. See, e.g., Michael Chernew et al., The Demand for Health Insurance Coverage by
Low-Income Workers: Can Reduced Premiums Achieve Full Coverage?, 32 HEALTH
SERVICES RES. 453, 464 (1997) (“Although the overwhelming majority of individuals
participate in their employer’s plan, there appears to be a subset who do not, even at prices
heavily distorted by the employer. For this group of workers, it is unlikely that a further
subsidy would alter participation dramatically.”). See also Jonathan Gruber & Ebonya
Washington, Subsidies to Employee Health Insurance Premiums and the Health Insurance
Market (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 9567, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9567.
30. See generally Chernew, et al. supra note 29.
31. See Fronstin, supra note 26, at 15.
32. See, e.g., Friedman infra note 35 (arguing why tax preferences should be
eliminated altogether); see also infra note 47 (proposing why all individuals should be
required to purchase health insurance or be penalized); see also infra note 56 (mandating
that employers offer health insurance to their employees); see also infra Part III.3 and supra
Monahan note 2 (describing current legislative efforts to reduce the impact of state
mandated benefit laws, the primary vehicle for enforcing micro-level risk pooling).
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Tax Reform Options

Arguments in favor of tax reform are based both on fairness and
affordability grounds. Currently, only self-employed individuals and those
who receive coverage through their employer may pay health insurance
premiums on a pre-tax basis.33 This historical accident puts those who are
not self-employed or who are not offered health insurance by their
employer at a significant disadvantage when it comes to purchasing health
insurance. These individuals must not only purchase insurance on the lessfavorable individual market, but the price is not subsidized by the federal
government.34 Reformers propose remedying this disparity in different
ways. Some propose that the tax preference should be eliminated entirely;
there would be no preference for employer-provided insurance but the
federal government would cease subsidizing the purchase of private health
insurance for anyone.35 Others argue that all individuals should be
permitted to purchase health insurance on a pre-tax basis, thereby retaining
the current tax preference for health insurance but making it universally
available.36 Concerned that even a universal ability to pay health insurance
premiums on a pre-tax basis will not significantly increase insurance
coverage levels, others argue in favor of various versions of a tax credit for
the purchase of health insurance.37
These proposals have markedly differing effects on their ability to
increase levels of health insurance coverage and therefore to increase risk
pooling. Eliminating the tax preference for insurance, while providing
equitable treatment to all individuals, would not immediately decrease the
cost of insurance. Rather, it would increase the cost of insurance for most
33. See I.R.C. §§106, 125, and 162(l)(1)(b).
34. See generally Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society
Health Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777 (2006) (explaining the effective federal subsidy
available for employer-provided coverage).
35. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, How To Cure Health Care, 142 PUB. INT. 3 (2001),
available at http://www.thepublicinterest.com/archives/2001winter/article1.html.
36. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Rethinking the
Tax Treatment of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 BYU L. REV. 1229, 1258
(1995) (“Congress should extend § 106’s exclusion to all taxpayers regardless of the source
through which they obtain coverage”).
37. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, Making Health Care More Affordable
(Sept.
2,
2004),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040902.html. (proposing that giving
small business owners refundable tax credits for contributions they make to their
employees’ health savings accounts would reduce the rising cost of health care and promote
affordable coverage options).
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individuals in the short run. Nonetheless, proponents argue that it might
very well increase coverage rates. Economists argue that, absent the
current economic distortions associated with employer-provided health
insurance, individuals would elect to purchase less comprehensive
insurance coverage.38 With the price no longer subsidized by the federal
government they would chose plans with higher deductibles and cost
sharing levels, less comprehensive coverage, or both.39 When individuals
bear a greater portion of their medical expenses they will tend to spend
less. And as individuals curb their medical expenditures the costs of both
medical care and health insurance will fall.40 As insurance prices fall, more
individuals will be able to afford coverage. If the model works according
to theory, this proposal could broaden macro-level risk pooling.41
The proposal to make the tax preference universally available would
potentially lower the cost of health insurance for those who are not selfemployed or do not have access to employer-provided coverage. However,
the value of the deduction from gross income varies based on the
individual’s marginal tax rate. For those in the highest marginal tax
bracket, the discount would be significant.42 For those without federal
income tax liability, the exclusion would have no effect on health insurance
affordability.43 Of course, those without access to employer-provided
health insurance are more likely to be lower-income individuals.44 So,
while broadening the current tax preference for health insurance would
eliminate the current disparate treatment for individuals who are not selfemployed or who lack access to employer-provided coverage, it seems
unlikely to greatly increase the number of insured individuals.

38. See Friedman, supra note 35, at 7.
39. See id. at 2 (arguing that people will be more conservative in how much they
spend for health coverage once they have to pay for it out-of-pocket).
40. David Hyman sums this up neatly by explaining that we should “make health care
less expensive by making it more expensive.” David A. Hyman, Health Insurance: Market
Failure or Government Failure?, 14 CONN. INS. L. J. (forthcoming 2008).
41. Of course, the evidence regarding the price-elasticity of the demand for health
insurance suggests that the magnitude of the effect on coverage rates would not be great.
See Chernew et al., supra note 29 at 453, 466.
42. An individual in the top marginal tax bracket would get a “discount” of 35% on
the cost of health insurance by virtue of being able to deduct or exclude health insurance
premiums from otherwise taxable income.
43. In 2002, 30% of all individuals who filed federal income tax returns had no
federal income tax liability. Michael Parisi & Scott Hollenseck, Individual Income Tax
Returns, 2002, 24 STAT. INCOME 8, 24 (2004).
44. See Fronstin, supra note 26, at 10, 13-14.
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The final tax reform option is to provide some form of tax credits to
help subsidize the purchase of health insurance. Tax credits have the
advantage of reducing an individual’s tax liability dollar-for-dollar and
therefore not varying with the individual’s marginal tax bracket. However,
non-refundable tax credits would not create a purchase incentive for
individuals without federal income tax liability.45 Because low income
individuals are more likely to be uninsured than higher income individuals,
many proponents argue that credit refundability is essential to the success
of a tax credit proposal.46 A refundable tax credit program appears to hold
the most promise for effectively increasing health insurance coverage rates,
but is also the most expensive tax reform option.
2.

Purchase Mandates

Leaving aside the potential for tax reform, another popular reform
option is to require all individuals to purchase health insurance and to
impose a monetary penalty on those who do not.47 This appears to be a
promising method to address what we consider to be sub-optimal demand
for health insurance.48 This reform is particularly appealing if it will cause
low-risk individuals—who might otherwise rationally decide to forgo
health insurance—to opt-in to the risk pool.
Individual health insurance purchase mandates would improve the
economic incentives for individuals to purchase health insurance. Under
most proposals to mandate health insurance purchase, a non-complying
individual would face a significant monetary penalty.49 Therefore, when an
individual contemplates whether to purchase health insurance, he or she
will take into account the cost associated with non-compliance with the
mandate. The result should be that a greater number of low-risk
individuals will purchase health insurance because of the additional cost
45. This would likely exclude 30% of the population. See supra text accompanying
note 30.
46. See Jonathan Gruber & Larry Levitt, Tax Subsidies For Health Insurance: Costs
and Benefits, 19 HEALTH AFF. 72, 78-79 (2000).
47. See generally KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, STATES
MOVING TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE REFORM (2008), (available at
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/kcmu_statehealthreform.cfm)
[hereinafter
KAISER
COMMISSION].
48. When I use the term “sub-optimal” in this context I am referring to sub-optimal
from a societal perspective. It may be possible that a given individual’s decision to forgo
health insurance is rational.
49. See KAISER COMMISSION, supra note 47, at 3.
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imposed on forgoing such coverage.50 By increasing the number of lowrisk individuals who are insured, the overall risk level of the insured
population should decline and premiums may decrease as a result. By
creating a strong incentive to opt-in to the risk pool, health insurance
purchase mandates would significantly strengthen social solidarity.51
3.

Offer Mandates

Another reform option, sometimes proposed in tandem with the
individual mandate discussed above, is to require employers to offer health
insurance to their workers.52 This proposal is premised on taking
advantage of both the preferential tax treatment granted to employerprovided health care coverage, as well as its group purchasing model.53
I will refrain from an in-depth discussion of offer mandates, primarily
because such mandates implicate the preemption provisions of ERISA, a
meaningful discussion of which is beyond the scope of this comment.54
However, the important question to be answered is whether offer mandates
would meaningfully increase coverage rates. While many workers
currently are either not offered coverage by their employer or are not
50. See Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and Potential
Lessons from Massachusetts, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1203, 1230-31 (2007) (discussing this
possibility in the context of Massachusetts’s health care reform legislation). Due to the
likelihood of increased employee demand, these mandates may also encourage more
employers to offer health insurance. See id. But see David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts
Health Plan: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1111-12 (2007)
(analogizing health insurance to automobile insurance mandates, which have led to lessthan-universal coverage).
51. However, this is not a perfect solution if the maximization of risk sharing is our
objective. Even if every state or the federal government were to require the purchase of
health insurance, risk pools would remain stratified. Under our current system, state
regulation of insurance results in state-level risk pools. See Christina H. Park, Prevalence of
Employer Self-Insured Health Benefits: National and State Variation, 57 MED. CARE RES. &
REV. 340, 342 (2000). Those pools are further stratified by self-insuring employers who
have their own risk pools. Id. at 340, 342. However, creating the broadest possible risk
pooling would require (1) moving the regulation or insurance to the federal level, (2)
preventing employers from self-insuring their plans, and (3) requiring community rating and
guaranteeing issue for all who apply. Given political realities, it may be too difficult to
obtain such nationwide risk pooling.
52. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.151F, § 2 (Supp. 2007).
53. Normative arguments are also made in support of offer mandates, arguing that
employers have a responsibility to make health care coverage available to their workers.
54. See generally Monahan, supra note 50 for a discussion of ERISA preemption in
the context of offer mandates.
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eligible for such coverage—suggesting that significant improvement could
be made by requiring employers to make such coverage available—30% of
workers who are offered coverage decline it.55 Because of the problem of
non-universal enrollment in offered health insurance, offer mandates are
often proposed in conjunction with purchase mandates.56
4.

Decreasing Micro-Level Risk Pooling

As we strive to find ways to increase health insurance coverage rates,
and therefore macro-level risk pooling, there is increasing discomfort with
mandated benefit laws, the primary vehicle for enforcing micro-level risk
pooling.57 The tension is this: as we increase micro-level risk pooling by
requiring more treatments or services to be covered by health insurance
contracts, we potentially raise prices and therefore decrease coverage rates.
The two appear to have an inverse relationship. As a result, there is
significant interest in eliminating or decreasing mandated benefit laws.58
But, as will be explored further below, blaming mandated benefit laws
for decreasing coverage rates oversimplifies the relationship. We cannot
have effective macro-level risk pooling without having effective microlevel risk pooling. If we strip away all of our micro-level risk pooling,
such that a health insurance contract protects only against the risk of loss
associated with broken toes, we have not gained much social solidarity,
even if we have universal coverage. I realize, of course, that we are not
anywhere close to stripping health insurance down to broken toe coverage,
but the point remains the same. It matters what gets covered by health
insurance contracts. The problems associated with decreasing micro-level
risk pooling are discussed in more detail below.
IV. AN EXAMINATION OF REGULATORY FEDERALISM
Professor Hyman critiques our current system of regulating the
substance of health insurance contracts on many fronts. He makes an
economic argument that our current regulatory system decreases welfare by
providing consumers with the choice between “nothing but the best and

55. See Fronstin, supra note 28, at 1.
56. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. Ch.111M, § 2 ( West. Supp. 2007).
57. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 2, at 1401-13 (describing current legislative efforts
to reduce the impact of or eliminated state mandated benefit laws).
58. See id.
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nothing.”59 He critiques mandated benefit laws as resulting from rentseeking, rather than sound health policy,60 and also makes a normative,
libertarian argument regarding freedom to contract.61
In lieu of our current system of regulation, Professor Hyman advocates
regulatory federalism with respect to health insurance. As he explains,
“The goal is to identify the “Delaware” of health insurance regulation.”62
Under this system of regulatory federalism, health insurance purchasers
could elect to buy insurance in any state, allowing such purchasers to elect
the regulatory regime that will apply to their health insurance coverage.63
For example, an individual who lives in Massachusetts but does not value
Massachusetts’ mandated coverage for infertility treatment would be free to
purchase coverage from Wyoming, where such coverage can be excluded
from a health insurance contract.
On first glance, regulatory federalism does appear to fix many of the
problems Professor Hyman has identified. Regulatory federalism would
almost certainly be an effective counter to rent-seeking behavior. As
Professor Hyman points out, a competitive regulatory environment would
not allow states the luxury of special interest legislation.64 If a state’s
mandated benefit laws were not valued by the population, they would
simply buy insurance elsewhere. States, not wanting to lose premium tax
revenue, would likely be hesitant to grant economic rents to special interest
groups. If rent-seeking is a primary concern, this appears to be a very
effective solution.
The case for welfare maximization is somewhat less compelling.
According to standard economic theory, consumers with free market
choices will be able to satisfy their preferences and therefore maximize
their welfare.65 But let us examine why regulatory federalism would
59. Hyman, note 40, at 10 (internal citation omitted).
60. Id. at 5, 10. See also David A. Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is "Consumer
Protection" Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N.C. L. REV. 5, 92 (1999).
61. Hyman, supra note 40, at 10.
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 11-12. Professor Hyman also proposes scaling back ERISA preemption by
requiring even self-insured plans to elect a home jurisdiction for purposes of health plan
regulation. Id. Further, he makes the novel proposal that states need not wait for federal
legislation to allow inter-state purchasing. Rather, two or more states could voluntarily join
together to allow their residents to purchase health insurance from any of the other
participating states. Id. at 11.
64. Id. at 7.
65. See Cecil E. Bohanon, A Comment on “Economic Inefficiency: A Failure of
Economists,” 21 J. ECON. EDUC. 427, 427-29 (1990).
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increase some individuals’ welfare. The benefit from regulatory federalism
comes from purchasers being able to forgo coverage for certain treatments
or services. This, in turn, will decrease the premium associated with the
policy, leaving the purchaser with more money to spend on other desired
items, thereby increasing the individual’s welfare. The individuals with the
most to gain under such a system are those with low health risks. For
individuals with relatively high health risks, their welfare is arguably
decreased. Granted, they should, in a functioning market, be able to
maximize their welfare by freely entering into a contract that maximizes
their preferences.
However, adverse selection in health insurance
purchasing creates market failure,66 and allowing interstate purchase of
health insurance will result in greater adverse selection problems. First,
note that state mandated benefit laws rely on market restriction in order to
function.67 You cannot compulsorily share risk if individuals are free to
opt-out of the mandate. Obviously, given the ability to opt-out, those who
do not anticipate utilizing the benefit at issue will forgo such coverage. But
now individuals who do not opt-out of the benefit will be signaling to the
insurer that they expect to utilize the benefit, and the premium increase
associated with the benefit will correspond to that expected utilization.
Essentially, regulatory federalism would prevent community-wide risk
spreading for the benefits at issue and instead spread risk only among the
population expected to utilize the benefit. And this assumes that such
coverage will continue to be available in an unrestricted market. Adverse
selection may be such a problem that insurance coverage for “optional”
benefits simply disappears. The fact that states will be competing for
premium tax dollars makes this outcome even more likely, since state
legislatures will likely move quickly to remove any mandates that are
causing decreased enrollment in health insurance contracts governed by
their state.68
Regulatory federalism appears to satisfy libertarian ideals by providing
freedom to contract, but only with respect to benefits unaffected by adverse
selection. The market failure caused by adverse selection affects not only
welfare maximization, but also the freedom to contract.69 It is not simply
that individuals will now be able to choose the contract terms they desire.
66. Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance
Markets, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89, 103 (2002).
67. Monahan, supra note 2, at 1410.
68. Id. at 1411-12 (discussing the impact that interstate sale of health insurance would
likely have on the state legislative process).
69. Monahan, supra note 2, at 1385-86.
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Because of adverse selection, the choice of contract terms with respect to
health insurance is likely to be limited even in a free market. So low risk
individuals will have the freedom to elect their contract terms (with lesser
coverage terms), while certain high risk individuals will be unable to elect
the broad coverage they may desire – falling short of the freedom to
contract ideal.
We might be able to look past the negative effects of regulatory
federalism on high-risk individuals if the end result is a significant increase
in macro-level risk pooling by increasing the number of Americans who are
insured. However, estimates suggest that allowing the interstate sale of
health insurance, as Professor Hyman’s proposal would permit, would not
result in an increase in health insurance coverage. The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) recently prepared an estimate for proposed federal
legislation allowing for interstate sale of health insurance.70 The CBO cost
estimate states simply that interstate sale of health insurance “would reduce
the price of individual health insurance coverage for people expected to
have relatively low health care costs, while increasing the price of coverage
for those expected to have relatively high health care costs” resulting in an
increase in the number of relatively healthy individuals, and a decrease in
the number of individuals expected to have relatively high cost, who buy
individual coverage” with little net effect on coverage rates.71 This
conclusion is consistent with the analysis above regarding the likely
outcome of regulatory federalism.
Professor Hyman’s concerns about our current system of regulation are
real, and should be addressed. But adopting regulatory federalism
fundamentally undermines micro-level risk pooling, an important
contributor to social solidarity.72 Micro-level risk pooling, after all,
determines which medical risks will be shared. As a result, I am not ready
to give up on the risk-pooling function of mandated benefit laws. Instead,
we need to work to (1) identify permissible justifications for such laws73
and (2) identify the proper procedure for drafting and adopting such laws.74
If we can do a better job of regulating the substance of health insurance
70. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE REPORT ON H.R. 2355: HEALTH CARE
CHOICE
ACT
OF
2005
1
(2005),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6639/hr2355.pdf.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Monahan, supra note 2, at 1385, 1387.
73. See Amy B. Monahan, Value-Based Mandated Health Benefits, 80 U. COLO. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009).
74. Legislatures seem ill-suited to the task. See generally Hyman, supra note 60.
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contracts we would move toward a health care system that effectively pools
risk, strengthens social solidarity, and yet eliminates unnecessary costs.
CONCLUSION
The issues touched on in this Comment are not, by any means, easy.
We want all Americans to have access to quality health care, which means
we want all Americans to have health insurance coverage. We seem to be
in agreement that, to one degree or another, we believe that health risks are
appropriate to be shared. At the macro-level, the goal is easy. As we
increase coverage, we increase risk-sharing and therefore social solidarity.
But as we strive to increase macro-level risk sharing, we must be on guard
against stripping away the micro-level coverage provisions. To decrease
the cost of coverage we might be tempted to exclude more and more
services from health insurance contracts. Even if such efforts do increase
health insurance coverage, they will reduce social solidarity by eliminating
the sharing of risk associated with the treatments at issue. As previously
stated, we cannot have effective macro-level risk pooling without effective
micro-level risk pooling. Professor Hyman has pointed out many of the
problems with our current system of regulating micro-level risk pooling, to
which we must respond not be giving up entirely, but by working to define
both appropriate justifications and processes for regulating the substance of
health insurance contracts.
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THE HEALTH INSURANCE DEBATE IN
CANADA: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES?
Mary Anne Bobinski1
I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay begins with an intentionally ambiguous title. Are
comparisons to Canada relevant and useful for policy-makers in the United
States and, if so, what lessons can we learn? Part II of this Essay highlights
some of the risks and benefits of cross-border comparisons between the
United States and Canada. In Part III, I analyze some of the key data points
often cited in comparing the two health care systems. Part IV explores the
current Canadian debate about private health insurance. Finally, in Part V, I
focus on the lessons from Canada for the health insurance debate in the
United States.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF COMPARISONS
Are comparisons to Canada relevant? Do they offer any value to policy
makers or to the American public? The frequency of these comparisons
might suggest that the answer is obvious. Yet there are substantial reasons
to pause and consider when and how comparisons to Canada are truly
relevant for the United States.2
1
Dean and Professor of Law, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. This
Essay is based on a presentation originally given in January 2007 at the AALS Conference
in Washington, D.C. The Essay was substantially revised, updated and submitted for
publication in February 2008. The Essay’s consideration of cross-border health law is paired
with separate piece on the relevance of U.S. health law and policy for Canada. See Judicial
Responses to Government Restrictions on Health Care Markets in the US and Canada,
presented at the Visions National Health Law Conference in Banff, Alberta (November 10,
2007). The author wishes to thank commentators at the AALS Section on Insurance
program in January 2007 for their questions and suggestions as well as Betsy Segal (UBC
Law ’07) and Brenda Osmond (UBC Law class ’09) for research assistance.
2
For a general discussion of the benefits and risks of comparative health policy
analyses, see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Comparative and International Health Law, 14
HEALTH MATRIX 141 (2004). See also American College of Physicians, Achieving a HighPerformance Health Care System with Universal Access: What the United States Can Learn
from Other Countries, 148 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 55, 62-63 (2008) (noting difficulties of
using comparative data but arguing that “the United States has much to learn by closely
examining how other countries’ health care systems tried to solve the problems that underlie
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For many in the U.S., Canada is a cold country to the north, perhaps
best known for maple syrup, ice hockey, natural beauty, and polite
citizenry. Canada’s proximity to the U.S. and the substantial economic ties
between the two countries tend to promote the comparison industry.
Canada seems familiar enough to create a natural quasi-empirical research
study for U.S. policy makers interested in trying to predict the impact of
changes in health care policy in the U.S. Advocates on both sides of the
debate seem to believe that we can determine, for example, whether or not
a single payer system would address the ills of the U.S. health care system
by looking to the Canadian experience.
There are of course substantial differences between the two countries.
Canada has roughly a tenth the population of the United States even though
it is slightly larger in size.3 Despite Canada’s vast geography, ninety
percent of Canadians live within a few hours’ drive of the U.S. border4 and
a significant portion of Canada’s economy is based on exports to the U.S.5
Canada has nonetheless retained its distinctive character, readily seen in
areas ranging from the coexistence of English and French traditions and
languages to a political and social climate generally viewed as significantly
more “liberal” and less dominated by social conservatives than the United
States. An illustrative list of the differences between the two countries
would probably include Canada’s failure to support the war in Iraq, the
relatively swift legalization of same sex marriage, and Canada’s pride in
adopting a largely government-funded health care system.6
Over and above these significant differences in history, politics, and
culture, so much of the debate about Canada seems to reveal more about
the U.S. than it does about Canada itself. The U.S.-Canadian border –
frequently referred to as “the longest undefended border in the world”7 –
may not provide a clear window into an alternate reality so much as it
the United States’ low-ranking performance ….”); Editor’s Note, Comparative Health
Policy, 26 J. H. POLITICS POL’Y & L. 675.
3
The Central Intelligence Agency, “Canada,” in The World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html
(updated
regularly with new data).
4
Id. (“Geography-note . . ..approximately 90% of the population is concentrated
within 160 km of the US border”).
5
Id. (Economy-overview section)
6
For a recent view on Canada’s slight shift to the center or right, see Clifford
Krauss, Conservative Win in Canada Could Help Repair Ties to the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2006, at A4.
7
See, e.g., Susan Catto, Tighter Border Security Slows Canadian Traffic, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, sec. 5, at 3 (noting new post-9/11 security measures).
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serves as a fun house mirror: reflecting back American concerns in
exaggerated form rather than revealing relevant data about the impact of
different systems of organizing and delivering health care.8 Is it accurate,
relevant or useful to characterize the Canadian system as “socialized
medicine” with health care providers fleeing to better paid jobs in the U.S.
and Canadian citizens waiting in dangerously long lines for emergency or
specialized care while government bureaucrats decide who will receive
what types of care?9 Is it any more accurate, relevant or useful to describe
the Canadian system as a nirvana in which society has accepted
responsibility for providing basic health care for all and has developed an
efficient, effective, and stable system of delivering on that commitment?10
The very terms of the debate – “socialized medicine” and “government
bureaucrats” -- reveal more about the signposts of American political
discourse than they do about the reality of the system they seek to
describe.11
Filmmaker Michael Moore’s indictment of the U.S. health care system,
Sicko¸ provides a useful illustration of this problem.12 The movie attempts
to puncture the myths about Canada’s health care system through vignettes
involving U.S. citizens seeking to qualify for coverage under the public
system in Canada and Canadians who have received prompt care for their
health conditions in Canada. The film thus includes an undoubtedly a
humorous debunking of the negative stereotypes about the Canadian health
care system often heard in political debates. Yet the Canadian reaction to
the movie is somewhat complex. Canadians view their health care system
as a source of national pride and identity and many Canadians undoubtedly
8
For a slightly different use of the mirror image, see KAREN DAVIS, ET AL.,
MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: AN INTERNATIONAL UPDATE ON THE COMPARATIVE
PERFORMANCE OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 1 (2007) (“Like the queen in the ‘Snow
White’fairy tale, Americans often look only at their own reflection in the mirror – failing to
include international experience in assessments of the health care system.”),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/1027_Davis_mirror_mirror_international_upda
te_final.pdf?section=4039.
9
The answer is “no,” of course. Among other things, medicine is Canada is not
socialized: Canada has a single-payer system but most health care is provided by nongovernmental institutions and private physicians. See William Lahey, Medicare and the
Law: Contours of an Evolving Relationship, in CANADIAN HEALTH LAW AND POLICY 1, 13
(Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield, and Colleen Flood, eds., 3d ed. 2007).
10
The answer here is “no” as well. See text accompanying notes 70-71.
11
For similar observations, see Peter S. Hussey, Review, Health Systems in
Transition: Canada, 297 JAMA 647 (2007).
12
See Michael Moore, Sicko, http://www.michaelmoore.com/sicko/index.html (last
visited Nov. 23, 2008).
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enjoyed the humorous comparisons between the two systems. But, at the
same time, the movie’s rosy glow created more than a few moments of
discomfort for Canadian audiences given broad concerns about the
sustainability of the current system and an intense debate about how to
address lengthy waiting times for certain procedures.13
Given the risks of cross-border comparisons, this Essay therefore takes
a skeptical, limited view of the relevance of the Canadian experience for
the insurance debate in the United States. The next section of this Essay
provides a basic outline of the Canadian system and then analyzes some
recent data comparing Canada to the U.S. using data on health care
expenditures, access and outcomes.
III. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
A. THE CANADA HEALTH ACT
The Canada Health Act established a publicly-funded health care
system that, confusingly enough for American readers, is called
“Medicare.”14 Much as occurred with the Medicaid system in the United
States, the federal government in Canada used the lure of federal funding
subsidies to induce provincial participation on a national health care
program. Unlike the Medicaid system established in the U.S., the Canadian
Medicare system is not viewed as a program designed to remedy the gap
poverty creates in what is viewed as the presumptively efficient operation
of the market for health insurance. The Canadian program as created by
federal legislation and implemented in the various provinces instead largely

13
See, e.g., Jeffrey Simpson, Sicko Lets Us Wallow In Our Health-Care Smugness,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), July 11, 2007, at A17. See also Tracy Hampton, 7-Country
Survey of Patients: US Adults Most Unhappy with Health Care, 298 JAMA 2730 (2007)
(while adults in the US are the most unhappy with their health care system, with 34%
agreeing that the system needs to be rebuilt completely and 48% more citing the need for
fundamental changes, many Canadians are worried as well. Twelve percent of Canadians
think their system needs to be rebuilt and another 60 percent think that fundamental changes
are needed).
14
The Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6. The Canada Health Act is available
online at http://www.canlii.org. Although the Act is refreshingly brief and clear,
particularly compared to health care legislation in the United States, the federal legislation
and related provincial Acts have nonetheless spawned considerable litigation and academic
commentary. For a general overview of the fundamentals of Canadian health care law,
including the Medicare system, see Lahey, supra note 9, at 1-67.
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supplants the private market for health insurance coverage for an important
set of core health care services.
The Canadian Medicare system is characterized by five fundamental
principles: accessibility, universality, portability, comprehensiveness, and
public administration.15 Under the portability requirement, provinces must
provide insurance coverage for lawful residents and are prohibited from
imposing any waiting or eligibility period greater than three months.16
Provinces are also required to pay for the costs of health care incurred by
residents who are temporarily away from their home province.17 The
Medicare program’s universality requirement establishes that provinces
must provide insured persons access to services covered under the plan on
the same terms and conditions.18 The accessibility of the system is
maintained through provisions requiring the payment of providers from
public funds that are coupled with provisions prohibiting extra billing or
user charges.19 Comprehensiveness is created through the coverage of all
medically necessary hospital services and medically required physician
services.20 The Act requires provinces to administer and operate their plans
15

Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 7. See also Lahey, supra note 9, at 3445 (discussing the criteria).
16
Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 11 (“(1) In order to satisfy the criterion
respecting portability, the health care insurance plan of a province (a) must not impose any
minimum period of residence in the province, or waiting period, in excess of three months
before residents of the province are eligible for or entitled to insured health services”).
Under section 2, “’resident’” means, in relation to a province, a person lawfully entitled to
be or to remain in Canada who makes his home and is ordinarily present in the province, but
does not include a tourist, a transient or a visitor to the province.” Id at §2.
17
Id. at §11(1)(b).
18
Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 10 (“In order to satisfy the criterion
respecting universality, the health care insurance plan of a province must entitle one
hundred per cent of the insured persons of the province to the insured health services
provided for by the plan on uniform terms and conditions.”) Section 2 defines “insured
persons” as “in relation to a province, a resident of the province” but excludes members of
the Canadian Forces, members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.),
penitentiary inmates, and provincial residents who have not yet completed their residency
requirements. Id. at § 2.
19
Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 12 (“In order to satisfy the criterion
respecting accessibility, the health care insurance plan of a province (a) must provide for
insured health services on uniform terms and conditions and on a basis that does not impede
or preclude, either directly or indirectly whether by charges made to insured persons or
otherwise, reasonable access to those services by insured persons”). Section 12 also
establishes the requirements and general standards for the compensation of physicians, other
practitioners, and hospitals. Id.
20
Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 9 (“In order to satisfy the criterion
respecting comprehensiveness, the health care insurance plan of a province must insure all
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through public entities on a non-profit basis, although health care can be
provided through physicians who are not government employees.21
The principles of the Canadian system enjoy broad public support even
though the system is saddled with some internal conflicts.22 Universality
and portability imply uniformity but Canada’s complex political landscape
has tolerated deviations in independent-minded Quebec.23 The system was
more comprehensive at the outset than it is today, given developments that
have moved care out of hospitals and away from physicians and toward
pharmaceuticals, home care, and other services not included within the core
Medicare mandate.24 Provinces have addressed at least some of these
challenges to comprehensiveness through programs layered on top of the
core health services mandate; however the terms of provincial plans vary,
leading to a lack of uniformity across Canada for some important types of
health care.25 Covered residents have access to the system without regard
to their economic circumstances and need not fear the potentially crushing
burden of deductibles and co-payments. But truly wealthy Canadians can
“buy out” of the current system by seeking care in the United States and
average Canadians may experience significant delays in accessing some
services.

insured health services provided by hospitals, medical practitioners or dentists, and where
the law of the province so permits, similar or additional services rendered by other health
care practitioners”). Section 2 provides that “’insured health services’” means hospital
services, physician services and surgical-dental services provided to insured persons” while
excluding services provided under other federal legislation or provincial workers
compensation regimes). “Medically necessary” and “medically required” are not defined
within the Act or in provincial legislation. The implications of this gap are explored in,
JUST MEDICARE: WHAT’S IN, WHAT’S OUT, HOW WE DECIDE (Colleen M. Flood, ed. 2006).
21
Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, § 8.
22
See Lahey, supra note 9, at 66-67; and BUILDING ON VALUES: THE FUTURE OF
HEALTH CARE IN CANADA: FINAL REPORT (2002) [The Romanow Report],
http://www.hcsc.gc.ca/english/pdf/romanow/pdfs/HCC_Final_Report.pdf.
23
See Lahey, supra note 9, at 47 (noting Quebec’s refusal “to reimburse other
provinces (except Ontario) at the rates of the other province for services provided to Quebec
residents”).
24
Id. at 21-23. Drug therapies are covered under the Canada Health Act when
administered in a hospital. Provinces have gone beyond the Act’s requirements by
establishing publicly funded pharmaceutical assistance programs, though there is
considerable variation in coverage and patient costs. Id.
25
Id.
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B. HEALTH EXPENDITURES IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Health care expenditures take a central position in many debates about
health care. Rising health expenditures have been taking a larger and
larger share of gross domestic product (GDP) in both Canada and the
United States. In 2006, per capita health care expenditures in Canada rose
to $3,678 or 10% of the GDP.26 In Canada, public sources generally pay
for about 70% of health expenditures with the private sector picking up the
remaining 30%.27 Super-inflationary increases in health care expenditures
mean that health care occupies a larger and larger share of provincial
expenditures. Private insurance and private payment cover goods and
services not within the core Medicare mandate.
Health care expenditures in the United States increased to $6,714 per
capita or 15.3% of the GDP in 2006.28 In the mid-1960s, before the
introduction of Medicare and Medicaid, the public and private share of
health expenditures were the mirror image of the distribution found in
Canada, with the private sector picking up 70% of the costs of health care
and the public sector paying for 30%.29 The public share of health
expenditures reached 40% by 1978 and stood at 45.8% in 2006.30 Increases
in health care spending have had a disproportionate impact on state and
local government budgets. 31
Both Canada and the United States spend more per capita and as a
percentage of GDP than many other developed countries. The median rate
of health care spending per capita for the thirty Organisation for Economic
26

OECD Health Data 2008 - Frequently Requested Data [hereinafter “OECD
Health Data 2008”] (MS Excel document; 2006 expenditures measured in “U.S.$,
purchasing
power
parity”),
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_2649_34631_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html. See
also Canadian Institute for Health Information, Health Care in Canada 2007 9-10 (2007),
http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/products/hcic2007_e.pdf
27
OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26. See also National Health Expenditure
Trends,
1975-2007
9-10
(2007),
http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/products/NHET_1975_2007_e.pdf.
28
OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Aaron Catlin, et al., National Health Spending In 2006: A Year of Change for
Prescription Drugs, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 14, 21 (2008) (Exhibit 5). The state and local share
of public health care expenditures has been close to 13% since 1990 but this relative
stability masks the fact that state and local spending on Medicaid has tripled during this
same time period while federal expenditures have grown 2.5 times and total expenditures
have only doubled. Id.
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in 2006 was $2,898 (US)
or 8.9% of GDP.32 The U.S. led the OECD countries in per capita costs and
percentage of GDP (at $6,714 and 15.3%) while Canada ranked fifth in
spending and eighth in percentage of GDP (at $3,678 and 10%).33 The
excellent comparative data on health care spending is relative rather than
normative: we can compare how much countries spend but we have no
definitive measure of how much would be the correct amount.34
Commentators therefore turn to other types of data that more readily permit
evaluation of the results of health care spending. Two major areas of
comparison involve access and health care outcomes.
C. ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES
Access to health care can be measured in different ways. Levels of
health insurance coverage are clearly important, as health care costs can
rapidly outstrip the ability of people to pay directly for their own health
care. Yet, as increases in the percentage of GDP allocated to health care
have vividly demonstrated, every society must manage trade-offs between
spending on health care and spending on other goods and services.
Restrictions on health care spending are managed through some form of
rationing conducted at some level of the system.35 The method of rationing
32

OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (derived from 2006 data). See also
Gerard F. Anderson, Bianca K. Frogner, and Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Spending in OECD
Countries in 2004: An Update, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1481, 1483 (2007) [hereinafter
Anderson, Frogner & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004] (Exhibit 1) and Gerard F.
Anderson, Bianca K. Frogner, Roger A. Johns, and Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Care
Spending And Use Of Information Technology In OECD Countries, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS
819, 820 (2006).
33
OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (derived from 2006 data). See also
Anderson, Frogner & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32, at 1483 (Exhibit 1).
34
See generally, William D. Savedoff, What Should A Country Spend on Health
Care?, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 962 (2007) (noting issue and analyzing different approaches).
35
“Rationing” is a somewhat vague term used in different ways in different
contexts. See, e.g., Roy G. Spece, Jr., A Fundamental Constitutional Right of the Monied to
“Buy Out of” Universal Health Care Program Restrictions Versus the Moral Claim of
Everyone Else to Decent Health Care: An Unremitting Paradox of Health Care Reform?, 3
J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 14-15 (2007). The admittedly expansive definition of
rationing used in this Essay is meant to cover everything from restrictions on the supply of
health care providers or type of care, to bedside rationing and waiting lists for services, to
rationing based on access to health insurance or wealth. In the global sense, “rationing”
simply refers to the process of aligning limited health care resources or funding with the
not-so-limited health care needs of the population.
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directly affects access to care because it defines who has access to what and
when.
Canada clearly wins compared to the United States whenever access is
measured by the percentage of the population with health insurance.
Canada provides health insurance coverage for nearly all of its legal
residents. In the United States, more than 45 million people – representing
more than 15% of the population – are uninsured with many millions more
underinsured from the risk of catastrophic health care costs. In total, “[a]n
estimated one-third of U.S. adults are either uninsured during the year or
underinsured.”36
Accessibility can also be compared using the method and impact of
rationing employed within a society. Some types of health care are
rationed through waiting lists in Canada as well as in other countries
offering universal coverage.37 In the United States, most types of care are
not rationed through waiting lists.38 Instead, certain portions of the
population are left uninsured or underinsured and therefore are denied care
altogether or face delays and the risk of substandard care.39 In the
aggregate, the result is that Canadians fare better than Americans:
“[c]ompared with Canadians, US residents are one third less likely to have
a regular medical doctor, one fourth more likely to have unmet health care
needs, and more than twice as likely to forego needed medicines.”40
However the U.S. results were not uniform: insured Americans reported
slightly better access to care and receipt of services than Canadians.41
Uninsured Americans generally fared much worse than Canadians.42
Accessibility is related to the supply of physicians (or other health care
professionals), hospital beds, and specialized medical equipment.
36

Cathy Schoen, et al., Toward Higher-Performance Health Systems: Adults’ Health
Care Experiences in Seven Countries, 2007, HEALTH AFFAIRS w717, 718 (2007).
37
Kristen Boyle, A Permanent Vacation: Evaluating Medical Tourism’s Place in the
United States Healthcare System, HEALTH LAW, June 2008, at 42.
38
One notable exception – at least for the moment -- involves the transplantation of
scarce organs. Organs are allocated from a waiting list rather than through the market. See
Troyen Brennan, Markets in Health Care: The Case of Renal Transplantation, 25 J. L. MED.
& ETHICS 249 (2007).
39
See, e.g., Sharon Wilcox, et al., Measuring and Reducing Waiting Times: A CrossNational Comparison of Strategies, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1078, 1078-79 (2007).
40
Karen E. Lasser et al., Access to Care, Health Status, and Health Disparities in
the United States and Canada: Results of a Cross-National Population-Based Survey, 96
AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1300, 1303 (2006).
41
Id. at 1303, 1304.
42
Id.
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Interestingly, despite record setting expenditures on health care, the United
States does not lead the world in various measures of health care supply.43
Both Canada and the U.S. have fewer physicians per 1,000 persons than the
OECD median.44 Canada appears to use its physicians more efficiently
than the U.S. and is at the median of OECD countries with 5.9 physician
consultations per capita compared to 4 in the United States.45 Canada does
have fewer practicing nurses per 1,000 population (8.8) than the U.S.
(10.5); in this area the U.S. is above the OECD median (9.8).46 Similarly,
Canada has more acute care beds per 1,000 population than the United
States though both are below the OECD median.47
Canada maintains universal coverage for physician and hospital
services, which explains why Canadians in general have better access to
health care than Americans. But Canada rations access to certain types of
care through waiting lists and those waiting lists have become a major legal
and political issue. Studies repeatedly find that Canadians wait longer for
certain elective procedures than Americans.48 A recent survey found that:
43

OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (derived from 2006 data). See also
Anderson, Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32, at 1485 (Exhibit 2).
This counterintuitive result is related in part to the fact that the price for health care is higher
in the U.S.:
Although these are crude measures, the low resource levels and
low utilization rates coupled with the high level of health care spending
in the United States suggest that U.S. prices for health resources are
higher than in other OECD countries. The high level of spending on
U.S. health care may reflect that the system more quickly adopts
expensive new technology and pays much higher prices for the real
resources used in health care.
Anderson, Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32, at 1484.
44
OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (derived from 2006 data). There were 2.4
practicing physicians per 1,000 population in the U.S. and 2.1 in Canada in 2006 compared
to the OECD median of 2.94. See also Anderson, Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending
2004, supra note 32, at 1485 (Exhibit 2).
45
OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (derived from 2005 data). See also
Anderson, Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32, at 1485 (Exhibit 2).
46
OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (2006 data on practicing nurses, density
per 1,000). But see Anderson, Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32,
at 1485 (Exhibit 2) (reporting more nurses per capita for Canada in 2004).
47
OECD Health Data 2008, supra note 26 (2.7 acute care beds per 1,000 population
for the U.S. and 2.8 for Canada in 2005; the OECD average was 3.9). See also Anderson,
Frogner, & Reinhardt, Health Spending 2004, supra note 32, at 1485 (Exhibit 2) (similar).
48
See, e.g., Cathy Schoen et al., supra, note 36, at 720 (“German and US adults
reported the most rapid access and Canadian and British adults, the longest waits”); and
Cathy Schoen, et al., U.S. Health System Performance: A National Scorecard, 26 HEALTH
AFFAIRS w457, w458 (2006).
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Although more US respondents had unmet health care
needs than did Canadians (13.2% and 10.7%,
respectively), their reasons for having such needs differed.
Seven percent of US respondents (and less than 1% of
Canadians) had unmet needs because of financial barriers,
whereas 3.5% of Canadians had unmet needs because of
waiting times (vs. less than 1% of US residents).49
In another recent survey, 11% of Canadians and 16% of Americans
reported having had elective surgery in the past two years.50 Only thirtytwo percent of the Canadian respondents received their elective surgery in
less than a month compared to 62% of respondents from the U.S.; 14% of
the Canadians waited more than six months, compared to only 4% of the
Americans.51
In some areas, Canada and the U.S. both fare badly compared to some
other developed countries. Survey respondents in both countries reported
difficulties in securing same day physician appointments and were more
likely than respondents from other countries “to report long waits (six days
or more) to see a doctor when sick.”52 Respondents from both countries
were also more likely to have sought care, sometimes inappropriately, from
an emergency room.53 Canadians were the most likely to have waited two
or more hours in the emergency room (at 46%).54 Americans had the fourth
highest percentage of persons waiting two hours or more (at 31%).55
In summary, Canadians generally have better access to health care than
Americans as a whole though insured Americans report slightly better
results in some areas. Both Canada and the U.S. are confronting some
challenges regarding the supply of health care providers and hospital beds.
More Canadians than Americans report delays in receiving some types of
care.
Access to care is important but not necessarily for its own sake so
much as because health care is related to positive health care outcomes. We
49

Lasser, supra note 40, at 1303.
Schoen et al., supra note 36, at w721 (Exhibit 2).
51
Id.
52
Schoen, et al., supra note 36, at w724. Thirty percent of Canadian respondents
reported waiting six or more days compared to 20% of US respondents. Id. at w725 (Exhibit
4).
53
Id. at w724-w725 (including Exhibit 4).
54
Schoen, et al, supra note 36, at w725 (Exhibit 4).
55
Id.
50
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care whether people have access to physicians, hospitals, and emergency
rooms because access to care bears at least some relationship to the length
and quality of people’s lives.56 As will be seen in the next section, the U.S.
does not fare particularly well on measures of health care outcomes
compared to Canada or many other countries.
D. HEALTH CARE OUTCOMES IN CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES
There are many measures of health care outcomes. Efforts to “rate” the
success of health care systems using multiple criteria and indicators are
increasingly common. Researchers associated with the Commonwealth
Fund have developed an analysis that uses data on the “Quality of Care,”
“Access,” “Efficiency,” “Equity,” and “Healthy Lives.”57 Unfortunately,
[t]he U.S. ranks last overall across the five dimensions of a high
performance health system” when compared to Australia, Canada,
Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.58 Yet Canada received
the next worst results, coming in 5th out of the 6 countries studied.59 Using

56
It is important, however, not to overstate the role of health care. There are
significant variations in morbidity and mortality that appear largely unrelated to access to
health care. For a summary of factors influencing health, see Canadian Institute for Health
Information, supra note 26, at 45 (noting that relevance of socio-economic status, social
environment and support networks, employment/working conditions, physical
environments, personal health practices, healthy child development, biology and genetic
endowment, and gender).
57
DAVIS, ET AL., supra note at 8, at 4. Each of these five categories is in turn broken
into subparts and measured using multiple benchmarks. “Quality of care” provides a
somewhat complicated example of this process. “Quality of care” is “defined . . . as care that
is effective or ‘right,’ safe, coordinated and patient-centered.” Id. at 6. Each of these subcategories is measured using specific indicators. “Right care measures” include indicators
such as the percentage of women in certain age groups who have had a Pap test within the
past two years and the percentage of diabetics receiving certain identified services. Id. “Safe
care” indicators are measures of errors in the health care system, such as being given the
wrong medication. Id. at 9. “Coordinated care” measures whether patients have a regular
doctor and whether the system collects and coordinates information about care. Id. at 11.
“Patient-centeredness” is defined as “care delivered with the patient’s needs and preferences
in mind.’” Id. at 12. The benchmark criteria include communication, continuity and
feedback, and the level of engagement and concern with patient preferences. Id. at 12.
Quality of care is the most complex category of measures but the scores for “Access,”
“Efficiency,” “Equity,” and “Healthy Lives” are determined using a similar process.
58
DAVIS, ET AL., supra note at 8, at 4.
59
Id. at viii (Figure ES-1. Overall Ranking).
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these global measures, the Canadian system produces better results that the
U.S. system, but both could benefit from improvement.
These global measures of system quality have the virtue of combining
a wide range of comparative data about health care systems. Yet as victims
of the U.S. News and World Report ranking system for law schools can
attest, ranking systems appear to offer numerical precision while
sometimes obscuring the important value choices inherent in picking some
indicators over others or weighing some results over others.60 It might
therefore be helpful to “drill down” into the results for some specific
outcome indicators in the United States and Canada.61
Two frequently cited indicators are infant mortality and length of life.
As is now well known, the United States does not fare particularly well on
these measures as compared to Canada and many other countries. In 2005,
the U.S. had a relatively high rate of infant mortality (7.0) compared to
Canada (5.4); neither country was a particular success story compared to
others around the world.62
Life span can be measured in several ways.63 One increasingly popular
method focuses on the rate of preventable death and healthy life
expectancy.64 The rate of preventable death or “amenable mortality”
“refer[s] to deaths from certain causes that should not occur in the presence
of timely and effective health care.”65 Examples include deaths from
“conditions such as bacterial infections, treatable cancers, diabetes,
cardiovascular and cerebrovascular disease, and complications of common
60
See, e.g., Law School Admissions Council, Ranking Law Schools,
http://www.lsac.org/Choosing/deans-speak-out-rankings.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2008).
61
The selection of indicators also represents a value choice. In this case, I have
chosen indicators based on the broad popularity of these measures in comparative health
studies.
62
DAVIS, ET AL., supra note at 8, at 21 (Figure 8). For the current comparative data
see Central Intelligence Agency, Rank Order—Infant Mortality, in The World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2091rank.html.
63
Canada and the U.S. can be compared on average life expectancy as well as
healthy life expectancy at age 60. In 2008, Canada was ranked 8th in the world for life
expectancy at birth (81.16 years) compared to the United States, which was ranked 46th (at
78.14 years). CIA, Rank Order – Life Expectancy at Birth, in The World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html
(website updated regularly with most recent data). Canada also bests the U.S. in average
healthy lives expectancy at age 60 (18 years in Canada compared to 17 in the U.S.). DAVIS,
ET AL, supra note at 8, at 21 (citing 2003 WHO data).
64
DAVIS, ET AL., supra note at 8, at 21.
65
Ellen Nolte & C. Martin McKee, Measuring the Health of Nations: Updating an
Earlier Analysis, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 58, 59 (2008).
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surgical procedures.”66 The United States has a higher rate of amenable
mortality than Canada (96.41 compared to 68.15) and has not been
reducing the rate of amenable mortality as quickly as many other
countries.67 Thus, “by 2002-03, the United States had among the highest
amenable mortality rates of countries studied, for both males and
females.”68
This data on health status and outcomes reinforces the conclusion that
the Canadian health care system produces better access to better care with
better outcomes and at lower cost that the United States. At the same time,
it is clear that both Canada and the United States fare poorly compared to
other OECD countries on many of these measures. Further, while the
United States struggles to broaden access to care within a system that
favors a private health insurance market, Canada’s public health care
system is confronting challenges related to costs, comprehensiveness, and
waiting times. Comparisons between the two countries invariably focus on
the balance of public and private sector responsibility for health care. The
next section of this Essay will explore the Supreme Court of Canada’s
recent foray into the debate.
IV. THE CANADIAN INSURANCE DEBATE
A. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DEBATE IN CANADA
Despite the title of this section, it is important to recognize the limited
nature of the debate about the roles of the public and private sectors in
Canada. As noted above, the Canadian Medicare program is a source of
national pride and identity. There is thus no real interest among Canadians
or their politicians in changing the fundamental character of the health care
system away from a publicly supported, universal and comprehensive
system of care.
In addition, there is little interest in affirmatively
developing anything that might be called a “two-tier” system of health care:
one in which a public health care system is coupled with a vigorous private
market for health care services. “Two-tier” is a symbolic touchstone –
66
Id. (researchers also included ½ the deaths from ischemic heart disease (IHD)
based on evidence that half the deaths in this category are preventable).
67
Id. at 62 (Exhibit 2).
68
Id. at 63. Improving U.S. scores to the average of eighteen studied OECD
countries would prevent 75,000 deaths of persons under age 75 per year. Id. For a similar
analysis, see DAVIS, ET AL., supra note at 8, at 21 (Canada is 3rd and U.S. is 6th in ranking of
six countries based on mortality amenable to health care).
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playing much the same role as the phrase “socialized medicine” does in the
United States – and the phrase generally means “bad” in any policy debate.
Indeed, one Canadian critique of the U.S. is that it has created a two-tiered
system in which the public programs have suffered from the emphasis on
the private market with the result that health care is allocated based on
ability to pay rather than need.
Of course it could well be argued that Canada already has a two-tiered
system, at least in some respects. The private sector pays for thirty percent
of health care costs in Canada, in part because the Medicare program does
not include within its core mandate increasingly important types of health
care such as out-of-hospital pharmaceuticals and home health care.69 In
addition, the wealthiest Canadians are capable of paying for care directly
from a limited number of private clinics in Canada or at health care
facilities in the U.S. or elsewhere. But it is important to recognize that these
examples typically inspire calls to expand or to improve the Medicare
program rather than creating a sense of comfort with the notion of
privatized care.
The Canadian health care system is under enormous pressure due to
increasing costs, insufficiencies in the supply of health care providers,
expanding waiting lists, and the anticipated impact of an aging population.
Commissions and academics have issued numerous reports on the future of
the health care system. By and large, these reports reaffirm the centrality of
the public’s role in funding and administering the delivery of health care in
Canada. Two particularly prominent recent reports, the Romanow Report70
and the Kirby Report,71 both concluded that Canada’s emphasis on public
responsibility for health care should be maintained. For all of these reasons,
the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in Chaoulli v. Québec
(Attorney General) generated considerable controversy.72
B. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAOULLI CASE AND (JUST A BIT OF)
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
69

Martha Livingston, Update on Health Care in Canada: What’s Right, What’s
Wrong, What’s Left, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 267, 271, 279 (1998). See also supra note 24.
70
See The Romanow Report , supra note 22.
71
THE HEALTH OF CANADIANS – THE FEDERAL ROLE, VOLUME SIX:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM (Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science
and Technology) (2002) [hereinafter The Kirby Report] (known as the Kirby Report after
Senator Kirby), http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/soci-e/repe/repoct02vol6-e.htm/.
72
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.).
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The Chaoulli case was initiated by a patient, George Zeliotis, and a
physician, Jacques Chaoulli.73 Mr. Zeliotis had become a critic of waiting
lists after experiencing delays while receiving treatment for various
medical conditions.74 Dr. Chaoulli had previously unsuccessfully sought
provincial recognition of his home-delivered medical services as well as a
license to open a private hospital.75 The plaintiffs sought a declaration that
two specific provisions of Québec law violated the both Quebec Charter76
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.77 The challenged
provisions prohibited the sale of private health insurance for health care
covered under the provincial Medicare plan.78 These prohibitions appeared
to be designed to support the public health system by preventing the
development of privately funded care.
73

Id. at 807.
Id. at 792.
75
Id. at 792-93.
76
Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12 (Can.) [hereinafter the
“Quebec Charter”], http://www.canlii.org/qc/laws/sta/c-12/20071213/whole.html .
77
The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 (Can.) [hereinafter the “Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” or the
“Canadian Charter”], http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/const/const1982.html.
78
The first contested provision prohibited private coverage of “insured services” –
that is, those covered under the provincial medical plan:
15. No person shall make or renew a contract of insurance or
make a payment under a contract of insurance under which an insured
service is furnished or under which all or part of the cost of such a
service is paid to a resident or a deemed resident of Québec or to
another person on his behalf.
Health Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-29. See Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 911 (Can.) (Appendix) The second contested provision was similar but
focused on hospitalization services covered under the provincial plan:
11. (1) No one shall make or renew, or make a payment under a
contract under which
(a) a resident is to be provided with or to be reimbursed
for the cost of any hospital service that is one of the insured
services;
(b) payment is conditional upon the hospitalization of a
resident; or
(c) payment is dependent upon the length of time the
resident is a patient in a facility maintained by an institution
contemplated in section 2.
(2) This section does not apply . . . [during the waiting period for
provincial coverage].
Hospital Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-28. See Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. 791, 911-12
(Appendix).
74

2008]

THE HEALTH INSURANCE DEBATE IN CANADA

357

The Quebec Charter is a provincial document that, while not strictly
speaking a constitution, does give courts the ability to review and to strike
down inconsistent provincial legislation. Section 1 of the Quebec Charter
provides that “Every human being has a right to life, and to personal
security, inviolability and freedom.”79 The Quebec Charter also includes a
type of “savings clause,” under which legislation that appears to violate §1
can nonetheless be justified and preserved. Section 9.1 of the Quebec
Charter provides: “In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a
person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order
and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec. . . . In this respect, the
scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed
by law.”80 The Supreme Court of Canada had previously found that §9.1
was similar to §1 of the Canadian Charter, discussed below, and that the
government could be required to demonstrate that “the restrictive law is
neither irrational nor arbitrary and that the means chosen are proportionate
to the end to be served.”81
The Canadian Charter establishes the broader power of the courts to
overturn any federal or provincial legislation inconsistent with its
provisions.82 Section 7 of the Canadian Charter provides that “Everyone
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.”83 There are two parts to the §7 analysis: determining whether there
has been a deprivation of a protected right and then determining whether
the deprivation is nonetheless consistent with the principles of fundamental
justice. As would be expected, there is a substantial body of case law and
commentary interpreting the provisions of §7 and other aspects of the
Canadian Charter.84
In addition, §1 of the Canadian Charter allows courts to uphold
legislation depriving individuals of their §7 rights in certain circumstances.
79
Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12, § 1 (Can.),
http://www.canlii.org/qc/laws/sta/c-12/20071213/whole.html.
80
Id. at art. 9.1; Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. at 821 (Deschamps, J.)
81
Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. at 821-23 (Deschamps, J.) (citing Ford v. Quebec (Attorney
General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.)) Justice Deschamps therefore noted that the Oakes test
developed under §1 of the Canadian Charter would be applied to determine whether the
legislation could be justified under §9.1 of the Quebec Charter. See notes 86-87, infra.
82
The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 (Can.), http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/const/const1982.html.
83
Id. at §7.
84
See generally PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (5th ed. 2007) (two
volumes).
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Section 1 provides: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.”85 Canadian courts use the “Oakes test” to
carry out the §1 analysis critical to determining whether or not to strike
down legislation that deprives someone of his or her §7 rights.86 Under this
test:
First, the court must determine whether the objective
of the legislation is pressing and substantial. Next, it must
determine whether the means chosen to attain this
legislative end are reasonable and demonstrably justifiable
in a free and democratic society. For this second part of
the analysis, three tests must be met: (1) the existence of a
rational connection between the measure and the aim of
the legislation; (2) minimal impairment of the protected
right by the measure; and (3) proportionality between the
effect of the measure and its objective . . . .87
The tests of rationality, minimal impairment, and proportionality have also
been applied to determine whether restrictive legislation can be justified
under §9.1 of the Quebec Charter.88
The plaintiffs were unsuccessful in bringing their Canadian Charter and
Quebec Charter claims in the lower courts. The trial court dismissed the
motion for a declaratory judgment under the Canadian Charter without
specifically considering the Quebec Charter.89 The trial court found that the
provincial legislation did infringe the right to life, liberty and security of
the person under §7 of the Canadian Charter but held that the deprivation
did not violate the principles of fundamental justice. It did not need to
reach the §1 analysis but nonetheless indicated that it would have upheld
the legislation as justified under §1. The plaintiffs’ appeal was thereafter
85

The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11, §1 (Can.), http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/const/const1982.html.
86
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 823 (Can.)
(Deschamps, J.). The test was developed in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.)).
87
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 823 (Can.)
(Deschamps, J.)(citing R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.)).
88
See Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. at 822-23 (Deschamps, J.) (citing Ford v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.)).
89
Id. at 807-08.
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dismissed by the Court of Appeal, with each of the panel judges writing a
separate opinion.90 Again, none of the judges drew specific attention to the
Quebec Charter.
Given the treatment of the plaintiffs’ claims in the courts below, and
the iconic status of Canada’s public health system, it was somewhat of a
surprise when the Supreme Court of Canada struck down Quebec’s ban on
private health insurance in a 4:3 decision. The justices split 3:3 on the
question of whether the legislation violated §7 of the Canadian Charter and
whether it could be justified under §1.91 The deciding vote and narrow
basis of the decision were therefore crafted by Justice Deschamps, who
found that the Quebec legislation violated §1 of the Quebec Charter and
that it could not be justified under §9.1 of that document.92 She did not
reach the claims under the Canadian Charter.
The opinions of the justices are detailed and comprehensive; the entire
decision is nearly 100 pages long.93 A number of important Canadian
commentaries already have been published on the decision and its
implications.94 For our purposes, we need only focus on two aspects of the
debate between the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada. First, we will
analyze the court’s treatment of whether the ban on private health insurance
intruded into a right protected by the Quebec Charter or the Canadian
90

Id. at 809.
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major wrote an opinion, joined by Justice
Bastarache, finding that
“[w]e concur in the conclusion of our colleague Deschamps J. that
the prohibition against contracting for private health insurance violates
s. 1 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c.
C-12, and is not justifiable under s. 9.1. On the argument that the antiinsurance provision also violates s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (“Charter”), we conclude that the provision
impermissibly limits the right to life, liberty and security of the person
protected by s. 7 of the Charter and has not been shown to be justified
as a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter.
See Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. at 843 (Can.) (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring)).
Justices Binnie and LeBel, joined by Justice Fish, were unwilling to find a violation of the
Quebec Charter or the Canadian Charter. Id. at 860-911 (Binnie & LeBel, JJ., dissenting).
92
Id. at 805-42 (Deschamps, J.).
93
The narrow opinion by Justice Deschamps will be referred to herein as the
“majority” decision; the opinion by the Chief Justice and Justice Major is the concurring
opinion and the opinion by Justices Binnie and LeBel is the dissenting opinion.
94
See, e.g., ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN CANADA, 257-77 (Colleen M. Flood et al., eds., 2005)
[hereinafter ACCESS TO CARE]; Symposium on Chaoulli, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 249 (2006)
[hereinafter Symposium on Chaoulli].
91
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Charter. Second, we will explore the court’s analysis of whether the ban on
private health insurance was rationally related to the continued existence of
the public health care system itself. The implications of these aspects of
Chaoulli decision for United States will then be explored in the final Part of
this Essay.
C. DID THE PROHIBITION ON PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE
DEPRIVE THE PLAINTIFFS OF A PROTECTED RIGHT?
It is not necessarily easy to draw a line from a provincial ban on private
health insurance to the freedoms protected under the Quebec Charter or the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. On its face, the legislation in
Quebec merely restricted the sale of insurance for services that were
already covered under a public health insurance scheme. The plaintiffs
were not prevented from using their own funds to purchase health care
privately, either in Canada or in another country. The restrictions imposed
appeared to affect economic rights of the sort not protected in either of the
two Charters. The plaintiffs nonetheless argued that the legislation violated
their rights to life, liberty, and personal inviolability under the Quebec
Charter and their rights to life, liberty, and security of the person under the
Canadian Charter.95 Despite the somewhat indirect nature of the claims,
the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously supported the
view that a prohibition on private insurance could, at least under some
circumstances, violate the protected rights of Canadian citizens. The
analysis of this issue is inherently interesting, of course, and may have
some implications for the United States.
Justice Deschamps in her majority opinion limited her analysis to the
provisions of the Quebec Charter, which provides protections for the “right
to life, and to personal security, inviolability and freedom.”96 She found
that the ban on private health insurance prevented Quebeckers from buying
private insurance and that this in turn prevented them from receiving care
in the private sector, thereby implicitly finding that insurance is necessary
to fund private health care.97 The ban on private health insurance therefore
forced the plaintiffs to rely solely on the public system to meet their health
care needs.98 Medical evidence indicating that some people would die
95
96
97
98

Chaoulli, [2005] 1 S.C.R. at 807.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 818-21.
Id.
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while on a waiting list due to delays was sufficient to implicate the right to
life.99 Medical testimony that waiting for surgery could cause injuries to
become irreparable while also causing people to endure pain, limited
mobility, and mental suffering was sufficient to show an infringement of
personal inviolability.100 The ban in private health insurance coverage thus
forced Quebeckers into a public system where rationing, in the form of
waiting lists for certain forms of treatment, infringed protected rights to life
and to personal inviolability.101
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major (with Justice Bastarache
concurring) agreed with Justice Deschamps’ analysis of the Quebec
Charter. The concurring justices applied a similar analysis and reached the
same conclusion under §7 of the Canadian Charter, using much of the same
evidence in the trial record. According to Chief Justice McLachlin and
Justice Major:
Not every difficulty rises to the level of adverse
impact on security of the person under s. 7. The impact,
whether psychological or physical, must be serious.
However, because patients may be denied timely health
care for a condition that is clinically significant to their
current and future health, s. 7 protection of security of the
person is engaged. Access to a waiting list is not access to
health care. As we noted above, there is unchallenged
evidence that in some serious cases, patients die as a result
of waiting lists for public health care. 102
The appellants have established that many Quebec
residents face delays in treatment that adversely affect
their security of the person and that they would not sustain
but for the prohibition on medical insurance. It is common
ground that the effect of the prohibition on insurance is to
99
Id. at 819-20 (citing evidence from a cardiovascular surgeon that persons with
cardiovascular disease are “’always sitting on a bomb’ and can die at any moment. In such
cases it is inevitable that some patients will die if they have to wait for an operation.”)
100
Id. at 820 (citing evidence from an orthopedic surgeon that “the usual waiting time
of one year for patients who require orthopaedic surgery increases the risk that their injuries
will become irreparable. . . [and that] many patients on non-urgent waiting lists for
orthopaedic surgery are in pain and cannot walk or enjoy any real quality of life.”).
101
Id. at 818.
102
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 850 (Can.)
(McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring).
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allow only the very rich, who do not need insurance, to
secure private health care in order to avoid the delays in
the public system. Given the ban on insurance, most
Quebeckers have no choice but the accept delays in the
medical system and their adverse physical and
psychological consequences.103
The concurring justices concluded that “prohibiting health insurance
that would permit ordinary Canadians to access health care, in
circumstances where the government is failing to deliver health care in a
reasonable manner, thereby increasing the risk of complications and death,
interferes with life and security of the person as protected by s. 7 of the
Charter.”104
The dissenting justices, led by Justices Binnie and LeBel, were more
resistant to the conclusion that a ban on private health insurance implicated
protected rights. They began their analysis with a discussion of claims that
did not involve protected rights. They emphasized that the Charter does not
protect any “right to contract” grounded in the “liberty” found in §7.105 The
dissent noted that Dr. Chaoulli did not have a protected liberty interest in
providing health care outside of the public health care system106 and
rejected as well the notion that individuals have a “constitutional right ‘to
spend money.’”107 The dissenting justices did, however, “accept the trial
judge’s finding that the current state of the Quebec health system, linked to
the prohibition against health insurance for insured services, is capable, at
least in the cases of some individuals on some occasions, of putting at risk
their life or security of the person.”108 Further, “if the public system fails to
deliver life-saving care and an individual is simultaneously prevented from
seeking insurance to cover the cost of that care in a private facility, then the
individual is potentially caught in a situation that may signal a deprivation

103

Id. at 845-46.
Id. at 850 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring).
105
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 879-80 (Can.)
(Binnie & LeBel, JJ., dissenting) (“We do not agree with the appellants, however, that the
Quebec Health Plan puts the ‘liberty’ of Quebeckers at risk. The argument that ‘liberty’
includes freedom of contract (in this case to contract for private medical insurance) is novel
in Canada, where economic rights are not included in the Canadian Charter and discredited
in the United States.”).
106
Id. at 880.
107
Id. at 880-81.
108
Id. at 875.
104
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of his or her security of the person”109 if the intrusion into physical or
mental security is sufficiently serious.110
It appears that the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada were
willing to recognize that private health insurance is the sina qua non of
access to health care in a private market place. Without access to private
health insurance, citizens were forced into a public system that admittedly
rationed care by using waiting lists for certain types of treatments. The
justices unanimously found that a restriction on the private market for
health insurance could, in these circumstances, cause the deprivation of the
right to life and security of the person. In the next section, we will explore
the court’s analysis of whether the needs of the public health care system
justified the infringement of protected individual rights.
D. ARE BANS ON PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE RATIONALLY
RELATED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF A PUBLIC HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM?
In Chaoulli, the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada all agreed that
the maintenance of the publicly funded health care system was a legitimate
and likely even a “pressing and substantial” governmental objective.111 The
key question then became whether the ban on private health insurance
109

Id. at 880-81.
Id. at 881-82.
111
See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138-40 (Can.) (setting out the proper
analysis for claims under §1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). Justice
Deschamps applied this test in applying the justificatory provisions of §9.1 of the Quebec
Charter, finding that: “the purpose of the prohibition is to preserve the integrity of the public
health care system. From this perspective, the objective appears . . . . [and is later
confirmed] to be pressing and substantial.” Chaoulli, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 825-26
(Deschamps, J.). The Chief Justice and Justice Major accepted that “the government
undeniably has an interest in protecting the public health regime” as part of their §1 analysis
under the Canadian Charter. Id. at 859 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring). The
dissenting justices also considered the purpose of the prohibition on private health insurance
coverage in their §1 analysis. The dissent found that:
Quebec’s legislative objective is to provide high quality health
care, at a reasonable cost, for as many people as possible in a manner
that is consistent with principles of efficiency, equity and fiscal
responsibility. Quebec . . . subscribes to the policy objectives of the
Canada Health Act . . . . The legislative task is to strike a balance
among competing interests. . . . The appellants do not challenge the
constitutional validity of the objectives set out in the Canada Health
Act.
Id. at 896-97 (Binnie & LeBel, JJ., dissenting).
110
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coverage was sufficiently related to the goal of preserving the public health
care system. The justices diverged sharply on the question of whether the
provincial ban on private health insurance was justified under §9.1 of the
Quebec Charter, the “principles of fundamental justice” portion of §7 of the
Canadian Charter, or the justificatory provisions of §1 of the Canadian
Charter. Although these three provisions use different language and, at
least in part, different analytical frameworks,112 the justices’ three opinions
in the end depended on whether or not the prohibition of private health
insurance was sufficiently related to and necessary for the maintenance of a
strong public health care system.
The four justices who ultimately invalidated Quebec’s ban in private
health insurance relied on four key arguments. First, they noted that the
Canada Health Act does not prohibit the development of a private health
insurance or private care.113 The provinces themselves vary, with only a
few banning the sale of private health insurance for covered services.114
The lack of uniform legislative response to the prospect of a private market
undercut the argument that a ban on private insurance or private care was
necessary to maintain the system.
Second, the majority found no direct and conclusive evidence in the
record that the development of a market for private health insurance market
and the potential expansion of a private health care system would actually
undermine the public health care system. The government presented
witnesses who testified that (a) “the emergence of the private sector would
lead to a reduction in popular support . . . for the public plan”;115 (b) “the
most influential people would no longer have any incentive to bring
pressure for improvements to the [public plan] because they would obtain
better coverage privately116; (c) “there would be a reduction in human
resources in the public plan because many physicians and health care
professionals would leave the plan out of a motive for profit”117; and (d)
112

See supra, text accompanying notes 80-83, 91-92.
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 844 (Can.)
(McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring).
114
As noted by Justice Deschamps, “The approach to the role of the private sector
taken by the other nine provinces of Canada is by no means uniform. In addition to Quebec,
six other provinces have adopted measures to discourage people from turning to the private
sector. The other three, in practice, give their residents free access to the private sector.”
Chaoulli, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 at 831 (Deschamps, J.). See also id. at 831-32 (summarizing
relevant provincial legislation in each jurisdiction).
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Chaoulli, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 828 (Deschamps, J.).
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Id.
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the development of a private health care market would “lead to a decline in
the professionalism and ethics of physicians.”118 Justice Deschamps
characterized this evidence as being based on “logic or common sense” that
was subject to dispute; she emphasized the absence of research studies or
empirical evidence.119
The government also contended that the private market would
negatively impact the public plan by (a) increasing overall health
expenditures120; (b) allowing private insurers to “reject the most acute
patients, leaving the most serious cases to be covered by the public
plan”121; and (c) encouraging physicians “to lengthen waiting times in the
public sector in order to direct patients to the private sector.”122 Justice
Deschamps once again discounted these claims, noting among other things
that the cost increases would be born by private individuals, that the public
system would not be worse off if left with seriously ill patients for whom
they already provided care, and that conflicts of interest could be and were
being managed in other ways.123
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major conducted a similar
analysis and reached a similar result in their concurring opinion, though
using the framework of “arbitrariness” under §7’s analysis of the principles
of fundamental justice.124 After summarizing the government’s evidence
about the relationship between the ban on private health insurance coverage
and the need to maintain the public health care system, these justices found
that “[t]o this point, we are confronted with competing but unproven
‘common sense’ arguments, amounting to little more than assertions of
belief. We are in the realm of theory. But as discussed above, a
theoretically defensible limitation may be arbitrary if in fact the limit lacks
a connection to the goal.”125 For the Chaoulli’s majority and concurring
justices the next best place to look for evidence of a connection between
the ban and the public system was in the experience of other countries.
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Justice Deschamps and Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major
reviewed the experiences of other OECD countries.126 The absolute
prohibition of private insurance for health care delivered by physicians who
are not participating in the public system is unique to some provinces in
Canada.127 The majority and concurring opinions noted that many OECD
countries with strong public health systems permit private health insurance
and have developed a strong private market for health care. For these
justices, the evidence thus tilted toward the conclusion that the ban on
private health insurance was not sufficiently related to the goal of
preserving the public health care system. Thus Chief Justice McLachlin and
Justice Major’s concurring opinion notes: “This brings us to the evidence
called by the appellants at trial on the experience of other developed
countries with public health care systems which permit access to private
health care. The experience of these countries suggests that there is no real
connection in fact between prohibition of health insurance and the goal of a
quality public health system.”128
Fourth and finally, the majority and concurring opinions rejected
claims that the courts should defer to legislative judgment in this sensitive
and important public policy debate. The courts were not required to defer to
the legislative branch. Justice Deschamps noted:
The instant case is a good example of a case in which
the courts have all the necessary tools to evaluate the
government’s measure. Ample evidence was presented.
The government had plenty of time to act. Numerous
commissions have been established. . . . Governments
have promised on numerous occasions to find a solution to
the problem of waiting lists. . . [I]t seems that governments
have lost sight of the urgency of taking concrete action.
The courts are therefore the last line of defence for
citizens.129
Similarly, the Chief Justice and Justice Major rejected the call for
judicial deference: “The fact that the matter is complex, contentious or
126

See, e.g., id. at 833-36 (Deschamps, J.) and 855-58 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major,
J., concurring).
127
Id. at 833-34 (Deschamps, J.).
128
Id. at 854 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring).
129
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 853, 840 (Can.)
(Deschamps, J.).
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laden with social values does not mean that the courts can abdicate the
responsibility vested in them by our Constitution to review legislation for
Charter compliance when citizens challenge it.”130 For Chief Justice
McLachlin and Justice Major, the court’s review was narrow in scope:
“[t]he Charter does not confer a freestanding constitutional right to health
care. However, where the government puts in place a scheme to provide
health care, that scheme must comply with the Charter.”131
This Essay’s discussion of Chaoulli has not focused on the intricacies
of Canadian constitutional law, the details of the legal analyses employed
by the justices, or on the strengths and weaknesses of their use of
precedent. Given the limited discussion of these important issues, the
majority and concurring opinions seem straightforward, logical, and even
compelling. Yet it is important to recognize that the Chaoulli decision
included a very strong dissent and that there are many critics of the
majority and concurring opinions.132
One important critique focuses on the standards for determining
whether §7 rights have been infringed. The dissent was sharply critical of
the “test” for when restrictions on the private market will implicate the
rights protected by §7 of the Canadian Charter. The Chief Justice and
Justice Major had noted in their concurring opinion that “[b]y imposing
exclusivity and then failing to provide public health care of a reasonable
standard within a reasonable time, the government creates circumstances
that trigger the application of s.7.”133 The dissent argued that this appeared
to be a legal rule but that it was at best a policy formula with no settled
answer:
What, then, are constitutionally required “reasonable
health services”? What is treatment “within a reasonable
time”? What are the benchmarks? How short a waiting
list is short enough? How many MRIs does the
Constitution require? The majority does not tell us. The
majority lays down no manageable constitutional
standard. The public cannot know, nor can judges or
governments know, how much health care is “reasonable”
130

Id. at 844 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring).
Id. at 843 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major, J., concurring).
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enough to satisfy [the Canadian Charter]. . . It is to be
hoped that we will know it when we see it.134
These concerns are amplified by the dissent’s view that rationing is
inevitable in any health care system, whether public, private or mixed, and
that there is no meaningful consensus about appropriate waiting times.135
For these reasons, and others, the dissent argued that the Supreme Court of
Canada should have deferred to the legislative choice to bolster the public
health system by restricting access to the private market.136
In addition, many have argued that the majority and concurring
opinions’ review of the evidence presented at trial and available in previous
studies is somewhat selective. Thus, while citing the data in the Romanow
and Kirby Reports, the majority and concurring opinions fail to note that
these reports and virtually all others in Canada have confirmed the need to
prevent the emergence of a private health care market that could create a
“two-tier” system of medicine in Canada.137 Justices Binnie and LeBel
noted that “[t]he Quebec government views the prohibition against private
insurance as essential to preventing the current single-tier system from
disintegrating into a de facto two-tier system. The trial judge found, and the
evidence demonstrated, that there is good reason for this fear.”138 Justices
Binnie and LeBel argued vehemently that the trial judge had sufficient
evidence – more than common sense conjecture – to find that the ban on
private health insurance protected the integrity of the public health
system.139
E. THE AFTERMATH
The Chaoulli case was ultimately decided on a narrow basis, under the
Quebec Charter, rather than under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.140 It nonetheless created considerable controversy and
widespread concern that the decision would upset the foundations of the
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Canadian health care system.141 Four years later, little has changed across
Canada.
Quebec adopted legislation in December 2006.142 Under Bill 33, the
province established centralized public waiting lists for various procedures
and expressed a commitment to reducing waiting times.143 The legislation
also authorized the creation of private hospitals; one type of private
hospital could contract to provide services for the public system and
another would be purely private, staffed by physicians who have “opted
out” of the public system. These private facilities would be limited to
providing certain types of services in order to reduce the waiting time for
access to those services.
No other province has significantly altered its approach to private
health care. Alberta’s then-premier initially praised the Chaoulli decision
and vowed to loosen constraints on the private health care system. After
much fanfare and anticipation, Alberta abandoned these “Third Way”
proposals when the public proved unenthusiastic about the reforms.144
Chaoulli’s more lasting legacy appears to be in focusing political and
public attention on waiting lists and the reduction of wait times.145
Chaoulli helped to accelerate federal and provincial efforts to reduce
waiting times for a number of important procedures, such as hip
Private health care continues to be
replacements or cataract surgery.146
controversial and subject to significant legal constraints.147
141

See, e.g., Lawrie McFarlane, Supreme Court slaps for-sale sign on medicare, 173
CMAJ 269 (2005). See generally ACCESS TO CARE, supra note 94; Symposium on Chaoulli,
supra note 94.
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An Act to Amend the Act respecting health services and other social services and
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Legislature,
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(December
2006),
http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=5&file=
2006C43A.PDF.
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See, e.g., John Geddes, Waiting for a Revolution, MACLEANS, Dec. 30, 2007,
http://www.macleans.ca/science/health/article.jsp?content=20071219_74840_74840 (“Last
year, Premier Jean Charest's government satisfied the court's requirements by promising to
provide joint replacements and cataract surgery within six months of a doctor determining a
patient needs the surgery. If government-funded hospitals can't do the job, the government
will pay to have it done at a private clinic. As well, the Charest government moved to let
Quebecers pay privately for a limited range of services, but predicted few would, since the
public system was about to get considerably faster”).
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See Wayne Kondro, Take the Highway, 179 CMAJ 25 (2008).
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Geddes, supra note 143.
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See, e.g., Petti Fong, Private B.C. Clinic Reopens to Public, THE TORONTO STAR,
April 10, 2007, at A11.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE U.S.
I argue in this Essay that it is important to take a limited, skeptical view
of cross-border health policy arguments. Canada is significantly different
from the U.S. in many respects, including in its commitment to health care
as a public good and its concerns about market-based allocations of health
insurance or health care. We need to be cautious when looking to Canada
to ensure that we are not merely gazing at a reflection of our own hopes or
anxieties. With this cautionary reminder, this Essay’s analysis has
suggested several important observations about the health insurance debate
in the United States.
Lesson 1: Look East or West rather than North or South
The data on cost, access, and health care outcomes suggests that both
Canada and the United States should look to other countries for ideas about
the organization and delivery of health care. While Canadians enjoy better
health care at lower costs and with better outcomes than citizens of the
United States, the health care systems of both countries suffer in
comparison to other OECD countries.148 In Chaoulli, the majority and
concurring justices avoided citing the United States experience, relying
instead the role of private health care of other OECD countries in Europe,
Japan, and Australia.149 Justice Deschamps, Chief Justice McLachlin and
Justice Major therefore undoubtedly sought to avoid both the ideological
baggage and poor results of the United States’ system. Advocates for
health care reform in the U.S. might well follow this example and focus
attention on other OECD countries.
Lesson 2: Courts Sometimes Resist Ideological Constraints
Canada and the U.S. are commonly distinguished by fundamentally
different views about whether health care is an ordinary market commodity
or a special social good. Peter P. Budetti has characterized the debate as
between “market justice” and “social justice.”150 In the U.S., where the
market justice “runs deeply,” “[i]ndividual resources and choices determine
148

See supra, text accompanying notes 26-68.
See Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 833-36 (Can.)
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the distribution of health care, with little sense of collective obligation or a
role for government.”151 In Canada, the social justice view dominates: the
view that “goods and services [are allocated] according to the individual’s
needs... stems from principles of shared responsibility and concern for the
communal well-being with government as the vehicle for ensuring social
equity.”152 Courts sometimes act as a counterweight to these ideological
commitments.
The Chaoulli decision is an example of this phenomenon. Quebec
sought to justify its restriction on private health insurance as necessary to
preserve the social justice basis of the public health care system. The
government argued that private insurance would at minimum result in some
individuals having better access to care than others based on their ability to
pay and that it might, in addition, erode the social justice underpinnings of
the public system.153 A majority of the justices rejected this argument,
finding that the government prohibition unreasonably risked the lives and
health of individual Quebeckers.154 The justices expressed concerns that the
prohibition on private coverage was based on ideology rather than
evidence.155 In the end, the Supreme Court of Canada therefore actually
supported the expansion of the private market for health insurance in
Canada despite the social justice ideology prevalent in that country.
The recent en banc decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach provides a
parallel example from the United States.156 In Abigail Alliance, plaintiffs
challenged an FDA policy which prohibited manufacturers from selling
certain experimental drugs to terminally ill patients.157 The plaintiffs’
claims mirrored those asserted in Chaoulli: they argued that the federal
rule had the effect of denying them access to potentially life-saving or lifeextending treatment and therefore violated their fundamental right to selfpreservation. As in Chaoulli, the market prohibition was justified, in part,
151
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by the needs of the public: it was feared that giving terminally ill persons
access to experimental therapies outside of clinical trials would
compromise the integrity of the clinical trial system.158 A panel decision
favoring the plaintiffs was withdrawn and replaced by an en banc decision
rejecting the claim that the market restriction implicated any fundamental
right.159 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.160 In the end,
the U.S. courts favored restricting the private market for experimental
therapies, at least in part to preserve the public good.
Lesson 3: Ideological Commitments Nonetheless Substantially
Constrain Health Care Reform
Canadians and Americans share a deep ideological commitment to the
fundamental premises of their health care systems even as those premises
are under considerable pressure. Canadians are deeply attached to the
vision of health care as a public good allocated based on need rather than
wealth, even as health care expenditures place increasing pressure on
governmental budgets. Moreover, limits to the benefits provided under the
Canadian Medicare program mean that 30% of health expenditures are paid
by individuals or private health insurance.161 Yet the specter of private
health care is considered to be a threat rather than either a present reality or
as a viable option for addressing the growing constraints on the public
health care system.
In some ways, Americans are even more constrained by ideological
commitments.
American rejection of “socialized medicine” or to
government-run health care appears to ignore the realities of the health care
market place in the U.S., in which 40% of the direct expenditures are made
by governmental entities and even the employment-based “private” health
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insurance market is subsidized by substantial federal tax breaks.162 Policy
debates in the U.S. are characterized by significant ideological -- and
political -- commitments to preserving both the private health insurance
market and the image of U.S. health care as primarily a private system with
narrow public responsibility and involvement. President Bush’s veto of the
expansion of the Children’s Health Insurance Program in 2008 was directly
linked to the threat than the public program would draw enrollment away
from the private health insurance market.163
Health care reform efforts in both the United States and Canada
therefore must meet ideological litmus tests, perhaps because both systems
are close to a transformative “tipping point.” In both countries, significant
reforms seem unlikely, despite relatively poor performance and high levels
of public concern.164 It sometimes seems that the primary purpose of policy
comparisons between Canada and the U.S. is to assure citizens that no
matter how concerned they are about their own health care system, they can
at least be grateful that they do not have the other country’s system. Thus
Canadians react just as negatively to the specter of a two-tiered health care
system as Americans do to the threat of Canada’s erroneously-labeled
system of “socialized medicine.” There is no fork in the road when it
comes to health care reform because one path is blocked by ideological
constraints. Even within the single permissible path, health care reform
proposals are evaluated in part by whether they will create a side route
away from the ideological commitments of each system.
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Lesson 4: The Cross-Border Trade in Health Law is Underdeveloped
The high level of cross-border policy debate between Canada and the
United States can sometimes obscure the relative lack of interest in crossborder health law. In some senses this should not be surprising: law is after
all a peculiarly national and local phenomenon. Legislation applies only
within the legislature’s jurisdictional boundaries.
Courts rely on
precedents, most often from their own jurisdictions, and have only a limited
authority to consider the legislation and judicial decisions of other
countries. U.S. courts rarely cite the precedents of other jurisdictions as a
basis for their own decisions and face considerable controversy when they
do so.165
Yet this Essay has suggested some areas in which health law academics
and perhaps even health care advocates might profitably consider
additional consultation and collaboration. The Chaoulli decision includes
two areas of possible mutual interest: (a) a substantive exploration of
when, if ever, restrictions on a private market can be considered to intrude
on individual liberty; and (b) a process-oriented analysis of the role of
courts in addressing the problems of a health care system in the face of
legislative inaction.
Scholars thus might reasonably consider the close parallels between the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Chaoulli and the D.C. Court of
Appeals decision in Abigail Alliance. The courts in these two cases
struggled to define when and how restrictions on the creation of a private
market impermissibly infringed individual life and liberty. It is at least
interesting that the Supreme Court of Canada was more willing to accept
such a claim than the D.C. Court of Appeals. There may well be aspects of
the arguments or opinions in Chaoulli that might be used in presenting
future claims in the U.S. The “self-preservation” argument made in Abigail
Alliance might be more compelling, for example, in cases where the
restriction on the market creates more definite harm for the individual and
165
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where the collective interest market restrictions is based on ideology rather
Similarly, Canadian scholars and
than demonstrated necessity.166
advocates might consider whether the Chaoulli decision means that the
Canadian courts will be more receptive to other types of challenges to
market restrictions, such as those governing experimental therapies or
organ transplantation. The Chaoulli case also provides an interesting case
study in the ability of courts to analyze and digest health policy and health
policy research as well as in the role of courts in fostering health care
reform.
Despite these linkages, as of November 2008, no reported decisions in
Canada have cited the Abigail Alliance litigation and only one U.S. court
has referred to the Chaoulli case.167 Thirty-eight articles in U.S. journals
found in the Westlaw JLR database referred to Chaoulli while no articles in
the Canada-JLR database referred to Abigail Alliance.168 The cross-border
trade in health law theories and arguments may therefore have considerable
room to grow in the years ahead.
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For an influential discussion of the self-defense argument, see Eugene Volokh,
Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007).
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IS HEALTH INSURANCE A BAD IDEA?
THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN PERSPECTIVE
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost1
Unique among the developed nations of the world, the United States
depends on private insurance to insure a majority of its residents.2 Private
insurance exists virtually everywhere in the world, but in most countries it
merely supplements or complements a comprehensive public insurance
program that covers all, or virtually all, of the population.3 There are
complicated historical, political, and cultural reasons why we depend on
private insurance for health coverage in the United States.4 It seems very
unlikely, however, that we will abandon private health insurance as our
primary form of health coverage in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, it seems clear, that private insurance coverage in the
United States is on the decline. Employment-based insurance coverage
probably peaked sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s, and has been
falling ever since, with a brief uptick in the late 1990s. Coverage has
dropped from 73 percent of the population under 65 in 1999 to 66.5 percent
in 2006.5 Even though public insurance coverage has been growing as
private insurance coverage shrinks, the number of uninsured continues to
rise, to 43.6 to 44.8 million, nearly 17% of the under-65 population in
2005-2006.6
1. Robert F. Willett Family Professor, Washington and Lee University., This article
was submitted in August of 2007, and was current as of that date. It is based in part on my
recently published book: TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF
THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 54-69 (2007). I would like to thank the Frances Lewis
Law Center and the Willett Family for research support.
2. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do? National Health
Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 433, 433 (2004) (describing how other nations
provide health care coverage).
3. ELIAS MOSSIALOS & SARAH M.S. THOMPSON, VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION, FUNDING HEALTH CARE: OPTIONS FOR EUROPE 128-31 (Elias
Mossialos et al. eds., 2002)
4. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1.
5. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS UNDER
AGE 65 YEARS WITH PUBLIC HEALTH PLAN COVERAGE AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE
BY
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1997-2006
(2007),
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Although most view the number of uninsured as a problem, a small, but
very influential minority of American policy advocates consider
“overinsurance” to be our most serious policy problem.7 The strength of
this movement, known euphemistically as the consumer-driven health
care (CDHC) movement, is demonstrated by the fact that these advocates
succeeded in the waning moments of the 109th Congress, in expanding
federal tax subsidies for health savings accounts (HSAs), their policy
alternative to conventional health insurance.8
Since the early 1970s, a number of conservative and libertarian
advocacy groups have kept up a steady drumbeat of criticism of our current
private health insurance system.9 They claim that this system is the product
of bad public policy, in particular of the employment-related health
insurance tax subsidy.10 This subsidy, they charge, has resulted in
employers offering and employees accepting far more insurance than
would be purchased without the tax subsidy.11
This excessive insurance, they claim, results in excess consumption
and higher prices of health care. The tax subsidy decreases the price to
consumers and thus increases the demand for health insurance, which in
turn decreases the price to consumers and increases the demand for health

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/200706_01.pdf. The higher figure is from:
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Revises 2004 and 2005 Health
Insurance Coverage Estimates (Mar. 23, 2007), available at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/health_care_insurance/009789.html.
7. See MICHAEL F. CANNON & MICHAEL D. TANNER, HEALTHY COMPETITION:
WHAT’S HOLDING BACK HEALTH CARE AND HOW TO FREE IT 46-58 (2005); JOHN C.
GOODMAN, GERALD L. MUSGRAVE & DEVON M. HERRICK, LIVES AT RISK: SINGLE-PAYER
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE AROUND THE WORLD 4 (2004); JOST, supra note 1, at 35.
8. Health Savings Accounts were created by the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066
(2003), and codified at I.R.C. § 223 (2007). Contribution limits were liberalized by the
Health Opportunity Patient Empowerment Act of 2006 in the last minutes of the 109th
Congress; see Press Release, United States Treasury, President Bush Signs Bill to Make
Health Care More Affordable, Accessible (Dec. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp209.htm.
9. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 70-85.
10. See JOHN F. COGAN, R. GLENN HUBBARD & DANIEL P. KESSLER, HEALTHY,
WEALTHY, AND WISE: FIVE STEPS TO A BETTER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, 15-16, 27-33 (2005);
CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 61-66; JOHN C. GOODMAN, GERLAD L. MUSGRAVE &
DEVON M. HERRICK, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE CRISIS, 50-51
(1992).
11. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 62-65.
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care.12 Insured health care consumers buy far more health care products
and services than they would if they had to pay for health care out of their
own pockets. This is the phenomenon of moral hazard that insurance
teachers talk about every day. Consumers also pay higher prices than they
would pay without insurance because they have no incentive to shop
around for lower price providers.13 The tax subsidy is, therefore, one of the
most important reasons why health care costs so much in the United
States14 While the moral hazard claims of CDHC advocates seem to be
solidly based in neoclassical economic theory, they also are supported by
the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, which found that insureds with
higher deductible plans do in fact consume less health care.15
But there is more to their claims. CDHC advocates also argue that
consumers who are not paying for health care out of their own pockets are
less concerned about quality than they might be if they were paying for
services themselves.16 At least, consumers have less reason to seek out
comparative information regarding providers, which could support
shopping based on quality as well as cost.17 Fully insured individuals also
have less incentive to take care of themselves, to engage in healthy
behaviors and seek preventive or early primary care, and thus are more
likely to become ill and need health care18 (a claim, by the way, that the
Rand study found no evidence to support).19
The ultimate solution to the problem of excess insurance–simply
outlawing health insurance–is not embraced by even the most fervent
market advocates. They understand the problem of catastrophic costs – of
the highly skewed nature of health care costs that accounts for health
insurance in the first place.20 Few people can afford to pay out of pocket
for a heart transplant or for the services required to respond to the major

12. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 62-63; COGAN, HUBBARD & KESSLER, supra
note 10, at 29-30.
13. JOST, supra note 1, at 19.
14. See supra note 10.
15. See JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1993); see JOST, supra note 1, at 120-28 (examining the findings
of and critiquing the RAND HIE).
16. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 54-57.
17. Id.
18. GOODMAN et al., supra note 10, at 92-94.
19. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15 at 200-01, 208.
20. See Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do?, supra note 2, at 436.
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traumatic injuries caused by a car accident.21 Many of those afflicted with
expensive chronic diseases would soon find themselves unable to afford
further health care without health insurance. Bankruptcy solves the
problems of some of those faced with enormous expenses and no
insurance, but it only deals with already incurred costs and does not assure
continuing access to care.22 Bankruptcy, moreover, only shifts the costs of
care to providers, who themselves may be financially unable to absorb the
loss.
Acknowledging the problems that would attend the elimination of
health insurance, CDHC advocates rather call for limiting insurance to truly
catastrophic expenses through the imposition of high deductibles.23 Most,
but not all, CDHC advocates also call for the creation of health savings
accounts (HSAs) to be coupled with high-deductible health insurance plans
(HDHPs).24 They call for tax subsidies to cover contributions to the HSAs
(whether contributions come from employers or employees) as well as the
income from those plans and payments for high-deductible health plans.25
Advocates contend that HSAs will introduce point-of-purchase competition
into health care and save the cost of claims processing, thus reducing health
care costs.26 At the same time, they believe that HSAs will assure that
consumers have funds available to purchase health care, thus assuring
access, and will encourage consumers to shop for better quality products
and services, thus improving quality. They even argue that moving to
CDHC will expand insurance coverage, as catastrophic policies will be
more affordable, both because they offer thinner coverage and because
consumers will consume more cost consciously, bringing down insurance
costs.27
Over the past half decade the CDHC movement has been
extraordinarily successful in public policy advocacy. Although tax
subsidies for medical savings accounts were first introduced by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, they were subject to
21. According to recent estimates, heart transplants cost from $50,000 to $287,000,
averaging $148,000, while liver transplants cost from $66,000 to $367,000, averaging
$235,000. Transplant, CHFPATIENTS.COM, http://www.chfpatients.com/tx/transplant.htm.
22. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor Patient: In Search of Non-Debt Based
Alternatives, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 453, 456-57, 462 (2003-2004).
23. GOODMAN et al., supra note 10, at 231-32.
24. Id., CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 66-68.
25. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 67; Cogan, Hubbard, & Kessler, supra note
10, at 35-38.
26. GOODMAN et al., supra note 10, at 249-250.
27. Id. at 250.
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The Medicare
many restrictions and never really caught on.28
Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”), however, greatly expanded tax
subsidies for health care accounts, which it rechristened health savings
accounts, or HSAs.29
The MMA offers a tax exclusion to employers and a deduction to
employees for funds contributed by an employer or employee to an HSA.
The HSA must, however, be coupled with a HDHP, which must, in 2007,
have a deductible of at least $1100 a year for a single individual or $2200 a
year for family coverage.30 The catastrophic policies that accompany an
HSA must also have caps on out of pocket expenditures, which cannot
exceed $5500 for an individual and $11,000 for a family in 2007.31 The tax
subsidies for contributions to the HSA for 2007 only extend to
contributions up to, for 2007, $2850 for individual coverage and $5650 for
family coverage.32 Under the MMA, tax-deductible contributions were also
limited to the amount of the deductible, but this limit was removed by
Congress in legislation late in 2006.33
Money contributed to an HSA can be spent for “qualified medical
expenses,” without being subject to income tax, but withdrawals are subject
to both income tax and to a 10% excise tax if it is spent for other
purposes.34 “Qualified medical expenses” are broadly defined to include
many things not covered by traditional health insurance, such as
nonprescription drugs. HSA expenditures are controlled only by very
28. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, § 301, 110 Stat. 1936, 2037 (1996). Too few people signed up for the HIPAA
demonstration project to allow program evaluation. General Accounting Office, Medical
Savings Accounts: Results form Surveys of Insurers, 1 (1998).
29. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 1201, and codified as amended at I.R.C. § 223.
For a careful
examination of these provisions, see Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal
Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36
MCGEORGE L. REV. 535, 548-56 (2005).
30. I.R.C. §§ 223(c)(2)(A)(i)(I) & (II) (2000). See also 2007 HSA Indexed Amounts,
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml.
The insurer may, however, cover preventive medical expenses, such as screenings or
vaccinations, before the deductible is met. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(C), I.R.S. Notice 2004-23,
2004-15 I.R.B. 725.
31. I.R.C. §§ 223(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I) & (II) (2000). See also 2007 HSA Indexed Amounts,
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml
32. I.R.C. § 223(b) (2000). See also 2007 HSA Indexed Amounts, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml.
33. H.R. 6408, § 303, 110th Cong. (2007).
34. I.R.C. § 223(f) (2000).

382

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:2

infrequent audits by IRS auditors who have no health care expertise35. It is
likely, therefore, that HSA expenditures will be limited only by the
imagination, on the one hand, and good faith, on the other, of their owners.
If HSA funds are not spent for health care, they can be withdrawn for
any purpose once the account holder dies, becomes disabled, or reaches the
age of 65.36 HSA funds may continue to be withdrawn after age 65 for
qualified medical expenses, including Medicare premiums, free from
taxation.37 If they are used for other purposes after age 65, withdrawals are
taxed as income, but no penalties attach.
The HSA has been joined by another new health savings device, the
health reimbursement account or HRA. The HRA was created not by a
statute but rather by the IRS. In 2002, the IRS determined that existing
legislation authorized the offer of tax subsidies for employer contributions
to health savings vehicles fully funded by employers.38 The HRA is
attractive to employers because the accounts can be held as notional
accounts and need not be fully funded and because the funds in them also
need not go with the employee if he or she leaves employment.
HSAs and HRAs have grown quite quickly over the past two years,
although the number enrolled in these plans, like everything else about
them, is contested. The Employee Benefits Research Institute estimates
that about 1.3 million Americans are enrolled in a consumer-driven plan,
though another 8.5 million Americans have a plan with a deductible high
enough that they could set up an HSA.39 The Center for Health Systems
change estimates that about 1.43 million Americans have an employmentbased HSA and 1.3 million have an HRA.40 AHIP, the health insurance
trade association, claims that 4.5 million Americans are in HSA-compatible

35. I.R.C. § 223(d)(2) (2000). Rev. Rul. 2003-102, 2003-38 I.R.B. 559; I.R.S. Notice
2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269.
36. I.R.C. § 223(f)(4) (2000).
37. I.R.C. §§ 223(d)(2)(C)(iv), (f)(1) (2000).
38. Rev. Rul. 2002-41.
39. Paul Fronstin & Sara R. Collins, The 2nd Annual EBRI/Commonwealth Fund
Consumerism in Health Care Survey, Employee Benefit Research Center, Issue Brief No.
300, December, 2006.
40. Jon Gabel, Jeremy Pickreign, & Heidi Whitmore, Behind the Slow Growth of
Employer-Based Consumer-Directed Health Plans, Center for Studying Health System
Change,
Issue
Brief
No.
107,
December
2006,
available
at
http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/900/900.pdf.
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plans.41 CDHC advocates claim that the number of Americans in
consumer-driven plans will grow to 15-30 million over the next 5 to 10
years,42 but CDHC growth, rapid in the first two years, seems to have
leveled off, at least in the employment-related market.43
There has been a great deal of speculation as to how CDHC will affect
health care in general and the health insurance market in particular.44
Advocates believe, of course, that it will bring down costs while improving
quality and access. Skeptics have worried that CDHC will lead to favorable
selection, as healthy individuals and families choose consumer driven
plans, leaving those with costly medical problems in comprehensive plans,
which will become ever more costly as they cover a smaller and more

41. AHIP.org, January 2007 Census Shows 4.5 Million People Covered by
HSA/High-Deductible Health Plans, Ctr. for Policy and Research, April 2, 2007, available
at http://www.ahipresearch.org/PDFs/FINAL%20AHIP_HSAReport.pdf.
42. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Dramatic Growth of Health Savings
Accounts,
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/pdf/fact-sheet-dramaticgrowth.pdf (14 million by 2010); Health Savings Account Enrollees Predicted to Rise to 30
WIRE,
May
10,
2007,
available
at
Million
by
2009,
BUSINESS
http://www.allbusiness.com/services/business-services/4342771-1.html.
43. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 6.
44. Much of this speculation is found in the large and growing law review literature
on consumer-driven health care and HSAs. For a sampling of the law review literature
examining the policy implications of consumer-driven health care, see generally Marshall
Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care: Informed Consent
and Informed Choice, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1 (2007); W. Eugene Basanta,
Consumer-Driven Health Care: Legal and Policy Implications, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (2007);
Arnold J. Rosoff, Consumer-Driven Health Care:
Questions, Cautions, and an
Inconvenient Truth, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 11 (2007); Michele Melden, Guarding Against the
High Risk of High Deductible Health Plans: A Proposal for Regulatory Protections, 18
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 403 (2006); David Pratt, Healthy, Wealthy, and Dead: Health
Savings Accounts, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 7 (2006); Amy Monahan, The Promise and Peril
of Ownership Society Health Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777 (2006); John V. Jacobi,
Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 531 (2005);
and Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
485 (2004). See also, exploring more closely the implications of consumer-driven health
care for the legal relationships of patients and health care professionals and providers, Mark
A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 106
MICH. L. REV. 643 (2008); Peter D. Jacobson and Michael R. Tunick, Consumer-Directed
Health Care and the Courts: Let The Buyer (And Seller) Beware, 26(3) HEALTH AFF.,
May/June 2007 at 704; Mark A. Hall, Paying for What You Get and Getting What You Pay
For: Legal Responses to Consumer-Driven Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159
(2006); and E. Haavi Morreim, High –Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old
Challenges from Tort and Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (2006).
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expensive population, the familiar insurance death spiral.45. Skeptics also
wonder whether consumers have the information, or perhaps even the
ability, to make wise consumer choices in health care.46 The Rand HIE, for
example, found that although insureds with higher deductibles did consume
less health care, they cut back on high value health care to the same extent
they cut back on low value health care.47
Empirical evidence as to how CDHC is working out remains sketchy.
It seems to be working out very well for banks. HSAs are the kind of low
interest savings accounts that used to be the bread and butter of banks but
that have been hard to market in recent years because they are bad financial
investments. The HSA market is worth billions to banks, not just because
banks pay low interest on these deposits, but also because they collect fees
for establishing the accounts and for transactions.48 HSAs are also seem to
be working out quite well for insurance companies that specialize in these
accounts, several of which have bought or partnered with banks, and some
of which are managing the accounts themselves.49 Finally, HSAs are
working out very well for wealthy individuals looking for a retirement tax
shelter. Individuals in high tax brackets who have the choice of doing so
are well advised to buy a eligible high deductible policy, cover any medical
expenses from the deductible, and invest the legal maximum in the HSA,
leaving it there for retirement to accumulate tax-free returns. This strategy
could allow, by one scenario, a tax-free accumulation of $1.5 million by
retirement over a 40 year period.50
It is less clear how CDHC is working out for employers, who purchase
much of the private health insurance in the U.S., and for providers. High
deductible policies are obviously somewhat less expensive than
comprehensive policies, but if employers make a significant contribution to
their employees’ HSAs, they do not necessarily pay less overall.51 Some
45. JOST, supra note 1, at 133-134.
46. Id. at 137.
47. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 162.
48. James G. Knight, What HSAs Mean for Banks, AMERICAN BANKER, April 29,
2005,
available
at
http://americanbanker.com/article.html?id=20050428X7JY10TC&queryid=630711033&hit
num=2; Eric Dash, Health Savings Promise a Windfall for U.S. Banks, REDORBIT NEWS,
Jan. 29, 2006, available at http://www.redorbit.com/news/display/?id=373206.
49. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 23.
50. Id. at 22.
51. Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research and Educational Trust, Employer
Health Benefits, 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, at 5 (2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7527/.
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providers welcome the possibility of being able to bill consumers directly
rather than to deal with insurers, but in fact most consumer-driven policies
are structured so that the provider bills the insurer in any event, and the
insurer then collects from the HSA.52 This assures consumers access to the
insurer’s bargaining power, but means that there is little savings in
transaction costs. To the extent that providers bill consumers directly, they
will experience savings in transactions costs and probably be able to charge
higher prices, but they also have more risk exposure if consumers are
unable to pay the bill.
The most important question, however, is how does consumer-driven
health care affect consumers? First, there is some evidence of favorable
selection toward consumer-driven plans, which seem to be chosen by those
in better health, but the effect is not clear.53 Because high deductible and
high coinsurance plans have become quite common in recent years, even
before the MMA, CDHC plans might be quite attractive to people with
high medical costs because the law at least requires a cap on out-of-pocket
limits. There is more evidence that CDHC plans are chosen by wealthier
and better educated subscribers, which is not surprising.54
There is also some evidence that CDHC reduces health care spending
and use, and that participants in CDHC plans use more preventive care
(which can under the law be excluded from deductibles) and comply better
with prescribed treatment regimes.55 Evidence on cost-savings, however, is
still weak and confounded by the possibility of favorable selection, while
evidence of quality improvement is far from conclusive. Some studies, for
example, find that CDHC members are more likely to delay or forego
needed medical care or the use of necessary medications.56
The most troubling emerging evidence is that CDHC is further eroding
the modest level of health care solidarity that private health insurance has
brought about in this country. The public health insurance systems of all
other developed countries are based, in the end, on the idea of solidarity–
the belief that we are all at risk of disease and injury, that we all need to be
52. Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in ConsumerDriven Health Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 408 (2005).
53. Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin, et al., Consumer-Directed Health Care: Early
Evidence About Effects on Cost and Quality, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 516, 519, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/search?ck=nck&andorexactfulltext=and&resourcetype=1
&disp_type=&author1=&fulltext=&pubdate_year=2006&volume=25&firstpage=516.
54. Id.; JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 139.
55. JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK,, supra note 1, at 145.
56. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 26, 29.
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healthy to be productive members of society, and we ought all to contribute
to the cost of health care to the extent of our ability to the cost of providing
health care for all.57 Employment-based health insurance has sustained a
weak version of solidarity in the United States. Within employment
settings, most employees have more or less equal access to health
insurance, subsidized by the taxpayer, and with costs arguably borne
somewhat disproportionately by higher income employees.58
If employers move toward high deductible policies, however, an ever
greater proportion of the cost of health care is going to be passed directly
on to employees, particularly sick employees. Recent research shows that
the majority of employees in high deductible plans are not offered a choice
by their employer; they are simply given the high-deductible plan.59
Thirty percent of employees with CDHC’s moreover, receive no employer
contribution to an HSA, and over half receive less than $1000 per year.60
Lower income employees, moreover, often contribute little or nothing
themselves to an HSA. 27% of individuals in CDHC plans with incomes
of less than $50,000 a year contribute nothing to their HSA according to
the EBRI survey.61 Of those who have had HSAs for a year or more, 23
percent rolled over nothing at the end of the year, 26%, $500 or less.62
Overall 14% had nothing in their accounts at the time of the survey, 16%
more $200 or less.63 44% of those who did not open an account said that
they did not do so because they did not have money to put into the account,
19% said that the tax benefits were not attractive enough to justify it.64
Of course, high deductible accounts mean high exposure for those with
high health care costs, and overwhelming evidence has emerged in recent
years that consumers with high deductible accounts who lack health
savings accounts forego necessary health care. Adults with health
problems who have deductibles above $500 (and particularly those with
incomes below $35,000 a year) are much more likely than those with lower
deductibles to not fill a prescription, not get needed specialist care, to skip a
57. Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do, supra note 2, at 433-34.
58. See Mark Pauly, The Tax Subsidy To Employment-Based Health Insurance and
the Distribution of Well-Being, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 89 (2006).
59. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 14. The same is true for about 2 in 5
employees in plans with HSAs/HRAs, Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and
Educational Trust, supra note 50 at 103.
60. Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 51, at 105.
61. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 18.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 14.
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recommended test or follow-up visit, or report having a medical problem
for which they have not sought medical care.65 Patients with high
deductibles are also much more likely to have medical bill or medical debt
problems.66 Nearly half of “underinsured” adults identified by a recent
survey were contacted by a collection agency in the year prior to the survey
regarding medical bills, while more than one-third said that they had to
change their lives dramatically to pay for medical bills.67
To put it bluntly, whatever else CDHC may accomplish, it seems to be
bringing us tax subsidized retirement savings for the rich, high deductible
health plans and financial misery for the poor. If one believes that health
insurance is a bad idea, that health insurance must be seriously curtailed to
bring about consumer choice and efficient markets, this cost in solidarity
may be acceptable.
If one believes, however, that insurance is ultimately about solidarity,
not efficiency, these issues are troubling. Health insurance obviously
contributes to solidarity between the sick and the healthy, but can also build
solidarity between the poor and the wealthy. Health insurance is also about
security–knowing that when you need health care you will be able to get it,
and to get it without missing a rent payment or a car payment. Efficiency
is a good thing, of course, and the efficient distribution of health care
should be encouraged. But the evidence that CDHC is bringing us
efficiency is at best equivocal. The evidence that it is bringing about the
breakdown of solidarity and threatening security is stronger. Health
insurance is, in fact, a good idea, and we must look for ways to achieve
efficiency while preserving what little risk sharing still exists in this
country–perhaps even building on it. But how we can achieve this is
beyond the scope of this essay.68

65. See Karen Davis, Michelle M. Doty and Alice Ho, How High Is Too High?
Implications of High-Deductible Health Plans, Commonwealth Fund Pub. No. 816, 2005, at
9,
available
at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/816_Davis_how_high_is_too_high_impl_HD
HPs.pdf?section=4039.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Cathy Schoen, et al., Insured But Not Protected: How Many Adults are
AFFAIRS,
at
w5-296,
June
14,
2005,
Underinsured?
HEALTH
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.289.
68. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 189-204 (exploring this topic
further).
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ASSIGNMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
RIGHTS FOR LATENT INJURY AND DAMAGE CLAIMS
John T. Waldron, III
Andrew R. Stanton*
The efficiency of the American business community depends in part on
the ability to transfer assets and stock with minimal limitations. Through
mergers, asset sales, stock sales, corporate dissolutions, and other
transactions, American businesses generally enjoy the freedom to change
their structure to adapt to the constantly-evolving business environment.
In these transactions, there is often a link between the assets being
transferred and the liabilities that are associated with those assets. For
instance, under the state statutes governing corporate transactions, the
surviving company in a merger typically is the successor to both the assets
and liabilities of the merging companies. Similarly, corporate dissolutions
often result in the transfer of the dissolving corporation’s assets and
liabilities to its shareholders. In other transactions, the link between assets
and their related liabilities has been broken. For example, under many
states’ laws, assets generally may be sold free and clear of any liabilities
associated with those assets, depending on the circumstances.
To ensure that transactions that could divorce assets from their related
liabilities do not adversely affect third parties or the general public,
legislatures and courts have developed a number of protections designed to
allow society to obtain the economic benefits derived from such corporate
transactions without incurring undesired consequences. For instance,
through the laws governing fraudulent conveyances and successor liability,
legislatures and courts have established safeguards that, when applicable
and under certain circumstances, serve to prevent tort defendants from
transferring their assets in a manner that would deprive tort claimants of a
proper source for recovery.
This link between assets and liabilities is a two-way street. Just as
courts have articulated rules to ensure that, in appropriate circumstances,
the seller’s liabilities follow the assets being transferred, courts also have
devised principles for determining whether certain assets, such as insurance
assets, follow the liabilities being transferred to a buyer.
For example, courts across the country have adjudicated a recurrent
dispute between insurers and policyholders regarding the effect of “anti-
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assignment” conditions1 in insurance policies where the policyholder has
attempted to transfer its insurance rights to a third party as part of a
corporate or other transaction. This issue has been particularly difficult to
resolve in the context of claims for insurance coverage for latent bodily
injury and property damage, such as environmental, asbestos and other
delayed-manifestation claims where the bodily injury or property damage
already took place (or began to take place) prior to the transfer of insurance
rights at issue but was not discovered until years after the transfer.
In such disputes, insurers often contend that anti-assignment conditions
preclude the policyholder from transferring its insurance rights to a third
party without the insurers’ consent, even where the transaction provides
that the third party will assume the liabilities to which the insurance assets
related (hereinafter, the “Insurer Position”). In response, the entity to
which the insurance rights have been assigned (the “Successor Insured”)
typically asserts that anti-assignment conditions cannot be used by insurers
to avoid providing coverage for occurrences that already took place prior to
the transfer, because the occurrences gave the assigning policyholder
“choses in action” under the policies that were freely transferable, with or
without the insurers’ consent (hereinafter, the “Successor Insured
Position”).2
Courts have resolved this dispute in different ways. A number of
courts have adopted the Successor Insured Position that, while an insurer
cannot be required to insure a third party for new occurrences that relate
solely to the third party’s conduct after the transfer in question, a
policyholder is free to assign or otherwise transfer its insurance rights
* Mr. Waldron is a partner and Mr. Stanton is an associate in the Pittsburgh office
of K&L Gates LLP, Henry W. Oliver Building, 535 Smithfield Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15222
(412/355-6500), a law firm that regularly represents policyholders in insurance coverage
disputes, including policyholders in environmental, asbestos, and other toxic-tort-related
insurance disputes. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily
those of any clients of the law firm.
1. These anti-assignment conditions often purport to provide that the insurance
policy, or interests thereunder, may not be assigned without the insurer’s consent. See, e.g.,
I MILLER’S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED, at 421.4 (2006) (“Assignment of
interest under this policy shall not bind the [insurer] until its consent is endorsed hereon.”).
2. The use of the terms “Successor Insured” and “Successor Insured Position” is a
simplification and is not intended to suggest that all insureds will or should have the same
position in a dispute over the transfer of insurance rights in a corporate transaction.
Ultimately, resolution of such issues will turn on the unique circumstances and facts of each
case and hence the discussion in this Article is necessarily general. The specific language of
the transactional documents and the insurance policies should be consulted as such language
may affect the transfer of insurance rights.
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relating to occurrences that began prior to the transfer without having to
obtain the insurer’s consent. On the other hand, other courts, including
most notably the California Supreme Court in Henkel Corp. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co.,3 have adopted the Insurer Position and held that an
anti-assignment condition precluded the policyholder from transferring its
insurance rights without the insurer’s consent, including its liability
insurance rights for bodily injury that had already happened prior to, but
was not discovered until after, the transfer in question. As a result, the
insurers in Henkel and these other cases were able to avoid paying
substantial amounts in coverage to the Successor Insured to which the
policyholder had attempted to assign coverage. Based on Henkel and
similar decisions, insurers are now more aggressively relying on antiassignment conditions in their policies as a basis for denying coverage
where the entity seeking coverage is a successor to the policyholder,
whether by way of merger, stock sale, dissolution, or asset sale.4
From the Successor Insured’s perspective, this insurer effort arguably
threatens to undermine the efficiency of corporate transactions while
benefiting the insurers alone. On this view, insurers are seeking enormous
windfalls through the virtual elimination of their coverage obligations
pursuant to historical policies, for which they collected substantial
premiums, by way of a corporate transaction or other subsequent
circumstances having nothing to do with the scope of the risk insured under
the policies. According to these Successor Insureds, courts should reject
the Henkel decision and remain committed to the position that antiassignment conditions do not preclude the transfer of liability insurance
rights for losses that took place prior to the transfer in question. As
discussed in more detail below, this position provides that, whether the
corporate transaction resulting in the transfer of rights to coverage was a
merger, stock sale, dissolution, or asset sale, the insurer’s consent is not
required to transfer such insurance rights even where the injury or damage
3. 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003).
4. The emergence of these issues, especially in light of the Henkel decision, has been
the subject of significant analysis by commentators. See, e.g., Seth A. Tucker and AnnKelley Kemper, You Have the Liabilities, But Do You Have The Coverage? Coverage
Rights for IBNR Liabilities Under Occurrence-Based Liability Policies Issued to a
Corporate Predecessor, 16 Coverage 3 (May/June 2006); Gregory J. May, Successors’
Rights to Insurance Coverage for Predecessors’ Preacquisition Activities: Recent
Developments, 40 Tort & Ins. L.J. 911 (2004-2005); Tom Baker, John Buchanan, and
Marianna Horton, Meet Your New Insured: Successors' Rights to Insurance Assets in
Corporate Transactions, 4 Coverage 1 (2004).
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at issue did not manifest until years after the transaction.5 In recent
months, there have been a number of developments in the decisional law
addressing this tension between the Successor Insured Position and Insurer
Position on the transferability of rights to insurance coverage.6
I.

AN INSURER’S CONSENT IS GENERALLY NOT NEEDED
FOR A POLICYHOLDER’S INSURANCE RIGHTS TO
TRANSFER BY MERGER

A policyholder’s insurance assets (along with its liabilities) generally
transfer to the surviving corporation in a merger, even where the insurer
has not consented to the transfer, notwithstanding any anti-assignment
conditions in the insurer’s policy.
All fifty states have adopted some form of merger statute.7 Merger
statutes generally provide that the surviving corporation, upon the effective
date of the merger: (i) assumes all of the rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities of the non-surviving corporation (provided they are not
inconsistent with the articles of incorporation of the surviving corporation
and that if the merger is with a foreign corporation they are not inconsistent
with any limitation in the domestic jurisdiction), and (ii) is subject to and
assumes the prior duties and liabilities of the non-surviving corporation.8
For instance, Section 259(a) of the General Corporation Law of the
State of Delaware (“DGCL”) provides that when a merger becomes
effective, the separate existence of the non-surviving corporation ceases
and the surviving corporation possesses “all the rights, privileges, powers
and franchises as well of a public as of a private nature” and is “subject to
all the restrictions, disabilities and duties” of each of the merged
corporations. As Section 259(a) further states:

5. This article focuses on the question of an insured’s continuing right to its
historical insurance coverage, notwithstanding changes in corporate structures and other
transactions; it does not address the competing interests of multiple potential insureds with
respect to the same policies, which can present different considerations (such as, for
example, policyholders that intended to retain their insurance rights and not transfer them in
the corporate transaction at issue). This article also does not focus in detail on the related
issue of whether and under what circumstances historical liabilities and related rights to
insurance coverage may be transferred to a Successor Insured by “operation of law.”
6. See infra section (IV)(C)(5) for a discussion of some of these recent
developments.
7. See Jonathan R. Macey, Macey on Corporation Law § 9.01[B] (2003).
8. Id.
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The rights, privileges, powers and franchises of each of said
[merging] corporations, and all property, real, personal and
mixed, and all debts due to any of said constituent corporations on
whatever account, as well for stock subscriptions as all other
things in action or belonging to each of such corporations shall be
vested in the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger
or consolidation; and all property, rights, privileges, powers and
franchises, and all and every other interest shall be thereafter as
effectually the property of the surviving or resulting corporation
as they were of the several and respective constituent
corporations . . . .9
Consistent with Section 259(a), courts have held that a merger results
in the transfer of the non-surviving corporation’s rights and obligations
under its insurance policies to the surviving corporation by operation of
law.10 Further, such a transfer does not violate any non-assignment
provision in such policies.11
9. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 259 (a)(2002) (emphasis added); Heit v. Tenneco, Inc.,
319 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Del. 1970) (“[Section] 259 provides that when a merger becomes
effective all assets of the merged corporation, including causes of action which might exist
on its behalf, pass by operation of law to the surviving company.”); cf. Texaco Refining &
Mktg., Inc. v. Delaware River Basin Comm’n, 824 F. Supp. 500, 507 (D. Del. 1993) (“A
statutory merger . . . results in a combination of the two corporations with the surviving
corporation attaining the property, rights, and privileges of the absorbed corporation, as well
as retaining its own property, rights, and privileges.”).
10. Brunswick Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 509 F. Supp. 750, 752-753
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (“under [Delaware, Maryland and Pennsylvania] corporation law, the
surviving corporation in a merger is vested with all rights and benefits under a liability
insurance policy formerly due the merged corporation.”); see also Knoll Pharm. Co. v.
Auto. Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (applying Illinois law, “once a
merger is established, the successor corporation takes on the obligations and liabilities under
the insurance policies”); Texaco A/S, v. Commercial Ins. Co., No. 90 Civ. 2722, 1995 WL
628997, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1995) (holding under New York law that surviving
corporations of mergers were named insureds under liability policies issued to merged
entities since “the risk contemplated by the insurers is not substantially altered by requiring
them to provide coverage for the pre-acquisition activities of the merged corporation”),
vacated on other grounds, 160 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998); Aetna Life & Cas. v. United Pac.
Reliance Ins. Co., 580 P.2d 230 (Utah 1978) (“logical conclusion is that the surviving
corporation . . . simply stands in the same position as that occupied by the merged
corporation . . . prior to the merger”); Paxton & Vierling Steel Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,
497 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Neb. 1980) (holding that it is “logical, reasonable and, most
importantly, fair” that insurance rights transfer from merging corporation to surviving
corporation by operation of law); Chatham Corp. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 334 N.Y.S.2d 959
(Sup. Ct. 1972) (observing that the non-surviving corporation’s insurance policy
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II. AN INSURER’S CONSENT TYPICALLY WOULD NOT BE
NEEDED FOR A POLICYHOLDER’S INSURANCE RIGHTS
TO TRANSFER IN A STOCK SALE
The conveyance of all of a corporation’s stock generally transfers
ownership of the corporate entity as a whole, with the corporation generally
retaining all of its assets unless certain assets are expressly excluded from
the transaction.12 Hence, because the sale of a policyholder’s stock alone
ordinarily does not involve an “assignment” of insurance policies, an
insurer’s consent typically would not be required.
When a policyholder’s stock is sold, insurers sometimes contend that
their consent is required for that policyholder to be able to keep its own
insurance rights. In response, Successor Insureds may challenge this
assertion on public policy grounds, contending that, if the insurers’ position
were taken seriously, public companies, whose stock is bought and sold
every day, would unwittingly forfeit their insurance rights each time a
share of stock were sold. Indeed, the insurers’ position has been rejected
by several courts for that reason.
For example, the court in Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Automobile Ins. Co. held
that a company whose stock is being sold need not obtain the consent of its
insurers to retain its insurance rights.13 In Knoll, all of the stock of the
named insured was sold to a third party.14 The named insured later was
“automatically vested in plaintiff as the surviving corporation by virtue of the provisions
of . . . the Business Corporation Law”).
11. See, e.g., Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 287,
292-93 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Thus, it is our conclusion that the no-assignment clause should not
be applied ritualistically and mechanically to forfeit coverage in these circumstances”);
Knoll Pharm., 167 F. Supp.2d at 1011 n.7 (finding no increased risk associated with the
statutory merger since the insurers were only liable on those claims against the surviving
corporation that arose out of the covered acts of the insured corporation and refusing to
enforce no-assignment clause); Texaco, 1995 WL 628997, at *6 (successors by merger
entitled to access coverage issued to merged entities “notwithstanding the no-assignment
clause, because the transfer of substantially all the assets of the corporation results in the
transfer of liability as well, irrespective of any agreement otherwise”); Paxton, 497 F. Supp.
at 581 (“It seems well recognized that a provision limiting assignment in an insurance policy
simply does not apply to a transfer occurring by operation of law.”).
12. See, e.g., Terrific Promotions, Inc. v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1243,
1248 (N.D. Ill. 1996); SCA Disposal Servs. of New England, Inc. v. Central Nat’l Ins. Co.,
No. 900393C, 1994 WL 879687, at *4 (Mass. Super. Apr. 12, 1994) (holding that the
company whose stock was purchased retained its insurance rights).
13. Knoll Pharm., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
14. Id. at 1006.

2008] ASSIGNMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE RIGHTS

395

merged with the plaintiff,15 and the plaintiff asserted that it was therefore
the successor to the named insured’s insurance rights.16 While the insurers
did not dispute that the plaintiff succeeded to whatever insurance rights the
named insured had at the time of the merger, the insurers claimed that the
named insured had no insurance rights after the earlier sale of its stock.17
In this regard, the insurers argued that the named insured’s insurance rights
did not transfer with the insured in the stock sale because the insurers’
consent was not obtained.18 Rejecting the insurers’ arguments, the court
held that the stock sale did not involve any change in the insured’s rights or
obligations under the insurance policies.19
In an effort to distinguish Knoll and similar decisions, insurers
frequently cite to other cases that they assert stand for the proposition that
their consent is needed for a policyholder to retain its insurance rights when
its stock is being sold. However, Successor Insureds may dispute whether
such cases support the insurers’ position. For instance, in SCA Disposal
Services of New England, Inc. v. Central National Insurance Company of
Omaha,20 the purchaser of an insured’s stock argued that it could access the
insured’s insurance, notwithstanding anti-assignment conditions, because
the purchase of the insured’s stock was akin to a merger. The court
rejected the purchaser’s right to access the insured’s insurance because, in a
stock sale, the company whose stock is being sold retains all of its assets
and liabilities:
[T]he transfer of [the insured] to [the purchaser’s predecessor]
was accomplished through stock purchase, not by statutory
merger. . . . [The insured] retained its separate corporate identity
after the purchase. When acquisition is accomplished by stock
purchase, all legal attributes of the acquired entity continue.21

15. Id.
16. Id. at 1007.
17. Id. at 1010.
18. Id. The insurers also argued that the insurance rights did not transfer with the
insured because the language of the purchase agreement expressly excluded insurance rights
from the transfer. However, the court held that the exclusion was referring to the parent’s
insurance contracts, not the insured’s. Id. at 1009.
19. Id. at 1007-08.
20. SCA Disposal Servs. of New England, No. 900393C, 1994 WL 879687, at *4
(Mass. Super. Apr. 12, 1994).
21. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
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The SCA court did not indicate that the insurers’ consent was needed
for the insured to retain its insurance rights through the stock sale (and
indeed the court went on to find coverage for the insured for its
environmental liabilities under a policy not containing a pollution
exclusion).22
Similarly, in Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,23 the court held that a subsidiary whose stock was sold lost
coverage because it had been covered under its parent’s policy as a
“subsidiary.” After the parent sold the stock of the subsidiary, the latter
ceased to be a subsidiary and, therefore, was no longer covered under the
parent’s policy for post-sale losses. Critically, the court did not hold that
the subsidiary lost coverage because it failed to obtain the insurer’s
consent. As the Court of Appeal clarified on appeal: “At the time of the
stock transfer from [the parent] to [the third party], [the former subsidiary]
lost its status as a subsidiary and therefore no longer fell within the ambit
of the [defendant’s] policy.”24
In addition, other cases often cited by insurers do not hold that an antiassignment condition in an insurance policy requires that the insurer’s
consent be obtained for the insured to retain its insurance rights when its
stock is sold:

Bunzl Pulp & Paper Sale, Inc. v. Golder25 – No party in the case
asserted that the sale of the stock of the insured in any way
affected the insured’s own insurance rights. The company
that bought the insured’s stock did assert that it could access
its new subsidiary’s insurance policies, but the court rejected

22. Id. at *10-11.
23. Indep. Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334 (D.D.C.
1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
24. Indep. Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 948. The decision in Home Ins. Co. v.
Service Am. Corp., 662 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Ill. 1987), similarly does not support the
contention that an insurer’s consent is needed for a policyholder to retain its insurance rights
when its stock is being sold. Like Independent Petrochemical, the Home case involved a
company that was insured as a “subsidiary” under its parent’s policy, but then the company
was sold to a third party, thus causing the company to lose its status as a covered
“subsidiary.” Id. at 967.
25. Bunzl Pulp & Paper Sale, Inc. v. Golder, No. Civ. A., No. Civ. A. 90-4303, 1995
WL 89026 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 1995).
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this claim because the policy “did not insure the
shareholders of [the insured].”26
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. CAE-Link Corp.27 – This decision
did not hold that an insurer’s consent is required for an
insured to retain its insurance rights when its stock is sold.28
Nor did this decision involve a sale or assignment of
insurance rights or policies, or even anti-assignment
conditions.29 Rather, the Lawyers Title decision involved a
form of insurance entirely different from general liability
insurance – title insurance – with unique policy language not
found in standard-form liability policies.30 Specifically, the
title insurance in Lawyers Title provided coverage for the
“insured,” which was defined to mean the named insured
and “those who succeed to the interest [in the real estate at
issue] of [the named insured] by operation of law as
distinguished from purchase including, but not limited to,
heirs,
distributees,
devisees,
survivors,
personal
representatives, next of kin, or corporate or fiduciary
successors.”31 Because the defendant acquired the real estate
at issue through a “purchase,” the court held that it did not
qualify as an insured under this definition.32
In re Asian Yard Partners33 – This decision did not involve
insurance policies or language similar to the typical
standard-form “Assignment” conditions.34 The partnership
agreement at issue included a “No Transfer” provision that
stated: “No Partner may sell, assign, transfer, give,
26. Id. at *3.
27. Lawyers Title Ins. v. CAE-Link Corp., 878 F. Supp. 767 (D. Md. 1994).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 768.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 771.
33. In re Asian Yard Partners, Nos. 95-333-PJW, 95-334-PJW, 1995 WL 1781675
(Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 18, 1995).
34. Id.
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hypothecate or otherwise encumber . . . directly or indirectly,
or by operation of law or otherwise, any interest in the
Partnership . . . .”35 The sole asset of one of the partners,
AOC, was its 1% general partnership interest. One of the
limited partners, AYP, owned 100% of the stock of AOC.36
When AYP sought bankruptcy court approval of the sale of
all of AOC’s stock, the court concluded that this sale would
constitute an indirect sale of AOC’s 1% general partnership
interest in the partnership, and thus that the sale violated the
“No Transfer” provision.37
Accordingly, Successor Insureds may argue that, because the sale of a
policyholder’s stock does not involve the assignment of any insurance
rights (let alone insurance policies), an insurer’s consent is typically not
required under normal circumstances for the policyholder to retain its
insurance rights through the sale.
III. AN INSURER’S CONSENT GENERALLY WOULD NOT BE
NEEDED TO TRANSFER INSURANCE ASSETS AS PART OF
A POLICYHOLDER’S DISSOLUTION
When a corporate policyholder is dissolved and its assets transferred to
a third party (typically its shareholder(s)), insurers frequently contend that
this transfer of insurance assets requires their consent under the
“Assignment” conditions in their policies.38 Successor Insureds will
ordinarily be able to refute the insurers’ position, relying on two principal
grounds.39
First, in cases involving the transfer of insurance rights in the context
of a corporate dissolution, courts have held that an anti-assignment
condition does not apply to the transfer of insurance assets relating to pretransfer losses, even where those losses are ongoing, but not discovered
until after the transfer.40 For instance, in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna
35.
36.
37.
38.
1974).
39.
40.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *6-7.
See, Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc., 501 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir.
Id.
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997).
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Casualty & Surety Co., the policyholder had engaged in operations that
were causing undiscovered environmental property damage.41 In 1979, the
policyholder was dissolved, and its remaining assets were transferred to a
liquidating trust.42 In the mid-1980’s, the environmental property damage
was discovered, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
demanded that the liquidating trust clean up the site of the operations.43
When the trust sought coverage under the policyholder’s policies, one of
the insurers contended that an anti-assignment condition had precluded the
transfer of the policyholder’s insurance assets to the trust.44 Rejecting the
insurer’s position, the Utah Supreme Court held that all of the
policyholder’s insurance assets had transferred to the liquidating trust,
despite the anti-assignment condition.45
One of the cases relied on by the Sharon court -- National American
Insurance Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc. -- held that assignment of an
insurance policy and coverage for post-assignment losses of the assignee
are not precluded by an anti-assignment condition in the policy, where the
assignment of the insurance policy did not increase the risk of the insurer.46
In Jamison, the policyholder purchased a fire insurance policy from the
insurer.47 Soon after the issuance of the policy, one of the defendants
purchased all of the stock of the policyholder.48 Several months after this
stock purchase, the policyholder was dissolved, and all of its assets were
distributed to its sole shareholder, including the fire policy.49 After the
dissolution and assignment, a fire caused damage to the insured premises,
and the shareholder sought coverage under the policy. Rejecting the antiassignment condition as a basis for denying coverage, the court held that
such conditions do not apply to the assignment of policies providing
coverage for post-assignment losses if “the assignment involves no increase
in risk to the insurer.”50 Finding that the dissolution of the policyholder
and assignment of the insurance policy resulted in no such increase in the
risk to the insurer, the court concluded that the anti-assignment condition
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 139 n.15.
Id. (citing cases finding anti-assignment conditions inapplicable).
Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc., 501 F.2d 1125, 1129 (8th Cir. 1974).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1128.
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did not apply.51 To hold otherwise, according to the court, would “place
form over substance and would conflict with the oft-expressed doctrine that
forfeitures of insurance policies are not favored in the law and are to be
avoided whenever possible.”52
Second, certain dissolutions arguably constitute de facto mergers for
which an insurer’s consent is not required in order to transfer insurance
assets. Courts addressing dissolutions have concluded that, where a
company purchases all of the stock of another company and then
subsequently dissolves its new subsidiary, transferring all of the
subsidiary’s assets and liabilities to it, a de facto merger may have
For example, in Arnold Graphics Industries, Inc. v.
occurred.53
Independent Agent Center, Inc., the court held that there had been a de
facto merger between a parent and its subsidiary where, some time after
purchasing all of the subsidiary’s stock, the assets and liabilities of the
subsidiary were transferred to the parent and the subsidiary dissolved.54
The court came to this conclusion even though the subsidiary had
conducted business as a distinct legal entity for about a year between the
parent’s purchase of its stock and the transfer of the subsidiary’s assets to
the parent, stating that “there is no requirement that all of the events that
are necessary to a finding of de facto merger occur at the same time.”55 As
discussed above in Section I, Successor Insureds may assert that the
transfer of insurance rights through a merger (“de facto” or otherwise) does
not require the consent of insurers.
Notwithstanding these two arguments advanced by Successor Insureds,
in an effort to avoid providing coverage to the sole shareholder parent of a
policyholder that has been dissolved, insurers may repeat their contention
that insurance must pass “by operation of law” for the anti-assignment
condition of their policies to not apply and that a transfer of assets through
51. Jamison, 501 F.2d at 1128.
52. Id.; see also Paxton & Vierling Steel Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 497 F. Supp. 573,
580 (D. Neb. 1980) (noting that, with respect to whether an anti-assignment condition
applies, the difference between a transfer of assets upon corporate dissolution and a transfer
based on a merger is not material, as the inquiry in both cases is focused on whether the
insurer’s risk has been materially increased).
53. Arnold Graphics Indus., Inc. v. Indep. Agent Ctr., Inc., 775 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir.
1985).
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also Hoche Prods. v. Jayark Films Corp., 256 F. Supp. 291, 295-96
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (finding de facto merger where (1) company purchased all of the stock of
third party, (2) third party then assigned all of its assets to the company, and (3) third party
later dissolved).
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a dissolution is not a transfer “by operation of law.” However, Successor
Insureds may attempt to refute this insurer position on two grounds. First,
as discussed below, insurance rights for pre-transfer liabilities arguably do
not have to transfer by operation of law to survive an anti-assignment
Second, assuming arguendo that this standard were
condition.56
controlling, the cases regularly cited by insurers arguably do not support
their contention that such a transfer in connection with a corporate
dissolution is not “by operation of law.”
To support their position that their consent is needed for the transfer of
insurance rights in the context of a corporate dissolution, insurers have
cited to the decision in Snellman v. A.B. Dick Co.57 However, Successor
Insureds may contend that the Snellman decision supports their position
that a successor may recover under a contract, such as an insurance policy,
for the damages suffered, but not discovered, by its predecessor prior to the
transfer of the predecessor’s rights. In Snellman, the plaintiff’s subsidiary
entered into an agency agreement with the defendant.58 Unbeknownst to
the plaintiff or his subsidiary, the defendant began to engage in activities
that allegedly constituted breaches of the agreement.59 The subsidiary was
later dissolved.60 Subsequently, the plaintiff discovered the defendant’s
activities and sued for breach of the agency agreement between the
dissolved subsidiary and the defendant.61 The defendant asserted that the
agency agreement had terminated at the time of the subsidiary’s dissolution
in light of a broadly-drafted anti-assignment condition in the agreement.62
Because the agreement was an executory contract and the court believed
that the plaintiff’s subsidiary should not be permitted to assign its ongoing
duties under the agency agreement to a third party with whom the
defendant had not agreed to contract, the court held that the antiassignment condition precluded the contract from continuing to be in effect
after the dissolution.63 However, to the extent that the plaintiff’s breach-ofcontract claim was based on the defendant’s conduct before the subsidiary
was dissolved, the court, relying on Illinois’ statute regarding corporate
56. See infra Section IV.A.
57. No. 81C3048, 1987 WL 8619, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1987).
58. Id. at *2.
59. Id. at *10 (citing plaintiff’s allegations of breaches of agency agreement that may
have occurred prior to dissolution of plaintiff’s subsidiary).
60. Id. at *1.
61. Id. at *2.
62. Id. at *3.
63. Snellman, 1987 WL 8619 at *9.
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dissolution, held that the plaintiff retained the subsidiary’s cause of action
despite the dissolution.64 Thus, even though the subsidiary was not aware
at the time of its dissolution that the defendant had already breached their
agreement, the subsidiary’s causes in action for this undiscovered breach
were transferred to the plaintiff at the time of its dissolution under Illinois
law, and this transfer was unaffected by the anti-assignment condition
included in the agreement.
In addition to Snellman, insurers frequently rely on Butera v.
Attorneys’ Title Guar. Fund, Inc., for the proposition that the transfer of
insurance rights to the sole shareholder of a policyholder upon the
policyholder’s dissolution is not a transfer by “operation of law.”65
However, Successor Insureds may argue that Butera is inapposite for four
principal reasons. First, the Butera case did not involve an anti-assignment
condition, but rather the interpretation of a definition of “insured” that is
unique to title insurance policies.66 Second, the definition of “insured” at
issue in Butera specifically provided that transfers “by operation of law”
did not include transfers by “purchase.”67 Therefore, even if it were
relevant whether a transfer was “by operation of law” as that phrase is used
in its ordinary legal meaning, the Butera case involved a definition of “by
operation of law” that was unique to the particular policy language at issue
and thus arguably provides no guidance regarding the ordinary legal
meaning of that phrase. Third, Butera did not involve transfers of assets
upon dissolution. Fourth, the court indicated that a transfer of property to
an insured’s sole shareholders as a result of the insured’s dissolution would
constitute a transfer “by operation of law.”68 Instead, the court held that a
separate purchase of the property by a third party from the insured was a
“purchase” and therefore not a transfer “by operation of law” under the
policy.69

64. Id. at *10.
65. Butera v. Attorneys’ Title Guar. Fund, Inc., 747 N.E.2d, 949, 954 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001).
66. Id. at 951, 952.
67. Id. at 951.
68. Id. at 952-53 (discussing favorably the decision in Historic Smithville
Development Co. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 445 A.2d 1174 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1981),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds 464 A.2d 1177 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1983), in
which the court held that “if a corporation, in dissolution or otherwise, transfers all of its
assets to some other entity or to an individual, the transferee is a ‘successor’ in every sense
of the word”).
69. Id. at 954.
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Finally, insurers often cite to the decision in Bunzl Pulp & Paper Sale,
Inc. v. Golder, for the proposition that dissolutions do not transfer
insurance policies containing anti-assignment clauses because dissolutions
are not transfers by “operation of law.”70 In Bunzl, the insured transferred
title to real estate to its parentand then was dissolved.71 The decision does
not explain what happened to the insured’s other assets, including its
insurance rights, at dissolution. The parent asserted that it could access the
insured’s liability policy either (i) because it owned all of the stock of the
insured when the insured dissolved, or (ii) because the insured had
transferred real estate to the parent.72 The court rejected both of these
arguments. First, the insurance policy did not insure the shareholders of
the insured and therefore the parent was not insured under the policy by
virtue of its ownership of the insured’s stock.73 Second, the mere
acquisition by deed from the insured of title to real estate did not also give
the parent the insured’s insurance rights relating to that property.74 These
holdings typically are irrelevant to cases involving the question of whether
the sole shareholder parent of a policyholder succeeds to that
policyholder’s insurance rights upon the policyholder’s dissolution,
because, unlike the transfer of real estate by deed in Bunzl which was
limited to real estate and did not seek to transfer insurance assets, the
dissolutions of corporate policyholders typically include the transfer of all
assets, including insurance assets and liabilities to the sole shareholder
parent.
In sum, Successor Insureds have a number of arguments to distinguish
the Insurers’ cases and to support the Successor Insureds’ Position that
insurance assets may be transferred to them in the context of the
policyholder’s dissolution, notwithstanding anti-assignment conditions
contained in the policies at issue.
IV. TRANSFERRING INSURANCE ASSETS AS PART OF AN
ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT
Bolstered by the Henkel decision, insurers are now asserting more
aggressively that the anti-assignment conditions in their policies preclude
the transfer of historical insurance rights without their consent.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

No. Civ. A. 90-4303, 1995 WL 89026, at *2, 3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 1995).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2,3.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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Specifically, even though a purchaser may have intended to obtain all of
the assets, including insurance rights, of a seller, insurers contend that their
anti-assignment conditions operate to block the transfer of insurance rights
and to defeat the purchaser’s and seller’s intent. This conclusion, and the
Henkel decision upon which it rests, is currently the subject of substantial
coverage litigation.
a. CASES ADDRESSING WHETHER THE TRANSFER OF INSURANCE
RIGHTS FOR COVERAGE FOR PRE-TRANSFER EVENTS
REQUIRES AN INSURER’S CONSENT
A number of courts addressing the issue have held that anti-assignment
conditions do not preclude a transferee from obtaining coverage under the
transferor’s policies for the liabilities arising out of pre-transfer events.
These courts have reasoned that, because the event causing the liability
already took place prior to the transfer, the transfer of the insurance rights
relating to this liability does not materially increase the risk to the insurer.75
For instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that rights to
insurance may be assigned without the insurers’ consent where the loss has
taken place prior to the assignment.76 In Lain, the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy assigned the policy benefits after the death of the insured
to a funeral home to cover the insured’s funeral expenses.77 The insurer
denied coverage, arguing that it had not given consent to the assignment.
Rejecting the insurer’s reliance on the anti-assignment condition, the court
held that such conditions do not preclude an assignment of insurance
benefits where the assignment takes place after the loss has occurred:
The general rule, supported by a great wealth of
authority, is that general stipulations in policies,
prohibiting assignment thereof except with the insurer’s
75. See, e.g., Elat, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 654 A.2d 503, 505-06 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995) (rejecting the insurer’s reliance on an anti-assignment condition where
the assignment took place after the property damage at issue had occurred, stating: “[T]he
purpose behind a no-assignment clause in a casualty or liability policy . . . is to protect the
insurer from insuring a different risk than intended. Assignment of the right to collect or to
enforce the right to proceed under a casualty or liability policy does not alter, in any
meaningful way, the obligations the insurer accepted under the policy. The assignment only
changes the identity of the entity enforcing the insurer’s obligation to insure the same
risk.”).
76. Lain v. Metro.Life Ins. Co., 58 N.E.2d 587, 588 (Ill. 1945).
77. Id. at 588.
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consent, or upon giving some notice, or like conditions,
have universally been held to apply only to assignments
before loss, and, accordingly, not to prevent an assignment
after loss, of the claim or interest of the insured in the
insurance money then due in respect to the loss.78
Similarly, courts applying New York law have found that rights to
insurance may be assigned without the insurer’s consent where the event
from which the liability arose took place prior to the assignment.79
In addition, courts in other jurisdictions that have considered the issue
agree that insurance benefits may be transferred without the insurer’s
consent despite the presence of an anti-assignment condition, where the
injury or damage in question took place prior to the transfer.80
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Bronx Entm’t v. St. Paul’s Mercury Ins. Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 359, 363 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (following Holt, and stating that, even though the policy at issue contained an antiassignment condition, the assignee of insurance rights could maintain an action against the
insurer for the named insured’s pre-assignment business interruption damages); Employers
Ins. of Wausau v. Duplan Corp., No. 94 Civ. 3143(CSH), 1999 WL 777976, at *32
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1999) (confirming that an entity that is not a named insured may invoke
rights under an insurance policy “when the party seeking coverage (1) is the surviving
corporation in a merger with the insured; (2) is legally regarded as the corporate successor
of the insured through purchase or transfer of the insured’s assets; or (3) has been assigned
the insured’s rights in the policy”) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Holt v. Fid. Phoenix Fire Ins.
Co., 76 N.Y.S. 2d 398, 399-400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (noting that, once a fire occurred,
the named insured had an accrued claim under its fire insurance policy that it could have
assigned to a third party); see also Texaco A/S, S.A. v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark,
N.J., No. 90 Civ. 2722 (JFK), 1995 WL 628997, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1995) (“[T]he
rationale for respecting the no-assignment clause does not apply when liability arises from
pre-sale activity – no-assignment clauses are designed to protect insurers from unforeseen
increases in risk. When the loss occurs before the transfer, any increase in risk due to the
successor’s characteristics is irrelevant.” (emphasis added; citations omitted)), vacated on
other grounds, 160 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998).
80. See, e.g., Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc., 501 F.2d 1125, 1128, 1130
(8th Cir. 1974) (holding that transfer of all assets to sole shareholder upon dissolution of
corporation effectively transferred insurance coverage for pre-dissolution losses); Ocean
Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 100 F.2d 441, 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1939)
(rejecting insurer’s reliance on anti-assignment condition and holding that assignment of
“[a]ll other property rights and assets of whatsoever nature and description” transferred to
succeeding corporation the right to insurance coverage for injuries occurring before the date
of conveyance); B.S.B. Diversified Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 947 F. Supp. 1476, 1479
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (“The purpose of a no-assignment clause in an insurance contract is to
protect the insurer from increased liability. After the events giving rise to the insurer’s
liability have occurred, the insurer’s risk cannot be increased by a change in the insured’s
identity.”); Int’l Rediscount Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 425 F. Supp. 669,
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b. CASES ADDRESSING WHETHER THE TRANSFER OF INSURANCE
RIGHTS REQUIRES THE CONSENT OF THE INSURER WHERE THE
INJURY OR DAMAGE WAS NOT DISCOVERED UNTIL AFTER
THE TRANSFER
A number of courts, including cases decided under New York and
Illinois law, have held that anti-assignment conditions do not preclude the
transfer of liability insurance rights relating to bodily injuries that took
place prior to, but were not discovered until after, the transfer.
For example, in Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co.,81 the policyholder’s product was injected into the claimant in 1950,
and allegedly, as a result of atomic decay, unknowingly caused continuous
bodily injury to the claimant until 1971, when the claimant was
diagnosed.82 The policyholder was insured under policies issued by the
defendant-insurer that were in effect from 1952 to 1960.83 As a result of a
corporate reorganization in 1963, the policyholder’s assets were transferred
to the plaintiff.84 When the claimant filed suit against the plaintiff in 1973,
672-73 (D. Del. 1977) (agreeing with the “numerous other courts over the years” that have
held that anti-assignment conditions do not apply to the transfer of insurance rights
providing coverage for pre-transfer losses, stating that “it would be a mere act of caprice or
bad faith for [the insurer] to take advantage of the stipulation that the transfers were subject
to its consent”); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 485 P.2d 837, 839 (Ariz. App.
1971) (“[T]his [anti-assignment] rule is based upon the right of the insurer to choose its
insured so as to know its risks. Therefore, it is not applicable when an assignment is made
by an insured after the liability-causing event has occurred.” (citing several cases)); P.R.
Mallory & Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., No. 54C01-0005-CP-00156, 2004 WL 1737489, at *8
(Ind. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2004) (noting that the loss at issue took place before the transfer of
insurance rights); Conrad Bros. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 640 N.W.2d 231, 237 (Iowa 2001)
(holding that anti-assignment condition was inapplicable to transfer of chose in action for
coverage for loss occurring prior to transfer, and noting that, “even if the [anti-assignment]
provision had specifically prohibited post-loss assignments, it would most likely be in
contravention of public policy and the general purpose of indemnity contracts”);
Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins., No. 9900467B, 2005 WL 3489658, at
*2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2005) (recognizing that the general rule is that anti-assignment
clauses do not prevent the transfer of insurance rights for pre-transfer losses); Egger v. Gulf
Ins. Co., 903 A.2d 1219 (Pa. 2006) (assignment of rights to coverage as part of litigation
settlement valid where loss pre-dated assignment); 3 COUCH ON INS. 3d, § 35:7 (1997)
(noting that “the great majority of courts adhere to the rule that general stipulations in
policies prohibiting assignments thereof except with the consent of the insurer apply only to
assignments before loss, and do not prevent an assignment after loss”).
81. No. 76 Civ. 809, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16759 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1977).
82. Id. at *1-2.
83. Id. at *2.
84. Id. at *8.
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the plaintiff sought coverage under the policies issued by the defendant to
the policyholder.85 Rejecting the insurer’s reliance on its anti-assignment
condition, the court, applying New York law, held that the policyholder
had an accrued claim at the time of the asset transfer in 1963 for the bodily
injuries that took place prior to that time, even though no claim was
asserted against the policyholder until ten years after the asset transfer:
Such [anti-assignment] clauses do not apply to an assignment
of an insurance claim after the loss has occurred. This is so even
if the insurance contract reads to the contrary, because the
assignment of an accrued insurance claim is the same as assigning
a chose in action, and contractual limitations on such assignments
are contrary to the public policy of New York.
In this instance, any claim of [the policyholder] against [the
defendant-insurer] accrued between 1952 and 1960, and the
transfer of [the policyholder]’s assets ultimately to [the plaintiff]
in 1963 occurred after any insurance claim against [the defendantinsurer] had arisen.86
Thus, even though the insurer did not breach its policy obligations by
failing to defend until the claimant filed suit in 1973, the insurance claim
was deemed to have accrued when the bodily injury itself took place from
1952 through 1960, prior to the transfer of insurance assets in 1963.87
Accordingly, the anti-assignment condition could not apply.88
85. Id. at *1-2.
86. Id. at *7-8 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at *8-9.
88. Id.; see also Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 672 F. Supp. 1105,
1105-07 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (anti-assignment condition did not preclude plaintiff, which
acquired the policyholder’s contract rights through foreclosure, from recovering under the
policyholder’s indemnity policy where the losses took place prior to, but were not
discovered until after, the transfer of insurance rights); Snellman v. A.B. Dick Co., No.
81C3048, 1987 WL 8619 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1987) (a successor may recover under a
contract for the damages suffered, but not discovered, by its predecessor prior to the transfer
of the predecessor’s rights under the contract to the successor); see generally Am. Nat’l Fire
Ins. Co. v. Harold Abrams, P.C., No. 99 C 5807, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2577 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 19, 2002) (contrasting occurrence-based policies with claims-made policies, and noting
that coverage attaches under occurrence-based policies when the occurrence causing the
bodily injury or property damage takes place, not when the claim is made: “‘In the
“occurrence” policy, the peril insured is the “occurrence” itself. Once the occurrence takes
place, coverage attaches even though the claim may not be made for some time thereafter.
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Beyond New York and Illinois, a number of courts in other
jurisdictions have also held that anti-assignment conditions do not bar the
transfer of liability insurance rights relating to losses that took place prior
to, but were not discovered until after, the transfer. For example, in
Gopher Oil Co. v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co.,89 the policyholder
engaged in activities in the 1950s and 1960s that resulted in undetected
environmental property damage during the insurers’ policy periods.90 In
1973, the policyholder assigned all of its assets to the plaintiff.91 Eighteen
years later, the property damage manifested, and the plaintiff was sued.92
The insurer refused to provide coverage based on an anti-assignment
condition in its policies.93 Rejecting the insurer’s reliance on the antiassignment conditions, the court held that it would follow the “great
majority of courts” that had concluded that anti-assignment conditions do
not bar the transfer of insurance rights for liability coverage for events that
took place prior to the transfer:
The purpose of a non-assignment clause is to protect the
insurer from an increase to the risk it has agreed to insure. But
when events giving rise to an insurer’s liability have already
occurred, the insurer’s risk is not increased by a change in the
insured’s identity.94
Thus, because there could not be a material increase in risk to the
insurer with respect to tortious conduct that had already taken place, the
court ruled that the anti-assignment condition did not apply to this transfer
of liability insurance rights for property damage that was ongoing, but not
yet discovered, at the time of the transfer.95
Similarly, in Total Waste Management Corp. v. Commercial Union
Insurance Co.,96 the policyholder was insured under a general liability

[Whereas] in the “claims made” policy, it is the making of the claim which is the event and
peril being insured . . . .’”) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bauman, No. 90 C 0340,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18668, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 1992)).
89. 588 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. App. 1999).
90. Id. at 761-62.
91. Id. at 761, 763.
92. Id. at 761.
93. Id. At 761-762.
94. Id. at 763.
95. Gopher Oil, 588 N.W.2d at 763.
96. 857 F. Supp. 140 (D.N.H. 1994).
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policy issued by the defendant with a policy period ending in 1984.97 In
1988, the policyholder sold certain assets to the plaintiff.98 A third party
subsequently sued the plaintiff for property damage that had occurred, but
had not been discovered, prior to the asset sale.99 The insurer denied the
plaintiff’s claim that it had succeeded to the policyholder’s liability
coverage rights.100 The court ruled against the insurer, holding that the
anti-assignment condition did not preclude the plaintiff’s right to liability
coverage for property damage that had been caused by the policyholder and
that had taken place during the insurer’s policy period:
Some of the damage or loss caused by [the policyholder] to
[the third party]’s property allegedly occurred during the term of
[the insurer]’s policy and prior to [the policyholder]’s transfer of
assets. [The insurer]’s risk is therefore no greater than when the
policy “covers only the risk it evaluated when it wrote the
policy.” If [the plaintiff] is found to be the corporate successor to
[the policyholder], [the insurer]’s liability on the insurance
contract to [the policyholder] would be limited to the terms and
date of the policy.101
In the context of asbestos-related bankruptcy plans, several courts have
confirmed that insurance rights of a debtor-policyholder may be transferred
to a trust to fund the payment not only of pending asbestos claims, but also
of future asbestos claims not yet asserted, despite the objections of the
debtor’s insurers based on the anti-assignment conditions in their
policies.102
97. Id. at 154.
98. Id. at 143 n.2.
99. Id. at 142.
100. Id. at 145.
101. Id. at 153 (quoting N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d at
1358); see also Wolkerstorfer Co. v. Bituminous Cas. Co., No. C0-93-12712, slip op. at 811 (Minn. 10th Dist. May 19, 1994) (holding that transfer of assets from a partnership to a
corporation transferred rights to liability coverage for environmental property damage that
had taken place prior to the transfer but which was not discovered until years after the
transfer); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 139 n.15 (Utah
1997) (holding that an insurer’s consent was not needed to transfer insurance rights covering
liability for ongoing, but undiscovered, property damage from the policyholder to a
liquidating trust as part of the policyholder’s dissolution).
102. See In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 41 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (“‘[B]ecause an
insured’s right to proceeds vests at the time of the loss giving rise to the insured’s liability,
restrictions on an insured’s right to assign its proceeds are generally rendered void.’”
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c. POTENTIAL INSURER RESPONSES
Insurers often proffer a series of arguments to support their position
that insurance rights may not be transferred in the face of an antiassignment provision without their consent, including the following
arguments. Specifically, insurers frequently argue:

1. That a policyholder has not suffered a “loss” under the
policy until the insurer has breached its duty to defend or
indemnify, and therefore that no “loss” could have taken
place prior to the execution of the asset purchase
agreement where the bodily injury or property damage
was not discovered until after that time;
2. That insurance rights can only be transferred “by
operation of law”;
3. That various cases should be read to support the
conclusion that the anti-assignment conditions apply to
the transfer of historical insurance assets;
4. That the decisions in Henkel and related cases represent
the better reasoned view.
As discussed below, Successor Insureds may raise various hurdles in
an attempt to defeat these insurer arguments.
1. The Successor Insured Position: Insurance Rights for
Pre-Transfer Injuries or Damage May Be Transferred
Regardless of Whether or Not the Insurer Has
Breached Its Duties by the Time of the Transfer
As discussed above, a number of courts have held that an antiassignment condition does not ordinarily preclude the transfer of insurance
(quoting Cont. Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1995)));
see also In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., No. 03-10495(JKF), Transcript of Bench Opinion at
145-46 (D. Del., July 31, 2003) (confirming bankruptcy plan that assigned insurance
proceeds to trust over the objections of debtor’s insurers based on anti-assignment
conditions, stating that “[a]ssignment of a right to receive proceeds does not change any risk
that was insured against.”) (vacated on other grounds, 391 F.3d 190, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2004))
(declining to reach merits of insurers’ argument that assignment of proceeds violated antiassignment conditions in policies).
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rights providing liability coverage for injuries or damage that was ongoing,
but undiscovered, at the time of the transfer. Insurers often try to avoid that
conclusion by asserting that, for such injuries or damage, the relevant loss
did not occur until after the execution of the asset purchase agreement. The
insurers base this contention on the theory that a policyholder does not
suffer a “loss” until an insurer has failed to defend or indemnify it. To
illustrate, in cases involving asbestos, environmental, and other latent
bodily injury and property damage claims that were not filed until after an
asset sale took place, the insurers may argue that they did not fail to defend
or indemnify the policyholder before the asset sale, and hence that no
policyholder incurred a “loss” until after the asset purchase agreement was
executed. Thus, the argument goes, there were no insurance rights or
choices in action to transfer to the purchaser at the time of the asset sale.
The decisions discussed above cast doubt on this pro-insurer argument.
In each of those cases, the underlying injury or damage had not yet been
discovered at the time of transfer of the insurance asset, and no suit had
been filed against the party seeking insurance coverage. Accordingly, no
claim had been made for the insurer to deny before the transfer. Under the
pro-insurer argument, no “loss” – i.e., rejection of the request for a defense
or indemnity – had occurred before the applicable transfer; nonetheless, the
courts concluded in each case that the anti-assignment condition was
inapplicable.
The decisional law discussed above thus appears to undercut the proinsurer position that “loss” for purposes of analyzing the applicability of an
anti-assignment condition relates to when the insurer decides to deny a
claim for coverage. Rather, the view of these courts is that the relevant
“loss” occurs not when the insurer denies coverage, but rather when the
event giving rise to the liability takes place, e.g., when the bodily injury or
property damage occurs.
Notwithstanding such cases, Henkel and its related cases, discussed
below, provide support for the insurers’ position. In an effort to build
further support, insurers may take relatively novel positions on the
interpretation of decisional law to bolster their position that liability
insurance rights cannot be transferred until the insurer has failed to defend
or indemnify the insured. However, Successor Insureds may contend that
the cases that insurers typically rely upon do not provide the necessary
foundation for that position:
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Bronx Entertainment v. St. Paul’s Mercury Ins. Co.103 – In this
decision, the named insured assigned its insurance claim for
business interruption damages to the plaintiff. Even though
the policy at issue contained an anti-assignment condition,
the court held that the plaintiff could maintain an action
against the insurer for these pre-assignment business
interruption damages.104 The court held that the plaintiff
could not recover for its own business interruption losses
suffered after the assignment at issue, absent the insurer’s
consent.105
Service Adjustment Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London106 –
Consistent with the majority rule discussed above, this
decision, which involves a fire loss under a fire insurance
policy, stands for the simple proposition that “[a]n insured’s
claim under a policy may be assigned after the loss.”107 The
decision does not address situations in which the loss took
place prior to the transfer, but was not discovered until after
the transfer.
Loyola Univ. Med. Center v. Med Care HMO108 – In this
decision, the court held that an anti-assignment condition did
not apply to the transfer of medical insurance benefits where
the injury had taken place before the transfer, even though
the medical costs for which the insurance policy would
provide reimbursement had not yet been incurred.109 Even
though the medical insurance policy would have no
obligation to indemnify the policyholder until it incurred
medical costs, the court found that the relevant “loss” was
103. 265 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
104. Id. at 363 (“Of course Plaintiff may maintain an action for [transferor’s] losses
that accrued as of the date of the assignment.”)
105. Id.
106. 562 N.E.2d 1046 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
107. Id. at 1049.
108. 535 N.E.2d 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
109. Id. at 1129.
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the incidence of injury and not the payment of medical costs.
Accordingly, because the loss occurred before the
assignment, the assignment was not precluded by the antiassignment condition.110
In sum, as discussed above, a number of courts have held that an antiassignment condition does not apply to the transfer of liability insurance
rights for coverage for injuries or damage taking place prior to the transfer,
even where such injuries or damage have not been discovered prior to the
transfer. The insurers’ contention that an assignor does not have any
insurance choices in action to transfer until it has been the victim of a
breach by the insurer of its duty to defend or indemnify is not consistent
with this decisional law.
2. The Successor Insured Position: To Survive
Application of an Anti-Assignment Condition, a
Transfer of Insurance Rights Is Not Required to Occur
“by Operation of Law
Insurers often contend that, where a policy contains an anti-assignment
condition and the insurer’s consent has not been obtained, coverage rights
can only be transferred if, among other requirements, that transfer occurs
“by operation of law.” Under this approach, insurers contend that neither
an asset purchase, a stock purchase, nor an assignment in connection with a
corporate dissolution constitutes a transfer “by operation of law.” As a
result, such insurers argue, the transferee in question cannot be the
successor to the transferor’s insurance rights at issue.
This particular pro-insurer position has substantial weaknesses.
Among other things, no requirement that the transfer of insurance rights
must be accomplished “by operation of law” can be gleaned from much of
the decisional law.111 Successor Insureds may argue that no basis exists to
110. Id.(“What [the policyholder] assigned was her present conditional right to the
insurance proceeds. A valid assignment of a conditional right is enforceable in equity.”
(citations omitted)).
111. By way of example, although the courts in each of the following cases held that
insurance rights had effectively transferred, not one of the cases involved a transfer by
operation of law: Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 672 F. Supp. 1105, 1105-07
(N.D. Ill. 1987); Snellman v. A.B. Dick Co., No. 81C3048, 1987 WL 8619 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
24, 1987); Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., No. 76 CIV 809,
1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16759 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1977); Gopher Oil Co. v. American
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impose such a requirement and that so doing would run afoul of the case
law supporting their position.
3. The Successor Insured Position: Cases Relied Upon
by Insurers Do Not Support the Insurers’ Position
In addition to Henkel, insurers often assert that a number of cases hold
that anti-assignment conditions preclude the transfer of insurance rights in
corporate transactions other than mergers. However, Successor Insureds
may argue that these decisions do not support the insurers’ position:

Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Duplan Corp.112 – Apparently
contradicting the insurers’ suggestion that coverage can
transfer only through a merger, this decision expressly
confirms that an entity that is not a named insured may still
invoke rights under an insurance policy not only as a result
of a merger, but also when the entity “is legally regarded as
the corporate successor of the insured through purchase or
transfer of the insured’s assets; or . . . has been assigned the
insured’s rights in the policy.”113 The party seeking
coverage in Wausau was denied coverage because it had not
purchased the named insured’s assets, obtained an
assignment from the named insured, or merged with the
insured.114
Home Ins. Co. v. Service Am. Corp.115 – In this decision, the
defendant was initially a subsidiary of the named insured,
and thus initially was covered under a policy that insured the
named insured and its “subsidiaries.”116 When the defendant
was sold to a third party, it ceased to be a subsidiary of the
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Minn. App. 1999); Wolkerstorfer Co. v.
Bituminous Cas. Co., No. C0-93-12712, slip op. at 8-11 (Minn. 10th Dist. May 19, 1994);
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 139 (Utah 1997); see
also supra Sections III, IV.
112. No. 94 Civ. 3143(CSH), 1999 WL 777976 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999).
113. Id. at *32.
114. Id.
115. 662 F.Supp. 964 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
116. Id. at 965.
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named insured, and thus ceased to be insured under the
policy for any losses that arose after the sale.117
Consequently, when the defendant suffered a fire loss after
the sale, the court found no coverage for the defendant’s fire
loss.118
Butera v. Attorneys’ Title Guar. Fund, Inc.119 – This decision
involves an entirely different form of insurance from
standard-form liability policies – title insurance – that has
unique policy language not found in standard-form liability
insurance policies.120 Specifically, the title insurance at issue
in Butera provided coverage for the “insured,” defined to
mean “the [named] insured [and] . . . those who succeed to
the interest [in the real property at issue] of such insured by
operation of law as distinguished from purchase including,
but not limited to, heirs, distributees, devisees, survivors,
personal representatives, next of kin, or corporate or
fiduciary successors.”121 Because the plaintiffs acquired the
real property at issue through a “purchase,” the court held
that they did not qualify as insureds under this definition.122
As the court noted, “Title insurance is an unusual type of
insurance. It is not a recurring policy: there is a single
premium, and the policy remains outstanding forever to
protect the property owner.”123 In short, because of the
substantial differences in the type of policy at issue, the
policy language, and the risks covered by the policy, Butera
may not be applicable more generally to cases in which
liability insurance rights are being transferred.

117. Id.
118. Id. at 968.
119. 747 N.E.2d 949 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
120. Id. at 950.
121. Id. at 951.
122. Id. at 954.
123. Id.
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Holt v. Fidelity Phoenix Fire Ins. Co.124 – In this decision, the
court agreed that, once a fire occurred, the named insured
had an accrued claim under its fire insurance policy that it
could have assigned to a third party.125 Other than
recognizing that insurance rights may be assigned without
the insurer’s consent where the loss has taken place prior to
the assignment, this decision stands for the relatively
commonplace proposition that an assignee of a business
interruption rider to a fire policy may not recover for its own
business interruption losses that were incurred after the
assignment, absent the insurer’s consent.126
Bronx Entertainment v. St. Paul’s Mercury Ins. Co.127 –Similar
to the facts in Holt, this decision involved a claim by the
named insured under a business interruption policy.128
Shortly after suffering property damage, the named insured
assigned its insurance claim to the plaintiff.129 Even though
the policy contained an anti-assignment condition, the court
confirmed that the plaintiff could maintain an action for
these pre-assignment damages against the insurer.130 As in
Holt, the court held that the plaintiff could not recover for its
own business interruption losses suffered after the
assignment at issue, absent the insurer’s consent.131
Carle Place Plaza Corp. v. Excelsior Ins. Co.132 – Similar to the
decision in Holt, this decision also stands for the proposition
that an assignee may not recover under a fire insurance

124. 76 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948).
125. Id. at 399.
126. Id. at 399-400.
127. 265 F.Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
128. Id. at 361.
129. Id. at 360.
130. Id. at 363.
131. Id.
132. 534 N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
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policy for a fire loss that takes place after the assignment,
absent consent of the insurer.133
EM Indus. Inc. v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co.134 – This decision
cites favorably the decision in Ocean Accident & Guar.
Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,135 which held that
insurance benefits may be transferred without the insurer’s
consent despite the presence of an anti-assignment condition
in the policy where the injury or damage has taken place
prior to the transfer.136 The court in EM Indus. stated that
the plaintiff’s insurer had “failed to establish its alternative
contentions that [another insurer] is obligated to the plaintiff
and therefore to it under an assignment theory (see, Ocean
Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 100 F.2d
441, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 658 [and cases cited therein]) or
under a successor-enterprise liability theory, since there was
no merger of companies as a result of the [purchase
agreement] (see, Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59
N.Y.2d 239).”137 In other words, insurance rights could have
transferred either by merger or by a non-merger transaction,
as in Ocean Accident.138
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Snyder Moving & Storage, Inc.139 –
The court in Snyder noted that the seller in an asset sale may
be permitted to sell its rights to insurance benefits despite an
anti-assignment condition: “‘This [non-assignment] rule is
based upon the right of the insurer to choose its insured so as
to know its risks. Therefore, it is not applicable when an
assignment is made by an insured after the liability-causing
event has occurred. . . . In such a case the general rule is that
133. Id. at 398.
134. 529 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
135. 100 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.1939), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 658 (1939).
136. Id. at 444-45.
137. EM Indus., 529 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
138. Id.
139. 52 Fed. Appx. 899 (9th Cir. 2002).
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the assignment is not of the policy itself, but of a claim
under, or a right of action on, the policy.’”140
Federal Ins. Co. v. Purex Indus., Inc.141 – In this decision, the
court denied an insurer’s motion for summary judgment
based on an anti-assignment condition because the insurer
had failed to carry its burden of showing that the condition
applied. The court did not have occasion to rule whether
insurance assets could be transferred only in a merger.142
Red Arrow Prods. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau143 – In this
decision, the court rejected the asset purchaser’s claim to
coverage under the seller’s policies because the parties
agreed that the insurance rights were not part of the assets
conveyed in the asset purchase agreement.144 Unable to
argue that there had been an express transfer of the seller’s
insurance rights, the buyer relied entirely on the Northern
Insurance line of cases to assert that, because it had
CERCLA liability for the actions of the seller, it should be
entitled to access the seller’s insurance by operation of
law.145 The court rejected the reasoning of the Northern
Insurance line of cases because “[t]he [public] policies
driving the product-line successor liability rule, however, are
clearly not at play here [in a case involving CERCLA
liability].”146

140. Id. at 903-04 (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Valley Nat. Bank of Ariz., 485
P.2d 837, 839 (1971)). Having said that, the court went on to deny that the plaintiff had
acquired the insurance benefits of the seller on the grounds that the asset purchase
agreement identified the specific assets that were being transferred, and insurance was not
among them. Id.
141. 972 F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1997).
142. Id. at 899-90.
143. 607 N.W.2d 294 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
144. Id. at 299.
145. Id. at 299-300.
146. Id. at 302-03.
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Muslin v. Frelinghuysen Livestock Managers, Inc.147 – In this
decision, a racehorse mortality policy contained an antiassignment condition and, in addition, expressly provided
that transfer of any interest in the horse at issue would result
in the voiding of the policy. The policyholder orally
transferred the horse to third parties. As a result, the court
held that the policy was void as of the time of the transfer.
Consequently, when the horse died after the transfer, the
new owners of the horse could not recover under the
mortality policy.148 Because Muslin involves a type of
policy and policy language not at issue in standard-form
liability insurance policies, the decision may be viewed by
courts as irrelevant in cases involving the assignment of
liability insurance rights. At best, Muslin stands for the
proposition that, where an insurance policy containing an
anti-assignment condition was assigned without the insurer’s
consent, the policy does not provide coverage to the assignee
for losses incurred after the assignment.
In sum, Successor Insureds have a number of arguments that they may
rely on to attempt to distinguish the cases often cited by insurers seeking to
establish the broad applicability of anti-assignment provisions.
4. Henkel and Cases Involving Retroactive Liability
a. The Henkel Decision
While the decisional law discussed above may not provide a strong
foundation of support to insurers seeking broad enforcement of antiassignment provisions, the Henkel decision does support the insurers’ usual
position that anti-assignment conditions bar the transfer of coverage rights
without their consent. However, the Henkel decision may be vulnerable to
several counter-arguments that Successor Insureds may raise.

147. 777 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1985).
148. Id. at 1232.
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i. The Successor Insured Position: The
Henkel Decision Would Lead to
Absurd and Unfair Consequences
From the Successor Insured’s perspective, the Henkel decision should
not be followed because requiring insurer consent to transfer insurance
proceeds for undiscovered losses that took place prior to the transfer would
lead to unreasonable consequences. On this view, an insurer has no
incentive whatsoever to consent to a request by the policyholder to assign
insurance proceeds. Indeed, an insurer arguably has an incentive to not
consent, in the hope that the policyholder would go forward with the asset
sale anyway, thereby giving the insurer an argument that it is free of any
coverage obligation for pre-assignment losses.
The policyholder seemingly is then left with a Hobson’s choice –
abandon the asset sale and its attendant benefits or, under Henkel, cause the
insurance rights that it had already paid premiums to obtain to vanish,
giving the insurer a windfall and likely making the asset sale much less
attractive to the buyer, who then may be risking the assumption of
liabilities without insurance to pay for them. Under the Successor Insured
view, either result is against public policy.
First, two entities that have decided that it is in each of their respective
economic interests to enter into an asset sale should not be dissuaded from
doing so because insurers, who have already been paid premiums to cover a
certain risk, can escape that risk by refusing to consent to the assignment.
Putting this kind of power in the hands of insurance companies to deter
legal and beneficial commerce benefits no one except those insurance
companies.
Second, from a Successor Insured’s perspective, insurers would receive
an undeserved windfall as a result of the Henkel approach in those cases
where the contracting parties went ahead with the asset sale. In contrast,
the Successor Insured Position avoids such windfalls by permitting the
transfer of coverage for pre-transfer losses on the rationale that such a
transfer does not increase the risk that the insurers agreed to accept and for
which they were paid substantial premiums.
Third, Successor Insureds may argue that the Henkel decision is at odds
with the well-settled principle of insurance law that ambiguous policy
language should not be construed to forfeit coverage.149
149. See, e.g., A.D. Desmond Co. v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 585 N.E.2d 1120,
1122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“Insurance forfeitures are not favored as insurance serves
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Fourth, according to Successor Insureds, the Henkel decision runs afoul
of the general rule that anti-assignment conditions are to be construed
narrowly, against the party seeking to prohibit the assignment.150
Therefore, the Successor Insured’s Position goes, because typical antiassignment conditions do not unambiguously apply to transfers of
insurance rights relating to losses that took place prior to the transfer, the
Henkel court should have construed the anti-assignment condition at issue
there against the insurer and in a manner that preserved, rather than
forfeited, coverage.
In sum, the Successor Insured Position posits that the Henkel decision,
if followed, would result in unfair and economically detrimental
consequences. Under this Position, because courts are to avoid interpreting
insurance policy or other contractual provisions in a manner that leads to
absurd consequences, courts should not construe the anti-assignment
conditions to bar the transfer of liability insurance rights where the losses
already took place, or began to take place, prior to the transfer.151
ii. The Successor Insured Position: The
Henkel Decision Incorrectly Found an
Increased Risk to the Insurer
In addition to leading to unfair consequences, Successor Insureds may
claim that the Henkel court’s analysis is flawed because it incorrectly
concluded that the transfer of insurance rights relating to losses that had
already taken place would subject the insurer to an increased risk. The
important purposes in contemporary society, and courts should be quick to find facts which
support coverage.”); Brynildsen v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 274 A.2d 327, 329 (N.J. Super.
Law Div. 1971) (“This court is in accord with the general principle of the law of insurance
that forfeitures are not looked upon with favor, and is disposed to avoid forfeiture if by
reasonable interpretation it can do so.”).
150. See, e.g., Elzinga & Volkers, Inc. v. LSSC Corp., 838 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (N.D.
Ind. 1993) (“[B]ecause the [anti-assignment] clause is a restriction on alienation, it must be
strictly construed against the party urging the restriction.”); First Bank & Trust v. Novak,
747 P.2d 850, 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (“A restriction against assignment is a restraint on
alienation, and as such it is strictly construed against the party urging the restriction”).
151. Cross Armored Carrier Corp. v. Valentine, 268 N.Y.S.2d 792, 797-98 (N.Y. Supr.
Ct. 1966) (“Resort to a literal construction may not be had where the result would be to
thwart the obvious and clearly expressed purpose which the parties intended to accomplish
or where such a construction would lead to an obvious absurdity or place one party at the
mercy of another.” (citations omitted)); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 726 N.E.2d
126, 128 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[A] strained, forced, unnatural, or unreasonable construction,
or one which would lead to an absurd result must be adopted.”)
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principal basis for the court’s conclusion was that, where the assignor still
exists or can be revived, the insurer may be required to “face[] the
dilemma” whether to provide coverage to the assignor, the assignee, or
both if a dispute arises over the existence and scope of the assignment.152
Successor Insureds may argue that, contrary to the court’s suggestion, such
a circumstance would not subject the insurer to any risk that is any different
from the risks that the insurers agreed to accept.
First, insurers are faced with the potential for invalid coverage claims
every day. Whether it is a request for coverage by a company that
previously assigned away its insurance rights or a request for coverage by
an insured whose claim falls within an exclusion, the business of insurers is
to apply their policies to the facts and pay those claims that are valid. The
fact that an insurer must distinguish valid claims from invalid claims does
not constitute an increase in the insured risk, but rather is a part of that
insurer’s normal business operations.
Second, the law and applicable rules provide procedural vehicles
through which the insurers may resolve any uncertainties regarding
whether coverage exists for a claim. If an insurer cannot determine
whether a claim is covered or excluded, or whether the entity requesting
coverage is insured or not, the insurer may reserve its rights and commence
a declaratory judgment action that will clarify its obligations.
Alternatively, where more than one entity claims a right to the same set of
insurance proceeds, the insurer may commence an interpleader action
and/or pay the proceeds into an account with the court, with the proceeds to
be paid to the entity that succeeds in demonstrating that it is entitled to
them.153 These procedural mechanisms ensure that the insurer will not be
required to pay any more money than it is obligated to pay under its
insurance policy.
Third, depending on the circumstances, the insurers may be obligated
to provide coverage to both entities seeking coverage. Insurers routinely
provide coverage, for instance, to multiple members of the same corporate
family. Each claim for coverage by competing claimants must be
evaluated on its own merits.

152. Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 75-76 (Cal. 2003).
153. See, e.g., Krauss v. Central Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (N.Y. Supr. Ct. 1943)
(explaining that in a dispute between a policyholder and an entity that alleged that the
policyholder had assigned its interest in insurance proceeds to the entity, the insurer
deposited the insurance proceeds with the court, to be distributed to whichever claimant
succeeded in demonstrating its entitlement).
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Thus, under the Successor Insured view, the fact that an assignor and
an assignee may both claim an entitlement to insurance proceeds does not
necessarily “increase the risk” to the insurer. An insurer may pay the party
that it believes possesses a valid claim, or a court may determine which
party has the valid claim. What the insurer should not be permitted to do,
according to Successor Insureds, is refuse to pay either claim because of
the possible occurrence of the other. This is particularly true when the lack
of increased risk to the insurer is weighed against the consequences to an
asset purchaser of finding that, contrary to its reasonable expectations, it
did not obtain any insurance rights after all. In sum, Successor Insureds
may strongly contest the court’s finding in Henkel that assignment of rights
to insurance proceeds increases the risk to the insurer.
iii. The Successor Insured Position: The
Henkel Decision Incorrectly Requires
a Breach by the Insurer Before an
Interest in the Policy May Be
Assigned
The Henkel decision also is based on the premise that the insurer must
have breached the policy before the policyholder has a right that may be
assigned. Without significant analysis, the Henkel court concluded that the
assignor there did not have an assignable chose in action for breach of the
insurance policy at the time of the assignment because the underlying
asbestos claimants had not yet asserted any claims; consequently, no claim
had been made yet to the insurer and no chose in action for breach of
contract existed that could be assigned.154
Successor Insureds will argue that the Henkel court’s holding that the
insurer must first breach the policy before the policyholder has accrued any
assignable rights under the policy is contrary to the rulings of the numerous
courts discussed above that have held that the policyholder possesses a
chose in action at the time that the underlying claimant suffers bodily
injury (or property damage).155 Those cases did not require a breach of the
154. Henkel, 62 P.3d at 75.
155. See supra Parts IV.A-IV.C.1. While these courts have found that the claim or
chose in action has arisen at the time that the loss takes place and therefore may be
transferred in a corporate transaction, the claim will typically not be considered to have
accrued for purposes of the statute of limitations, because different considerations and
public policies are implicated in the analysis of whether the statute of limitations has expired
in a given case. Analysis of statute of limitations issues are outside the scope of this article.
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policy by the insurer – only that the loss in the underlying case occurred
prior to the transfer.
Further, even assuming arguendo that the policyholder does not
possess an accrued insurance claim at the time of the assignment, it
arguably does possess a conditional right under the policies. Such
conditional rights have been found by certain courts to be assignable.156
From the Successor Insured’s perspective, just as anti-assignment
conditions do not apply to accrued insurance claims relating to losses that
took place prior to the assignment, such conditions do not bar the
assignment of conditional rights to insurance coverage. As an example in
support of this position, in Loyola University Medical Center v. Med Care
HMO,157 an insured possessed an insurance contract with a health
maintenance organization (HMO) that entitled her to reimbursement for
payments made for medical treatment covered under the contract.158 Prior
to receiving treatment or paying any medical expenses for a medical
condition that the insured sustained, the insured assigned her rights to
proceeds under the medical insurance contract to the hospital that would be
providing her treatment.159 After providing treatment, the hospital sought
payment from the HMO. However, the HMO denied coverage on the
grounds that the insured’s assignment of the insurance proceeds violated an
anti-assignment clause. Specifically, the HMO argued that the medical
insurance contract provided indemnity for the cost of medical services and,
since the insured had not received any medical services at the time of the
assignment, the insured had no chose in action to assign to the hospital.160
Rejecting this argument, the court held that the anti-assignment clause did
not preclude the transfer of the insured’s conditional right to insurance
proceeds:

156. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 320 (“The fact that a right . . .
is conditional on the performance of a return promise or is otherwise conditional does not
prevent its assignment before the condition occurs.”); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Allied
Freightways, Inc., 91 N.E.2d 823, 824-25 (Mass. 1950) (following the “great weight of
authority” recognizing the validity of a present assignment of anticipated benefits under a
contract that are conditioned on an event that may or may not happen in the future);
Costanzo v. Costanzo, 590 A.2d 268, 271 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1991) (confirming that
injured victim could assign his conditional right to settlement proceeds even though his tort
claim had not settled and may have never settled).
157. 535 N.E.2d 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
158. Id. at 1129.
159. Id. at 1126-27.
160. Id. at 1128-29 & n.2.
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What [the insured] assigned was her present conditional right
to the insurance proceeds. A valid assignment of a conditional
right is enforceable in equity. Hence, the assignment attaches to
each installment of money “to become due” under an existing
contract as it becomes due and payable to the assignor.161
Accordingly, Successor Insureds will argue that, once a claimant has
suffered injury or damage, the policyholder has an accrued liability
insurance claim under its policies in effect during the time of the injury or
damage, or, at a minimum, the policyholder has a conditional right to
proceeds under those policies. Either way, under the Successor Insured
Position, the claim or right is assignable and such an assignment would not
violate an anti-assignment condition.
Moreoever, for the reasons discussed above, Successor Insureds may
contend that the Henkel decision is erroneous, and hence courts should
follow the cases holding that anti-assignment conditions do not apply to the
transfer of liability insurance rights relating to losses that took place prior
to the transfer, including losses that are not discovered until after the
transfer.
b. Cases Involving Retroactive Liability
Insurers also typically rely heavily on two cases, (1) Quemetco Inc. v.
Pacific Auto. Ins. Co.;162 and (2) Century Indem. Co. v. Aero-Motive Co.,163
involving an asset purchaser’s ability to access the seller’s insurance
policies for environmental liability imposed retroactively by statutes passed
subsequent to the date of the asset purchase.164 In each of these cases,
according to the insurers’ perspective, the asset seller allegedly could not
have had a right to insurance proceeds at the time of the asset sale because
there was no basis for liability at that time.165 It was not until years after
each respective transaction, however, that statutes were passed. These
161. Id. at 1129 (citations omitted); see also Robert S. Pinzur, Ltd. v. Hartford, 511
N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (confirming that a policyholder may assign its
present conditional right to proceeds that had not yet accrued, though ultimately finding no
assignment because the assignor received no consideration), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 126
(Ill. 1987).
162. 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
163. 318 F.Supp.2d 530 (W.D. Mich. 2003).
164. Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628; Aero-Motive, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
165. See Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629-30; Aero-Motive, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
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statutes retroactively imposed environmental liability on the asset seller
(and the asset purchasers) such that a right to insurance proceeds could
exist; even though the asset seller had no right to insurance proceeds at the
time of the transaction and no right to insurance proceeds could have been
conveyed to the asset purchaser. The courts, agreeing with this position,
held that no insurance proceeds transferred to the asset purchasers.166
For instance, in Quemetco, the buyer contended that it had acquired the
seller’s insurance choses in action in the asset purchase agreement. The
court cited with approval the decisions in Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp.v. Sw.
Bell Tel. Co.,167 and Greco v. Oregon Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,168 in which the
courts held that anti-assignment conditions did not preclude the transfer of
insurance proceeds for losses that took place prior to the transfer.169
However, because of the retroactive nature of CERCLA, the court held that
no loss or damage existed at the time of the sale, and thus no insurance
proceeds could have been purchased by the asset buyer.170
Similarly, in Aero-Motive, in 1972, the named insured sold assets,
including a manufacturing plant, to the defendant, and expressly assigned
two insurance policies to the defendant.171 In the early 1990s, the
defendant discovered contamination at the site where the plant was located,
and was then required to take remedial action by the Michigan Department
of Environmental Quality.172 Like the court in Quemetco, the court in
Aero-Motive confirmed that “an anti-assignment clause will not be
enforced where a loss occurs before the assignment, because in that
situation the assignment of the claim under the policy is viewed no
differently than any other assignment of an accrued cause of action.”173
Moreover, the court noted that the “majority rule” was that “an insurer’s
responsibility under a liability policy accrues at the time the complainant
suffers damage rather than at the time of the negligent act.”174
Nevertheless, because there was no damage upon which liability could be
imposed until decades after the asset sale, the court concluded that there
was no right to insurance proceeds at the time of the sale, and thus the asset
166. See Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632; Aero-Motive, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 538-39.
167. 100 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1939).
168. 12 Cal. Rptr. 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
169. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 100 F.2d at 447; Greco, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
170. Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632.
171. Aero-Motive, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 532-33.
172. Id. at 533.
173. Id. at 539 (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 540.
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purchaser did not acquire any rights to coverage for the environmental
liability at issue.
From the Successor Insured’s perspective, the decisions in Quemetco
and Aero-Motive are flawed because, while these courts correctly
acknowledged and agreed with the cases that anti-assignment conditions
generally do not bar the transfer of coverage for pre-transfer losses, these
courts failed to properly apply this conclusion. While the courts were
focused on the passage of statutes after the transfers in question that sought
to impose retroactive liability, the courts ignored the fact that the common
law typically provides a basis, such as under the laws of trespass and
nuisance, for imposing liability for environmental property damage. Thus,
as subsequent courts have found, Successor Insureds may assert that the
courts were arguably mistaken in concluding that there was no right to
insurance proceeds at the time of the transfers in question.175 In addition,
where a policyholder’s conduct has caused bodily injury or property
damage, the policyholder arguably possesses, at a minimum, a conditional
right under its insurance policies, and hence, even though this right may be
conditioned on the subsequent imposition of liability for such conduct, the
policyholder’s conditional right is transferable.176
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Several recent court decisions have addressed the rights of a successor
to access insurance coverage for pre-transfer losses.
A. PILKINGTON AND GLIDDEN
The Ohio Supreme Court recently issued two decisions holding that,
where a successor assumed liabilities under a contract, the rights to
coverage did not automatically transfer to the successor by operation of

175. See, e.g., Gopher Oil Co. v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 756,
764 (Minn. App. 1999) (refusing to follow Quemetco because, while the loss at issue in
Quemetco under California law arguably did not occur until Congress enacted CERCLA in
1980, the loss at issue in Gopher Oil clearly occurred under Minnesota law at the time of the
contamination).
176. See supra Section IV.A.
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law: The Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.177 and Pilkington N.
Am., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.178
In order to address whether the insurance rights could be transferred,
the Pilkington Court first examined the corporate history, which the Court
set forth as follows: prior to 1986, various insurance companies issued
occurrence policies (the “LOF policies”) to Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass
Company (“LOF Glass Co.”).179 In 1986, Pilkington purchased LOF Glass
Co.’s glass-manufacturing business in a two-part transaction. First, in
February 1986, LOF Glass Co. placed the assets and liabilities of its glassmanufacturing division into a new wholly-owned subsidiary, LOF Glass,
Inc., pursuant to a Transfer and Assumption Agreement.180 Second, in
March 1986, LOF Glass Co. entered into a Share Exchange Agreement
with Pilkington Brothers P.L.C. and one of its subsidiaries, Pilkington
Holdings, Inc., pursuant to which the Pilkington entities acquired all of the
stock of the newly-formed LOF Glass, Inc.181 In July 2000, LOF Glass,
Inc. was renamed Pilkington North America.182 As a result of the
transactions, Pilkington obtained both the glass business and the
environmental liabilities arising from the business, including liabilities
arising from conduct by LOF Glass Co.183 Pilkington sought coverage for
defense and indemnification for those liabilities under the LOF policies.184
The court was presented with the question whether, despite the
presence of anti-assignment conditions in the policies, Pilkington had the
right to defense and indemnification under the LOF policies for the
environmental liabilities it had assumed.185 The Ohio Supreme Court
certified three questions of state law from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division.186 The three questions
177. 861 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 2006).
178. 681 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio 2006). The issue of a successor’s rights to coverage also
has been recently addressed in the courts of Indiana, and is pending before the Indiana
Supreme Court in the case of Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. et al. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 870
N.E.2d 529, 541 (Ind. Ct.App. 2007) (holding that "a chose in action arises under an
occurrence-based insurance policy at the time of the covered loss.... The lack of a
specifically defined amount of recovery is not fatal to the determination that a chose in
action exists."), opinion vacated and transfer granted, 878 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Dec. 20, 2007).
179. Pilkington, 861 N.E.2d at 124.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 123.
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addressed by the court were: (i) Whether Pilkington’s demand for defense
and indemnification constituted a “chose in action”; (ii) whether antiassignment conditions in the policies barred Pilkington’s acquisition of
such a chose in action; and (iii) whether rights to coverage for pre-transfer
occurrences automatically followed liabilities by operation of law when the
liabilities had been assumed by contract.187
The court, rejecting the reasoning of the Henkel court that a chose in
action arises when a sum certain is due and payable, held that “a chose in
action arises under an occurrence-based insurance policy at the time of the
covered loss. The distinction created in Henkel does not align with the
obligations recognized in Ohio that the insured’s right to recover arises
automatically at the time of loss.”188 The court further ruled in favor of the
Successor Insured Position that “[w]e see no reason to deviate from the
standard rule on this issue, and thus we hold that the chose in action as to
the duty to indemnify is unaffected by the anti-assignment provision when
the covered loss has already occurred.”189
Finally, the court rejected Pilkington’s argument that, because it had
assumed liabilities by contract, it should be able to access the insurance
rights by operation of law. Rather, the court recognized that insureds may
intend to transfer liabilities while retaining the insurance assets that may
respond to those liabilities, and reasoned that “[t]he parties specifically
contract to control liability. Allowing indemnity to follow liability as a
matter of law interferes with that control.”190 Accordingly, the court held
that “when a covered occurrence under an insurance policy occurs before
liability is transferred to a successor corporation, coverage does not arise
by operation of law when the liability was assumed by contract.”191
Relying on the reasoning set forth in the Pilkington decision, the Ohio
Supreme Court in Glidden reversed the pro-successor holding of the Ohio
Court of Appeals that rights to coverage followed liabilities by operation of
law.192 Specifically, the Ohio Court of Appeals had held that Glidden’s
rights to coverage arose by operation of law, following certain historical
liabilities that had been transferred to it. In so holding, the Court of
Appeals had rejected the reasoning in Henkel that permitting the transfer of
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The court did not reach a definitive holding regarding the transferability of the
insurers’ duty to defend under the policies. Id. at 134.
190. Id. at 131.
191. Id.
192. Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 861 N.E.2d 109, 115 (Ohio 2006).
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insurance rights by operation of law would undercut the freedom of parties
to contract as they please. Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Ohio
Supreme Court reiterated the reasoning set forth in Pilkington and held that
rights to insurance coverage do not follow the transfer of liabilities by
operation of law.193
B. ELLIOTT
In another recent Ohio decision, Elliott Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,194
the district court for the Northern District of Ohio framed the question
before it as follows: “[T]he specific issue in this case [is] whether coverage
can pass by operation of law where liability was assumed by contract.”195
Specifically, the facts in Elliott were described by the court as follows:
In 1957, the original Elliott Company and Carrier Corporation (“Carrier”)
merged and Elliott Company was dissolved and operated thereafter as a
division of Carrier (“Elliott Division”).196 For the next six years, the
defendant insurer issued policies that insured Carrier and “The Elliott
Company, A Division of Carrier Corporation.”197 In 1979, United
Technologies Corporation (“UTC”) acquired Carrier, and the Elliott
Division continued to operate as a division of Carrier.198
In 1981, UTC incorporated Elliott Turbomachinery Company, Inc.
(“Elliott Turbo”), and UTC, Carrier, and Elliott Turbo entered into an
“Agreement and Plan of Reorganization and Corporate Separation”
(“Separation Agreement”).199 Under the Separation Agreement, the parties
agreed to transfer all of the assets and liabilities of the Elliott Division to
Elliott Turbo.200 In the Elliott action, Elliott Turbo contends that, pursuant
to the Separation Agreement, it also had transferred to it the insurance

193. Id. Based on the specific facts presented, the court further rejected Glidden’s
arguments that rights to coverage were expressly transferred by the terms of the corporate
transactional documents at issue, that the insurers were collaterally estopped from raising
certain defenses to coverage, and that the insurers’ “corporate history” defense was barred
by waiver and/or equitable estoppel. Id. at 115-116.
194. Elliot Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 483 (N.D. Ohio 2006), rev’d
in part on reconsideration, 239 F.R.D. 479 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2006). See supra note 134.
195. Id. at 495.
196. Id. at 486.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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rights under the 1957-63 Carrier policies.201 However, the exhibit to the
Separation Agreement that is identified therein as listing the specific assets
transferred to Elliott Turbo has been lost and, as a result, the insurer argues
that Elliott Turbo cannot establish that the insurance rights were transferred
to it by contract.202
When plaintiff Elliott Co. sought coverage under the Carrier policies
for asbestos claims arising from the pre-transfer alleged conduct of the
Elliott Division and Elliott Turbo, the insurer argued that, among other
things, the anti-assignment conditions in its policies barred the assignment
of coverage for such claims.203 Disagreeing with the insurer’s position, the
court noted that the “vast majority of courts, including courts in Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New York and Delaware, hold that noassignment clauses do not prevent the voluntary assignment of coverage
rights under occurrence-based policies for claims related to preassignment
occurrences.”204 Following such courts and rejecting the conflicting view
espoused in Henkel, the court concluded that “no-assignment clauses do not
preclude the assignment of coverage for preassignment occurrences.”205
Having found that the insurers’ anti-assignment conditions did not
apply, the court then addressed whether the parties intended in the relevant
transactional agreements to transfer to plaintiff the rights to the coverage at
issue. The court initially found that the parties did not intend to transfer
rights under the Carrier policies to plaintiff under the 1981 Separation
Agreement.206 In addition, the court held that the rights under the Carrier
policies were not transferred to plaintiff by “operation of law” where the
liabilities at issue had been transferred to plaintiff by contract.207 In so
holding, the court stated that, “[i]f sophisticated parties to a corporate
transaction do not intend for the entity acquiring liability to also succeed to
coverage, there is no reason for the courts to rewrite their contracts.”208
201. Id.
202. Id. at 491.
203. Id. at 486-87.
204. Id. at 490.
205. Id. at 491
206. Id. at 492. The court subsequently granted Elliott’s motion for reconsideration
and held that whether rights to coverage under the Carrier policies were transferred under
the 1981 Separation Agreement is an issue of disputed fact. Elliot Co. v. Liberty Mutual
Co., 239 F.R.D. 4791, 481 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2006).
207. Elliot, 434 F.Supp. 2d at 496 (“When a successor entity acquires liability by
contract, it is not entitled to coverage for that liability unless coverage was also acquired by
contract.”).
208. Id. at 498.
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C. HOLLOWAY
The Oregon Supreme Court adopted a different approach to the issue in
Holloway v. Republic Indem. Co. of America.209 In Holloway, the insured
sought coverage under a “Worker’s Compensation and Employers’
Liability Policy” for an injury claim brought by one of the insured’s
employees.210 After the insurer denied coverage, the insured and claimant
reached a settlement that stipulated to the entry of a judgment against the
insured and to a covenant not to execute on that judgment against the
insured for more than a fraction of the judgment.211 Under the settlement
agreement and notwithstanding an anti-assignment condition in the policy,
the insured also assigned her rights against the insurer for indemnity
payments or any breach of the insurance contract to the claimant.212 The
claimant then sought to recover from the insurer on the grounds that the
anti-assignment condition was ambiguous and should be construed to not
apply to losses that took place prior to the assignment.213
Rejecting the validity of the assignment, the Oregon Supreme Court
held that the anti-assignment condition in the policy did not distinguish
between pre- and post-transfer losses: “Nothing in the [anti-assignment]
clause suggests a limitation to pre-loss rights or duties or provides an
exception for post-loss rights or duties. Reading such an exception into the
policy would not be reasonable and would ‘insert what has been
omitted.’”214 Accordingly, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the
anti-assignment clause in the employers’ liability policy at issue was
unambiguous and precluded the insured’s assignment of rights.215
VI. CONCLUSION
After successfully defeating their coverage obligations in Henkel,
insurers have been more aggressively raising the anti-assignment condition
to attack policyholders’ claims for insurance coverage for latent bodily
209. 147 P.3d 329 (Or. 2006).
210. Id. at 332.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 330.
214. Id. at 334 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 42.230).
215. Id. at 335 (“[T]he anti-assignment clause in question is not ambiguous … we
conclude that that clause prohibited the assignment of rights from the insured to Holloway
because the insured had not obtained [the insurer’s] written consent.”).
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injury and property damage, such as environmental, asbestos and other
delayed-manifestation claims. To counter these arguments by insurers,
Successor Insureds may rely on decisional law holding that anti-assignment
conditions do not preclude the transfer of insurance rights relating to bodily
injury or property damage that took place prior to the transfer. These cases
may successfully undermine insurers’ arguments, concluding that a
policyholder may transfer to a third party its liability insurance rights
without its insurers’ consent, whether the corporate transaction in which the
insurance rights were transferred was a merger, stock sale, dissolution, or
asset sale, even where the injury or damage at issue did not manifest until
years after the transaction.
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THE “RACE CARD” AND REFORMING
AMERICAN HEALTH INSURANCE
Dayna Bowen Matthew
A person’s race defines little that is biologically distinctive. However,
as a social construct,1 race is a powerful determinant. For example, race
stubbornly continues to serve as a determinant of health care status, access,
outcomes and medical well-being in America. For the one-third of
Americans who self-identify as racial or ethnic minorities,2 their race
accurately predicts that they are more likely to be un-insured3 no matter
what their income level or socio-economic status is,4 and completely
independent of the level of education they may attain.5 Hispanics are the
most likely group of Americans to be uninsured; 33% of Latinos (“nonwhite Hispanics”) in this country were uninsured in 2001.6 AfricanAmericans followed closely (19% uninsured) and 18% of Asians were
uninsured while only 14% of white Americans lacked health insurance
during the same period, 7 although the United States Census Bureau
estimates that whites represent over 66% of the American population.8 The
simple fact is not only that more minorities than white Americans are
uninsured, but that among racial and ethnic minority Americans, a
substantially greater share are uninsured than are covered by health
insurance.
This disproportionate representation of minorities among the uninsured
means that racial minorities are less likely to visit a primary care physician
than whites; more likely to receive an inferior quality of care for cancer,
1. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
2. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERV., PUBL’N NO. 06-0017, 2005 NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT 119
DISPARITIES
REPORT],
available
at
(2005)
[hereinafter
AHRQ
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/Nhdr05/nhdr05.pdf.
3. See generally id.
4. Id. at 91.
5. Id. at 90-93.
6. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PUBL’N NO. P60-223, HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002 7 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-223.pdf.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATE & COUNTRY QUICKFACTS
(2008), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.
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diabetes, heart disease and HIV/AIDS than whites; and by some measures,
are more likely than whites to suffer iatrogenic injury when they do finally
receive health care.9 The evidence shows that it does not matter whether
one is a wealthy member of a minority group, or a poor one, a welleducated or marginally-educated minority, a young or elderly minority;
every member of racial and ethnic minority groups in America is more
likely to have no health insurance than her white counterparts
notwithstanding any other demographic characteristics they might share.
Changing the health care system that has resulted in these disparities is
currently the policy issue of choice.
Health care reform has been a centerpiece of virtually all the
presidential candidates’ platforms this election year. Each major political
party has articulated a general approach toward providing health insurance
coverage for the 46 million uninsured in this nation. Although the details
of these various plans and approaches may differ, the many proposals to
reform the American health insurance system fall into broad general
categories, each likely to have an objectively identifiable, and predictable
impact on people who are members of racial and ethnic minorities. This
essay examines and compares the likely impact of two major health
insurance reform proposals on the health insurance disparities that persist
for ethnic and racial minority Americans. More specifically, this essay
describes the extent to which these competing approaches to health
insurance reform are likely to either help exacerbate or eradicate existing
health care disparities.10

9. See AHRQ Disparities Report, supra note 2.
10. My observations will depend on a few assumptions that I will state expressly at
the outset. There are many determinative factors that contribute to the health care
disparities that separate the health status and outcomes of minority and majority Americans,
socio-economic differences, levels of stress, social and behavioral choices such as diet and
exercise, these and other factors all contribute to disparate health outcomes. Some
biological differences that trend along racial and ethnic lines, as well as environmental risk
factors, and differences in morbidity and mortality rates that differ with ethnicity may all be
responsible to some extent for disparities now well documented. However, this essay is
about the confirmed link between health insurance status and health status. That is, I
assume that the answer to the question of whether increased health insurance coverage will
ultimately result in improved health care status is “yes.” I assume that increased health
insurance coverage will lead to increased access to health care, which will improve the
quality of health care which will result in improving the health outcomes and status of those
who are able to obtain health insurance.
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MINORITY WORKERS AND EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH
INSURANCE
First and foremost it is important to understand that disparities in health
care flow directly from disparate access to health insurance coverage that
minorities experience through our employer-based insurance system.
Employers are the source of health insurance coverage for nearly 60% of
Thus, the structural relationship between minority
all Americans.11
Americans and their level of employment, fundamentally determines their
health insurance status. For example, Latinos are far less likely to be
insured simply because they are also far less likely to have jobs that
provide health benefits.
The dominance of employer-based health insurance is largely an
accident of this country’s economic history. Employers responded to postWorld War II wage freezes by offering health benefits as an alternative
way to attract and retain labor.12 Later, the federal government began to
subsidize this method of compensation.13 Beginning in 1954, federal tax
subsidies available to employers made contributions they paid on behalf of
employees to purchase health insurance premiums deductible as a business
expense.14 Moreover, the amount of those health insurance premiums paid
for employees is also excludable from the employee’s taxable income.15
The outcome is that this federal tax subsidy of employer-based insurance
was estimated to be worth $188.5 billion per year which is more than the
approximately $171.9 billion spent on Medicaid public insurance for the
categorically poor and disabled in the same period.16
Poor Americans and those Americans belonging to ethnic and racial
minority groups have not fared comparatively well under this employerbased health insurance model. Three sets of data explain why. First, the
number of minority workers employed by smaller firms; second the
11. David S. Johnson, Chief, Housing and Household Economic Statistics, U.S.
Census Bureau, Remarks at the News Conference on 2006 Income, Poverty and Health
Insurance Coverage Estimates from the Current Population Survey and the American
Community Survey (Aug. 28, 2007), available at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/2007/djohnson_remarks07iph.htm.
12. David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States –
Origins and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 83 (2006).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for a
More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 17 & n.117 (2005).
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number of minority workers who are part-time rather than full-time
employees; and third, the rate at which minority employees decline to
accept partial payment of health insurance premiums offered on their
behalf are datasets that all provide insight into the way that employer-based
health insurance disadvantages minorities. Understanding these three
factors in turn is prerequisite to understanding the effect that insurance
reform proposals have on minority versus majority Americans.
Small employers provide less coverage than larger employers.
Minority workers are disproportionately represented in smaller firms. Only
43% of firms employing fewer than 25 employees offer health benefits
while over 81% of firms which employ 100 or more employees provide
health insurance.17 However Hispanic-, Black-, and Asian-American
employees comprise 25.2%, 16.6%, and 9.5% of all workers in firms with
fewer than 25 employees.18 Put another way, over half the small-firm
workers in America belong to these three minority groups who comprise
only 30% of the general population. Moreover, as the size of American
firms increases, thus increasing the likelihood that an employer can afford
to provide health benefits to its employees, the number of Hispanic
employees in these large firms declines.19 It is easy, therefore, to see why
and how Hispanic-Americans suffer a greater incidence of un-insurance
than any racial or ethnic group in the nation.
Most uninsured workers are low-income, part-time, minority workers
who are most likely young, female members of racial and ethnic minority
groups. In 2003, 30% of workers earning less than $20,000 were uninsured
while only 5.8% of workers earning $50,000 or more were similarly
situated.20 Also, employers who do not offer health insurance are more
likely to employ a higher number of part-time, rather than full-time
workers, and part-time employees are more likely to be minority, female
and poor.
Poorer workers have lower “take-up” rates, declining partial assistance
offered to pay their insurance premiums as part of employer-sponsored
programs more often than wealthier workers; these poorer workers are
disproportionately members of racial and ethnic minority groups. While
19% of workers making less than the federal poverty level decline
employment-based health insurance when offered, only 2% of workers fail
17. Id. at 17.
18. Brian Headd, The Characteristics of Small Business Employees, MONTHLY LABOR
REV. 13, 14-15 (April 2000).
19. Id. at 15.
20. Hermer, supra note 16, at 18.
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to “take-up” employment-based health insurance when offered these
benefits once their incomes reach or exceed 300% of the federal poverty
level.21 This is because employees’ premium shares represent a higher
percentage of poor employees’ incomes than of wealthier employees’
incomes.
In summary, the racial and ethnic composition of America’s workforce is structurally skewed to concentrate minority workers in those jobs
where health insurance is least accessible. Minority workers are more
likely to be employed in part-time jobs with small employers who pay a
smaller share of their health insurance premiums. The outcome is
predictable: more minority employees than majority employees are
uninsured.
MARKET-BASED PROPOSALS
BASED INSURANCE

TO

REFORM

EMPLOYER-

At this writing, four candidates remain in the race for the Republican
nomination for president of the United States.22 All four have proposed a
version of health insurance reform that they characterize as “market-based”
reform and that features a role for individual health savings accounts.23
Generally, health savings accounts (HSA’s) are tax-favored plans that
allow consumers to self-insure to cover their first-dollar health
expenditures, while carrying high-deductible health insurance policies to
pay for catastrophic and last-dollar care. Professor Regina Jefferson has
observed that these accounts benefit wealthy Americans more than they
benefit middle-income or poor consumers.24 Moreover, HSA’s are most
advantageous for the healthy that have relatively low medical expenditures
and therefore can use the HSA account as a pre-tax savings plan. Finally,
individuals who are knowledgeable and able to be vigilant to control the
order and timing of their medical expenses can take greater advantage of
the limitations that apply to investing and deducting expenses from their
21. Id. at 19.
22. John McCain, Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee, and Ron Paul.
23. See Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Policy Alternatives, Former 2008
Presidential Candidate Health Care Proposals: Side-by-Side Summary (2008),
http://www.health08.org/sidebyside.cfm (click on link to view pdf); On the Issues: Straight
Talk on Health System Reform, John McCain 2008 – John McCain for President,
http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/Issues/ (click on “Health Care” in left hand column)
(last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
24. Regina T. Jefferson, Medical Savings Accounts: Windfalls for the Healthy,
Wealthy & Wise, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 685, 689 (1999).

440

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:2

HSA’s. In a pithy but accurate summary, Jefferson points out that HSA
plans disproportionately benefit those in society least in need of assistance:
those who are already “healthy, wealthy and wise.”25
The average American spends approximately $975 annually on health
care.26 Individuals whose employers contribute more than this, either to
their HSA accounts or to pay premiums, gain the most from these plans
because they will be able to rollover the HSA funds not used to cover
health expenses in a given year. These accounts favor those who are able
to pay the high deductibles on policies that accompany HSA’s, out of their
current income. Americans who do not have the discretionary income to
cover several thousand dollars of health expenses out-of-pocket, are not
helped by having access to these plans. Moreover, low and moderate
income taxpayers benefit significantly less than high income tax payers
from HSA accounts because they tend to save less. This is confirmed by
evidence from IRA savings accounts which are analogous. Only 26.5% of
households earning under $25,000 made IRA contributions while 43.8% of
those earning $200,000 to $500,000 made these IRA contributions.27
Minority households are disproportionately over-represented among these
lower income households and therefore are unlikely to efficiently make use
of the savings benefits offered by HSA’s.28 Conversely, minority
households are disproportionately under-represented in higher income tax
bracket households which are those most able to benefit from the tax
advantages available through HSA’s. The exclusion benefits under HSA
plans benefit wealthy more than moderate and low income taxpayers for
two additional reasons. First, the value of the exclusion increases as
income rises because of the progressive tax structure that takes larger
percentages of the exclusion for higher income families. Second, upper
income taxpayers are likely to work for employers who pay a more
generous share of their health premiums or make a more generous HSA
contribution.
In summary, the feature shared by conservative health reform proposals
is to place more discretion and control with the consumer. HSA accounts
25. Id.
26. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Healthcare Financing Trends, 2008 MED. COST
REFERENCE GUIDE 10.
27. P. Sailer, V. Bryant & S. Holden, Trends in 401(k) and IRA Contribution Activity,
1999-2002 at 168-169, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05sailer.pdf. (last visited
Nov. 13, 2008).
28. William H. First, Overcoming Disparities in U. S. Health Care, 24 HEALTH AFF.
445, 446 (2005).
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are a key part of this approach to health insurance inform. Yet, the impact
of this market-based reform is likely to be less helpful to minorities than it
will be to white Americans directly, and will be highly unlikely to have any
meaningful impact on reducing health care disparities between minority
and majority Americans.
EXPANDING PUBLIC INSURANCE
EMPLOYER-BASED INSURANCE

ALTERNATIVES

TO

Two Democratic candidates for president remain in the 2008 election.29
Both purport to advocate “universal health coverage” as their approach to
reforming our current system of health care financing. Both feature the
Democrats’ standard approach to covering the uninsured: expansion of
current public insurance programs including Medicaid and the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program.30 This reform bypasses the
vicissitudes of disparities associated with the employer-based insurance
system discussed above. However, increasing minority Americans’
reliance on public insurance programs exposes these beneficiaries to the
most politically volatile and vulnerable sources of health insurance
available. Medicaid has never been politically popular as evinced by the
annual efforts to cut back benefits and reduce expenditures to the disabled
and “categorically needed” covered by these plans. Yet, minority
Americans rely on public health insurance programs more than white
Americans. In 2006, 24.35% of all American Indian and Alaskan Native
Americans obtained Medicaid coverage; 26.8% of African Americans and
23.1% of Hispanic Americans were covered by Medicaid in the same year.
However, in 2006 only 9.5% of all Non-Hispanic Whites received
Medicaid benefits. 31 Twenty eight percent of African-Americans, 23% of
29. Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton.
30. See Edward M. Kennedy, The Role of the Federal Government in Eliminating
Health Disparities, 24 HEALTH AFF. 452, 454 (2005) (stating that Senator Kennedy is the
ranking Democrat on the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee and that in his
view “[t]he most effective way to benefit minorities is through the expansion of Medicaid
and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program…”); Kaiser Family Foundation &
Health Policy Alternatives, 2008 Presidential Candidate Health Care Proposals: Side-bySide Summary (2008), http://www.health08.org/sidebyside.cfm (click on check boxes below
Clinton and Obama and then click “compare”).
31. National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States, 2007 With Chartbook
on Trends in the Health of Americans at 402, Table 138 (2007) (Yet, this relatively small
proportion of the Non-Hispanic White population accounts for over 43% of all Medicaid
enrollees. See, Department of Health and Human Services, A Profile of Medicaid
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Latino-Americans, 10% of Asian-Americans and 12% of White-Americans
rely upon Medicaid, Medicare, or other forms of publicly sponsored health
insurance.32
Ironically, although a greater share of minority groups rely upon public
health insurance than white Americans, minorities in America are curiously
under-represented in the most universal of all universal health insurance
plans. Medicare covers all Americans who reach age 65, regardless of
race, ethnicity, income, health status, or any other demographic.
Nevertheless, by comparing the race of Medicare beneficiaries to their prorated representation in the general population, we can confirm that race
matters even in universal health plans. For example, whites comprise 82%
of elderly Medicare beneficiaries, but represent just over 65% of the
American population.33 Conversely, 7% of Medicare beneficiaries are
Latino and 8% are African-American while these minority groups represent
14% and 12% of the general population respectively.34 A partial
explanation for this disparity must include the fact that minority Americans
do not live as long as white Americans do and therefore are a smaller
percentage of the elderly population covered by Medicare. However, it is
also important to recognize that even universal public health insurance
coverage cannot, alone, erase health disparities between minority and
majority Americans, and may, if not carefully structured, actually
exacerbate racial health disparities.
WHAT WILL WORK?
Some reforms in private health insurance can reduce disparities. For
example, to the extent that health insurance reform addresses economic
disadvantages faced by employees seeking to purchase health insurance
through their employers, either by subsidizing those premium contributions
or by limiting the premiums that can be charged to a percentage of income,
minorities will be more likely to choose private health coverage for
themselves and their families. Further, those health insurance reform plans
that include relief for small businesses facing catastrophic health expenses,
Chartbook
2000
at
24
(HCFA
Form
2082)
available
at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/TheChartSeries/downloads/2Tchartbk.pdf).
32. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KEY FACTS: RACE, ETHNICITY & MEDICAL CARE 14
(2007), available at http://www.kff.org/minorityhealth/upload/6069-02.pdf.
33. Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare: A Profile at 70 (July 2000)
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/TheChartSeries/downloads/35chartbk.pdf.
34. Id.
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either through reimbursements or tax credits, are more likely to reduce the
number of minorities who are uninsured. But perhaps the most meaningful
of all possible health insurance reforms is one that neither conservatives
nor liberals have yet addressed.
Health insurers are uniquely positioned to collect race and ethnicity
data to evaluate demographically information such as the incidence and
size of claims, usage of covered services, patterns of provider practices,
availability of coverage plans, incidence of certain covered diseases and
catastrophes, and a host of other indicators that would shed light on the
facts about the access racial and ethnic minority Americans have to health
insurance and care. This data is largely unavailable from any other source.
Yet, the 2004 report of the American Health Insurance Plans found that
nearly half of health plan enrollees belong to plans that do not collect data
on race and ethnicity.35 Here, the wisdom of the adage that is true for
engineers and physicists is also true for health insurance reform: “that
which can be measured can be changed.” Current proposals to reform
health insurance track political platforms and priorities and they accurately
reflect the broad principles of their sponsors. However, in order to
purposefully address the racial disparities in health care access that are
attributable to minorities’ status within the financing structure of the
American health care system, reformers absolutely must not be afraid to
“play the race card.”

35. AMERICA’S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS (AHIP), HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS
ADDRESS DISPARITIES IN CARE: HIGHLIGHTS OF A 2004 AHIP/RWJF QUANTITATIVE SURVEY COLLECTION AND USE OF DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY 1 (2004), available at
http://www.ahip.org/content/default.aspx?bc=38|82|5859.
The Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality have formed the National Health Plan Collaborative to reduce racial
and ethnic disparities and improve the overall quality of healthcare in the United States.
This Collaborative has sponsored efforts to improve collection of race and ethnicity data.
NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN COLLABORATIVE, PHASE ONE SUMMARY REPORT 1-2, 7 (2006),
available
at
http://www.rwjf.org/files/publications/other/NHPCSummaryReport2006Revised.pdf.
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THE PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF
DUAL SOVEREIGNTY IN PROSECUTING
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS AGAINST
STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
Daniel Maldonado
Steven Plitt
I.

INTRODUCTION

The declaratory judgment action is the modern legal vehicle for
determining whether coverage exists under an insurance policy. Generally,
declaratory judgments were not recognized as remedies in the United States
until the early 1900’s.1 In 1922, the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA),2 effectively
standardizing declaratory judgments throughout the United States.3 The
great majority of states have adopted some version of the UDJA.4
1. Russell B. Hill, Should Anticipation Kill Application of the Declaratory Judgment
Act?, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 239, 240 (2004); Mark Peter Henriques, Desuetude and
Declaratory Judgment: A New Challenge to Obsolete Laws, 76 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1060-61
(1990).
2. UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 1 to 17 (2007).
3. See Hill, supra note 1, at 240; Sean Gay, Declaratory Relief and Sovereign
Immunity in Oregon: Can Someone Tell Me if I Turned Square Corners?, 40 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 563, 567 (2004); See also Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord
Over Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds’ Allegedly Intentional and Immoral
Conduct: A Historical and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory
Judgments—1900-1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1142 (1998).
4. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-220 to -232 (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1831 to 1846 (2007); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 16-111-101 to -111 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-51101 to -115 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6501 to -13 (2007); FLA. STAT. §§ 86.011 to 111 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-4-1 to -10 (2007); IDAHO CODE §§ 10-1201 to -1217 (2007);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-701 (2007); IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-14-1-1 to -16 (2007); IOWA R.
CIV. P. 1.1101 to -1109 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1701 to -1716 (2007); LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. arts. 1871 to -83 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5951 to -63 (West
2007); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-401 to -415 (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 231A, §§ 1-9 (2007); MINN. STAT. §§ 555.01 to -16 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 527.010 to
-130 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-101 to -313 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,149 to
-164 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:16-50 to -62 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-6-1 to
-15 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-23-01 to -13
(2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2721.01 to -16 (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1651 to
-57 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 28.010 to -160 (2007); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7531 to -41
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Following the states’ lead, in 1934 Congress enacted the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act5 (FDJA), and authorized federal courts to
similarly grant declaratory judgment relief.6 As early as 1937, the United
States Supreme Court held that an insurance coverage dispute presents a
judicial controversy for which a District Court has the authority to hear and
determine pursuant to the FDJA.7
Declaratory judgment actions provide “a speedy and inexpensive
method of adjudicating legal disputes without invoking coercive remedies
…”8 Declaratory judgments may often be employed to dispose of issues in
the initial stages of a dispute before the parties would otherwise need to
(2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-30-1 to -16 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (2007);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-24-1 to -16 (2007); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 29-14-101 to -113
(2007); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001 to -11 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-33-1 to -13 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4711 to -25 (2007); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8.01-184 to -191 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.24.010 to -144 (2007); W. VA.
CODE, §§ 55-13-1 to -16 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 806.04 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-37-101
to -115 (2007).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
6. Rice, supra note 3, at 1143-44 (The FDJA provides in relevant part: “In a case of
actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of
an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such
declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be
reviewable as such.”); See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
7. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937); See also Am. Nat’l
Fire Ins. Co. v. The Hungerford, 53 F.3d 1012, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We have
previously held that a dispute between an insurer and its insured over the duties to defend
and indemnify satisfies the requirement for purposes of the [Federal] Declaratory Judgment
Act, whether or not there is an underlying state court action.”). The FDJA does not provide
an independent basis for federal jurisdiction and a district court must rely upon its original
jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory judgment action. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (noting that federal jurisdiction can be based upon
diversity and the district court has discretion to exercise that jurisdiction); Wilton v. Seven
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995) (“Brillhart makes clear that District Courts possess
discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the [Federal]
Declaratory Judgment Act.”).
8. See Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc. v. Deknatel, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir.
1975); Beacon Const. Co., Inc. v. Matco Elec. Co., Inc., 521 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975);
See also Ryan R. Dreyer, Civil Procedure-Discouraging Declaratory Actions In MinnesotaThe Res Judicata Effect Of Declaratory Judgments in Light of State v. Joseph, 29 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 613, 616 (2002); Eugene L. Stewart, Procedural Issues and Remedies in
the Administration and Judicial Resolution of Customs and International Trade Cases: The
Role of Sanctions, Contempt, Assessment of Costs, and Extraordinary Legal Remedies in
Reforming Practice Before The Court of International Trade, 3 FLA. INT’L L. J. 341, 391
(1988).
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proceed to full blown litigation.9 Thus, declaratory judgments often serve
to eliminate unnecessary time and expense otherwise incurred in fishing
expeditions in many contexts.10
In crafting the declaratory judgment complaint, as counsel begins to
pencil in the captioned names, a question arises as to who needs to be
named as defendants in the suit. Obviously, in the insurance context, the
insureds must be named since their policies are being interpreted.11
Whether necessary or not,12 insurance companies also typically name the
underlying claimants as defendants because they are considered to have an
interest in the outcome of a declaratory judgment action that will determine
insurance coverage for their claims and insurers wish to ensure that the
determination is binding on all parties. However, unique problems can
arise based upon this practice. One such problem, which is the focus of
this article, arises where both the state and federal governments are the
underlying tort claimants.
It is not uncommon for the actions of an insured to implicate both state
and federal regulations, especially in the area of environmental

9. Dreyer, supra note 8, at 616.
10. Id.
11. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hugee, 32 F.Supp. 665, 669 (E.D.S.C.
1940); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. of Ill. v. Cieri, 23 F.Supp. 435, 435-36 (M.D.Pa. 1938);
Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Dupont, 21 F.Supp. 606, 608 (D.Del. 1937); Cont’l Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Cochrane, 4 P.2d 308, 310 (Colo. 1931); See also Weissbard v. Potter Drug & Chem.
Corp., 69 A.2d 559, 561 (N.J.Super.Ch. 1949) (“A contract may not be declared null and
void in the absence of a party to the contract.”).
12. There is some debate among jurisdictions on whether a third-party claimant is a
necessary and/or indispensable party in a declaratory judgment action filed by an insurance
carrier against its insured for purposes of determining the insurance carrier’s liability for an
incident between the insured and the third-party. Compare CFI Wis., Inc. v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 230 F.R.D. 552, 554 (W.D. Wis. 2005) ( “[An] injured third-party is a necessary
party in a declaratory judgment action by an insurance company seeking to determine its
liability arising from an occurrence between its insured and the injured party.”), and Am.
Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Rogers, 123 F.Supp. 2d 461, 467 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Evangelical
Lutheran Church in Am. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 173 F.R.D. 507, 508-09 (N.D. Ill. 1997), with
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 230 (3d Cir. 2005) and Ace Am. Ins.
Co. v. Paradise Divers, Inc. 216 F.R.D. 537, 540 (S.D.Fla. 2003) (holding that because the
third-party claimant’s interests are adequately represented by the insured in a declaratory
judgment action regarding coverage under the insured’s policy, the third-party claimant is
not indispensable), and Austin Fireworks, Inc. v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 809 F.Supp. 829, 830-31
(D.Kan. 1992), and Black Diamond Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 621 F.Supp. 96, 97-98 (S.D.W.Va. 1985), and County of Wyoming, NY v. Erie
Lackawanna Ry. Co., 360 F.Supp. 1212, 1215 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
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regulation.13 For example, an insured performs clearing operations to
prepare a piece of land for development. However, the insured contractor,
during the course of these clearing operations, discharged dredged or fill
material into neighboring waterways. Based upon these actions, both the
federal and state governments asserted separate claims against the insured
pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act (“CWA”)14 and the state clean
water laws15 respectively. The action brought by the federal government
was filed in federal court and the action brought by the state government
was filed in state court. Based upon certain terms of the policy, it is the
insurance company’s belief that the insured contractor is not covered under
the policy for the allegations in either lawsuit. Both lawsuits arise out of
precisely the same actions committed by the insured. It does not make
judicial or economic sense to litigate the same coverage issue in two
separate declaratory judgment proceedings which could result in
inconsistent adjudications.16 Accordingly, the insurer wishes to file a

13. See, e.g. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1423,
1424 (1st Cir. 1991) ( involving lawsuitsfiled against insured company by both the United
States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act [CERCLA] and other environmental and civil
statutes seeking damages and cleanup costs resulting from pollution of the Acushnet River
and New Bedford Harbor); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F.Supp. 731, 733 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) (involving claims by both the United States and the State of Michigan under
section 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, for the recovery of response costs incurred in
connection with the contamination of the Verona Well Field); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Wausau
Chem. Corp., 809 F.Supp. 680, 689-90 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (involving a declaratory judgment
action brought by an insurer against an insured chemical company seeking declaration that
there was no obligation to defend or indemnify the insured chemical company for CERCLA
response costs incurred pursuant to consent decree with the United States and the State of
Wisconsin); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., Ltd., 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1097
(Ohio 1992) (involving a declaratory judgment action over right to defense and indemnity
from insurers for lawsuits filed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency and
the State of Ohio due to leakage of pollutants from landfill). See also Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd's v. Health Care Mgmt. Partners, Ltd., 2006 WL 2050962, *3-*4 (D. Colo. 2006)
(involving a declaratory judgment action over coverage for claims alleged against an insured
by both the United States and the State of Colorado for false or fraudulent claim
submissions under Medicare and Medicaid).
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2007).
15. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21, §§ 26-53 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 204.006.141 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-211 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 90.48.010.910 (2007).
16. Courts have consistently recognized that inconsistent adjudications do not serve
the interests of justice and judicial economy. See Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
776 F.2d 1492, 1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that one of the factors to consider in
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single declaratory judgment lawsuit against the insured, the federal
government, and the state government in order to resolve this single issue
of coverage and have a single binding decision on all of the interested
parties.
It is at this point that the insurance company faces a conundrum: where
should the insurer file this action, state or federal court? Can the insurer
file such a single action against both governmental entities in either state or
federal court? Does the insurer have to file two separate actions? If so,
will an insurer be faced with the possibility of two divergent and
inconsistent decisions on the same issue? These are just some of the issues
that an insurer must grapple with when a contemplated declaratory
judgment involves dual sovereigns—the state and federal governments.
In order to be able to determine the best path through this maze of
problems, it is important to first examine the history and development of
the underlying principles. The first part of this article discusses the concept
of dual sovereignty of federal and state governments as was designed in the
Constitution and preserved through judicial and legislative actions. Part II
analyzes the actions of the federal courts in preserving dual sovereignty
through use of the abstention doctrine. Part III addresses the enactment of
the Eleventh Amendment and the impact of this Constitutional amendment
on dual sovereignty through the delineation of sovereign immunity
reserved by the States. The second part of this article addresses the specific
dilemma created by dual sovereignty principles, as set forth briefly above,
where an insurance company wishes to file a declaratory judgment action
against both the state and federal governments. Each possible scenario is
addressed separately: (1) Part IV discusses the issues involved in filing a
declaratory judgment against the federal government in federal court; (2)
Part V discusses the issues involved in filing a declaratory judgment
against the federal government in state court; (3) Part VI discusses the
issues involved in filing a declaratory judgment against the state
government in federal court; and (4) Part VII discusses the issues involved
in filing a declaratory judgment against the state government in state court.
consolidation of cases under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the risk of
inconsistent adjudications of common factual and legal issues); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate
actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent
or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, . . .
Mitchell-Tracey v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 551, 559 (D.Md. 2006).
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Finally, in part VIII, the article addresses how to effectively try and rectify
the procedural obstacle course created by dual sovereignty and reach a
practical solution for this procedural conundrum.
II. PRESERVATION OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH
FEDERAL ABSTENTION.
Dual sovereignty is the foundation of the governmental structure of the
United States.17 Under the concept of dual sovereignty, states hold
sovereignty18 concurrently with the federal government. This shared
sovereignty is subject only to those limitations imposed by the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution.19
Federal courts recognize duel sovereignty through the Federal
Abstention Doctrine. There are many types of abstention.20 The principle
variants of abstention are: Pullman,21 Burford,22 and Younger23 abstention.
The various types of abstention “are not rigid pigeon holes into which
federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a complex of
17. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
18. For the advantages and disadvantages of the dual sovereignty system: see
generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988).
19. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (stating that the central purpose of the
sovereign immunity doctrine is to accord the States the respect owed to them as “joint
sovereigns”); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
146 (1993).
20. Many concepts can be labeled as part of the abstention doctrine. A case in point is
exemplified by the so-called Rooker-Feldman abstention which originated from Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983) (stating that under Rooker-Feldman abstention, the court recognizes
that Congress has conferred original jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction on the federal
district courts.) Rooker-Feldman abstention prevents a state court party from having two
bites at the apple: one through the state courts with a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court
and the other through a subsequent collateral attack originating in the federal courts. Where
a party begins litigating a constitutional matter in state court and stops short of petitioning
the U.S. Supreme Court, and then initiates litigation in federal court regarding the same
constitutional matter, the federal district court can abstain. Rooker-Feldman abstention
essentially holds that the federal district court does not have appellate jurisdiction over the
state court. The state court party should continue through the state court proceeding up
through the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
21. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
22. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
23. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

2008] PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY 451
considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that
contemplates parallel judicial processes.”24
Federal courts have original power to abstain from exercising
jurisdiction through principles of equity.25 In order to maintain a balance
between state and federal sovereignty, the abstention doctrine was
judicially formulated.26 Cases merit abstention where the proceedings
implicate some discernable state interest or state law.27 While the state
interest test has been substantially mitigated recently,28 there must at least
be a superficial state interest present to trigger abstention.
Under the Pullman abstention, “when a federal constitutional claim is
premised on an unsettled question of state law, the federal court should stay
its hand in order to provide the state court’s an opportunity to settle the
underlying state-law question and thus avoid the possibility of
unnecessarily deciding a constitutional question.”29 Under Burford
24. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987).
25. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996) (“It has long been
established that a federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it
‘is asked to employ its historic powers as a court of equity.’” (quoting Fair Assessment in
Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
26. See generally Charles Alan Wright, et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §
4241 (1988). (stating that supporters of abstention assert that it promotes a wiser balance of
judicial federalism); see, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, Abstention, the Supreme Court and
Allocation of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1151 (1974); David L. Shapiro,
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (writing that critics assert the
superiority of federal courts over state courts as enforcers of federal rights);
Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977) (“The only judicial
forums in our system capable of enforcing counter majoritarian checks in a sustained,
effective manner are the federal courts.”).
27. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
28. Ann Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases:
Observations on the Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051, 1083-90
(1988) (arguing that Pennzoil eliminates the state interest test as a requirement for
abstention).
29. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 285 (1979) (Powell, L., dissenting) (quoting Harris County Comm'rs Court v.
Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975)). See also Moore, 442 U.S. at 427-28 ( “A federal action
should be stayed pending determination in state court of state-law issues central to the
constitutional dispute.”); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978); Ohio Bureau of
Employment Serv. V. Hoodry, 431 U.S. 471. 477 (1898) ( “[Pullman abstention] involves
an inquiry focused on the possibility that the state courts may interpret a challenged state
statute so as to eliminate or at least to alter materially, the constitutional question
presented.”); Boehning v. Indiana State Emp. Assn., Inc., 423 U.S. 6 (1975); Askew v.
Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); Aldrich v. Aldrich,
378 U.S. 540 (1964); Dresner v. Tallahassee, 378 U.S. 539 (1964); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
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abstention,30 the Federal Court considers the independence of state
governments in carrying out domestic policy, and seeks to avoid conflict
between state and federal courts.31 Burford abstention is not based on a
need to defer to a concurrent state court proceeding. Rather, Burford
counsels that a district court should abstain from hearing a case if the case
involves a difficult question of state law or if it implicates a state regulatory
scheme, regardless of the presence of an ongoing state proceeding.32 Under
Younger abstention33, “a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal
prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal suit except in very
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959);
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
30. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (stating that the origin of Burford
Abstention is equitable in nature. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728 (stating that lower federal
courts have disagreed on the propriety of abstention in cases involving legal rather than
equitable claims). Compare Tribute Co. v. Abiloa, 66 F.3d 12, 16 (2nd Cir. 1995) (“Burford
Abstention is generally appropriate in cases where equitable relief is sought.”); Garamendi
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 350, 356 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A District Court may not abstain
under Burford when the plaintiff seeks only legal relief.”); Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764,
777 (3rd Cir. 1995) (Nigard, J., concurring) (“Burford Abstention is simply not available
when legal, rather than equitable or declaratory, relief is sought.”); Fragoso v. Lopez, 991
F.2d. 878, 882 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that abstention is improper in cases asserting only
inequitable claims); University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265,
271 (3rd Cir. 1991) (Burford Abstention is limited to federal courts sitting in equity); with
Riley, 45 F.3d at 772, n.7, (expressing doubt that the restriction against applying Burford
Abstention in non-equitable suits is still good law); Gen.l Glass Indus. v. Monsour Medical
Found., 973 F.2d 197, 202 (3rd Cir. 1992) (“Decisional authority remains inconclusive as to
whether Burford Abstention may be ordered only in cases of inequitable nature. . . .”);
Taffet v. Southern Co. 930 F.2d 847, 853 n.4 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Though abstention rulings
premised upon principles of comity and federalism were originally developed in the context
of actions seeking equitable relief, those principles have also been applied to actions seeking
monetary actions.”); Lac D’Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v. Am.Home Assurance Co., 864 F.2d
1033, 1044 (3rd Cir. 1988) (“If the relief sought is legal and the disruption is of the extent
and character suggesting that Burford Abstention is appropriate, a refusal to abstain simply
because the federal court is not sitting as a court of equity makes no sense.”).
31. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 727-28. Burford Abstention requires a district court to
abstain from hearing a case if the case involves a different question of state law or if it
implicates a state regulatory scheme, regardless of the presence of an ongoing state
proceeding. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361
(1989). As such, it is not predicated upon a need to defer to a concurrent state court
proceeding.
32. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 361.
33. See Younger, 401 U.S. 37. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68 (1971). See also
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976) (
“[A]bstention is inappropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid
state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state
criminal proceedings.”).
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unusual situations, where necessary to prevent immediate irreparable
injury.”34 Although the Younger doctrine has equitable origins, the
Supreme Court has, in large part, abandoned the equitable foundation in
cases subsequent to Younger.35
The court appears to be moving towards a merger of the various
For example, in Colorado River Water
abstention doctrines.36
Conservation District v. United States,37 the court tied the variations on
abstention together under the broader category of “exceptional
The Court found that there are “exceptional
circumstances.”38
circumstances” relating to “[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to
conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of
litigation,”39 and that the exceptional circumstances should be weighed
against the duty to exercise federal jurisdiction.40 The Pullman, Burford
34. Samuels, 401 U.S. at 69. See also Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816 (“Abstention
is inappropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute,
federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal
proceedings.”).
35. See George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide-Rethinking the Younger Abstention 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 120 n.56 (1990) (writing
that post-Younger cases have strayed form the equitable rationale); Rehnquist, supra note
36, at 1088 n. 219, 1089; Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity:
Pennzoil Co., v. Texaco Inc., 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1007 (1989) (writing that Younger’s
progeny toppled the equitable pillar in favor of federalism and comity); Larry W. Yackle,
Explaining Habeus Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1042 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme
Court has eroded the equitable foundation to the doctrine). Numerous lower court cases
have addressed Younger as a case based on comity and federalism as opposed to equity.
See, e.g. Warmust v. Melahn, 62 F.3d 252, 255 (8th Cir. 1995) vacated 116 S. Ct. 2493
(1996) (stating that Younger Abstention has its roots in comity and federalism); Schilling v.
White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1084 n.3 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that the Younger doctrine is founded
in federalism and comity); Gwyned Properties v. Lower Gwyned Township, 970 F.2d 1195,
1199-2000 (3rd Cir. 1992) (same).
36. See Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal
Court Deference to State Court Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 212 (1989) (stating
that similarities between various abstention doctrines outweigh differences and therefore
one test for abstention should be adopted); and Stephen Jon Moss, Comment, Pennzoil: A
Merger of Federal Abstention, 13 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 607 (1988) (stating that Pennzoil
effectively merged Pullman and Younger abstention doctrines).
37. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
38. Id. at 813-17.
39. Id. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180,
183 (1952)).
40. Id. at 817-19. A plurality of the court in Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S.
655, 665-67 (1978), contradicted the Colorado River “exceptional circumstances” doctrine.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist observed that the district court had discretion to
accept concurrent jurisdiction of a state court matter. Id. at 664. Justice Rehnquist found
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and Younger abstention doctrines are not the only three general categories
of “exceptional circumstances.”41 If the facts of a case fall outside those
three general categories, there are other principles which can give rise to
application of abstention.42
that “it is well established that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to
proceedings concerning the same matter in the federal court having jurisdiction.” Id.
Justice Rehnquist stated: “[I]t is equally well settled that a district court is ‘under no
compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction’,... where the controversy may be settled more
expeditiously in the state court.” Id. at 662-63. He emphasized that the “right to proceed
with a duplicative action in a federal court can never be said to be ‘clear and undisputable’.”
Id. at 666 n.8. Five Justices joined the plurality in Calvert establishing the principle that any
likelihood of duplicative litigation was sufficient to justify abstention.” Id. at 663-64. This
plurality contradicted the exception.
The conflicting holdings of Colorado River and Calvert were clarified in Moses
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). The Court in Moses held
that the “exceptional circumstances” test of Colorado River should be used by district courts
in determining to stay an action in favor of state court proceedings. Id. at 13-19. The Moses
court formulated two additional factors for the “exceptional circumstances” test: (1) the
determination of which forum’s substantive law would govern the merits of the litigation;
and (2) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the parties’ rights. Id. at 23-27. The
Moses court reaffirmed the doctrine that federal courts have a “[virtual] unflagging
obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction given to them. Id. at 15. After Moses the circuit
courts were divided over which standard governed a district court’s decision to stay or
dismiss a declaratory judgment action where there were parallel state proceedings. The
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth circuits applied the discretionary standard articulated in
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942) and Calvert. See, e.g., Terra
Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213 (3rd Cir. 1989); Mitcheson v. Harris, 995
F.2d 235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1992) (the “exceptional circumstances” test of Colorado River
and Moses is inapplicable in declaratory judgment actions); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana
Farm Bureau Fed’n Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 778 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); Cont’l Cas. Co. v.
Robsac Indus., 947 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1991); Chamberlin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d
1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1991) (Colorado River test does not apply to declaratory relief actions
because they have “special status”).
However, other circuit courts applied the narrow exceptional circumstances test
developed in Colorado River and expanded in Moses. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wassau
v. Missouri Elec. Works, 23 F.3d 1372, 1374 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (Following Colorado River
and Moses the district court was not justified in staying or dismissing a declaratory relief
action absent “exceptional circumstances.”); Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 411, 413 (2nd Cir. 1986) (same). A middle ground between
these two positions can be found. See, e.g., Fuller Co. v. Ramon I. Gill, Inc., 782 F.2d 306,
308-11 (1st Cir. 1986) (ststaing that where the state court has expended significant resources
through the adjudicatory process of the state law claims, federal courts may decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action).
41. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814-17.
42. Id. at 817 (“Although this case falls within none of the abstention categories, there
are principles unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and regard
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A separate line of abstention cases has developed defining the
boundaries of discretion in the context of federal declaratory judgment
actions (“FDJA”).43 Jurisdiction under the FDJA is discretionary and not
compulsory.44 The Act itself states that the district court “may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party.”45 A separate
variation of abstention has arisen in the context of the FDJA when a
parallel case is pending in state court at the same time the federal district
court is being asked to exercise its discretion to accept jurisdiction under
the FDJA.46 The doctrine enunciated by the court in Brillhart v. Excess
Insurance Company of America47 directs the court regarding its exercise of
discretion to deny jurisdiction.
In Brillhart, the insurance company brought suit for declaratory relief
in federal court to determine its obligation in a pending state court
proceeding.48 The Brillhart court found that it would “ordinarily be
uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a
declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court
presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same
parties.”49 The Brillhart court indicated that district courts should assess
whether the controversy could better be resolved in the state court
proceeding in determining whether to abstain.50 This assessment may
require “inquiry into the scope of the pending state court proceeding and
the nature of defenses open there.”51 Further, “[t]he federal court may have
for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the contemporaneous
exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal courts or by state and federal courts.”).
43. In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insur. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996), the Supreme
Court found that the various forms of the abstention doctrine had been extended to “certain
classes of declaratory judgments, the granting of which is generally committed to the court’s
discretion” (citation omitted). It is interesting to note that in Great Lakes Dredge & Duck
Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297 (1943) and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-70
(1971) the Supreme Court recognized that the actions were brought pursuant to the FDJA
but did not apply the discretion under this statute but rather applied different forms of the
abstention doctrine. For a thorough discussion of the effects of Quackenbush on diversity
jurisdiction in general see Lewis Yelin, Note, Burford Abstention in Actions for Damages,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1871 (1999).
44. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286-87; Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v.
Dizol,133 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) (emphasis added).
46. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Knight, 96 F3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996).
47. 316 U.S. 491, 495(1942).
48. Id. at 492-94.
49. Id. at 495.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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to consider whether the claims of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be
adjudicated in that proceeding, whether necessary parties have been joined,
whether such parties are amenable to process in that proceeding, etc.”52
In Wilton v. Seven Falls Company,53 the Supreme Court established the
Brillhart test and not the Colorado River exceptional circumstances” test as
governing a district court’s exercise of discretion in a federal declaratory
judgment action, brought during the pendency of parallel state court
proceedings.54 “Congress, and not the judiciary, defines the scope of
federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds.”55 This
concept is foundational upon the idea that an exercise of judicial discretion
to abstain constitutes a judicial usurpation of legislative power.56To
function properly, American constitutional democracy requires courts to act
within their congressionally-conferred jurisdictional province.57
52. Id.
53. 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
54. Id. at 289-90.
55. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359
(1989) (citing Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)).
56. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 79 (1984). Some commentators have argued for the expansion
of federal judicial power for two principle reasons: (1) fear of perceived local prejudices,
and (2) fear that a local forum will ignore or disregard federal law. David J. McCarthy,
Note, Preclusion Concerns as an Additional Factor When Staying a Federal Suit in
Deference to a Concurrent State Proceeding, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183, 1198 (1985). See
also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM &
MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981) (noting that federal courts are the preferred forum for
determination and analysis of constitutional principles); David A. Sonenshin, Abstention:
The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 TUL. L. REV. 651 (1985) (noting that because
federal judges have life tenure, they are less subject to the vagaries and pressures of local
public opinion, Congress has preserved the federal forum to litigants).
57. In Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) the court observed:
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each
branch having certain defined functions delegated to it by the
constitution. While “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is,” … it is equally – and
emphatically – the exclusive province of the Congress not only to
formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but
also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once Congress,
exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a
given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the
courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.
Id. at 194 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177(1803)). See also California v.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576
(1979).
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Although the Federal Abstention Doctrine has an essential role to play
in judicial preservation of dual sovereignty within the judiciary, it has been
criticized on constitutional grounds.
A well established tradition of the common law is that a court must
exercise the jurisdiction that it possesses.58 Chief Justice Marshall declared
that judicial conduct contrary to this principle would be in direct defiance
of the prerogatives set forth in the Constitution. Marshall opined, “[we]
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,
than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution.”59 “Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the
58. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1971) (citing Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821)). See also Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534
(1893) (“[T]he courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford
redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot
abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction.”) (citations
omitted); Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (“[W]hen a federal court is
properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such
jurisdiction . . . The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a
choice cannot be properly denied.”) (citations omitted). McCLellan v. Carland, 217 U.S.
268, 282 (1910) (concluding that federal courts have no authority to abdicate jurisdiction
because of a pending state proceeding).
59. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, observed:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should
not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The
judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it
approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by
because it is doubtful.
With whatever doubts, with whatever
difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought
before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which
we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to
exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.
Id. Justice Marshall’s comments have found resonance with the court. See, e.g.,
Justice Brennan’s warning in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Co.,
460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983), where he stated that the Federal Courts have a “virtually unflagging
obligation … to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” This belief has been expressed
through leading scholarly publications. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 56 at 112 (“[V]esting
of power in the Federal Courts to adjudicate the relevant claims without a corresponding
duty to do so is unacceptable.”) See generally Shapiro, supra note 26; Michael M. Wilson,
Comment, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel State Court
Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 641, 641-42 (1977)
(observing that the right to a federal forum is secured by the Constitution); Note, Power to
Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE
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scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible
bounds.”60
Commentators have opined that abstention can be anathema to the
doctrine of separation of powers where federal jurisdictional requirements
have been legally met.61
III. PRESERVATION OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT.
The Eleventh Amendment was enacted to delineate the scope of
sovereign immunity reserved by the States.62 The Eleventh Amendment
guarantees that non-consenting states may not be sued by private
individuals in federal court.63 Thus, states are immune from suits brought
in federal court by their own citizens, and the citizens of other states.64
L.J. 978, 980 (1950); Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently
Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM L. REV. 684, 687 (1960) (stating that the right to a
federal forum is secured by the Constitution and supportive judicial precedent). Barry
Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530 (1989); Linda S.
Mullenix, A Branch Too Far, Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99 (1986).
60. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 359 (1989) (citing Kline v. Burke
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)).
61. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 56, at 77-79. Some commentators have argued for
the expansion of federal judicial power for two principle reasons: (1) fear of perceived
local prejudices, and (2) fear that a local forum will ignore or disregard federal law. David
J. McCarthy, Note, Preclusion Concerns as an Additional Factor When Staying a Federal
Suit in Deference to a Concurrent State Proceeding, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183, 1199 n.66
(1985). See also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981) (noting that federal courts are the preferred forum for
determination and analysis of constitutional principles); David A. Sonenshin, Abstention:
The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 TUL. L. REV. 651 (1985) (noting that because
federal judges have life tenure, they are less subject to the vagaries and pressures of local
public opinion, Congress has preserved the federal forum to litigants).
62. See Id. at 722-23. The full breadth of the sovereign immunity retained by the
States was not explicitly memorialized by Congress when the United States Constitution
was ratified. In ratifying the Eleventh Amendment, Congress chose only to address the
specific historical concerns when, in 1793, the United States Supreme Court erroneously
held that Article III of the Constitution authorized citizens of one State to sue another State
in Federal Court. Id. As a result, the Court has concluded that the Eleventh Amendment is
only one particular exemplification of the States’ sovereign immunity. Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our
constitutional structure which it confirms.”).
63. E.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). See
also, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 706 (1999) (applying the Eleventh Amendment to
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Prior to the ratification of the United States constitution, States had
inherent sovereignty and partial sovereignty was reserved under the Tenth
Amendment.65 In contrast, the doctrine of inherent sovereignty does not
apply to the federal government.66 The federal government is a sovereign

lawsuits by private individuals in state courts based upon federal causes of action);
Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775 (applying the Eleventh Amendment to lawsuits by Indian tribes);
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (applying the Eleventh Amendment to lawsuits
by foreign nations); In re New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (applying the Eleventh
Amendment to admiralty proceedings); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900) (applying the
Eleventh Amendment to lawsuits by federal corporations); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890) (applying the Eleventh Amendment to lawsuits by citizens of the State under
federal-question jurisdiction).
The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not bar a suit against a State in that
State’s own court system nor does it bar a suit against a state in a different State court. See,
e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). As discussed further in this Article, Congress can
abrogate the state's immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of power, hence allowing a state to
be sued in federal court. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). There are
other situations where a State can be sued in federal court. See, e.g., United States v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965) (holding that a State can be sued in federal court by the
United States); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (holding that a State
can be sued in federal court by another State); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)(holding
that a State can be sued in federal court by a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in a suit
against a state official).
Some commentators believe that the Eleventh Amendment is more akin to a
jurisdictional bar for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction than to true immunity. See,
e.g., J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52 (1983); Akil Reed Amar,
Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473-84 (1987). See also, Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) ( “[An] Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently
partakes of a jurisdictional bar that it need not be raised in the trial court”); Welch v. State
Dep’t of Highways & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 476 n.6 (1987) ( “Eleventh Amendment
immunity partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar”) (citation omitted).
64. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63. See also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363; Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72–73 (2000); Hans, 134 U.S. at 15 (1890).
65. The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
Respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Supreme Court has previously
delineated the limits of a State’s sovereign as it relates to a dual sovereignty system:
Where state antagonism to another State or Nation begins, the state
sovereignty ends, and that is at just the point where the matters of exclusive regulation
within the state boundaries, the things done by or in the State, tend to pass over into the
other limited sovereignties, and then the exclusive power, the reserved power, falls, or
rather stops.
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 68 (1907).
66. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 335 (1935) (citing Kansas, 206 U.S. 46).
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of delegated, limited, and enumerated powers.67 As a separate sovereign,
States also inherently have sovereign immunity.68 Sovereign immunity, as
embodied by the Eleventh Amendment, serves to avoid the indignity of
subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the request
of private parties.69
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress could not directly
legislate the American people, but could do so only with the approval of
the States.70 The Constitutional Convention was convened, in part, because
of the inadequacy of the federal government to directly legislate.71
Throughout the Constitution’s ratification process States retained their
sovereign immunity.72 The Constitutional Convention sought to restructure
Congress and give it the power to legislate without the need of the state
legislatures.73 During the Constitutional Convention, delegates debated the
merits of the Virginia and New Jersey Plans under which the federal

67. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883). “The powers of Congress are
not given by the people of a single State; they are given by the people of the United States to
a Government whose laws, made in pursuance of the Constitution, are declared to be
supreme. Consequently, the people of a single State cannot confer a sovereignty which will
extend over them.” Kansas, 206 U.S. at 69-70.
68. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 686 n.4 (1999); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 57
(1994) (“Sovereign immunity, after all, inheres in the permissible exercise of state power.”);
Hans, 134 U.S. at 13 (1890) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without its consent.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81
(Alexander Hamilton)).
69. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Mefcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 146
(1993) ([The Eleventh Amendment is a] “fundamental constitutional protection . . . rooted in
a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty,
including sovereign immunity. It thus accords the States the respect owed them as members
of the federation”) (citation omitted).
70. New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 163 (1992) (“Congress ‘could not directly tax or
legislate upon individuals; it had no explicit “legislative” or “governmental” power to make
binding “law” enforceable as such.’”) (citing Amar, supra note 63 at 1447.
71. Id.
72. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
73. This issue was addressed by Alexander Hamilton:
The new National Government must carry its agency to the
persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate
legislations . . . . The government of the Union, like that of each State,
must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of
individuals. . . .
See Hamilton, supra note 68, at 116.
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government could exercise its powers.74 Under the Virginia Plan, Congress
could exercise legislative authority directly without employing the States as
intermediaries.75 The New Jersey Plan mirrored the status quo and
Congress would continue to require the approval of the States before
legislating.76
The New Jersey Plan was objected to because it might require
Congress to coerce the States into implementing legislation.77
Consequently, the Convention adopted the Virginia Plan which provided
for a constitution in which Congress would exercise its legislative authority
directly over individuals, rather than over States.78 One reason for adopting
the Virginia Plan was to avoid coercing States as separate sovereign
entities. Instead, Congress would be able to legally coerce individuals.79
In providing for a stronger federal government, the framers explicitly chose
a constitutional framework that conferred upon Congress the power to

74. Various proposals for the structure of the new federal government were discussed
during the Constitutional Convention. However, two plans were dominant: the Virginia
Plan and the New Jersey Plan. New York, 505 U.S. at 164.
75. Delegate Edmund Randolph first introduced the Virginia Plan. Under the Virginia
Plan, Congress would exercise legislative authority directly without employing the States as
intermediaries. Id. (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 21 (Max
Farrand ed. 1911), hereinafter “RECORDS”).
76. Delegate William Paterson first introduced the New Jersey Plan. Under the New
Jersey Plan, Congress would continue to require the approval of the States before legislating
like it did under the Articles of Confederation. New York, 505 U.S. 144, 164 (1992). (citing
1 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 243-44). Although both the Virginia and New Jersey plans
underwent various revisions during the Convention, they remained the two primary options
discussed by the delegates. Id.
77. Id. (“The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan [i.e., the
New Jersey Plan], or introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been
fully displayed. . . . There are but two modes by which the end of a Gen[eral] Gov[ernment]
can be attained: the 1st is by coercion as proposed by Mr. P[aterson’s] plan[, the 2nd] by
real legislation as prop[osed] by the other plan. Coercion [is] impracticable, expensive, cruel
to individuals. . . . We must resort therefore to a national Legislation over individuals.”)
(quoting Edmund Randolph in 1 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 255-56)); see also id.
“The practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political
bodies, had been exploded on all hands.” (quoting James Madison in 2 RECORDS, supra
note 75, at 9)).
78. Id. at 165 (noting the Constitutional Convention rejected the New Jersey Plan in
favor of the Virginia Plan) (citing 1 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 313).
79. Id. at 165 (“This Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states,
in their political capacity. . . . But this legal coercion singles out the . . . individual.”)
(quoting Oliver Ellsworth in 2 J. Elliot, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 197 (2d
ed. 1863))).
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regulate individuals, not States.80 The Constitution gives Congress the
authority to enact legislation requiring or prohibiting certain acts; however,
Congress lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or
prohibit those acts.81
Congress’ authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity is
limited. Because the “abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets the
fundamental constitutional balance between the federal government and the
states,”82 any judicial determination of whether abrogation has lawfully
occurred are made with great care. In order to lawfully abrogate state
sovereign immunity, Congress must (1) act “pursuant to a valid exercise of
power”; and (2) “unequivocally express its intent to abrogate the
immunity.”83 The power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
resides in Congress’ enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.84 When Congress is operating under its Article 1 powers,
Congress has no authority to nullify State’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity.85 Under Section 5, Congress is authorized to enact remedial
legislation focused on preventing violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment.86 A valid exercise of this power requires Congress to
“identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive

80. Id.
81. Id. at 166 (citing Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
762-66 (1983), Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 28889 (1981), and Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868)). See also id. (noting that the
Commerce Clause is a constitutional provision that authorizes Congress to regulate
interstate commerce directly; but does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’
regulation of interstate commerce).
82. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989) (citation omitted). See Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (“Our reluctance to infer that a
State’s immunity from suit in the courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system.”).
83. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).
84. Bd. of Trs. Of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001).
85. Id. at 365. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to
enforce the substantive guarantees contained in Section 1 by enacting “appropriate
legislation.”; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). But see Seminole, 517
U.S. at 59 (holding that Congress only has two constitutional sources to abrogate a State’s
sovereign immunity; Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause)
(citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1 (1989))). See also Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 647-48 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that
Congress passed the ADA pursuant to its power to enforce the 14th Amendment and its
power to regulate commerce).
86. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,75 (2000).
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provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or
preventing such conduct.”87
Congress has no authority to enact substantive legislation which
defines the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment restrictions on the States.88
“It is the responsibility of [t]he court, not Congress, to define the substance
of congressional guarantees.”89 In City of Boerne v. Flores90 the high court
formulated the “congruence and proportionality” test to determine whether
the exercise of Congress’ enforcement power was remedial and appropriate
or definitional and not appropriate. “There must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end.”91
Courts must recognize or establish two facts through reliable factfinding to prove congruence. First, to justify the federal intervention in
their affairs, the court must establish whether the state or local government
has done something unconstitutional or likely unconstitutional.92 Second,
the means chosen must be “responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior.”93 These determinations are made by examining
the legislative record to identify the reasons for Congress’ action.94
Eleventh Amendment immunity may be waived.95 Generally, by
participating in a federal spending program, States can waive their Eleventh
Amendment immunity.96 Congress may offer federal funding with
87. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
639 (1999).
88. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
89. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
90. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
91. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“The appropriateness of
remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures
appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another lesser one.”);
Bd. of Trs. Of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).
92. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13
(1883)).
93. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 509.
94. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000).
95. There are three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, Congress
has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity without the state’s consent when
acting pursuant to its enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Garrett, 531 U.Sat 365; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
Second, individual suits that seek prospective relief for ongoing violations of federal law
may be brought against state officials pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 155-56 (1908). Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9. Third, states may voluntarily waive their
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1.
96. Id.
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conditions attached as part of its Spending Clause powers.97 Congress may
require states to waive their sovereign immunity as a condition for
receiving federal funds.98 If Congress intends to impose this condition, the
relevant statute must “manifest[] a clear intent to condition participation in
the programs ... on a State’s consent to waive its constitutional
immunity.”99
The Supreme Court’s decision in College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board100 reaffirmed and
strengthened the test to be applied in determining whether a state has
waived its sovereign immunity. The Court emphasized that a state’s
“decision to waive ... immunity [must be] ‘altogether voluntary.’”101
Courts may not find “implied” or “constructive” waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.102 “A state will be seen to have waived its Eleventh
97. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The
Constitution empowers Congress “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defen[s]e and general Welfare of the United
States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. “Incident to this power, Congress may attach
conditions on the receipt of federal funds.” Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1081 ( quoting South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)). Congress has employed this power “to further
broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal mon[ies] upon compliance by the
recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.” Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (Burger, C.J.). See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974)
(“power to fix terms”); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958)
(“impose reasonable conditions”).
98. Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1081. Congress’s spending power is not unlimited. Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1981). In South Dakota v. Dole, the
Court reviewed the case law concerning the spending power of Congress, noting four
general restrictions. 483 U.S. at 207. First, “the exercise of the spending power must be in
pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’” Id. See U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 1. See also Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). Second, “if Congress desires to condition the state’s
receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously ... enabl[ing] the states to exercise
their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’” Dole, 483
U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17). Third, it has been “suggested (without
significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are
unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’” Dole, 483
U.S. at 207. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)). Fourth, “other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to [a]
conditional grant of federal funds.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. (citing Lawrence County. v.
Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985)).
99. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247.
100. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. V. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666,
675-76 (1999).
101. Id. (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858)).
102. Id. at 680. The Court recognized, in reaching this decision, that it was overruling
its decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184
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Amendment immunity only ‘if the State voluntarily invokes [the federal
court’s] jurisdiction, or else if the State makes a “clear declaration” that it
intends to submit itself to’ the federal court’s jurisdiction.”103 In College
(1964) “We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived,
and see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it . . . [w]hatever may remain of
our decision in Parden is expressly overruled.” Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680. Pardenstyle constructive waivers that were held unconstitutional are viewed as being
“fundamental[ly] different[t]” from situations where states voluntarily waived their
immunity in exchange for federal funds. Id. at 680-81. In a different section of the College
Savings Bank opinion, Justice Scalia reiterates that “conditions attached to a State’s receipt
of federal funds are simply not analogous to Parden-style conditions attached to a State’s
decision to engage in otherwise lawful commercial activity.” Id. at 678-79 n.2. The Court
distinguished Parden from Atascadero which involved section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. Id. In the Court’s view, Atascadero “suggest[ed] that a waiver may be found in a
State’s acceptance of a federal grant.” Id. (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 234). The Court
in College Savings Bank appears to have reaffirmed this observation of Atascadero
“mak[ing] the same suggestion today, while utterly rejecting Parden.” Id.
103. Pugliese v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 147 F. Supp 2d 985, 990 (D. Ariz.
2001) (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675-76.) Following the College Savings Bank
decision, several federal decisions have rejected the waiver concept in the Eleventh
Amendment context. E.g., Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 158 F. Supp. 2d 539, 544 (E.D. Pa.
May 31, 2001) vacated (June 5, 2001), reconsideration denied (July 31, 2001) (rejecting
former employee’s allegation that his state employer violated the RA thereby waiving its
Eleventh Amendment immunity, even though state employer received federal funds); Castro
Ortiz v. Fajardo, 133 F. Supp. 2d 143, 150 n.6 (D. P.R. 2001) (noting that “[p]laintiff[’]s
claims under the Rehabilitation Act, although barred ... because of lack of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, on the merits would have suffered the same treatment of dismissal
as to monetary damages based on the cases of [Garrett and Kimel].”(citations omitted));
Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that New
York did not waive its sovereign immunity to suit under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act when it accepted federal funds). See also New Holland Vill. Condo. v. Destaso Enters.
Ltd., 139 F. Supp. 2d 499, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“There is little, if any, room under this
stringent standard ... for the sort of ‘constructive’ waiver of immunity that plaintiff asks this
court to apply based on [defendant’s] receipt of Federal funds under the Act.”). Contra ;
Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000). Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 520-21 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
However, in different contexts, waiver has been found. As an example, waiver
has been found in cases involving the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §151,
where courts have found that the College Savings Bank decision permitted waiver based on
a state’s receipt of federal funds and permitted constructive waiver based on a state’s
voluntary conduct in regulating telecommunications affairs. AT&T Commc’n v. BellSouth
Telecomm., Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 645 (5th Cir. 2001); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 344 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1132 (2001) (“We
believe that College Savings does not alter the principle that states may waive their
immunity by accepting a benefit from Congress that has conditions attached ... .”); MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 216 F.3d 929, 937-38 (10th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001).
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Savings Bank, Justice Scalia discussed the rationale behind the requirement
of a “clear declaration”:
The whole point of requiring a “clear declaration” by the
State of its waiver is to be certain that the State in fact
consents to suit. But there is little reason to assume actual
consent based upon the State’s mere presence in a field
subject to congressional regulation.
There is a
fundamental difference between a State’s expressing
unequivocally that it waives its immunity and Congress’s
expressing unequivocally its intention that if the State
takes certain action it shall be deemed to have waived that
immunity. In the latter situation, the most that can be said
with certainty is that the State has been put on notice that
Congress intends to subject it to suits brought by
individuals. That is very far from concluding that the State
made an “all together voluntary” decision to waive its
immunity.104
IV.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS AGAINST THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN FEDERAL COURT.

The federal government’s sovereign immunity is based upon the
English Practice of granting sovereign immunity to the Crown.105 When
the American Constitution was ratified, it was well established in English
law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its own courts.106
104. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680-81 (citations omitted).
105. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-16 (1999) (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall.
419, 437-446, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting), as surveying English practice).
The preeminent authority on English law at the time, Sir William Blackstone, described the
relationship between sovereignty and immunity as follows:
“And, first, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of
sovereignty, or pre-eminence.... Hence it is, that no suit or action can be
brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can
have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction implies superiority of
power ....”
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *234-35 (hereinafter “Blackstone”).
106. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979) (“The immunity of a truly independent
sovereign from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for
centuries. Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the absolute character of that
immunity”).
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Sovereign immunity has its origins in the feudal system.107 As part of the
feudal system, a lord could not be sued by a vassal in his own court.108
However, a petty lord could be sued in the courts of a higher lord.109 The
King’s court was the highest court in the land. Consequently, there was no
higher court where the King could be sued.110 Sovereign immunity not
only rested on the structure of the feudal system, but also on the fiction
that the King could do no wrong.111 The Supreme Court has rejected the
concept that sovereign immunity is based upon the principle that the
sovereign can do no wrong.112
“Although the American people had rejected other aspects of English
political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its
consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and
In adopting our federal system, the founding fathers
ratified.”113
considered immunity from private lawsuits central to sovereign dignity.114
107. Id.
108. Id. at 414-15 n.6 (“He can not be compelled to answer in his own court, but this is
true of every petty lord of every petty manor; that there happens to be in this world no court
above his court is, we may say, an accident.” (citing 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1899))); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive
Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1972).
109. Nevada, 440 U.S. at 415 & n.6.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 415 & n.7 (“The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but
even thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing.” (quoting WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE , COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 246 (William S. Hein & Co, 1992)
(1765))).
112. Id. at 415 & n.8 (the Supreme Court based this holding on the colonies rejection
of the principle because the Declaration of Independence referenced the repeated wrongs
inflicted by the Crown on the colonies) (“The Declaration of Independence proclaims:
‘[T]hat whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right
of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government . . . and such is now
the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history
of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all
having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states’.” (citing
B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 198-229 (1967))).
113. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 715, 716 (1999) (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
419, 434-435 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“I believe there is no doubt that neither in the State
now in question, nor in any other in the Union, any particular Legislative mode, authorizing
a compulsory suit for the recovery of money against a State, was in being either when the
Constitution was adopted, or at the time the judicial act was passed.”)); See also Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890) (“The suability of a State, without its consent, was a thing
unknown to the law. This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and
jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted”).
114. Alden, 527 U.S. at 716.
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The United States, as sovereign, is immune from a lawsuit except when
it consents to be sued.115 The terms of its consent to be sued defines that
court’s jurisdiction to entertain the lawsuit.116 Pursuant to the Tucker Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1491, the United States has sovereign immunity for claims for
damages against it in excess of $10,000 unless the claim is brought in the
Court of Federal Claims.117 The Little Tucker Act gives district courts
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims in most Tucker
Act cases seeking less than $10,000.118 Claims in excess of $10,000 cannot
be brought in a district court.119 The Court of Federal Claims has exclusive
jurisdiction over such claims.120 Appeals of Little Tucker Act claims
brought in district court are taken to the Federal Circuit, not the district
court’s geographical Court of Appeals.121
A lawsuit is considered against the United States regardless of whether
or not the United States is a named defendant if ‘the judgment sought
would expend itself on the public treasury or domain’.”122 A lawsuit is also
considered against the United States when the judgment interferes with
public administration, or when the judgment’s effect is to compel or
restrain the government’s actions.123
115. Nevada, 440 U.S. at 415 (“Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the
absolute character of that immunity.”).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (the Federal Question statute merely establishes the
subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts over federal claims that are within the
competence of federal courts to entertain and does not generally waive sovereign
immunity); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); Whittle v. United States, 7
F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1993).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000). The Tucker Act gives the United States Court of
Federal Claims jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. Id.
118. Kidwell v. Dep’t of Army, Bd. for Corr. of Military Records, 56 F.3d 279, 283
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988)).
119. Cf. Van Drasek v. Lehman, 762 F.2d 1065, 1071 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting
that so-called “exclusive jurisdiction” of Court of Federal Claims over Tucker Act claims
depends not on language of the Tucker Act, but on fact that Congress rarely grants district
courts jurisdiction over such claims).
120. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 n.48 (1988).
121. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (2000).
122. Clark v. United States, 691 F.2d 837, 839, 840 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Land v.
Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947)).
123. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963); Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d
623, 624 (W.D. La. 2000) (suit against federal official in his or her official capacity is suit
against United States). In deciding whether a suit against an officer for non-monetary relief
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The issue of declaratory relief poses a different situation. A district
court does not have jurisdiction merely because a lawsuit fails to seek
monetary relief.124 Courts recognize that plaintiffs may seek to bypass the
Tucker Act jurisdiction by converting complaints which “at their essence”
seek money damages from the government into complaints requesting
injunctive relief or declaratory actions.125 In order to prevent forum
shopping which circumvents a primary purpose of the Tucker Act and to
ensure that a central judicial body adjudicates most claims against the
United States Treasury, “[j]urisdiction under the Tucker Act cannot be
avoided by ... disguising a money claim” as a claim requesting a form of
equitable relief.126 Absent other grounds for district court jurisdiction, a
claim is subject to the Tucker Act and its jurisdictional consequences if, in
whole or in part, it explicitly or “in essence” seeks more than $10,000 in
monetary relief from the federal government.127
Courts will look to the complaint’s substance, not merely its form to
determine if a complaint is in essence seeking monetary damages when it is
styled as seeking equitable relief.128 A complaint does not “in essence”
seek monetary relief merely because it hints at some interest in a monetary
reward from the federal government or because success on the merits may
obligate the United States to pay the complainant.129 So long as the
complaint only requests non-monetary relief that has “considerable value”
is in essence a suit against the United States, a court would engage in the legal fiction that a
suit against a government officer in his official capacity is not a suit against the sovereign if
(1) the government officer's powers in his official capacity are limited by statute and his
actions were ultra vires, or (2) the officer was acting unconstitutionally or pursuant to an
unconstitutional grant of power from the sovereign. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949).
124. See, e.g., Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see
also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 916 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Relying on multiple federal authorities)
(“[D]istrict court jurisdiction is not established merely because a suit fails to pray for a
money judgment.” (citing cases)).
125. Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 968.
126. Van Drasek, 762 F.2d at 1071 n.11. See also, United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64,
71-73 (1987) (describing goal of uniformity behind creation of Federal Circuit); Vietnam
Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (recognizing the
Tucker Act's interest in uniformity).
127. Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 967-68; Heller, Ehrman, White & MacAuliffe v. Babbitt,
992 F.2d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Plaintiffs “may not, by creatively framing their
complaint, circumvent a congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction.”).
128. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Hodel, 815 F.2d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 1987).
129. Vietnam Veterans, 843 F.2d at 534 (“It is ... clear that a claim is not for money
merely because its success may lead to pecuniary costs for the government or benefits for
the plaintiff.”).
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independent of any future potential for monetary relief, that is, as long as
the sole remedy requested is declaratory or injunctive relief that is not
“negligible in comparison” with the potential monetary recovery, courts
will respect the party’s choice of remedies and treat the complaint as
something more than an artfully drafted effort to circumvent the
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.130 In such cases, even if a
complaint is filed with a desire to seek a future monetary award, a district
court with otherwise appropriate jurisdiction may hear the claim and grant
the proper equitable relief.131
Congress enacted the FDJA in 1934, thereby authorizing federal courts
to grant federal declaratory judgment relief.132 The FDJA provides in
relevant part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction …
any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such. 133
Federal jurisdiction under the FDJA is based solely upon the original
jurisdiction of the court, namely diversity jurisdiction or federal question
jurisdiction.134 District courts have discretion to exercise jurisdiction over

130. See e.g., Kidwell v. Dep’t of Army, Bd. for Corr. of Military Records, 56 F.3d
279, 283-286 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Francis E. Heydt Co. v. United States, 948 F.2d 672, 677
(10th Cir. 1991); Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 589 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that
district court did not have jurisdiction over request for money damages in complaint, but
allowing it to retain jurisdiction over non-monetary claims also requested); cf. Vietnam
Veterans, 843 F.2d at 535 (noting that courts are divided, in cases where plaintiffs request
both monetary and equitable relief, over whether Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction
precludes district court from hearing simultaneous request for equitable relief or vice-versa,
and that this court has not decided issue).
131. Kidwell, 56 F.3d at 284; but see Vietnam Veterans, 843 F.2d at 535 (noting, but
not deciding, that pursuit of equitable relief in district court may preclude plaintiff from later
seeking monetary relief in Court of Federal Claims).
132. See Id.
133. Id.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2001).
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declaratory judgment actions brought under the FDJA.135 The discretion
granted under the FDJA is not unfettered. A district court cannot decline to
entertain a declaratory judgment action as a matter of whim or personal
disinclination.136 The discretion granted by the FDJA essentially builds the
abstention doctrine into this grant of jurisdiction.137
In a declaratory judgment action involving coverage there is generally
no request for monetary relief against the federal government. Instead, the
carrier is seeking a declaration of rights under the policy. Unlike most
previously decided cases where the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief with a
desire to obtain monetary relief in the future, a carrier generally is not
seeking monetary relief in the future. In fact, if the carrier is successful in
seeking declaratory relief that the policy does not provide coverage, then
no money would be exchanged. Even if the carrier is unsuccessful in
seeking declaratory relief, the carrier would be responsible for any
monetary award and not the federal treasury. This distinction, however,
does not necessarily allow the carrier to sue the federal government.
The Tucker Act is “only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any
substantive right enforceable against the United States for money
damages.”138 A party must rely on some other independent, substantive
right enforceable against the United States for money damages.139 Various
statutes address whether the federal government has waived its
No statute specifically confers jurisdiction over a
sovereignty.140
declaratory judgment action against the federal government.
A similar issue was addressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Anderson v. United States.141 In Anderson, the trustees of the Hermann
Hospital Estate filed a lawsuit against the United States and the Veterans
Administration seeking declaratory relief to determine the rights and legal
relations of the parties with reference to a parcel of land that had been
condemned and appropriated for public use. The complaint alleged
135. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995) (“Brillhart makes clear that
District Courts possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action
under the [Federal] Declaratory Judgment Act”).
136. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998).
137. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282.
138. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
139. Rogers v. United States, 697 F.2d 886, 887 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983).
140. See generally 14 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3656 (3d ed. 1998) for a discussion of statutory exceptions
to sovereign immunity in actions against the United States.
141. Anderson v. United States, 229 F.2d 675, 677 (5th Cir. 1956) 229 F.2d 675, 677
(5th Cir. 1956).
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jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which confers original
jurisdiction on the district courts of all civil actions wherein the matter in
controversy exceeds a specified sum and arises under the constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States. The Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiff could not rely upon Section 1331 because the United States cannot
be sued without its consent. In addition, the Fifth Circuit noted that the
plaintiffs did not allege a claim for money damages cognizable under 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) and that there was no statute authorizing an injunction
against the United States.142 Furthermore, the Court held that the Federal
Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, did not grant any consent to
sue the United States.143 Consequently, the Court affirmed the dismissal of
the case, reasoning that the United States had never consented to be sued in
an action.
As discussed in Anderson, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act
empowers federal courts to give declaratory judgments in “a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction,” but it is not an independent grant of
jurisdiction.144 Rather, federal jurisdiction must be predicated on some
other statute.145 Consequently, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is not
a source of waiver of sovereign immunity that would allow a carrier to sue
the federal government in federal court.
Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §
701 et seq., contains a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign
immunity. Section 702 provides in pertinent part:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof. An action ... seeking relief other than
money damages ... shall not be dismissed ... on the ground
that it is against the United States.

142. Id. (citing Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10; Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703).
143. Id. (citing Love v. United States, 108 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1939), Blackmar v. Guerre,
342 U.S. 512, 515-16 (1952), Trueman Fertilizer Co. v. Larson, 196 F.2d 910 (5th Cir.
1952), and Mitchell v. United States, 111 F.Supp. 104, 105 (D.N.J. 1952)).
144. Rueth v. United States EPA, 13 F.3d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1993)(holding that federal
court lacked jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to review EPA's pre-enforcement
actions and that court could not grant declaratory relief).
145. Id.
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Agency action for purposes of the APA is defined as “the whole or a
part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or
denial thereof, or failure to act”.146 The APA may be relevant in cases
where the underlying litigation is filed by the United States at the request of
a federal agency. An insured, for example, may violate a federal law like
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319. The administrator of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) may seek to obtain
injunctive relief and criminal penalties for alleged violations of the Clean
Water Act and request that the Justice Department file a lawsuit against the
insured. The filing of the lawsuit could constitute “agency action” for
purpose of the APA. It is axiomatic that the insured is an aggrieved party
by the EPA’s decision to seek injunctive relief and criminal penalties.
Pursuant to state law in certain jurisdictions, an insurance company may be
the real party in interest in liability cases where the conduct of the insured
may operate to impair or impede the insurance company’s ability to protect
its own interest with respect to the insurance policy under which coverage
is claimed.147 Federal courts also recognize the insurer’s real party of
interest status.148 Although no cases have specifically addressed the issue,
it can be argued that the carrier is the real party in interest in the lawsuit
filed by the Justice Department at the behest of the EPA and that the carrier
is also aggrieved by the agency’s decision and has standing to seek review
under the APA. Because the APA contains a broad waiver to government
sovereign immunity in agency review actions seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief,149 the APA would constitute an independent basis for
jurisdiction in a lawsuit against the federal government.150

146. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) and 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) (2000) (“For the purpose of this
chapter ... ‘agency action’ ha[s] the meanin[g] given ... by section 551 of this title”).
147. See, e.g., Comacho v. Gardner, 456 P.2d 925 (Ariz. 1969); East v. Hedges, 608
P.2d 327 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
148. Ocean Ships, Inc. v. Stiles, 315 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing when an
insurer is a real party in interest); Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553, 554-555 (D. Kan. 1965)
(holding that when an accident involved an insured automobile the insurance company is
actually, in fact, if not in law, the real party in interest in the litigation).
149. Cheyenne-Arapaho Gaming Comm'n v. National Indian Gaming Com'n, 214
F.Supp.2d 1155, 1167 (N.D. Okla. 2002).
150. Cf., Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1389 (5th Cir.
1989) (holding that based upon the CERCLA statute, its structure, and legislative history,
until the government initiates a cost-recovery action, a potential responsible party cannot
obtain judicial review of the agency action under the APA).
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In addition, a request for a declaratory judgment in the example given
would not impose an intolerable burden on governmental functions.151 “A
declaratory judgment is just that: a declaration of rights. It is not a coercive
remedy like an injunction or a money judgment.”152 Consequently,
sovereign immunity would not apply and would not preclude the carrier
from seeking declaratory relief in federal court.153
V. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION AGAINST
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN STATE COURT.

THE

As previously discussed, the United States, and its officers while acting
in their official capacities, enjoy sovereign immunity. Thus, a state court
only has jurisdiction over an officer of the federal government if the United
States has waived its immunity by consenting to suit or if the officer has
exceeded any statutory or constitutional authority.154 “Federal courts
generally deem a suit for specific relief, e.g., injunctive or declaratory
relief, against a named officer of the United States to be a suit against the
sovereign.”155 However, the protection of public officials from the fear of
civil damages is not a concern when the lawsuit is for declaratory and
injunctive relief.156 As previously discussed, it can be argued that the
federal government waived its sovereign immunity under the APA for a
declaratory judgment action. The issue is whether the federal government
can be sued in state court under the APA.
Although Congress did not explicitly grant federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain APA lawsuits, it has been held that the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over APA lawsuits.157 In Aminoil U. S.
151. Clark v. United States, 691 F.2d 837, 841 n.5 (7th Cir. 1982).
152. Id. at 841.
153. C.H. Sanders Co., Inc. v. BHAP Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 114, 119 (2d
Cir. 1990) (“We hold that an action (regardless of the amount sought) may be commenced
under § 1331 in the district court provided there is an independent waiver of sovereign
immunity outside the Tucker Act.”).
154. See Aminoil U.S.A., Inc. v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 674 F.2d 1227,
1233 (9th Cir. 1982).
155. Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 (1949)).
156. See B. C. Morton Int’l Corp. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 305 F.2d 692, 695-96 (1st
Cir. 1962).
157. See Aminoil U.S.A., Inc.,. 674 F.2d at1235 (9th Cir. 1982); 2 FED. PROC. L. ED. §
2:267 (2006) (“It is not proper to permit a state court to review the decisions of federal
agencies under the APA when, in fact, the APA provides no independent basis for federal
jurisdiction and should provide no independent cause of action in state court either.”). But
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A., Inc. v. California State Water Resources Control Board,158 for example,
Aminoil operated oil and gas wells at a site in Orange County, California.
The various operations produced drilling wastes that were discharged into
the surrounding environment. The Fish and Wildlife Service of the United
States Department of the Interior requested that the Santa Ana Region of
the State Board (Regional Board) adopt an order declaring Aminoil’s
disposal site a “wetlands” subject to the jurisdiction of the Clean Water
Act159 and its companion California statute.160 The EPA and the Regional
Board concluded that the disposal site could not be defined as national
wetlands and, therefore, a permit for the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters was not necessary. An environment group appealed the
decision to the California State Water Resources Control Board (“State
Board”), which reversed the decision.
Aminoil originally filed a lawsuit in California state court to review the
order of the State Board and joined the Administrator of the EPA as a real
party in interest. The Administrator removed the case to the district court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Upon removal, the Administrator filed
a motion to dismiss, asserting that neither the state court, nor the district
court upon removal, had jurisdiction to entertain the lawsuit because of
sovereign immunity. The district court granted the motion, holding that a
state court does not have jurisdiction over a federal agency in a dispute
over federal law when the federal court lacked jurisdiction.161
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, although the State court
had general jurisdiction over Aminoil’s cause of action against the State
Board, the State Court may not necessarily have the power to join the
Administrator as a party. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that it is well settled
that the United States, and its officers while acting in their official
capacities, enjoy sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit noted that a State
court may entertain an action against an officer of the federal government

see Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,101 S.Ct. 2870, 2875-76(1981) (“[T]he mere grant
of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from concurrent
jurisdiction over the cause of action.”).
158. 674 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1982).
159. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000).
160. CAL. WATER CODE § 13320 (West 1992).
161. Aminoi U.S.A. Inc., 674 F.2d at 1231 n.3.(District court held that the EPA must
take final action before it can be sued pursuant to the Clean Water Act, and that when the
EPA is sued, it must be sued in federal court).
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only if the United States has waived its immunity by consenting to suit or if
the officer has exceeded his statutory or constitutional authority.162
On appeal, Aminoil argued, among other things, that Section 702 of the
APA applied and that the federal government waived its sovereign
immunity.
The Ninth Circuit held that Section 702 was clearly
inapplicable. The Court noted that while Section 702 waives the sovereign
immunity of the United States for non-monetary claims against the
government, the waiver of sovereign immunity is expressly limited to
actions brought “in a court of the United States ...”163 The Court based its
decision on the legislative history of the APA which demonstrated that
Section 702 was not intended to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity for
suits against the United States or its officers in state courts.164
Consequently, there is no state forum for a declaratory judgment action
against the federal government.165
VI. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION AGAINST STATE IN
FEDERAL COURT.
The Eleventh Amendment was enacted to delineate the scope of
sovereign immunity reserved by the States.166 The Eleventh Amendment
provides, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one

162. Id. at 1233. See also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 623 (1963); United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Martinez v. Marshall, 573 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir.
1977); Smith v. Grimm, 534 F.2d 1346, 1351 n.6 (9th Cir. 1976).
163. Animoil U.S.A. Inc.,674 F.2d at 1233 (citing Hill v. United States, 571 F.2d 1098,
1102 (9th Cir. 1978)).
164. Animoil U.S.A. Corp., 674 F.2d at 1233(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 11
(1976), as reprinted in (1976) U.S.C.C.A.N. 6121, 6131 (“The consent to suit is also limited
to claims in the courts of the United States; hence, the United States remains immune from
suit in state courts.”)).
165. In Aminoil, the Ninth Circuit also held that the removal of the state case to federal
court did not confer jurisdiction on the district court because removal jurisdiction is entirely
derivative of the jurisdiction of the state court. Id. at 1232 (citing Minnesota v. United
States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939)). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that when the state court
lacks jurisdiction, the district court does not acquire jurisdiction even if it would have had
jurisdiction if the suit had originally been commenced in federal court. Id. (citing Lambert
Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); Jacobson v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1362 (9th Cir. 1977)).
166. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723 (1999).
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of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.”167
The Eleventh Amendment guarantees that non-consenting states may
not be sued by private individuals in federal court.168 Thus, States are
immune from suits brought in federal court by their own citizens, and the
citizens of other States.169 “The Eleventh Amendment bar is not absolute.
States may consent to suit in federal court and, in certain cases, Congress
may abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.”170
Federal courts will give effect to a State’s waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity “‘only where stated by the most express language or
by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for
any other reasonable construction.’”171 “A State does not waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only in its own
courts.”172 “Thus, in order for a state statute or constitutional provision to
constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the
State’s intention to subject itself to suit in federal court.”173
States generally maintain their absolute and qualified sovereign
immunity in various, enumerated circumstances by statute which may not
be applicable to a particular declaratory judgment action.174 If the State, for
example, sues the insured in State court, the filing of the suit does not
waive the State sovereign immunity in federal court. States typically do
not specifically consent to being sued in federal court. States may typically
authorize tort and contract actions against the State.175 Such limited
waivers of its sovereign immunity do not waive the State’s sovereign
immunity such that it can be sued in federal court.176
Congress can abrogate the State’s immunity pursuant to a valid
exercise of power, hence allowing a State to be sued in federal court.177
167. U.S. CONST., amend. XI.
168. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2000).
169. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). See also, Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72–73
(2000); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
170. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990).
171. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985) (internal
quotations ommitted).
172. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 495 U.S. at 306.
173. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 241.
174. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-820.01 (2006).
175. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-821 (2007).
176. Markowitz v. United States, 650 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1981).
177. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 445-46 (1976).
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According to the Ex Parte Young doctrine, a State can be sued in federal
court by a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in a suit against a state
official.178 However, the Ex Parte Young doctrine only applies when “the
relief sought is prospective in nature and is based on an ongoing violation
of the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights.”179 The Eleventh
Amendment also bar claims in federal court asserted against state officers
based on alleged violations of state law.180
A lawsuit filed by the State for violations of state environmental laws
would typically not contain any federal issues. Consequently, the Ex Parte
Young doctrine would be inapplicable and a federal forum is unavailable
for a declaratory judgment action involving the state government.
In addition, when “a corporation of one state sues another state, the
action is deemed not to be between citizens of different states, and diversity
of citizenship is therefore unavailable as a basis for federal jurisdiction.”181
VII. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION AGAINST STATE
GOVERNMENT IN STATE COURT.
The Eleventh Amendment, does not bar a suit against a State in that
State’s own court system nor does it bar a suit against a state in a different
State court.182 Most States have adopted the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act. Arizona’s Declaratory Judgment Act, A.R.S. § 12-1832,
presents as a typical enactment of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
A.R.S. § 12-1832 provides:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract
or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute,
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising
under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or

178. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166-67 (1908).
179. Cent. Reserve Life of N. Am. Ins. Co. v. Struve, 852 F.2d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir.
1988) (first emphasis added). See Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. Sida of Haw.,
Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 874 (9th Cir. 1987).
180. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).
181. Cent. Reserve Life of N. Am. Ins. Co., 852 F.2d at 1161 n.5 (citing State Highway
Comm'n of Wyo. v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 200 (1928)).
182. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 411 (1979).
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franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other
legal relations thereunder.
Arizona courts, like most jurisdictions, have held that the Arizona
Declaratory Judgment Act is a means by which a party may seek
declaratory judgment relief to resolve controversies involving public
officials.183 In addition, declaratory relief is available to insureds, insurers,
and other parties whose rights, status, or legal relations are affected by an
insurance policy.184 Hence, based upon the State’s enactment of its
declaratory judgment act and its waiver of sovereign immunity, a carrier
can seek declaratory relief against the State and its agencies in state court.
Based upon the relevant case law, a carrier typically cannot file one
consolidated action involving the insured, the federal government, and the
state government. A carrier must file two separate actions: one in federal
court against the federal government and another in state court against the
state government. Alternatively, the carrier may chose to file only one
declaratory judgment action against either the federal government or the
state government with the hopes that the other governmental entity may
chose to intervene. If the governmental entity intervenes in a court where it
has sovereign immunity, the governmental entity has waived its sovereign
immunity and jurisdiction in the court is proper.185
VIII. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO
FINDING A WAY THROUGH THE MAZE OF DUAL
SOVEREIGNTY
It is not possible to force both the federal government and state
government into one single unified declaratory judgment action in either
state or federal court. The question becomes whether there is a practical
way to maneuver around the obstacle created through dual sovereignty to
avoid the time and costs associated with bringing two separate actions, as
183. Riley v. Cochise County, 455 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969).
184. See Connolly v. Great Basin Ins. Co., 431 P.2d 921, 926-27 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
185. Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 24 (1933) (noting that State’s Eleventh
Amendment Immunity may be waived by a voluntary proceeding in intervention, but
holding no waiver under particular facts); United States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037, 1041 (10th
Cir. 1996) (holding that federal government waived its sovereign immunity by initiating
suit); see also, 6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1427, at
197 (2d ed. 1990) (“[W]hen the United States institutes an action, defendant may assert by
way of recoupment any claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the
original claim in order to reduce or defeat the government's recovery.”).
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well as to avoid the possibility of inconsistent results on the same issue.
One strategic approach to this problem may be found within the doctrines
of full faith and credit and comity.
Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution provides that: “Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State … Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”186 Strictly speaking, the full faith
and credit clause of the United States Constitution does not require that the
federal courts give full faith and credit to the judgments of state courts.187
Similarly, judgments of the federal courts are generally not considered to
be within the purview of the constitutional requirement that state courts to
give full faith and credit to judgments from other states.188
However, all federal courts are required by statute to give full faith and
credit to valid state court judgments.189 Specifically, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, “[t]he records and judicial proceedings of any court of any …
State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, …
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in
the courts of [the[ State, Territory, or Possession from which they are
186. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (West 2007) (duly authenticated “records and judicial
proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof …
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the court[] [from] which they
[were] taken.”).
187. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986); Taylor v. Sawyer, 284 F.3d
1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[b]y its terms, and in light of its purpose, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause imposes no obligation whatsoever on the federal government.”);
United. States. v. Carter, No. 05-5179, 2006 WL 2076807 at *3 (10th Cir. Jul. 27,2006).
188. Supreme Lodge, K.P. v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30, 33 (1924); Del. Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air v. Com. of Pa., 755 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1985); Puckett v. City of
Emmett, 747 P.2d 48 (Idaho 1987); Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W.2d 93 (1936).
189. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the Full Faith and
Credit Act requires a federal district court to give the same, not more and not less,
preclusive effect to a state court judgment as that judgment would have in the state courts of
the state in which it was rendered); Slip Track Systems, Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d
1256, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that federal courts must give state court judgments full
faith and credit by applying the preclusion law of the rendering state); Genesys Data
Technologies, Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 2000); Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 18 (1st
Cir. 2000) (observing that the statute granting full faith and credit to state judicial
proceedings requires the federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court
judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the
judgments emerged).
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taken.”190 Thus, a federal court generally must give full faith and credit to
a state court judgment, allowing it to have both res judicata191 and collateral
estoppel effect.192
Similarly, a state court must give a federal court judgment full faith and
credit,193 and thus both res judicata194 and collateral estoppel effect.195
Under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA),196 the
term “foreign judgment” includes a judgment of any court of the United
States.197 Thus, a judgment of a federal district court comes within the
purview of the UEFJA.198 Under the UEFJA, a copy of a foreign judgment
may be filed in a court of the state, in which case the judgment is treated as
a judgment of a court of the state.199
190. 28 U.S.C. A. § 1738 (West 2007).
191. Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991); Americana Fabrics,
Inc. v. L & L Textiles, Inc., 754 F.2d 1524, 1529 (9th Cir 1985).
192. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980); Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456,
1459 (10th Cir. 1991).
193. Meyer, 265 U.S. at 33 (holding that “[w]hile the judicial proceedings of the
federal courts are not within the terms of the constitutional provision, such proceedings,
nevertheless, must be accorded the same full faith and credit by state courts as would be
required in respect of the judicial proceedings of another state.”); Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc.,
437 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2006); Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Com.
of Pa., 755 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that “although Congress implemented the
Constitution's full faith and credit clause of Article IV, § 1, in language referring only to
state courts, there ‘is a clearly established rule that state courts must give full faith and credit
to the proceedings of federal courts[.] That this is the rule is beyond doubt, and the state
courts have generally accepted it.’”); Nottingham v. Weld, 237 Va. 416, 419, 377 S.E.2d
621, 623 (Va. 1989); McAllister, 216 B.R. 957, 974 (Bankr. N.D.Ala. 1998); Rehabilitation
of Frontier Ins. Co., 27 A.D.3d 274, 275 (N.Y.App.Div. 2006); Denny Wiekhorst Equip.,
Inc. v. Tri-State Outdoor Media Group, Inc., 693 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Neb. 2005);
Transamerica Trade Co., Inc. v. McCollum Aviation, Inc., 424 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1981).
194. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2006); S. Coatings, Inc. v.
City of Tamarac, 916 So.2d 19, 21 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005); Federated Mgt. Co. v. Latham &
Watkins, 742 N.E.2d 684, 689 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Urlic v. Insurance Co. of State of
Pennsylvania, 259 A.D.2d 1, 4 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999).
195. Denny Wiekhorst Equip., Inc. v. Tri-State Outdoor Media Group, Inc., 693
N.W.2d 506, 511 (Neb. 2005); McCallum v. N. C. Co-op. Extension Service of N.C. State
Univ., 542 S.E.2d 227, 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
196. Unif. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act §§ 1-10 (West 2007).
197. Id. § 1.
198. Bechtel Corp. v. W. Contracting Corp., 414 N.W.2d 130, 131 (Iowa 1987).
199. Unif. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1964 § 2 (West 2007). However,
it is important to note that there is at least one state variation of the UEFJA Act that does not
apply to federal court judgments. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Panelfab Intern. Corp., 501
So.2d 167, 168 (Fla.Disct.Ct. App. 1987).
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The usefulness of the full faith and credit doctrine as it pertains to the
subject matter of this article derives from the specific factual circumstances
at issue. While it is not possible to bring both the state and federal
governments into one unified action, the insured will be a part of the action
irregardless of the forum. If the factual and legal issues pertaining to
coverage are the same in relation to the claims by both the state and federal
governments, any decision in favor of the insurance carrier against the
insured should be given full faith and credit in either forum.
For example, if the insurance carrier proceeds against the insured and
the federal government in a federal declaratory judgment action, the
decision should be given full faith and credit in any subsequent state court
proceeding. Technically speaking, because the state government was not a
party to this proceeding, the state government would not be bound by the
decision under either res judicata or collateral estoppel.200 However, the
state government should, for all practical purposes, be bound to the
judgment on the coverage issue via the decision against the insured. More
specifically, any possible recovery which can be obtained against the
insurance policy by the state government in relation to a judgment against
the insured in state court can only occur if the insured is entitled to such
coverage under the terms of the insurance contract. Since a judgment on
the issue of coverage has already been rendered by the federal court under
this scenario, the state court should be effectively precluded from
recovering against the policy pursuant to the full faith and credit doctrine.
Arguably, the above should work whether the declaratory judgment
action is filed in either state or federal court. However, the practical effect
of the full faith and credit doctrine may be weaker as it pertains to the
federal government giving full faith and credit to a decision of a state court.
The federal full faith and credit statute may be subject to certain

200. It has been held that in order for a federal court judgment to have preclusive effect
in a state court action the parties to the state court proceeding must be the same as the
original federal court proceeding; the judgment is not binding on strangers but is conclusive
only as against those parties or their privies or others who sufficiently participate or are
represented in the action. McCallum v. N.C. Co-op. Extension Serv. of N.C. State
University, 142 N.C.App. 48, 51-52, 542 S.E.2d 227, 231 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); Wagner v.
Heavlin, 136 Ohio App.3d 719, 738, 737 N.E.2d 989, 1002-03 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Great
Dane Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Malvern Pulpwood, Inc., 301 Ark. 436, 439, 785 S.W.2d 13, 15
(Ark. 1990); Waddell v. Stevenson, 683 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Silver v.
Queen's Hospital, 63 Haw. 430, 435-36, 629 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Hawaii 1981).
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exceptions,201 and the effect of state court judgments may be limited by
competing federal interests or public policy.202
In contrast, states do not appear to have such flexibility in applying the
full faith and credit doctrine to federal court decisions.203 A judgment or
decree which has been duly rendered by a federal court is binding and
conclusive on the parties to that action in all subsequent state court
litigation between them, and is not subject to review or reexamination by
the state courts on the merits.204 Likewise, the procedural transfer of a
federal court judgment to a state court pursuant to the UEFJA does not
confer jurisdiction upon the state court to reconsider the merits of the case
de novo.205 A judgment duly rendered by a federal court also cannot be

201. Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 84 F.3d 1388, 1392 (11th
Cir. 1996); Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1995);
In re Hale, 155 B.R. 730, 735 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
202. U.S. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1001-02 (9th 1980) (observing that in
employment discrimination suits under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, several courts
have refused to give collateral estoppel effect to prior decisions by state agencies under state
law because of the countervailing public policy that a plaintiff is not to be deprived of a
federal forum to adjudicate employment discrimination claims); Batiste v. Furnco Constr.
Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1974); Matter of Shuler 722 F.2d 1253, 1258 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1984).
203. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) (holding that the doctrine of full
faith and credit required Mississippi to extend full faith and credit to a judgment obtained in
Missouri upon a gambling debt even though that debt was incurred in Mississippi and such a
debt was not a valid legally enforceable obligation under Mississippi law); Hilton Intern.
Co. v. Arace 35 Conn.Supp. 522, 530, 394 A.2d 739, 743 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); see also
REST. (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1971) ( “[a] valid judgment rendered in one
State of the United States will be recognized and enforced in a sister State even though the
strong public policy of the latter State would have precluded recovery in its courts on the
original claim.”).
204. Prina v. Union Canal & Irr. Co., 63 Ariz. 473, 163 P.2d 683 (1945); Meyer v.
Milliken, 111 Colo. 113, 138 P.2d 276 (1943); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 151
Fla. 564, 10 So.2d 85 (1942); Meyer v. Kenmore-Granville Hotel Co., 308 Ill.App. 78, 31
N.E.2d 330 (1941);Union Pac. R. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 136 Kan. 166, 13 P.2d 276
(1932); Hays v. Lundy, 293 Ky. 711, 170 S.W.2d 49 (1943); Real Estate Exch. Corp. v.
Harte, 304 Mich. 596, 8 N.W.2d 652 (1943); In re McLure's Estate, 90 Mont. 502, 3 P.2d
1056 (1931); Wehle v. Shanks, 35 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1942); Dittmar v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 155 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Ct. App. 1941); State ex rel. O'Brien v. Superior Court for King
County, 173 Wash. 679, 24 P.2d 117 (1933).
205. U.S. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1001-02 (9th 1980) (observing that in
employment discrimination suits under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, several courts
have refused to give collateral estoppel effect to prior decisions by state agencies under state
law because of the countervailing public policy that a plaintiff is not to be deprived of a
federal forum to adjudicate employment discrimination claims); Batiste v. Furnco Const.
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impeached collaterally in a state court for any alleged irregularity or
error.206 A state court can only reexamine a federal court judgment for
purposes of determining the scope and extent of that judgment.207
This approach may find further support depending upon the facts and
regulations at issue. Specifically, privity may be held to exist between the
state and federal governments if the violations sued for and adjudicated in
the federal case are the same as those presented in a state enforcement
action.208 Although the state government may not be involved in the
federal court action, if privity exists the state may nevertheless be bound by
the decision under either res judicata or collateral estoppel because of the
federal government’s involvement.
For example, in State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.,209
the insured, Smithfield Foods, Inc., was sued by both the EPA and the
Virginia State Water Control Board in separate proceedings for violations
of a permit that regulated the discharge of wastewater into navigable
waters.210 In the federal action brought by the EPA, it was determined that
Smithfield had engaged in numerous violations of its permit.211 Smithfield
subsequently filed a motion in the state action, asserting that the Virginia
State Water Control Board’s enforcement action in state court was now
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.212 The central issue in that case was
whether privity existed between the Virginia State Water Control Board
and the EPA in the federal action. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that
Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1974); Tronagun Corp. v. Mizerock, 820 F.Supp. 225
(W.D.Pa. 1993).
206. Chapman v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, Kentucky, 117 F.2d 321 (6th Cir.
1941); Mueller v. Elba Oil Co., 21 Cal.2d 188, 130 P.2d 961 (1942); Standard Accident Ins.
Co. v. Simpson, 151 Fla. 564, 10 So.2d 85 (1942); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co., 136 Kan. 166, 13 P.2d 276 (1932); Real Estate Exch. Corp. v. Harte, 304 Mich. 596, 8
N.W.2d 652 (1943); Cline v. Tait, 113 Mont. 475, 129 P.2d 89 (1942); U.S. v. President and
Directors of Manhattan Co., 276 N.Y. 396, 12 N.E.2d 518 (1938); Upton's Estate, 199
Wash. 447, 92 P.2d 210 (1939).
207. State v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 258 S.W. 609, 162 Ark. 443 (1924).
208. See, e g., State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 261 Va. 209, 215-16,
542 S.E.2d 766, 769-70 (2001). Cf. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d at 1003 (holding that the
relationship between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Washington Department
of Ecology was sufficiently close such that the Environmental Protection Agency was
collaterally estopped from re-litigating in a federal enforcement action under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act an issue which had already been decided in a state enforcement
action in which the Washington Department of Ecology had been a party).
209. State Water Control Bd., 542 S.E.2d 766.
210. Id. at 768.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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privity existed in that case because the interests and rights of both the state
and federal agencies were vested in a single permit issued pursuant to joint
program between the agencies.213 In other words, “the [Virginia State
Water Control Board] and the EPA share[d] an identity of interest in the
permit issued to Smithfield … such that the [Virginia State Water Control
Board’s] legal right was represented by the EPA in the federal action when
the EPA sought to enforce the provisions of the permit.”214
It should be noted that whether privity exists between the parties in
particular circumstances requires a case by case determination in which the
traditional principles of the doctrine are applied.215 The mere existence of
dual enforcement powers between the state and federal governments in and
of itself neither compels nor precludes a finding of privity.216 Nevertheless,
it is another factor which may work in favor of the approach to solving the
dilemma which is the subject matter of this article, as outlined above.
In sum, it would appear that the less problematic approach would be
for the insurance carrier to file a declaratory judgment action in federal
court against the insured and the federal government in these dual
sovereignty situations. If the insurance carrier is successful on the relevant
coverage issues, the state government should be effectively precluded from
recovering under the policy due to the full faith and credit protection
afforded to the decision rendered on coverage between the insurance carrier
and the insured. Any state proceeding which may be necessary to enforce
the federal judgment should be abbreviated, thereby avoiding the expense
associated with prosecuting two separate actions. This should also
effectively avoid the possibility of inconsistent decisions rendered on the
same issue.
Practically speaking, taking this approach to resolve this dilemma
could also operate to force the state government to consider voluntarily
waiving its immunity and participate in the federal declaratory judgment
action, thereby avoiding the dilemma altogether. If the state government is
aware that the declaratory judgment action is proceeding and that a
decision in that action could prevent the state from recovering under the
policy, the state may seek to join the federal action in order to protect its
interest in the resolution of the coverage issue.

213. Id. at 770.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 771.
216. Id.
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I CAME, I SAW, I UNDERWROTE: D & O LIABILITY
INSURANCE’S PAST UNDERWRITING PRACTICES AND
POTENTIAL FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Joshua Dobiac
Underwriting is rarely easy.
For D & O liability insurance
underwriting this is even truer. A field that has long been recognized as
more of an art than a science, many billions of dollars rest upon their
accurately rating the risks that they underwrite. This paper attempts to
evaluate the current practices of D & O insurance underwriting with one
goal in mind: Is there a better way of underwriting the risk?
Part I of this paper provides a basic review of the D & O underwriting
market and how underwriters go about underwriting risk, first in general
and then specifically D & O risk. Part II evaluates the how corporate
governance may be a compelling factor in individualized underwriting.
Finally Part III discusses an alternative to the current underwriting
methods, with the goal of making D & O insurance underwriting less prone
to errors.
I. THE D & O INSURANCE MARKET AND D & O UNDERWRITERS
All states in the U.S. have statutes allowing for the indemnification of
Directors and Officers.1 Such indemnification is allowed even for those
acts that the corporation is statutorily prevented from personally
indemnifying.2 While historically states were silent on whether this was
allowed, it soon became apparent that this type of insurance was not going
to go away.3 This was the beginning of Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance
as a bona fide line of insurance.4

1.

For a complete list, see Joseph Warren Bishop, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
§ 6:4 (2006).
2. See Intermarque Automotive Products, Inc. v. Feldman, 21 S.W.3d 544 (Tex.
App. Texarkana 2000).
3. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr. New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability, 22 BUS. LAW. 92 (1966).
4. Although the first D & O policy was issued in the 1930s in the U.S. by Lloyd’s
underwriters. IAN YOUNGMAN, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY INSURANCE 144 (2d
ed. 1999). The insurance was a response to the wave of lawsuits following the 1929 stock
market crash. Id.
AND DIRECTORS
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Starting in the 1960s, D & O insurance was created to protect directors
and officers from derivative lawsuits. In general, public policy did not
allow for indemnification.5 By the 1970s, as the line of insurance
continued to grow, coverage was readily available at relatively low cost,
despite it being an otherwise unfriendly time for most lines of insurance.6
However, the 1980s marked a time of significant change. A major
Delaware Supreme Court case is often regarded as the beginning of a new
era of shareholder litigation and thus executive liability.7 Here, the court
found the directors of a corporation personally liable for failing to make an
informed business decision with respect to a recent merger.8 This was
despite the absence of fraud or bad faith.9 On the tail of this decision,
many other lawsuits increasingly revealed the substantial risks to which
corporate officers were being exposed.10 Also just making this revelation
was the D & O insurance market, which subsequently began to harden.
Policy limits decreased, premiums increased and the list of exclusions in
the policies multiplied considerably.11 By 1987 states began to reduce the
potential exposure of Directors and Officers through legislation.12
Again the market softened and became more accommodating to
corporations. However, a significant underwriting cycle was developing.13
The market during 1990s was initially soft, but by the close of the decade
began to harden appreciably.14 This problem persisted into the current
decade.15 Following such large profile scandals such as Enron, Adelphia
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 46 A.L.R.4th 821 (Del. 1985).
8. Id. at 864.
9. Under the business judgment rule, poor decision making is not defense. Id. at
872. As the court stated, “fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires more than the mere
absence of bad faith or fraud. Representation of the financial interests of others imposes on
a director an affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a critical eye in
assessing information of the type and under circumstance [in the case.]” Id.
10. See LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND
INSURANCE § 8:1.
11. Id. For a detailed discussion of the crisis in the market in the late 80s, see Roberta
Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors’ and Officers Liability Insurance?, 14 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1 (1989).
12. See Id. §§ 7:22 et seq.
13. This underwriting cycle, including its potential causes and effects, will bear
significantly upon the topic in this paper. It will be discussed in greater detail infra.
14. See Tillinghast Towers Perrin, 2005 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY
[Hereinafter Tilinghast 2005 Survey].
15. Though there was a slight softening of the market around the turn of the century.
See Tillinghast 2005 Survey.
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and Tyco, the D & O insurance market paid out roughly twice as much as it
brought in from premiums.16 The majority of these losses came from
shareholder litigation.17 In 2002 alone, premiums were estimated to have
increased anywhere from 25% to 400%, with the largest increases going to
the more financially unstable companies.18 This trend continued into the
next year.19 2003 was the zenith, however.20 In 2004 and 2005, premiums
dropped significantly, returning to lows not seen since 2001.21 At the same
time, for-profit corporations saw their average limits increase 9% in 2005
alone.22
These results are somewhat troubling, however. Despite lower
premiums23, higher limits24 and less restrictive policies, claims experience
in 2005 was more severe.25 This is attributable to both higher frequency
and greater severity in individual claims.26 In addition to this, legal costs
have also increased by as much as 100% from 2004 alone.27 Whether this
counterintuitive behavior is attributable to underwriting lagging market

16. Id.
17. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 4 (reporting that responding companies experienced
57% of their D & O claims from shareholders).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 61.
22. Id.
23. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 61(“reporting that average premium for all participants
were approximately 13% lower in 2005 than in 2006”).
24. Although it should be noted that average limits actually decreased for those
corporations with assets greater than $5 billion. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 24. Also, the
most significant increase occurred with the excess layers. There was little change in the
limits of the primary layers. This is particularly surprising, given that the average claim is
increasingly more expensive and in any event the average is higher than the average primary
layer. Staid primary limits indicates greater excess layer exposure, which would imply
lower excess layer limits or higher premiums, but the opposite occurred.
25. Id.
26. Severity can be measured in several ways, but a common one is average
settlement amounts. See Ronald I. Miller, et al., Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action
Litigation: Beyond the Mega-Settlements, is Stabilization Ahead? (NERA Economic
Consulting, April 2006). In 2005, settlements averaged over $24 million. Id. at 5. This was
an increase of over 26% from 2004. Id. In fact, the average settlement from ’02 to ’05 was
67.7% greater than the average settlement value for the years ’96 to ’01. Id.
27. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 112 (Average expense cost in 2005 was $781,000 per
claim, up from $370,000 per claim in 2004).
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forces or is the result of optimism or increased competition will be
addressed below.28
The rising and falling of premiums and limits only tell part of the D &
O insurance story. In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley act in
response to the highly publicized corporate scandals discussed above.29 As
a consequence, the cost of doing business for publicly-traded companies
increased by 90.4%.30 Furthermore, while asset size was the single largest
determinant of premium level historically, industry and claims history now
play a more significant role.31 Thus, large companies with negative claims
histories are finding premiums increasingly more painful to pay.32 In fact,
24% of respondents who did not purchase the insurance claimed they
declined to do so because the cost was too high.33
Other legal concerns inform D & O insurance. In particular, most
shareholder claims allege a violation of directors’ fiduciary duties34 or are
securities-based lawsuits.35 Nor are these complaints repetitiously alleging

28. “We attribute this shift to the greater market capacity of the D & O insurance
market. However, it will be difficult to sustain this trend, and we expect capacity to begin to
shrink. This shrinkage will likely come not from companies exiting the market altogether,
but from a reduction in the overall amount of D & O coverage they underwrite.” Tillinghast
2005 Survey at 3.
29. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
30. This increase was the result of increased accounting fees, compliance rules, rising
premiums for D & O insurance, increased director compensation, legal fees and auditor fees.
31. Joseph Warren Bishop, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 8.02
(2006). How much this affects corporate conduct will be discussed in Part II, infra.
32. At present no one is finding it difficult to find coverage, however. Tillinghast
2005 Survey (“[A]ll U.S. and Canadian participants reported that they were able to obtain D
& O coverage”). This indicates that insurers are still more than willing to underwrite a
corporation regardless of the level of risk presented. This is troubling, insofar as
underwriters are tasked with risk selection as well as risk pricing. There may be a time in
the future when the market hardens appreciably that insurance will no longer be offered to
the highest risk tier, whatever that may be determined to be. Despite this, the fact that there
are periods where the vast majority of companies can find coverage testifies to the degree of
endogenous risk in the line.
33. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 21. However, those who gave this reason were only
from two of the 6 principal business classes, Durable Goods and Nonbanking Financial
Services. Id.
34. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomson, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004).
35. These lawsuits are based upon both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 USCA §§ 77a-77aa (1997 and Sup 2005); 15 USCA §§ 78a78mm (1997 and Sup 2005).
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the same violations.36 And shareholders are not the sole moving party in
these lawsuits. The SEC additionally is empowered to bring lawsuits
against corporations suspected of securities violations.37 Most violations,
however, are alleged to be caused by misrepresentations that adversely
affected shareholders.38 The mechanism whereby this impacts the
shareholders is stock price.39 These lawsuits typically rely upon a violation
of Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.40
A. D & O INSURANCE POLICIES AND COVERAGE
The line of Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance can be divided into three
distinct types of coverage: Side A, B and C. Side A coverage is individual
coverage that is meant to indemnify corporate officers for any sums for
which they become liable to pay.41 There is often language in the policy
that restricts this indemnification to circumstances where the firm is not
permitted to indemnify the officer directly.42 Side B coverage “reimburses
the corporation for its indemnification payments to officers and
directors.”43 And finally, the least common type of D & O insurance. Side
C “protects the corporation from the risk of shareholder litigation to which

36. See William E. Knepper & Dan A. Baily, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS § 17.02 (7th ed. 2003) (containing a list of 170 different bases for corporate
liability in shareholder actions).
37. See generally, 15 U.S.C. § 77s; § 77t; § 78u(a); § 78u(d).
38. “Misstatements designed to keep the firm afloat, as opposed to those designed
merely to pad executive pay packages, because they arguably benefit the firm may not seem
to arise out of agency costs. However, any benefit to current shareholders – through, for
example, overstated earnings – comes at the expense of future shareholders – those who buy
in under the misrepresentation and therefore pay too much for their shares and also those
who fail to sell prior to the corrective disclosure. This reveals a temporal conflict between
investors generally.” Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk:
Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 CHICAGO L. REV.
487,497 fn 38, citing Steven L. Schwartz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict
Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044 (2005). For a detailed
discussion of why corporations are willing to mislead corporate investors, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock
Market Investors, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000).
39. See Generally, Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as
Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 903 (2003).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2000); C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
41. Baker, et al, Predicting Governance Risk, supra note 38, at 499.
42. See Id. at 499, note 51.
43. Id. at 499.
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the corporate entity is itself a party.”44 Side A and B coverage is generally
referred to as “standard coverage.”45
While the mechanics of each type of policy are different, so is the
general liability structure and degree of protection. For example, Side A
insurance frequently does not have any deductible associated with the
coverage.46 Side B and C, however generally have large retentions.47
Some companies now purchase split retentions, where the deductible is
higher for securities claims.48
D & O insurance policies typically cover settlement amounts, legal fees
and compensatory damages.49 This coverage is contingent upon the
liability coming from the conduct of directors and officers in their
professional capacity.50 The policies also have three distinct exclusions.
The first exclusion removes coverage from claims involving “actual
fraud.”51 Secondly, there is no coverage for acts that were committed prior
to the start of the policy.52 This is called the “prior acts” exclusion.53
Finally, because some acts may result in the Corporation suing its own
directors or officers, there is the “Insured v. Insured” exclusion.54 This
exclusion removes coverage for expenses arising out of litigation between
named insureds on the policy.55 Myriad other exclusions exist,56 but since
44. Id. “The Insurer will pay on behalf of the Company Loss which the Company
shall become legally obligated to pay as the result of a Securities Claim…against the
Company for a Wrongful Act…” Id. at note 53, citing Hartford Specimen Policy, §I.C.
45. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 47.
46. Tillinghast 2005 Survey at 53 (98% of U.S. respondents with Side A coverage had
no deductibles).
47. Deductibles are averaged by asset size. For firms with assets up to $400 million,
the average retention or deductible in 2005 was $212,491. Firms with assets from $400
million to $1 billion saw an average that was $812, 500; between $1 and $2 billion:
$1,217,000; between $2 and $5 billion, $3,327,966 and for firms with assets over $5 billion,
the average retention was $6537,143. Id. at 52, tbl 38.
48. Id. at 53 (reporting that 4% of U.S. respondents and 57% of Canadian respondents
had this type of split retention). What is the cause of the marked difference between U.S.
and Canadian firms is not explained.
49. Hartford Specimen Policy § IV.J.
50. Id.
51. Chubb Specimen Policy §§ 7-8.
52. See, e.g., AIG Specimen Policy §§ 4.h., 1.
53. Id.
54. Id. at §§ 4.i., j.
55. Id.
56. See generally, Id. § 4 for list of these exclusions. The most common types of
exclusions are: illegal profit or gains, dishonesty or fraud, questionable payments,
inadequate insurance, product defects, injury, sickness and damage, damage to property,
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these contracts are negotiated by the insurer and insured, they are highly
individualized and characterizing them with broad strokes would give a
false sense of the industry uniformity. Suffice it to say that potential
insureds are concerned with shareholder litigation risk primarily and the
policies will generally reflect that concern.57
It should also be noted that each corporation does not have one D & O
insurance policy from one insurer. In fact, corporate insureds frequently
possess many layers of insurance from several insurance companies.58
These layers can be broadly termed primary or excess.59 Excess insurance
generally exists simply because insurers are unwilling to underwrite the
whole risk for a single large firm.60 To do so would place too much
correlated risk in the insurer’s portfolio, with potentially catastrophic
consequences.61 There is qualitative evidence which indicates that $50

guarantee or warranty, copyright, professional indemnity/liability, pensions, fines, failure to
control pollution, known actions, deliberate acts. IAN YOUNGMAN, DIRECTORS’ AND
OFFICERS’ LIABILITY INSURANCE at 37-39.
57. The following is a partial list of risks for which firms would be concerned:
employment, unfair practices, abuse of authority, wrongful dismissal, libel and slander, nonpayment or underpayment, misrepresentation, takeovers and mergers, wrongful trading,
financial, contractual, personal (conspiracy or bribery), the state (for price-fixing or sundry
under illegal acts), company regulations, mismanagement, intellectual property and
corporate manslaughter. IAN YOUNGMAN, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY INSURANCE
at 12-16. Corporations would like protection from as many of these as possible, but
frequently will likely be able to receive cover on all of them.
58. Outside D & O insurance, it has not been unusual historically for one company to
have dozens of insurers covering different parts of the same risk. This is quite common
with CGL policies, the impact of which is best seen in the asbestos litigation in the last 30
years.
59. This, of course, ignores reinsurance, whether standard or retrocessionary.
Although, non-treaty insurance can often look like excess-of-loss coverage, it need not and
may look more like a vertical slice than the horizontal partitioning of the risk that defines
traditional excess coverage.
60. Insurers, like investors, generally wish to diversify their portfolio. Since all
insurers have finite resources, having a large part of their risk placed on one insured could
lead to a devastating loss and possible bankruptcy. As some corporations have upwards of
$300 million in policy limits across all of their layers, potential exposure is considerable to
any undiversified insurer.
61. Offering a single insured too much insurance coverage is an easy example of
excessive correlated risk. However, it can pop up in other settings and natural disasters
have been the historical culprit. Both the San Francisco and Chicago fires are examples of
disasters that bankrupted many local insurers precisely because their risks were
geographically highly correlated.
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million dollars is the largest single insurer limit currently available.62 In
order to achieve the desired coverage, several policies must be purchased.
The aggregation of the multiple policies is generally referred to as “towers
of insurance.”63 The first layer of insurance, the one that would respond
first to a lawsuit, is called the primary layer.64 All layers stacked on top of
the primary layer are referred to as “excess layers.” These excess layers
could be vertical layers or horizontal layers. The more common excess
layer is the horizontal one, which means that the excess insurer would pay
the first $X excess of the primary layer, after which it will have exhausted
its liability. The vertical layer can be seen as a proportional layer of
insurance that pays a percentage of several excess layers. So if two excess
insurers each had $5 million in excess coverage, one on top of the other, for
a total of $10 million of coverage above the primary layer, another insurer
could agree to pay for 20% of both layers. Thus, each excess insurer’s total
liability risk is reduced to $4 million. In this way, the proportional insurer
could be seen as a type of reinsurer of the two excess insurers.
The dynamics of this is important, because insureds want some degree
of consistency with the policy. This is generally referred to as
“concurrency.”65 This is where the higher layer policies “follow the form”
of the underlying policy.66 What this generally means in practice is that
most definitions are omitted from the excess insurance policies, except to
say that they take all the definitions, exclusions, etc from the underlying
policy.67 The law surrounding these “follow the forms” clauses is little, but
in recent years, considerable excess insurance and reinsurance losses in
areas like asbestos has substantially increased the number of cases that
discuss this historically esoteric area.68
62. Tom Baker, Predicting Corporate Governance, supra note 38, at 20. In fact, as of
late 2005, no one insurer was willing to offer a policy larger than $25 million.
63. Id.
64. The market for primary insurance is dominated by two firms: AIG and Chubb,
which combine to control 53% of the market by premium volume. Tillinghast 2005 Survey
at 86. However, this share decreases to only 36% of total policy count. Id.
65. See Barry R. Ostrager & Mary Kay Vyskocil, MODERN REINSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE §2.03[a] (2d ed. 2000). To see how courts have interpreted this clause, see North
River Ins. Co.v. CIGNA Reins. Corp., 52 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1995);
66. See Ostrager, supra note 65 at § 2.03[a].
67. Id.
68. See Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Cologne Reins. Co., 75 N.Y.2d295, 298,
552 N.E.2d 139, 140 (1990) (“reinsurance is an area of law “in which differences [were]
often…settled by handshakes and umpires, and pertinent precedents [were] few in number].
See also Ostrager, supra note 65 at 1-3 (“The proliferation of reinsurance disputes,
generated in large part by pollution and asbestos claims and insurer and reinsurer

2008]

I CAME, I SAW, I UNDERWROTE

495

Because of the nature of D & O insurance layers, the premiums paid in
exchange for the higher layers are lower per dollar than the premium for
the primary layer.69 This makes sense, since the further a coverage layer is
from the base, the less likely any one claim or group of claims will exhaust
all of the underlying layers. Thus, when one speaks of the premium paid for
a firm’s D & O coverage, the number provided is actually a combination of
the premiums paid to several insurers.
B. THE INSURANCE UNDERWRITING CYCLE
An “underwriting cycle” can be described as the following:
Profits in property and liability insurance have tended
to rise and fall in fairly regular patterns lasting between
five and seven years from peak to peak; this phenomenon
is termed the underwriting cycle.
Stages of the
underwriting cycle may be described as follows: initially,
when profits are relatively high, some insurers, wishing to
expand sales, start to lower prices and become more
lenient in underwriting. This leads to greater underwriting
losses. Rising losses and falling prices cause profits to
suffer. In the second stage of the cycle, insurers attempt to
restore profits by increasing rates and restricting
underwriting, offering coverage only to the safest risks.
These restrictions may be so severe that insurance in some
lines becomes unavailable to the marketplace. Insurers are
able to offset a portion of their underwriting losses through
earnings on investments. Eventually the increased rates
and reduced underwriting losses restore profits. At this
point, the underwriting cycle repeats itself.70
This underwriting cycle also does not generally coincide with the more
well-known business cycle.71 There is a fair amount of uncertainty as to
insolvencies, has spurred reinsureds and reinsurers to rsort to litigation and arbitration wit
much greater frequency”).
69. See Tom Baker, et al, Predicting Governance Risk, supra note 38, at 20-21.
BRITTANICA,
available
at
70.
Insurance,
in
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-13260 (September 18, 2008).
71. Barbara D. Stewert, Profit Cycles in Property-Liability Insurance, in 1 ISSUES IN
INSURANCE 294, 294-295 (John D. Long & Everett D. Randall eds., Am. Inst. For Prop. &
Liab. Underwriters 1984).
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exactly what causes these cycles to persist, but a standard explanation has
been provided for years. This explanation is largely driven by economics.
The standard explanation relies upon three unique insurance
economic characteristics. The first is that the traditional economic
balancing of supply and demand cannot be achieved in the insurance
industry because the demand, i.e. the number of claims and their respective
costs, cannot be accurately determined ex ante.72 The next problem
originates from the unique nature of the insurance industry. Profitability is
not limited to bringing in more premium income than payments made
under the policies, but also from investment income. These investments
are sensitive to the standard variables of investment theory, particularly
If the interest decreases, insurer reserves will be
interest rate.73
underfunded and additional income is required. This can only be acquired
from higher underwriting profitability.74 Finally, it has been argued that
reinsurance capacity undermines the underlying insurance market
whenever the capacity decreases.75 When this occurs, insurers lose an
important means of risk reduction.76
72. Robert F. Wolf, Actuary Counters Hunter on Med Mal Insurance Crisis, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER 10 (Nov. 11, 2002).
73. This is due to the required conservative investment strategies insurance companies
must make in order to guarantee reserves are available to pay claims. See Joseph D .Haley,
A Cointegration Analysis of the Relationship between Underwriting Margins and Interest
Rates: 1930-1989, 60 J. RISK AND INSURANCE 480, 486-487 (1993). For a mathematical
justification of the prior article’s methodology, see Scott E. Harrington & Tong Yu, Do
Property-Casualty Insurance Underwriting Margins Have Unit Roots?, 70 J. RISK AND
INSURANCE 715 (1997). This asset-liability matching is so important that actuaries must
learn the basics of it early in their examination process. See generally The Society of
Actuaries, available at www.soa.org. This idea finds further quantitative traction in the
degree of importance rho matching plays in risk hedging at insurance companies. Rho is
defined as the change in the value of an underlying asset or liability due to a change in the
interest rate. Being under- or over-hedged can significantly expose an insurance company
to market risk, thereby causing substantial modifications in reserving needs. Typically rho
can be hedged by purchasing long or short positions in swaps.
74. For a discussion of this in the medical malpractice field, see Tom Baker, The
Medical Malpractice Underwriting Cycle.
75. Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability
Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 18-19 (1989).
76. Id. See also Ostrager, supra note 65 at § 1.02[b] (“By ceding portions of their risk
to reinsurers, insurers are able to assume more risk than would otherwise be possible”). The
basis for this is more than just unloading some risk:
[I]nsurance companies must meet certain financial standards in
order to do business. The insurer must maintain specified minimum
reserve requirements based on the amount and type of reinsurance in
force and the insurer’s loss exposure. The reserve requirements
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The pricing problem seems to be the most significant driver of these
underwriting cycles, giving rise to what is known as “the Winner’s
Curse.”77 While analyses of the Winners’ Curse are often restricted to
auction situations, there is an easy analog to the insurance market.78
Studies done have shown that two principle risks affect the frequency and
severity of the Winners’ Curse.79 The first is “the degree of uncertainty
concerning the value of the item for bid.”80 The second is “the number of
competing bidders.”81 The larger the number for either, the greater the risk
of suffering from the Winner’s Curse.82
The problem with this analysis, though accurate at describing the
variables and mechanisms of the underwriting cycle, is that it does not
address the “how.” This has been well articulated in the following way
(though with respect to the medical malpractice underwriting cycle):
establish the assets that an insurer must have available to pay all claims,
losses, and adjustments and settlement expenses. These requirements
have the express purpose of adequately protecting the insured and
securing the solvency of the insurer. A contract of reinsurance is one
by which an insurer procures a third person to insure him against loss or
liability by reason of such original insurance. A fundamental purpose
of reinsurance is to permit an insurer to reduce its reserve requirement.
California requires insurers to file financial statements with the state.
On those statements, an insurer may deduct certain risks from its
liabilities, provided those risks are subject to reinsurance. By utilizing
reinsurance, therefore, an insurer can spread the risk its undertakes over
a larger number of policies, effectively reduce the amount of reserves
required to maintain its business, and increase its profitability.
American Re-Insurance Co. v. Insurance Commission, 527 F. Supp. 444, 452-53
(C.D.Cal. 1981).
77. The Winner’s Curse “occurs in competitive situations when a successful buyer
finds that he or she has paid too much for a commodity of uncertain value.” Max H.
Bazerman and William F. Samuelson, I Won the Auction But Don’t Want the Prize, 27 J.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 618, 618 (1983). See also, Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Winner’s Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 191 (1988); Jeremey Bulow & Paul Klemperer,
Prices and the Winner’s Curse, RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (2002).
78. The insurance market, especially D & O insurance, is very much like an auction,
with many bidders – the insurers – bidding for something of value – the insurance premium
– the value of which is uncertain at the time of purchase and only becomes certain at a much
later time. As Sean M. Fitzpatrick wrote, “the insurance market…is a particularly fertile
ground for instances of the Winner’s Curse.” Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear is the Key: A
Behavior Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 10 Conn. Ins. L. J. 255, 260 (2002-2003).
79. Bazerman & Samuelson, supra note 77 at 1.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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But [this analysis], like the economists and industry
observers who preceded them, concentrated on the
“proximate” causes of the medical malpractice crisis,
without delving more deeply to discover what might be
called the “ultimate” causes. Put another way, the GAO
study accurately reported what had occurred in the medical
malpractice market and described the mechanics of how it
had occurred, without finally addressing the more
fundamental question: why?83
This approach is the behavioral approach to the underwriting cycle.84
The purpose of elaborating on these root causes is integral to thesis of this
paper: that the underwriting cycle is explainable by behavioral factors and
the heuristics of underwritings. Especially in low frequency, large loss
areas of insurance, like D & O or catastrophic risk insurance, where the
dynamics leading to losses are many and fluid, these factors further
exacerbate the cycle and destabilize the market sufficiently that
profitability will always be difficult to achieve, or will be achieved with a
dangerous amount of loss potential.85 However, before this can be fully
83. Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear is the Key: A Behavior Guide to Underwriting Cycles,
10 CONN. INS. L. J. 255, 263 (2002-2003).
84. Id. at 264. The problem of applying traditional economic principles to insurance
has long been questioned. The following excerpt articulates the point well:
[F]ew firms are able to determine their marginal revenue or cost
curves. To provide a profit, they rely on marking up the average cost
per unit by some given percentage. While prices may be allowed to
decline below average costs, prices will not be set below variable cost.
Insurers tend to follow the same pricing method but, in addition, must
contend with the following problems.
1) Average costs in insurance are predominately variable in nature
and to a large extent beyond the control of the insurer.
2) Accurate projections of average costs, particularly claims items,
require sufficient numbers of exposures to allow the ‘law of large
numbers’ to operate.
3) Prices may violate the economic rule and be set below unit
variable cost, if losses and claims expenses are far in excess of those
projected by the actuaries.
4) For many insurers, within the constraints of capacity, unit cost
does not change significantly with sales.
D.E. Ayling, infra note 91, at 24 (internal citation omitted).
85. This should not be taken to mean that Catastrophic Risk Insurance lacks viability.
In fact, engineering science has long utilized some tools for the situation in which there is
very little data. In particular, the Weibull Distribution is most effective when modeling
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evaluated, a more detailed discussion of underwriting in practice must be
done. Then we can discuss what this means for the D & O Insurance
market.
C. UNDERWRITING PRACTICES
In Part II, this paper will diffuse some of the public policy bases behind
firm-by-firm underwriting of D & O insurance, but there yet may be an
adequate economic basis for individualized ratemaking. After all, if
insurance companies can successfully distinguish good risks from bad
during the underwriting process, then they would have a strong incentive to
do so. If an insurance company’s risk portfolio contains a higher
proportion of good risks than its competitors, it will have more profitable
claims experience. Greater profitability in turn would allow the insurer to
be more aggressive in attracting other clients. Thus, market share would be
increased. This section will attempt to cast doubt on underwriters’ ability
to do that.86
Underwriting “is the process of accepting or rejecting risks.”87
Underwritings focus on four general areas in assessing risks: the premium
rate, the policy provisions, the hazard, and reinsurance arrangements.88
Depending on the quality of risk, the underwriter has many different
discretionary steps that can raise or lower the insurer’s exposure to that
phenomena for which little or no data is actually available. The problem, however, is that
for the modeling to be of any value, the mode of failure must be singular and quantifiable,
something often missing in the D & O market. That, combined with the more ethereal
underwriting practices, militates against this methodology.
86. This in no way contradicts the analysis in the next section, for there we are
concerned with the market for D & O insurance in its entirety. Here, we are focusing on the
economic behavior of a single firm. A firm that rates better than its competitors will have a
competitive advantage, offering good risks lower rates. If the insurer was equally good at
pricing bad risks, they would not offer insurance at actuarially unsound premiums. Other
insurers, possessing less discerning underwriting practices, may undercut the more accurate
competitor, yielding the result that insureds may still have little incentive to change their
governance practices. In any event, this discussion rests entirely upon the assumption that a
particular insurer or subgroup of insurers possess unique underwriting prowess, the
likelihood of which is at best questionable.
87. ROBERT B. HOLTOM, UNDERWRITING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 11 (1973). “[It] is
a systematic technique for evaluating risks which are offered by prospective insureds. The
function of underwriting involves evaluating, selecting, classifying and rating each risk, and
establishing the standards of coverage and amount of protection to be offered to each
acceptable risk.” Id.
88. George L. Head, Underwriting in Five Easy Lessons?, 35 J. RISK AND INS. 307,
308 (1968).
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risk.89 However, experience is frequently mentioned as a key component is
successful underwriting.90 That is why rating decisions are frequently
made by the lead underwriter.91 After the initial rating decisions are made,
more junior underwriters follow the guidelines the lead underwriter made.92
In many traditional lines of insurance, both experience and scope of the
line has created many mathematical models that allow underwriters to
expeditiously price risks.93 However, such is not generally the case for D
& O underwriters.94 Though, again, generalizations should be done
carefully here, because the market for D & O is relatively young and
various underwriting methods have been utilized by different insurers.
The D & O underwriting initially focuses on three risks.95 The first
part focuses on the individual application of the insured, which contains a
questionnaire.96 The second part involves an independent investigation of
all publicly available data.97 And finally, the application process finishes
with acquiring as much private information about the firm as possible.98
Again how this data is utilized is varied, but the following quote
demonstrates the more informal nature of D & O underwriting:

89. Id.
90. Id. See also Tom Baker, et al, Predicting Governance Risk, supra note 38, at 24,
note 101 (“We literally sat at a round table and just based upon the experience of the more
senior folks, we would say that this is a great number, and we just threw a number out of the
hat,” citing Underwriter #6).
91. D.E. Ayling, UNDERWRITING DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: THE CATASTROPHE
MARKET. 19 (1984).
92. Id.
93. See Neal Gendler, Rise in Automated Underwriting Spurs Credit Scoring Use;
Computer Doesn’t Decide to Grant Loan, but Whether Secondary Loan Standards Are Met,
Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN January 2, 1999). See also Tom Baker, et al, Predicting
Governance Risk at 24, note 101.
94. See note 75, supra.
95. Baker, supra note 38, at 510.
96. Id. (this “includ[es] the experience of covered officers and directors and the
claims history of the corporation, plans for acquisitions or securities issuances, and whether
any prospective insured has “prior knowledge” of acts or omissions likely to give risk to a
claim.”)
97. Id. at 511(“They use a wide variety of publicly available data sources including
SEC filings, Bloomberg reports, analyst ratings, corporate governance reviews from
specialized providers such as Corporate Library, and…forensic accounting.”)
98. Id. (This is accomplished “through a series of meetings with the prospective
insured’s senior managers – often the Chief Financial Officer or Treasurer as well as
members of the accounting and legal departments and occasionally…the [CEO]”).
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“We look at the industry that the company operates in,
trying to figure out if we are in a mature industry, a growth
industry, a start up section of the industry, whatever. Are
we working with proven technology, new technology,
proven consumer goods, new consumer goods?
We look at the history of the company and see if
M&A is a prominent part of their planning process for the
future or not. We look if there are takeover risks. We
look if there is a restructuring perhaps necessary in the
future of the company. We examine the type of securities
filings they did at the SEC… We look at any SPEs, SPVs,
joint ventures that they are using to grow strategically.
Then we dive into the corporate governance. We
examine who the directors and officers are, their
applicable experience. We look at interlocking board
relationships. We actually keep a separate database here.
Since 1996 we can run our database and tell you if any one
director or officer was a defendant in a securities class
action or derivative action…[W]e record which company
they were serving in when they were sued, but what we
can then do is go back and look to see if the folks that we
are underwriting now were sued in what was a fender
bender or if it was a complete corporate meltdown…So we
have a driving record in this.
We look at the organization of the corporate
governance committees and independence of those
committees and how active they are and ten we look at
insider ownership [and] compensation packages. Then we
move into a broader understanding of the entire ownership
of the company…and what conflicts may or may not exist
within ownership interests.
We take a serious look at the equity trend of the
company over recent years and what made its price
earnings multiple what it is. We examine insider trades.
We look at any intellectual property that the company may
be relying upon. We look at the regulatory structure and
who the regulators may be and what the history with the
regulatory relationships were. We look at both former
existing director and officer litigation as well as general
litigation that the corporation may be involved in that
could be a threat to the future value of the company. We
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look at how they handle corporate investor
communications. We look at how they are handling
legislative or environmental issues that may face the
company. We look at how they may handle employment
practices and bankruptcy of course. We have an entire
dedicated review of the bankruptcy and potential
emergency or liquidation.
Then we go into a very meticulous breakdown of the
financials of both the balance sheet and the cash flow
statement and the profit and loss statement. You know,
your typical ratio analysis is supported by about 55 or so
different ratios.
Underneath those ratios we look
meticulously at who the auditors are, what the revenue
recognition policies are, how they manage accounts
receivable, inventory, payables, valuing intangibles, you
know, formulating debt and appreciation, capital
expenditures, pension obligations, and we look even at
vendor financing if it exists. We summarize, you know,
what makes us want to write the account and what makes
the necessity of the insurance relevant to the risk of the
company. And then we price it.99
Thus, while a substantial amount of data is analyzed, it is frequently
driven more by intuition than by an automated or computerized
underwriting scheme.
D. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND UNDERWRITING
Behavioral Economics attempts to reunify psychology and economics.
In other words, replace the utility maximizing homo economicus with a
more empirically supportable version.100 Perhaps most important to
underwriting is Prospect Theory. This adjustment to the traditional Utility
Theory stipulates that people use past experience to weight the likelihood

99. Id. at 512-514.
100. More specifically, behavioral economics seeks to displace the following four
principles: Expected Utility, Equilibrium, Discounted Utility and Own-Payoff
Maximization. The Behavioral Economic substitutes are Prospect Theory, Learning,
Hyperbolic Discounting and Social Utility, respectively. Colin Camerer, 96 Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 10575, 10576 (1999).
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of future outcomes.101 While this theory is about how individuals attempt
to maximize wealth102, its portability to underwriting is not that much of a
stretch and has important implications. For example, if past experience
informs underwriting judgments for D & O underwriter’s risk selections
and the efficacy of those past decisions in the present corporate climate is
questionable, then it is likely that the resulting judgment will not be wealth
maximizing for the insurance company.
Underwriters are typically concerned with two things: “The desire for
financial reward” and “the fear of losing one’s job.”103 The payment
structure for underwriters is tied precisely to these two variables. Insurers
typically pay underwriters based upon how much insurance they write, not
on the long term profitability of that insurance. And even in the presence
of long term incentives, the average underwriter is going to pursue those
actions that are more likely to create immediate or near immediate gain.104
This can be partly explained by the dominant evaluation schemes, such as
annual bonuses, reviews and promotions. This can be further exacerbating
by the turnover rate among corporations in general. If an underwriter does
well this year, then they can jump ship to another insurance company
before the full effects of his or her underwriting decisions are felt.105

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles,
10 CONN. INS. L. J. 255, 264 (2003-2004).
104. Id. at 265. This is also consistent with the hyperbolic discounting supposed under
behavioral economics which strongly discounts the value of near future benefits in favor of
more immediate gain or very long term gains. See Peter D. Sozou, On Hyperbolic
Discounting and Uncertain Hazard Rates, 265 PROCEEDINGS: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 2015,
2016-2017 (1998) (“arguing that experimental subjects preferences did not match
exponential discounting and that hyperbolic discounting was consistent with subjects having
exponential prior distributions with bayesian updating of an unknown hazard rate.”).
105. Although this may not be likely. A metastudy of performance and turnover rates
found that high performers were less likely to leave their job. Glenn M. McEvoy & Wayne
F. Cascio, Do Good or Poor Performers Leave? A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship
Between Performance and Turnover, 30 THE ACAD’Y OF MANAGEMENT J. 744, 750 (1987).
However, the study’s confidence interval included both zero and positive correlations, so the
efficacy of this result is uncertain. The underwriting profession also may have some
different characteristics, such as transportability. Compare William Wilt, et al, Leverage in
All The Right Places, REINSURANCE: GLOBAL INSIGHTS, Oct. 1, 2003 at 8, 16 (noting the
ease with which underwriters can change jobs) with John L. Cotton & Jeffry M. Tuttle, A
Meta-Analysis and Review with Implications for Research, 11 THE ACADEMY OF
MANAGEMENT REV. 55, 60 (1986) (“finding that the availability of opportunities elsewhere
was positively correlated with job turnover rates”).
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When profitability is up, relatively easy access to the insurance market
causes an increase in the new entrants.106 New entrants further increase the
availability of jobs. This only exacerbates the turnover problem and
diminishes the incentives generated by long term benefits.
Finally, the structure of insurance companies power base and interests
can sometimes empower the underwriter and sometimes not.107 When the
support is behind underwriters they will generally try to write as much
insurance as they can without any one in charge asking too many questions.
Also, when corporate pressure to maintain market share increases,
underwriters continually become more aggressive with their underwriting.
When the market hardens, however, the adjustors’ and actuaries’ power is
on the rise and conservative underwriting practices become the norm.108
Thus, the structure of insurance companies combined with the extant
compensation structures may play a role in the underwriting cycle. But if
this is true, it seems that insurance companies are behaving irrationally by
maintaining this inefficient organizational scheme.109 And if they are
behaving irrationally, it would seem likely for them to have recognized the
problem long ago. The end result is that cycle-mitigating strategies should
have already been employed and the underwriting cycle should be less
severe.110 The fact that they have not should then be regarded as some
evidence that the organizational characteristics of insurance companies is
not a significant driver of the underwriting cycle.
But this conclusion is premature. Recent scholarship has become
interested in “system justification theory.” This theory articulates and
evaluates the tendency of individuals in a group to maintain the status

106. See Barbara D. Stewert, Profit Cycles in Property-Liability Insurance, in 1 ISSUES
IN INSURANCE 288-89 (John D. Long & Everett D. Randall eds., Am. Inst. For Prop. & Liab.
Underwriters 1984).
107. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 103 at 266.
108. Id. at 269.
109. As Fitzpatrick observes, “the single best means of mitigating underwriting cycles
would be to tie a more substantial portion of the overall compensation of underwriters,
claims analysts, and actuaries – as well as the senior managers of their companies – to
profitability achieved over time frames appropriate to their class of business.” Fitzpatrick,
supra note 103 at 274. Based upon empirical support for hyperbolic discounting, this could
be achieved with a combination of short-term rewards and very long term rewards, such as
increased pension contributions or greater visibility to long-term career prospects. For a
discussion of hyperbolic discounting, see note 100 supra and accompanying text.
110. Though it will never completely go away, as the unique characteristics of the
insurance industry essentially guarantee the perpetuation of the cycle. The use of behavioral
economics is to evaluate root causes that can reduce the cycle, not eliminate it.
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quo.111 This theory “suggests that people are motivated to accept and
perpetuate features of existing social arrangements, even if those features
were arrived at accidentally, arbitrarily, or unjustly.”112 The diverse
application of this theory can be combined with corporate behavioral
research. In corporate settings, there is a strong motivation to resist change
once a course of action is adopted.113 Furthermore, individuals who stand
to profit because of a prevailing belief that serves there interests further
complicates the problem.114
The current corporate culture in the insurance industry manifests these
characteristics. There is a strong inertia keeping the current reward
structure in place. It is unlikely that this will change immediately.
Furthermore, the evidence available is not absolute in the condemnation of
the current system. Finally, the other alternatives discussed above are not
developed to the extent that they can be tried by an insurance company.
Thus the current system will not likely change, even if it appears that a
better system is available.
E. HEURISTICS AND UNDERWRITING
A heuristic is a simple rule that helps analyze a large amount of data.115
Underwriting can be compared to “risky choice heuristics.” A risky choice
heuristic contains three distinct components: “(1) The alternatives available
to the decision maker, (2) Events or contingencies that relate actions to
outcomes and (3) The values associated with those outcomes.”116 The risky
choice heurist takes a “problem space” and through a series of rules of
thumbs, simplifies that space to a manageable level.117 Researches have
generally studies heuristics through the construction of mathematical
111. See Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, Symposium on Behavioral Realism: System
Justification Theory and Research: Implication for Law, Legal Advocacy and Social Justice,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2006) (“The theory…posits a general human tendency to
support and defend the social status quo, broadly defined”).
112. Id. at 1124.
113. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), IN LAW AND
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 144, 151(Cass R. Sustein ed. 2000).
114. Id.
115. Don N. Kleinmuntz, Cognitive Heuristics and Feedback in a Dynamic Decision
Environment, 31 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 680, 680 (1985).
116. Eric J. Johnson & John W. Payne, Effort and Accuracy in Choice, 31
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 395, 396 (1985).
117. Id.
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models and computer programs.118 While the conclusions of this research
are diverse, several observations are important to the scope of this paper.
First, as the number of potential outcomes increases, the chances that
these heuristics work efficiently at arriving at an acceptable outcome
generally diminish.119 This is fairly problematic for underwriters, where
the number of options available, such as whether to accept or reject the
risk, the price and exclusions, is very considerable. The research here
would then recommend that the capacity to properly gauge the risk would
be improved if the number of available decisions is decreased. This can be
accomplished by the method discussed in Section III, infra.
Yet another difficulty to be contained is that the studies that show high
accuracy with heuristics is that they assume all knowledge about the tasks
is complete and accurate.120 A relaxation of that assumption can result in
wildly different outcomes.121 In recognition the lack of clear information
about outcomes in D & O underwriting, discussed supra, this questions
whether heuristics can consistently predict the quality of a potential risk.
Finally, increasing the complexity of the heuristic generally leads to, at
best, marginally improved results.122 The solution, therefore, is not that
underwriter’s should increase the complexity of their task in an attempt to
improve their risk-rating ability, but rather to create a simple basis from
which to work. This can be accomplished by automating a reasonable
portion of the process. The end result will be a simplified solution space
and limited options, both factors which are favorable correlated with
efficient heuristics.123
Underwriting is not easy. It is full of compromises and rapid
processing of noisy information, the value of which is not always. In D &
O insurance, this problem is even more of a threat to the efficacy of an
118. See generally Id. See also Klenmuntz, note 115, supra; K.D. Glazebrook, et al,
Cost Rate Heuristics For Semi-Markov Decision Processes, 29 J. OF APPLIED PROBABILITY
633 (1992).
119. See Johnson, et al, note 116, supra, at 403 (“Increasing the number of
outcomes…does not affect the level of absolute and relative accuracy of the equiprobable
heuristic. Other rules, in contrast show decreases in accuracy as the number of outcomes
increase”). As the equiprobable heuristic (which implies all outcomes have the same
probability, does not accurately represent underwriting, the conclusion above follows.
120. Don N. Kleinmuntz, Cognitive Heuristics and Feedback in a Dynamic Decision
Environment, 31 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 680, 697 (1985).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 696.
123. See generally, Eric J. Johnson & John W. Payne, Effort and Accuracy in Choice,
31 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 395, 402-412 (1985).
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underwriter’s judgment. The section evaluated the economic basis for
individual underwriting. The purpose was to determine whether or not
there was substantial value to be added by individualized underwriting of
corporations. Through a survey of several different fields of economics,
finance and behavioral theory (including heuristics), a strong argument can
be made that individual underwriting does not necessarily lead to superior
results and in fact may even create greater variability in outcomes.124
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND UNDERWRITING
The purpose of criminal and civil penalties serve two purposes: one ex
ante and the other ex post. The ex post goal is to punish those who commit
social wrongs. The ex ante goal is to deter people from committing those
social wrongs. In this way, regulations of the SEC and statutes of the
various states and the federal government are meant to either punish or
deter directors and officers from committing what is perceived as socially
harmful acts. This dynamic, in the case of tortious acts, is upset when
insurance comes into play.125
Not all is lost, however. Insurers revive the deterrence goals of tort law
through a combination of factors. These include the cost and availability of
insurance, the exclusions of certain conduct, and the right to recover
against insureds in certain circumstances.126 There are natural correlates in
D & O insurance for these, as well.
In D & O liability insurance, three methods of deterrence are available.
The first means by which insurers the objectives of securities laws is by
setting the price “based upon the best assessment of the liability risk of
each individual corporation…” The second means by monitoring and
improving corporate governance. The final method is by controlling the
defense and settlement of the claims. The issue of price has already been
discussed above and third method is beyond the scope of this paper. The
second method, monitoring corporate governance, is the topic of this
section. One significant objection to the alternative underwriting method
124. Studies have indicated excess variability in stock prices as the result of irrational
expectations. See generally, George Bulkley & Richard D. F. Harris, Irrational Analysts’
Expectations as a Cause of Excess Volatility in Stock Prices, 107 THE ECON. J. 359 (1997).
125. Though not in the case of criminal acts. For policy reasons, intentional harms are
not insurable. In D & O insurance this translates to such acts as fraud. See note 51 supra
and accompanying text.
126. For a more detailed discussion of this, see Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort
Regulation: 6 Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law, 12 CONN. INS. L. J. 1 (2005).
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outlined in Section III, infra, is that it essentially causes insurers to
completely abdicate their gate keeping role.
This section answers that question in a two step process. The first step
will describe recent scholarship that calls into question whether insurers
have ever fully occupied the gate keeping role. This is in contrast to some
other studies that indicate the opposite.127 The second step is to provide an
economic argument for why the monitoring role of D & O insurance will
not adequately punish or reward intransigent or compliant corporations,
respectively.
A. D & O INSURERS AS GATEKEEPERS?
The recent work of Professor Tom Baker and Sean Griffith point
out an interesting anomaly: In the vast majority of instances, insurers do
not provide corporate governance.128 As one of their interviewees stated:
You had asked me on the phone whether companies
changed their behavior for the benefit of their D & O
insurers. I don’t think they are. I think the brokers
sometimes can put lipstick on the pig, but that is a
marketing feature. And it seems to me that however high
D & O premiums climb, they are not going to climb high
enough to get the companies to really, really pay
attention.129
This also is relevant to the discussion, infra § II.B. Even in instances
where the insurer provides some services related to governance, they are
generally ignored.130 Thus, the governance role of D & O insurance is
minor and whatever effect poor governance has on pricing is not adequate
to change corporate behavior.

127. Clifford Holderness, Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors, 10 INT. R. LAW &
ECON. 115, 116 (1990).
128. See generally Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate
Governance: The Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurer § II.A., available at
www.ssrn.com.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 16. Even those who had substantial loss prevention mechanisms in place at
one time eliminated them because “[w]e couldn’t show the discount…” Id. at 18.
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B. PRICE AS A FAILED DETERRENT
A qualitative explanation is available. The D & O insurance market is
characterized by lower regulation relative to other lines of insurance, lower
barriers to entry and less orthodox underwriting processes. By its nature
then, there is greater competitive pressure on premium pricing. Insurers,
on the other hand, currently endeavor to price each insured according to
their relative risk of loss, with the higher risk insureds thereby paying more
for the same product as a lower risk insured. This can be viewed as a type
of price discrimination.131
The goal of price discrimination is to capture consumer surplus.
Consumer surplus, simply described, is the difference between the price a
consumer is willing to pay and what they do pay.132 However, in order to
capture consumer surplus, a firm must have some monopoly power over
price levels. In a competitive industry, any increase of market price would
drive the demand for the firm’s product to zero. Conversely, a decrease of
price below the market level would have similarly disastrous effects. This
is because the market price is equal to the marginal cost of the good, so
profit is already zero. Any downward deviation from this would cause a
firm to lose money for every unit sold. Furthermore, ease of entry and exit
in the market makes increasing market share virtually impossible. In
addition, firms supply relatively small amount of goods to the market, with
the result that production decisions are insufficient to affect market price.
Thus, there is little incentive for any firm to decrease price below market
levels.
131. Price discrimination is the charging of different customers different prices for the
same or nearly the same product. There are classically three different types of price
discrimination. First-Degree Price Discrimination is when a firm charges a customer the
most he or she is willing to pay for the product (called the reservation price). In SecondDegree Price Discrimination, a firm charges a lower price upon the quantity consumed (socalled bulk discounts). This is generally considered the most common form of price
discrimination. And Third-Degree Price Discrimination is when a firm divides the market
into different groups with different demand curves and determines the prices for each group
separately. In practice, a firm segments the market into large, discrete classes that are easily
identifiable and charges each class a distinct price. . However, given the firm-by-firm
underwriting in D & O insurance, it would be more accurate to view insurers as engaging in
imperfect First-Degree Price Discrimination. The thesis of this paper then can be seen as
advocating that insurers switch from this form of discrimination to Third-Degree Price
Discrimination.
132. For an elementary treatment of Consumer Surplus and Price Discrimination, See
generally Robert S. PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS (6th ed. 2004). For a
more advanced treatment, See ELMAR WOFSTETTER, TOPICS IN MICROECONOMICS (1999).
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If we view D & O premium pricing as a form of price discrimination,
then the market structure becomes an integral part of the analysis. While
by no means a perfectly competitive market133, there is sufficient
competitive pressure to limit the degree to which firms can price the
premiums.134 The more competitive the industry, the less aggressively
insurers can punish bad risk for their poor corporate governance practices.
For if they offer them a premium sufficiently high to compensate the
insurer for absorbing the risk, there is another insurer who will offer the
same coverage for less. This competitive pressure drives down the price
and results in a lower premium.
The same can be said for low risks, as well. In instances where claims
experience is low and profits are up, insurers are likely to be aggressive
with respect to what they believe are good risks. As such, during hard
markets, premiums drop across the board in an attempt to create market
share. During soft markets, the same dynamics would drive up the
premium of good risks more slowly than perceived poor risks.
The problem with the analysis in the last paragraph is that it assumes
that good risks and bad risks can be differentiated perfectly so that any
difference in premium, even after accounting for competitive pressures,
roughly equate to the difference in the expected loss between the good and
bad risk insureds. However, this is not a realistic assumption. No matter
how much underwriting an insurer engages in, there is a substantial
informational discrepancy between what the insurer knows and what the
insured knows. Thus, for any firm an insurer classifies as low risk, there is
a chance that it is a higher risk. Similarly, firms classified as high risk may
in fact be low risk.135
133. See Tillinghast 2005 Survey.
134. In fact, the two largest players in D & O insurance comprise over 50% of the
market. It also bears noting that the insurance industry goes through underwriting cycles,
where during some times premiums industry wide increase, followed by periods where
premiums drop. These underwriting cycles are described well in Fitzpatrick, supra note
103. However, what is true in all environments is that competition for business is real and
this has an impact on what insurers can charge potential insureds.
135. Of course firms that are truly low risk have every incentive to be classified as
such, so it is unlikely that they would be misclassified. However, low risk firms may have
some high risk characteristics such as past directors, type of industry, or some combination
of other factors. This can be compared to auto insurance or credit scores. Just because an
individual was once a high risk does not necessarily mean that they cannot now be low
risks. But past performance informs present perceptions, so there is inevitably some inertia
in risk-rating. This also provides an explanation for why during very profitable periods
insurance companies are more willing to bet that a particular risk is no longer as high a risk
as it appears.

2008]

I CAME, I SAW, I UNDERWROTE

511

In George Akerlof’s seminal paper, The Market for Lemons, this
dynamic is well illustrated.136 When informational asymmetries exist in a
market, that is, where one side possesses more information pertaining to a
product than another, the side with more information has an incentive to
pass off a low quality product as a high quality one.137 This, in turn, slowly
erodes the market for the high quality product until only low quality
products remain.138 In the same way, high risk firms have an incentive to
appear to be low risk. Insofar as they are successful, insurers have little
incentive to charge ostensibly low risk firms a lower premium. The end
result is that all firms would be charged the same, high risk premium.
This extreme result has not occurred, however, because firms are
Furthermore,
obligated to reveal information about themselves.139
insurance companies are not completely unable to differentiate low risk and
high risk companies.140 But what this does imply is that insurers have an
incentive to charge low risk firms a higher premium than would be
actuarially required to compensate for the risk acquired.
Finally, corporate demand for D & O appears to be relatively inelastic.
While there is not much research to support this contention, indirect
evidence does exist.141 First and foremost, the underwriting cycles create
large swings in premium pricing,142 yet the vast majority of publicly traded
corporations still purchase D & O insurance.143 Second, though premiums
136. George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. This occurs through SEC and state filings, etc.
140. For example, large market cap corporations are more susceptible to lawsuits that
low market cap corporations. High growth companies and those that go through frequent
mergers are also higher risk. See generally TILLINGHAST 2005 SURVEY.
141. See Tillinghast 2005 Survey, infra note 146. The basic idea here is that if the
pricing was relatively elastic, there would be changes in market composition as a result of
price movements. However, the percentage of firms, year over year, that continue to
purchase D & O insurance suggest that, even with significant changes in premiums, demand
is relatively constant, hence inelastic.
142. See Scott E. Harrington, Tort Liability, Interest Rates, and the Insurance Cycle, in
BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES: 2004 (Robert E. Liton & Richard
Herring eds., 2004); J. DAVID CUMMINS, ET AL, CYCLES AND CRISES IN PROPERTY/CASUALTY
INSURANCE: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (Scott E. Harrington & Robert
W. Kleins, eds., 1991). See also Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance
Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2005).
143. Tillinghast 2005 Survey. Note that the sample in the survey is not random, so
may not be representative of the corporations in general. However, a substantial sample set
exists, so very likely inferences can be drawn.
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are not inconsiderable, if we look at the average cost of D & O insurance
for large market cap companies, the cost represents far less than 1% of their
total value.144 Finally, as derivative actions frequently settle within D & O
policy limits,145 the purchase of D & O insurance trades a future
indeterminate liability for a present known one. As firms, like people, are
generally believed to be risk adverse, there is an additional incentive to
purchase this insurance even in the presence of escalating prices.146
Given the foregoing, market forces tend to support the view that the
premium differences between low and high risk firms are not as large as
their level of risk would indicate. The end result is that low risk firms are
indirectly subsidizing high risk firms. The gap between the two premiums
therefore may not be large enough for high risk firms to change their
governance structure because the cost of doing so would be higher than the
savings associated with lower premiums. This is further supported
qualitatively by the recent scholarship of Tom Baker and Sean Griffith. In
particular, one insurer had bundled their insurance policy with active
attempts to improve corporate governance.147 They discontinued the
practice, however, because they could not show a benefit in the
premium.148
Thus, given the market structure of D & O insurance, the lack of
demand for active assistance in improving governance149 and the inability
to effectively demonstrate a significant quantifiable benefit supports the
position that D & O insurance policies do not fully further the deterrence
effects of tort law. The other alternative, that D & O insurance provides an
ex ante benefit to shareholders has been questioned by recent research,
which demonstrates the anomalous result that D & O insurers neither

144. A more significant measure would be the cost as a percentage of revenue, but a
review of the revenues of the Fortune 500 show that revenues and market cap are both
several orders of magnitude larger than the average D & O insurance premium for large
market cap companies.
145. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV
497, 512 (1997). Roughly 96% of all cases settle within policy limits.
146. As with all things, there is a limit, but given the pervasiveness of D & O
insurance, that does not appear to be a substantial issue at present. In fact, in the 2005
TILLINGHAST survey, 100% of responding corporations purchased D & O insurance.
TILLINGHAST TOWERS PERRIN, 2005 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY 20, fig.
21(2006).
147. Tom Baker, et al, The Missing Monitor, note 128 supra at 514.
148. Id. at 18.
149. See Tom Baker, The Missing Monitor, note 128 supra at 515-517.
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attempt to shape corporate governance practices before claims, nor attempt
to manage costs during and after shareholder litigation is initiated.150
However, there are reasons to doubt the efficacy of underwriters’
ratemaking. In this section, current insurance underwriting practices will
be discussed, with a particular focus on how D & O underwriting is
different than more traditional lines of insurance. Second, it will be shown
how heuristic substitutes for more complex evaluations increase outcome
volatility. And finally, drawing an analogy to asset management research,
this section will show how irrational optimism about one’s own
performance combined with constant corporate pressure to price
competitively leads to the outcome that underwriters will, over the long
run, consistently understate the risk of potential insureds.151
III. MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY, VOLATILITY AND
DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ INSURANCE
UNDERWRITING
Modern Portfolio Theory is, at its most basic level, the theory of how
to combine a group of assets, with the goal of achieving efficient returns.152
How this would apply to insurance underwriting is fairly straightforward.
The goal would be to partition the group of insureds into several classes
and create a standard insurance rate for those classes based upon several
easily identifiable characteristics.153 In some ways this imitates auto
underwriting, although D & O underwriting could not fully achieve that
degree of precision.154 Whether some minor adjustments are made

150. Id. at Part II.C.
151. This is well demonstrated by the following quote following a discussion of fund
managers’ performance expectations: “We are reminded of a recent survey of the entering
class of one of the countries top-rated colleges. When students were asked if they expected
to finish in the top 10% of their class, 87.5% responded that they did.” EDWIN J. ELTON, ET
AL, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (6th ed. 2003).
152. See generally, EDWIN J. ELTON, ET AL, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (6th ed. 2003).
153. For example, market cap, industry type, stock classification (such as growth,
income, etc).
154. This follows from a straightforward application of the Law of Large Numbers and
the Central Limit Theorem. In auto insurance there are far more policyholders and thus the
loss data is much more consistent from year to year. The number of companies purchasing
D & O is incredibly small by comparison and loss exposure is far more variable.
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subsequent to this partition is optional, although it would be well-advised
to restrict it to some easily available data.155
An analogy to indexed mutual funds accurately portrays the workings
of this type of underwriting. An indexed mutual fund is usually tied to a
particular stock market or stock markets.156 For example, a fund indexed to
the S & P 500 would purchase shares in companies in the exact proportion
to the S & P 500. As a result, the indexed fund’s return would be similar to
the growth of the S & P year over year.
Yet, this methodology is far too simplistic to be workable by any multiline insurer. MPT informs capital allocation decisions that help protect
against peculiar market risk. An initial reaction to this may be skepticism.
It would appear obvious that well-trained and intelligent mutual fund
managers could actively manage a fund to superior performance. In the
same way, skilled and intelligent underwriters could select a group of
insureds with risk below the market average.
Research in mutual fund management calls into question the accuracy
of this belief. First, mutual funds, on average, have performed worse than
portfolios consisting of a random selection of assets.157 Furthermore,
actively managed funds generally do worse than passive funds, which can
be considered a type of random fund.158 Not only is it difficult to predict
the future, actively managed funds have additional problems that have to be
overcome: more non-diversified risk, greater management costs, higher
155. Previous claims experience, for example. The goal, however, is to minimize the
expensive underwriting practices that add a great deal of time and expense, with perhaps
small realized benefit.
156. They can actually be tied to just about any type of asset market, real or not.
157. See John McDonald, Objectives and Performance of Mutual Funds: 1960-1964, 9
J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 311 (1974); Peter Williamson, Measurement and Forecasting of
Mutual Fund Performance: Choosing an Investment Strategy, 28 FIN. ANALYST J. 78
(Nov./Dec. 1972); T.E. Crenshaw, The Evaluation of Investment Performance, 50 J.BUS.
462 (1977); Bruce Lehman & David Modest, Mutual Fund Performance Evaluation: A
Comparison of Benchmarks and Benchmark Comparison 42 J. OF FIN. 233 (1987); Edwin J.
Elton, et al, Efficiency with Costly Information: A Reinterpretation of Evidence from
Manager Portfolios, 6 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1 (1993). All but the last, however, suffer from
survivorship bias. Survivorship bias is where the study overstates the return of mutual
funds. This occurs because funds are studied over a period of time, say 10 years, and thus
the researchers require the funds to be in existence for those ten years. Funds that failed
during the interval are not evaluated. And funds that fail have, on average, well below
average returns.
158. See Elton, et al, supra note 152 at 681 (“Although index funds have outperformed
most active managers, most investors who hire active managers believe they can spot the
manager who will outperform the index. This belief persists despite the fact that there is
very little evidence that superior performance is predictable [italics added]”).
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transaction costs from increased asset turnover and more tax liability.159
The last two reasons are particular to mutual funds, but the first two are
equal concerns for underwriters. Underwriters not only have to outperform
the market in risk selection, they must generate even higher returns to
compensate for increased underwriting costs.
There is yet another danger. D & O underwriters currently acquire and
evaluate a dizzying amount of information on potential insureds.160 In
economic environments of asymmetric information, there is a curious
phenomenon called the “curse of knowledge.” 161 This phenomenon
basically states that individuals who possess a large amount of information
are unable to completely differentiate good information from bad.162 The
result is that more knowledgeable actors may perform worse than the actor
with inferior information.163 Combining this information loss with
feedback shows little improvement.164 Furthermore, there exists a
principle-agent problem in that the “curse of knowledge” often results in
weaker punishments for poor performance and inadequate rewards for good
performance.165
The application of this to underwriting is straightforward. Consistent
with the discussion above of heuristic theory,166 underwriters who possess
too much information about a potential insured may unreasonably lend
weight to certain variables and not adequately weigh other variables
enough. As the amount of data increases, this problem may be
exacerbated. The end result is that underwriters that possess less
knowledge may perform better than their more knowledgeable peers.
The idea behind an indexing approach to D & O underwriting is
relatively simple.
The majority of D & O risk is tied to derivative

159. Id. at 680-681.
160. See Part I.
161. Colin Camerer, et al, The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An
Experimental Analysis, 97 J. OF POL. ECON. 1232 (1989).
162. Id. at 1233
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1246. Incidentally, this may also strengthen the argument above relating to
the poor governance oversight insurance companies have. Again we have an informational
asymmetry and both good and bad corporate performance could rationally be explained by
factors that absolve them of blame or approbation. Thus the benefits of good governance
may not be fully manifest in the premium, diminishing the incentives of the firm to improve.
166. See Part II, supra.
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litigation.167 In fact, in 2005 and the first half of 2006, 93% and 92%,
respectively, of all complaints alleged 10b-5 claims. 168 Furthermore, 88%
and 90% of these claims alleged misrepresentations in financial statements.
169
As a consequence, it is not too surprising that stock volatility is an
important determinant in litigation activities. But if stock volatility can be
utilized to assess litigation risk, it can also be utilized to underwrite D & O
insurance. Supposing that is true, then, the first step in the underwriting
process will be to partition the market into different “volatility tranches.”
In order to fully appreciate the significance of this, however, some
understanding of stock market volatility is in order.
The inherent problem with volatility is that it is not directly observable.
This has lead to several different techniques by which it can be measured.
A simple metric, historical volatility, can be calculated using the following
formula:

Where εt = LN(St/St-1), the natural log of the change in the stock price.
The problem with this form of volatility is that it is inherently backwardlooking; it says nothing about future or current prospects about volatility,
which is predominantly what is of interest to D & O underwriters.
Furthermore, it weights all periods equally, which may not be proper.
Other types of historical volatility measures may used, such as Exponential
Weighted Moving Average Volatility (or EWMA), which weight the
volatility of more recent returns more, but they still suffer from the
backward-looking issue. Alternative measures include both Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroskedacity Model (ARCH) or the Generalized version
(GARCH). Each of these have the advantage of a statistical forecasting
framework, but further discussion will be omitted on each of these models
to conserve a relatively simplicity. Suffice it to say that no matter how you
slice it, historical volatility may not adequately suggest future litigation risk
(though, since litigation does lag volatility, past volatility may be a
harbinger of current litigation risk). To alleviate this problem, implied
volatility can be used.

167. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS: 2006
MID-YEAR ASSESSMENT (2006).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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Implied volatility is the volatility of a stock or index implied by its
option. An option, in its simplest form, is a contract to buy or sell a stock
or index170 for a fixed price at some predetermined time in the future. The
volatility implied by an option is a function of both the option’s strike price
and time to maturity. This does create a selection problem; which volatility
observed is the proper one?
The impasse can be dealt with through the more advance financial
models, of which the most common is probably the Heston Stochastic
Volatility Model.171 Again, the specifics will be avoided, but the
observation that should be taken away is that, given historical data, future
implied volatilities can be observed.
Once we have implied volatilities, excess volatility can be determined.
Excess volatility simply means, relatively to an industry baseline, how
much of a given firm’s volatility can be characterized as non-systemic. We
would expect, on average, that a particular industry, such as financial or
aerospace, would have a certain level of volatility and an associated
ambient risk of derivative lawsuits. Firms that deviate from that baseline
within the industry would then be expected to have either a greater or lesser
risk of litigation depending on whether they have positive or negative
excess volatility.
When this process has been completed, you will have a list of industry
volatilities and individual firm excess volatilities. At the moment we are
really only interested in the relative volatilities implied at the time the
underwriting is being conducted. As such, this analysis has much in
common with nonparametric statistics. From this list, industries and then
firms can be classified into as many different risk classes as the underwriter
desires. Once this has been conducted, historical experience of litigation
vs. implied volatility levels can be used to assess current claim exposure for
each tranche. Finally, depending on the insurer’s risk tolerances, a portion
of the market can be assessed as preliminarily insurable. Finally, premiums
can be calculated in accordance with the various capital models insurers
utilize that then take account the probable claims experience in each
tranche.
This formulation is certainly reductive in its current form, but it does
provide a basis by which a D & O underwriting model could be
implemented and backtested to check its veracity. One particular benefit of
170. Id.
171. For example, see ROBERT L. MCDONALD, DERIVATIVE MARKETS (2nd Ed. 2006),
Chapter 23.
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the model is its relative simplicity. It utilizes a framework that requires
only publicly available information that also does not require substantial
vetting of potential insureds. Though this is not to suggest no form of that
is required; there are other exposures for which insurers should account.
Litigation risk that is not tied directly to market performance is an example
of this. But what this does allow is a baseline model that can then be
tweaked to accommodate peculiar firm risk at knowable at little expense.
This should keep underwriting margins low and help improve profitability.
A further concern is correlated risk. For example, insuring only a
select industry with low volatility may seem like a reasonably safe activity,
but if the volatility is highly correlated, then each firm may be exposed to
elevated litigation risk should volatility spike. To protect against this, D &
O insurers should aim to underwrite historically low-correlated risks, to
help curb the possibility of this happening.172
CONCLUSION
Directors’ and Officers’ insurance is a unique line of insurance. It is
also relatively young. This youth is partially demonstrated by the myriad
methods in which its underwriters price potential insureds.173 Which
underwriting method is the best cannot be precisely answered. What this
paper has attempted to accomplish is to synthesize several aspects of
economics, psychology, sociology, finance, insurance law and corporate
governance to critically evaluate current underwriting practices in D & O
liability insurance. The success of this analysis is predicated upon several
assumptions.
First, underwriters are individuals of bounded rationality. Much of
behavioral economics presupposes that due to lack of time or lack of
ability, people do not make fully rational choices, in the classical economic
sense of the word. Second, it is assumed that the D & O underwriting cycle
exists and is, at least, partly explainable by behavioral and organizational
characteristics of the insurance industry and its constituents. And the final
assumption is that the lessons of Modern Portfolio Theory are moderately
transferable to underwriting. There is, as discussed in the last section, at
least some support for this assertion.

172. It is unlikely that negatively correlated risks are available. Equities are almost
always positively correlated, so the best scenario is likely only low correlation.
173. See Baker, et al, supra note 38.
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Several questions are left unanswered. What are the market dynamics
of a D & O insurance market consisting of “indexing” underwriters and
“non-indexing” underwriters? Would this create market share problems?
Perhaps the nature of individual underwriting may make it difficult for the
“indexing” underwriters to maintain market share. Perhaps this will result
in a shift away from the current market dynamics of increased
specialization and back towards more carte blanche underwriting, with
each insurer occupying a smaller sliver of risk for a greater number of
insureds. This paper does not address these issues, but their resolution is
important to the value of the suggested type of underwriting.
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STOLI ON THE ROCKS: WHY STATES
SHOULD ELIMINATE THE ABUSIVE PRACTICE OF
STRANGER-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE
Eryn Mathews∗
“The objection is not that wholesale murder will ensue. Such an
assertion only trivializes the debate. The objection is the third party owner
of the policy benefits only from the death of the insured. The essence of
sound underwriting is that the owner of the policy and the insurer both are
better off if the insured continues to live.”
Mike Nelson1
“I have always depended on the kindness of strangers.”
Tennessee Williams2
INTRODUCTION
The life insurance market is a burgeoning field of sophisticated
investment transactions. A life insurance policy, traditionally an illiquid
asset, has developed into an asset-backed security which has proved quite
profitable to investors and insureds alike. These transactions allow
insureds under certain circumstances to sell their policies to investors. The
development of this secondary market has injected competition into the life
insurance business and resulted in better products with more options for
consumers.
∗
Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2009; B.A.,
College of the Holy Cross, 2005. Many thanks to Professors Thomas E. Baker and Patricia
McCoy for their invaluable assistance throughout the course of this project. Thank you also
to the staff of the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal for their editorial assistance. A special
thank you to my parents, my sister Meghan, John Moran and all my family and friends for
their support, patience, and guidance.
1. Mike Nelson, Insurable Interest Under Siege, STEVE LEIMBERG’S ESTATE
PLANNING NEWSLETTER #671 (2004) available at http://www.leimbergservices.com (last
visited May 14, 2008).
2. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREET CAR NAMED DESIRE (Signet 1951).
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Stranger-owned life insurance, also known as STOLI, is an outgrowth
of this legitimate secondary market. It is a consequence of innovation and
sophisticated investment planning, but has distorted the purpose of life
insurance. It allows strangers to benefit from the death of an insured, to
wager on the lives of others for profit. In STOLI transactions, this
anticipated profit is the sole motivation for acquiring the life insurance.
The potential risks STOLI transactions pose, not only for legitimate
secondary market transactions and the insurance industry generally, but
also for consumers and investors, need to be addressed. STOLI, however,
is cleverly structured and has, until recently, evaded state regulation. State
legislatures must confront this regulatory vacuum to counter the ever
growing risks STOLI presents.
Part I of this note addresses the history and development of the
secondary life insurance market. This section demonstrates the value of
legitimate secondary transactions to the insurance market in contrast to the
perversity of STOLI arrangements, emphasizing that regulation would be
directed specifically at illegitimate STOLI transactions and not secondary
market transactions generally.
Part II examines the risks of STOLI transactions for life insurance
companies, consumers, and investors. This section also discusses the tax
implications of STOLI investments. Analysis of the adverse consequences
to all involved in a STOLI transaction, including the negative and
distorting impact it has on the life insurance market, demonstrates the need
for regulation and prohibition.
Part III explores the states’ roles in regulating STOLI. Regulation of
STOLI implicates states’ enforcement of insurable interest laws. This Note
analyzes both the minority and majority positions of states regarding
insurable interest and how the prevalence of STOLI has resulted in a reevaluation of these laws. This section also explores regulatory alternatives
such as adoption of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
new model act limiting STOLI transactions.
Part IV emphasizes the spectrum of regulatory options available to
states and the increasing need to apply such regulations to prohibit STOLI
transactions. It argues that prohibiting STOLI is necessary because of the
fundamental shift it creates in the life insurance paradigm and the
fraudulent practices it promotes. Further, regulation of STOLI transactions
would not limit legitimate secondary market transactions or curb property
rights or contract rights of those who no longer require insurance because
of altered life circumstances. Consequently, state law should be utilized to
eliminate the abusive insurance practices embodied by STOLI.
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PART I: WHERE IT ALL BEGAN
a. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF STOLI
The development of the life settlement industry3 began with the AIDS
epidemic in the late 1980s.4 At that time, HIV/AIDS victims required
extensive, continuous treatment. A victim’s chance of survival was
minimal even with access to quality care. In addition to its devastating
physical impacts, HIV/AIDS was financially straining and often
overwhelming. The harsh reality of HIV/AIDS made access to funds a
necessity if one hoped to receive treatment and survive. This necessity
resulted in the creation of the secondary life insurance market which took a
traditionally illiquid asset, life insurance, and made it possible for the
insured to exchange his interest in the policy for cash.5 Thus, life insurance
was transformed into an asset-backed security known as a viatical
settlement.6
In a viatical settlement the policyholder (“viator”), who has contracted
HIV/AIDS or another terminal disease, directly or indirectly7 sells his
interest in his life insurance policy to an investor.8 The investor’s payment
in return for the policy provides the viator with immediate access to funds.9
Typically, the viator is paid the present value of his policy. The present
value depends on the viator’s life expectancy, the face value of the policy,

3. STOLI transactions grew out of the life settlement industry and both life
settlements and STOLI are secondary market transactions.
4. Florence Bih Shu-Acquaye & Elisabeth Divine Reid, Viatical Settlement Industry:
Does Mutual Benefits Render It Terminal, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. OF BUS. L. 7, 10
(2005).
5. Id. Viatical settlements give insureds access to death benefits that would normally
be unavailable to them.
6. A viatical settlement is defined as the purchase of a terminally ill person’s life
insurance policy, by an investor or investment company, for a certain percentage of the
policy’s face value. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
7. Most viatical settlement transactions contain intermediate investors, broker firms,
promoters or financial institutions which evaluate the worth of the policy, market the
investment to secondary investors, and provide loans for the purchase of the policy. The
result is that multiple parties often have an interest in the death of a single viator. BARRY D.
FLAGG, THEINSURANCEADVISOR.COM, INC., STRANGER-ORIGINATED LIFE INSURANCE: FREE
INSURANCE? FOUND MONEY? A GOOD INVESTMENT? A SCAM? WHAT IS IT ANYWAY?, 1-2
available at http://www.theinsuranceadvisor.com/documents/STOLIWhitePaper-Final.pdf.
8. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 738 (11th Cir. 2006).
9. Id.
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and the cost of future premiums and administrative costs.10 Upon the death
of the viator, the investor receives the proceeds of the insurance policy.
His gain is the difference between the death benefit received and his
payment to the viator plus premium payments and administrative costs.11
Thus, viatical settlements provided HIV/AIDS patients with a much
needed service and injected healthy competition into the market. Insurance
companies began offering accelerated death benefits as a means of
competing with viaticals.12 The result was a competitive life insurance
market which benefited consumers and responded to their needs. These
insurance developments combined with medical advances that increased
the life expectancy of the insured, however, reduced the rate of return on
investments and thus diminished the appeal of viaticals to investors.13 The
viatical industry responded to this decline in demand by broadening its
consumer base.14 Viatical settlements now encompass any insured who has
a life expectancy of less than two years.15 Currently, most states have
enacted Viatical Settlement Acts to regulate the industry.16
Life settlements are an outgrowth of the viatical settlements industry.17
A life settlement, much like a viatical, provides the insured the opportunity
to gain financial liquidity through the sale of his life insurance policy.
Instead of selling the policy for medical reasons, however, the insured
seeks to sell the policy based on a change in life circumstances. Examples
10. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
11. Id. The court defines an investor’s profit as the difference between “the
discounted purchase price paid to the insured and the death benefit collected from the
insurer, less transaction costs, premiums paid, and other administrative expenses.” Id. If
the viator lives longer then expected the profit is correspondingly reduced. See Bih ShuAcquaye & Reid, supra note 4, at 7.
12. An accelerated death benefits rider “provides terminally ill individuals with the
immediate right to receive a small percentage of their death benefit” and thus enabled
insurance companies to compete with viatical settlements. See Robert H. Heinrich, J.D. &
Bradley K. Feldman, J.D., Wet Paper: Giving Secondary Market for Life Insurance a Bad
ADVISORS
NETWORK
2
(May
2007)
available
at
Name,
FEE
http://investor.financialcounsel.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
13. Heinrich & Feldman,supra note 12, at 3; Bih Shu-Acquaye & Reid, supra note 4,
at 11.
14. Heinrich & Feldman,supra note 12, at 3.
15. Id; Sachin Kohli, Pricing Death: Analyzing the Secondary Market fir Life
Insurance Policies and its Regulatory Environment, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 279, 281 (2006).
16. Westlaw 50 State Statutory Surveys, Life Insurance -- Viatical Settlements
(August 2007) available at www.westlaw.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). Further, as of
June 16, 2005 forty-seven states regulated viaticals as securities. Bih Shu-Acquaye & Reid,
supra note 4, at 11.
17. Kohli, supra note 15, at 281.
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include divorce, death of a spouse, retirement, disability, or bankruptcy.18
The industry targets policyholders who are 65 or older with a life
expectancy between two and twelve years.19
An insured engaged in a life settlement transaction typically sells his
policy for a sum greater than its cash surrender value but less than the death
benefit.20 The price offered takes into account the administrative costs of
maintaining the policy -- primarily continued payment of premiums. The
death benefit is ultimately paid directly to the investor, rather than to the
initial insured, and the profit is computed just as in a viatical settlement.21
The life settlement industry has filled the vacuum left by viatical
settlements and is flourishing.22 The current market is estimated at thirteen
billion dollars and is projected to exceed one hundred and sixty billion
dollars in the future.23
STOLI24 could be considered the illegitimate offspring of the viatical
and life settlement industry. STOLI transactions occur when elderly
persons who do not already own life insurance decide to purchase a policy
at the behest of investors and brokers.25 The investors initiate the life
18. National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, 1 STOLI Alert 1, 3-4
(March 2007) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). Typically, an insured
is looking to enter into a life settlement when a change in their financial condition or their
health has occurred. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3.
19. Generally, a life settlement is desirable when: (1) the policy has been owned for
longer then two years; (2) the policy has a lower premium obligation as well as a cash
surrender value; and (3) candidate is over the age of 65 with “an impaired life expectancy”.
Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3.
20. Id. The cash surrender value of a policy is the money an insurance company
would be willing to pay the insured if he were to surrender his policy to the company.
Kohli, supra note 15, at 288. However, when an insured’s health declines the surrender
value of the policy is less than the market value making it a profitable sale. Id.
21. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
22. Kohli, supra note 15, at 298 (“Demographic trends within the United States
indicate that the market is positioned for tremendous growth.” The article cites such factors
as increased life expectancy that correlates to less need for life insurance policies. It also
predicts that the market for these transactions should increase at three times the rate of the
general population in the next twenty-five years).
23. R. Mark Keenan & Steven Seltzer, Life Settlements – Investors Beware Complete
Your Due Diligence Before Buying (November 2006) available at www.andersonkill.com
(last vis ited Oct. 10, 2008).
24. STOLI is also referred to as speculator-initiated life insurance (“SPIN-LIFE”) and
investor-initiated life insurance (“IOLI”).
25. STOLI transactions generally deal with universal life insurance policies. See,
Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement For Life Insurance: A Critical
Reassessment, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 478 (2005); Terry M. Magady, Practice Tips: Selling
Life Insurance on the Secondary Market, 28 LOS ANGELES LAWYER 14, 14 n.7 (2006).
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insurance transactions with strangers at the point of sale.26 The investors
often characterize the life insurance purchase as “free insurance”, “riskfree”, or “no-cost”, and offer other financial incentives such as upfront cash
bonuses to induce purchase.27 Investors or agents often advertise STOLI
through the internet and at fancy solicitation forums such as on cruises.28
The target population is wealthy people who are 65 years or older with a
limited life expectancy.29 The targeted consumer agrees to purchase a life
insurance policy with a large face value with funds provided by the
investor through an outside financial institution.30 A two-year nonrecourse31 loan is typically used to purchase the policy and to fund the
insured’s payment of premiums.32 At the end of two years, the policy is
usually assigned to the investor.33 The assignment functions, to some
extent, as a repayment of the initial loan plus interest. While assignment of
26. STOLI unlike life settlements involve mainly private rather than institutional
investors.
27. Stephen R. Leimberg, Stranger-Owned Life Insurance: Killing the Goose That
Lays Golden Eggs!, THE INS. TAX REV. 811, 811 (May 2005) available at
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/2005-6866-1.pdf. (last visited Oct. 10, 2008);
Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3; Ted Anagnoson, Is Death a Commodity?, CAL. ST.
UNIVERSITY EMERITUS & RETIRED FACULTY ASS’N REPORTER 1,3 (March 2008).
28. Anagnoson, supra note 27, at 3.
29. Kohli, supra note 15, at 284. Prime candidates also have a life expectancy of less
than fifteen years. Id. See also Written Statement of David M. Lewis, Representative of the
Life Settlement Institute, Addressing the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Financial Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, at 3 (February 26, 2002)
available at www.financialservices.house.gov (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
30. Kohli, supra note 15, at 3.
31. Premium non-recourse financing means that the loan issued to pay the premiums
on the policy is secured only by the policy itself. If the borrower defaults the lender may
only receive the insurance policy and can not go after the borrower’s other assets or
finances. Louis S. Harrison, Death Don’t Have No Mercy When It Comes To Non Recourse
Premium Financed Life Insurance, 41ST ANNUAL SOUTHERN FEDERAL TAX INSTITUTE 1, 13
(Sept. 18-22, 2006).
32. Though non-recourse financing is typically used in STOLI transactions recourse
loans are also made in connection with such arrangements. Insurer Acts to Rescind Free Life
Insurance, LEIMBERG INFORMATIONAL SERVICES (September 2006) [hereinafter LEIMBERG].
Recourse or semi-recourse financing is being used more frequently as insurance companies
are refusing to issue policies to applicants who have received non-recourse financing due to
its association with STOLI transactions. FLAGG, supra note 7. The loan, whether recourse
or not, is made for two years in order to cover the contestability period on a life insurance
policy. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3. Once that period passes an insurance
company can only attempt to rescind the policy on the grounds of fraud or lack of insurable
interest. Id.
33. The two year waiting period is utilized in order to avoid state wet ink laws and
contestability clauses in the policies themselves. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3.
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the policy is not technically required, it is inevitable given the size of the
loan plus interest and premiums an insured would have to repay and
continue to pay if he chose to maintain the policy.34 An insured’s other,
less viable, options include: (1) continuing to pay the premiums himself
and repaying the initial loan plus interest; or (2) selling the policy to a third
party and using the return to repay the loan plus interest35. Neither of these
two options is as feasible or as frequently exercised as ceding the policy to
the investor without having to repay any portion of the loan or interest.

b. STOLI VERSUS LEGITIMATE LIFE SETTLEMENTS: WHAT ARE
WE REGULATING?
The Supreme Court iterated the basic premise for distinguishing
legitimate life settlements from STOLI in Connecticut Mutual Life v.
34. A recent complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California, Lincoln National Life v. Fishman, emphasizes this point stating, “[i]ndeed the
money used to purchase the policies was lent at such a usurious and exorbitant interest rate
that when the note becomes due, the trust will not be able to repay the loan and will have no
effective alternative but to forfeit the policies and assign them to the investor”. National
Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, 2 STOLI Alert 1, 4 (March 2008)
available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). In this case Fishman, a retired
physician took out three insurance policies each with a ten million dollar death benefit. Id.
Prior to applying for the policies it is alleged that Fishman accepted one million dollars from
Mutual Credit Corporation. Id. Further, Mutual Credit Corporation provided all the
financing in the form of a non-recourse loan. Id. The finance charge on the loan was more
than 100 percent of the amount loaned assuring that then only way to satisfy the debt was
the transfer of the three policies. Id. See also, Alan Jensen & Stephan R. Leimberg,
Stranger-Owned Life Insurance: A Point/Counterpoint Discussion, 33 THE AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL JOURNAL 110, 130 (Fall 2007). The authors describe
a fraudulent scheme in which a broker, Joseph Gennaco, peddled free life insurance with an
upfront cash bonus to those willing to purchase and then turnover life insurance policies. Id.
The scheme involved use of a two year non-recourse loan secured only by the policy. Id.
The interest rate on the loan was prohibitively high such that at the end of the two year
period the insured had no choice but to turn the policy over to the lender. Id.
35. When the insured initially purchases the policy it is in connection with a particular
investor or investment firm. Unless that firm declines to purchase the policy because of
changed circumstances it is highly unlikely the insured will sell the policy to a third party.
This is because in addition to finding a new investor the amount of the loan and interest rate
are usually too high for the insured to make a profit upon sale. See Jenson & Leimberg,
supra note 34, at 130.
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Schaefer.36 The Court held that, “[a]ny person has a right to procure
insurance on his own life, and assign it to another, provided it not be done
by way of cover for a wager policy” and that “the essential thing is that the
policy shall be obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose of
speculating upon the hazard of a life in which the insured has no interest.”37
Under this reasoning, legitimate life settlements are those in which the
insurance was procured in good faith and the initial intention was to
purchase insurance for oneself or a loved one. Accordingly, traditional
viatical and life settlements are lawful and serve legitimate purposes.
These financial transfers were not planned prior to the purchase of the
policy. Rather, the insured legitimately obtained life insurance for the
financial benefit and protection of family members or dependents. As
circumstances within their lives changed, access to those benefits became
necessary and so the insurance market adapted to those needs.38 Without
these secondary market alternatives, policyholders’ life insurance would
remain an illiquid asset.39
STOLI transactions, however, inherently conflict with the Supreme
Court’s reasoning, because the consumer’s purchase of an insurance policy
is a cover for the investor’s and consumer’s true intent. People
participating in these transactions do not want life insurance. It is a
financial transfer of the policy from inception to an unrelated party,
literally a stranger. It is speculation on the life of another. STOLI is a
means of circumventing states’ insurable interest laws by having the
insured purchase the policy in his own name, but with the investor’s money
and for the investor’s ultimate benefit.40 These transactions have broad and
36. See generally Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876).
37. Id. at 457, 460. See also Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 781 (1881) (applying
the Schaefer Court’s distinction and ruling that “[t]o hold it valid for the whole proceeds
would be to sanction speculative risks on human life, and encourage the evils for which
wager policies are condemned”); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 480 F.3d 499, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2007)(citing Schaefer in a unanimous decision rejecting
a corporate party’s claim to death benefits from an insurance policy on a stranger’s life).
38. National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, 1 STOLI Alert 1, 3-4
(March 2007) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
39. Kohli, supra note 15, at 280.
40. A permutation on these deals utilizes the loophole created by relaxed insurable
interest laws which allows charities to take policies out on an individual’s life or to be
named a beneficiary. In this type of transaction, “investors ‘borrow’ the insurable interests
of charities to purchase insurance coverage on the lives of the organization’s older, wealthy,
charitable-minded, and generous donor[s]”. Leimberg, supra note 27, at 813. These
arrangements are commonly referred to as COLI transactions. Id. Further, STOLI
transactions may be achieved through the use of irrevocable trusts and banks as well.
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negative implications for all parties involved as well as for primary and
secondary life insurance markets. State action is necessary to prevent this
bad faith speculation on human life and its untoward consequences.
PART II: WHY STOLI SHOULD BE PROHIBITED
The practical and legal distinctions between legitimate secondary life
insurance market transactions and STOLI provide a basis for regulation. It
is the risks STOLI poses to consumers, however, that make state action and
elimination of STOLI essential. These risks directly harm consumers
through potential confidentiality breaches, misleading marketing strategies
including false promises of financial security and certainty, and health
risks. STOLI derivatively harms consumers through its impact on
insurance companies and tax consequences which result in market
distortions, affect availability and affordability of life insurance, potentially
negate positive tax treatment and consequently may result in a fundamental
shift of the life insurance paradigm. These risks are discussed in greater
detail below.
a. IMPACT OF STOLI ON THE INSURANCE MARKET
Life insurance is a business. Thus, insurers calculate everything from a
business perspective including premiums, value of policies, savings, and
who will be insured. In pricing life insurance, companies analyze and base
prices on multiple factors including mortality and lapse rates.41 The first
factor, mortality rates, is integral to pricing insurance policies as well as to
the rate of return for STOLI investors.42 It is generally based on medical
information and is important because a life insurer cannot raise premiums
due to deterioration of an insured’s health.43 This factor remains virtually
unchanged by the emergence of life settlements and STOLI transactions.
The second factor, lapse rates, has the most potential to negatively
affect availability and pricing of life insurance policies for the elderly.
Under a regular life insurance contract, a certain percentage of
41. Cynthia J. Crosson, et. al., Fatal Attraction: Risks in the Secondary Market for
Life Insurance, FITCH, INC., FITCH RATINGS LTD 1, 7 (2007) available at www.lifeinvestor.eu. (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
42. The rate of return for STOLI transactions or any viatical or life settlement is
inversely proportionate to the health of the insured. Therefore, a decline in the insured’s
health increases profits for the investor(s). Id.
43. Id.

530

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:2

policyholders will surrender their policies or allow them to lapse.44 In
these cases the insurer retains all premiums which have been collected and
never pays out a death benefit.45 Insurance companies have come to rely
on this percentage and use the information to calculate premiums for all the
policies they issue.46 STOLI transactions distort this percentage because
STOLI is designed to ensure that policies never lapse and that the death
benefit is always paid, just not to the original insured.47 This occurs
because investors can usually afford to pay premiums and maintain the
policy until the initial insured’s death. In order to compensate for this
additional and incalculable risk, life insurers will need to increase
premiums, permanently, for all life insurance applicants, including those
who genuinely need it, particularly the elderly.48
Another reason STOLI is likely to increase life insurance premiums is
the cost and resources insurance companies require to litigate STOLI issues
such as fraud and misrepresentation. Insurance companies have already
begun expending valuable resources litigating whether STOLI policies
must be paid.49 Increased litigation costs, coupled with increased

44. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison et al, 484 F.3d 284, 295 (4th Cir. 2007).
45. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 2.
46. Morrison, 484 F.3d at 295. See Charles Duhigg, Late in Life, Finding a Bonanza
in Life Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006 (noting that companies rely on policies lapsing
so much so that on ninety percent of the policies companies never pay a death benefit and
that last year (2006) “insurance companies reduced their financial exposure by $1.1 trillion
when 19.8 million policyholders stopped paying premiums”. Accordingly, death benefits
were paid on only 2.2 million policies).
47. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3-4.
48. Id. This change in lapse rates will eventually force companies to revise previous
statistics and assumptions. This distortion is expected to drive up the overall cost of life
insurance most notably for the elderly. Id.
49. Id. at 4 (noting that New York Life and Annuity Company and John Hancock
brought legal actions alleging fraud because the policies were purchased as part of a STOLI
transaction). See also complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, Lincoln National Life v. Fishman, in which Lincoln National requests
rescission or voidance of three ten million dollar life insurance policies because of alleged
misrepresentations by the insured and the investors’ lack of insurable interest. National
Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, supra note 34, at 4. See generally Life
Product Clearing, LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that
investors were not entitled to the proceeds of a $10 million life insurance policy because the
policy was always intended to benefit the investors and is therefore in violation of insurable
interest laws and public policy).
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regulation and monitoring costs, will drive up life insurance prices
generally.50
Moreover, because of this market distortion and increased payment of
death benefits, there are potential solvency issues. Insurance companies
plan on a certain number of policies lapsing and so reserve funds
accordingly.51 Potentially, with so many people unexpectedly collecting on
very large policies, an insurance company will not have set aside enough
funds to pay all the claims, legitimate and illegitimate. While companies
may adjust to some of these changes in the future, current unanticipated
collections pose a threat.
STOLI’s effect on insurance companies is important because it
adversely affects the death benefits of those who legitimately purchased
life insurance or who want to purchase life insurance in the future. It does
so by potentially diminishing an insurance company’s ability to pay claims
and by driving up the average cost of life insurance. Accordingly, STOLI’s
effect on insurance companies negatively reshapes the current life
insurance market for consumers.
b. IMPACT OF STOLI ON CONSUMERS/INSUREDS
STOLI directly and derivatively harms consumers, particularly the
elderly. The offer of a risk-free investment with a large payoff is enticing,
50. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3-4. The emergence of life settlements and
STOLI markets will lead to the creation of new monitoring and tracking systems which may
affect the pricing of ordinary policies. Id. John Hancock Life Insurance Co. of Boston is a
prime example of the increased monitoring insurance companies are enacting while waiting
for states to play a larger regulatory role. Sara Hansard, Hancock moves against ‘strangerowned’ policies, INVESTMENT NEWS (September 25, 2006) available at
www.investmentnews.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). John Hancock has modified a
number of forms including two new forms now required of applicants over the age of 70
that must be approved by each state. Id. Further the company is requiring new applications
and certification forms for policies to be owned by trusts. Id. All of this increases an
insurance company’s overhead and is reflected in the price all consumers have to pay not
just those participating in STOLI transactions. See also, Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 34,
at 123 (stating, “[i]nsurers are forced unnecessarily to spend millions of dollars to monitor
and filter these fraudulent transactions” and questioning why insurers, a victim in the
process, should be forced to single-handedly regulate STOLI).
51. E-mail from Doug Head, LISA Executive Director, regarding Comments on
NCOIL Model on Life Settlements (February 20, 2007) available at
www.lisassociation.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2008). See also Jenson & Leimberg, supra
note 34, at 112 (noting that 89% of universal life policies did not pay benefits).
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but misleading. The individual risks of these arrangements are not being
regulated, nor are the resulting market distortions which adversely affect
the availability and cost of life insurance for consumers.
First, STOLI arrangements raise concerns regarding the relationship
between the insured and investors. The STOLI relationship is much more
intrusive than that of an insured to an insurance company. Under this
multi-party arrangement, the investors may require more regular
examinations as their profit is directly determined by the health of the
insured.52 Further, a STOLI transaction involves an insured, a broker, and
an investor at the very least. Only the insured has an interest in his
continued vitality. While concern that an investor will murder an insured
to increase profit may seem implausible, history and human nature
advocate against such ready dismissals.53 Therefore, while the chances of
an investor murdering an insured are rather small there is no guarantee that
it will not happen.
A larger concern is maintaining the confidentiality of an insured’s
identity and medical history. This information may be circulated to

52. FLAGG, supra note 7.
53. In truth, the basis for prohibiting wagering contracts is not so historically distant
as one might hope, consider, C. DiMassa, 2 Arrested in Homeless Life Insurance Scam, Pair
Are Accused of Obtaining Policies on two men who later died in hit-and-run accidents, L.A.
TIMES (May 19, 2006), The article provides: “[t]wo women were arrested Thursday after
they allegedly befriended two homeless men, took out 19 life insurance policies on them
and filed claims worth more than $2.2 million after the transients mysteriously died in hitand-run pedestrian accidents in Los Angeles”. See also Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873,
879-880 (Wash. 2007) (Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of
his wife and business partner. Stenson, in financial difficulty, had taken out a $400,000 life
insurance on his wife prior to killing her); Williams v. Ozmint, 494 F.3d 478, 485-86 (4th
Cir. 2007) (in a petition for Habeas corpus the court noted that defendant was in dire
financial straits and recently declared bankruptcy. Further, less than a month before the
murders of both his son and wife Williams “substantially increased” their life insurance
coverage naming himself as the beneficiary. Williams was convicted and sentenced to death
for both murders.); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 374 n.1 (1972) (Defendant
confessed that “Minnie Lee Claybon (the murder victim) and myself had an insurance
policy together. So I started thinking about the insurance and the money that I could get if
something happened to her. I knew that I could use the money if something happened…So
I drived the car into the river and she was killed”. The defendant was convicted of murder.).
These are just a few incidents and are representative of the potential for both strangers and
loved ones to murder in order to make a profit. It is fair to speculate that if family members
are enticed to kill spouses and children an even greater temptation would exist with respect
to strangers.
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unsavory investors over whom the insured has no control.54 Providing this
information exposes the insured to myriad breaches of confidentiality
which could jeopardize his life or otherwise expose him to harm. For
example, in Stranger-Owned Life Insurance: A Point/Counterpoint
Discussion, Stephen Leimberg notes that on April 5, 2007, “the federal
court for the Southern District of Florida released information on a case in
which Columbian drug cartel members bought life settlements to launder
drug money.”55 This case demonstrates that STOLI investors are unknown
figures who have absolutely no interest in the health or wellbeing of the
insured. Based on the potential attenuated chain of investors, an insured
may not know who has an interest in his death.56 Moreover, the investor
has a legal right to assign the policy to whomever he chooses, such that an
insured cannot prevent a person from having an interest in his death.57
These risks are the direct consequence of turning human lives into
investments.
Second, the insured is giving up the benefits of obtaining and owning a
life insurance policy in the future. There is a maximum amount of
aggregate coverage insurance companies are willing to issue to any
individual.58 STOLI transactions are designed to maximize profits for all
participants, so insureds are often encouraged to procure the largest policy
possible irrespective of the insured’s future insurance needs. In doing so,
the consumer uses up his insurability.59 Uninformed or ill-informed
participants may unwittingly sacrifice these rights and ruin any chance of
obtaining needed life insurance after they participate in a STOLI
transaction.
Moreover, there are many uncertainties accompanying STOLI
transactions. The contestability period of a life insurance policy plays a key

54. See J. Alan Jensen & Stephan R. Leimberg, supra note 34, at 118-19 (stating that
“original investors have the legal right (and often the intent) to sell the policy individually or
in a block with other policies immediately to a different group of investors. There is no legal
limit to how many times the policy on your life can be sold or to whom. Therefore, the
insured has no control or knowledge of who will own it and be its beneficiary”).
55. Id. at 119.
56. Id.
57. Leimberg notes that the only way for an insured to prevent future assignment of
the policy is by contractual agreement. Id. at 126. There is no incentive for an investor to
agree to profit limiting provisions and given the unequal bargaining power between the
investor and the potential insured it is unlikely that a STOLI company would. Id.
58. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 4.
59. Id.
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role in determining when, how, and if the death benefits are distributed.60
There are two possibilities: the insured will either die during the
contestability period or after it. If he dies during the contestability period,
then the initial designated beneficiary will receive the death benefits, but
the loan that the insured received in order to pay the premiums will need to
be repaid plus interest and administrative costs to the lenders.61 Therefore,
family members will not receive the full benefit of the policy.
Additionally, there is a chance that the insurance company will try to
rescind the policy based on the attempted STOLI transaction.62 If the
insurance company succeeds, the family may be responsible to the investor
for the loan.63 Therefore, the potential result is expensive liabilities and
litigation for the decedent’s family.
Alternatively, if the insured survives the contestability period, even
though the investors have agreed to finance the loan, there is often no
guarantee the investors will purchase the policy.64 The insured’s life
expectancy may have changed and consequently the price originally
offered may decrease accordingly, or the investors may no longer be
interested in the policy.65 In this situation, the lender may seek repayment
of the initial loan from the insured because it will no longer be repaid upon
transfer of the policy.66 Thus, an insured may suffer an overall loss on the
transaction.67 Lastly, even if the investor purchases the policy upon the
insured’s death, his estate may still be liable to investors for the value of
the policy.68
60. See supra notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text.
61. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3. The lender is a creditor of the
decedent’s estate such that it is entitled to repayment of the loan. Because the loan is
typically non-recourse the estate has two options, either repay the debt or the lender is
entitled to assignment of the policy as the policy was collateral for the loan. If recourse
financing was utilized, as is the growing trend, the decedent’s family is responsible for full
repayment of the loan plus any accumulated interest. See supra notes 31 & 32 and
accompanying text.
62. If the insurance company succeeds in rescinding the policy because of a
misrepresentation regarding the STOLI transaction then the nature of the loan often shifts
from non-recourse to recourse rendering the decedent’s family liable for up the full face
value of the policy. See Harrison, supra note 31, at 14.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.; Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 34, at 117.
66. See Jenson & Leimberg, supra note 34, at 117.
67. Id. This danger is mitigated if the transaction utilized non-recourse financing, as
the lender’s only recourse is to acquire the policy. Harrison, supra note 31, at 13.
68. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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Given the potential illegality of STOLI transactions, insurance
companies and states are increasingly challenging the validity of such
agreements and insurance companies’ responsibility to pay the benefit.69
This uncertainty, often lost on consumers, is not overlooked by investors
who require consumers to execute complex legal documents guaranteeing
payment of the proceeds.70 Therefore, when lenders and investors are
denied recovery by insurance companies, they often have recourse against
the estate.71 The one-sided nature of these provisions suggests that insureds
do not understand the risks they are taking on, or lack the bargaining power
to rewrite the STOLI contract to reduce these risks. What may seem like a
good way to increase savings and provide relatively quick income can
instead lead to devastating debt and financial insecurity.72
In addition to fraud, confidentiality breaches, and health risks, STOLI
has the potential to make life insurance prohibitively expensive for those
who genuinely need or want it. Consumers cannot protect themselves from
these fundamental market shifts. Further, consumers are the main target of
STOLI and the harm it creates. Therefore, while STOLI may benefit some
wealthy consumers and investors, the costs of treating humans as
commodities adversely affects the entire population and exceeds any
benefit received through these transactions. The only way to protect
consumers is through state action and prohibition.
c. IMPACT OF STOLI ON INVESTORS
Investors also must clearly understand the risks of STOLI transactions.
As participants, their finances are exposed to the risk that the investments
will either be unprofitable or nullified. This is perhaps a familiar risk for
some investors, but given the marketing of STOLI arrangements as safe
investments, conservative investors with limited resources may be misled
into investing.73 There are two levels of potential fraud that may affect the
risk of investment and the rate of return.
69. It is much harder to challenge the validity of the policy once the contestability
period has expired. See Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3. However, most challenges
to successfully alter the nature of the financing from non-recourse to recourse, involve
misrepresentations in the insurance application or fraud on the insurer. It is unclear whether
the nature of the financing would shift based on a denial for lack of insurability. See
Harrison, supra note 31, at 14.
70. Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 34, at 117.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Leimberg, supra note 27, at 811.
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The first level of fraud may be perpetrated by either the insured or the
investment broker/company.74 Investment return relies upon accurate
estimates of life expectancy, so if an insured lies about his good health to
gain more compensation, the investor’s profit may decrease. Theoretically,
companies promoting STOLI and corresponding brokers should evaluate
an insured’s life expectancy independent of what is reported, but that is not
always the case.75
This form of fraud upon investors is often perpetrated by the STOLI
company or broker. Often the STOLI company handles most, if not all,
aspects of the investment transaction, e.g., evaluation of life expectancy
and payment of premiums.76 Therefore, the investment company retains
most of the knowledge and control over the transaction. Power often leads
to abuse as evidenced by one of the most recent and biggest frauds upon
investors, addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in SEC v. Mutual Benefits
Corporation.77 In Mutual Benefits, the company defrauded approximately
29,000 investors by using misleading life expectancies in predicting when
the insureds would die.78 As insureds outlived these expectancies, the
company used money from new investors to pay the premiums on the older
policies rather than the ones they purportedly invested in, much like a
pyramid scheme.79 Investors lost millions of dollars, including many
people’s life savings.80
74. An indictment issued by United States Attorney McGregor W. Scott of the
Eastern District of California evidences the type of fraud that is perpetrated upon investors.
The indictment alleges a scheme to defraud approximately 500 investors in twenty states for
over twenty-five million dollars. McGregor W. Scott, U.S. Atty, Eight Defendants Indicted
On Major Viatical/Life Settlement Fraud Scheme, E.D. CALIFORNIA (August 23, 2007). The
indictment alleges that the company involved made false and misleading statements
regarding the safety and risk of the investment as well as that they were not required to be
licensed. Id. at 2.
75. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 739 (11th Cir. 2005) cert. dismissed
(Mut. Benefits Corp. v. SEC, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8978 (U.S. 2007).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.; National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, 1 STOLI Alert 1, 5
(June 2007) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); Patrick Danner,
Viaticals are now subject to regulation, RTG CONSULTANTS, LLC available at
www.herald.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). The 29,000 investors purchased 7,322 life
insurance policies valued at a total of 1.5 billion dollars. Id.
79. National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, 1 STOLI Alert 1, 5
(June 2007) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). Those responsible for
the Mutual Benefits scandal were sentenced to five years in prison and ordered to pay $826
million in restitution damages to investors. Id.
80. Id.
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The second level of fraud is on the insurer. As insurance companies
have become increasingly aware of STOLI transactions, they have begun to
tailor the application process to detect such arrangements.81 In order to
avoid tripping the STOLI wire, insureds are often told to lie or omit
information to induce the insurance company to issue a policy.
Misrepresenting one’s intent when directly questioned qualifies as a
misrepresentation of material fact, if the insurance company would not
have issued the policy but for the lie or omission. This is insurance fraud,
punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony depending on the state.82
Also, the insurance company may contest the policy under insurable
interest laws or even rescind it entirely based on these misrepresentations.
New York Life and Annuity Corporation recently rescinded a one million
dollar policy on the grounds that the trust involved was created solely for
the benefit of investors rather than the insured.83 These investors were the
beneficiaries and premium payors on the policy but had no familial or
economic interest in the life of the insured.84 This action emphasizes not
only the importance of disclosure regarding STOLI transactions but more
importantly the risk to both the investor and the insured’s estate when
participating in such arrangements. Though with any insurance policy
there is some risk that it may be rescinded, that risk is multiplied with
STOLI because the legality and regulatory requirements remain unsettled.

d. TAX IMPLICATIONS OF STOLI
How the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) will treat money acquired
through STOLI transactions as well as the transfer of the policy itself
remains unsettled. Tax analysis includes treatment of the initial financing
loan, the payment on exchange, and the receipt of the death benefits by
81. As noted in Section II.a, insurance companies have great incentive to prevent
STOLI transactions.
82. Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 34, at 115.
83. See LEIMBERG supra note 32. The complaint alleges a violation of New York’s
insurable interest laws. Id. The company notes that the only remedy available to the
company is to rescind the policy and return the premiums plus interest. Id. See also New
Obstacles to Stranger-Owned Life Insurance Transactions (“SOLI”), GREENBERG TRAURIG
SPECIAL REPORT (January 2007) available at www. Gtlaw.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
84. LEIMBERG, supra note 32.
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investors.85 Resolution of these issues will greatly affect all involved in
STOLI arrangements including the profit to investors and the financial
compensation of consumers. The tax consequences of these transactions
may eliminate any promised financial benefit.86
Typically, life insurance proceeds received as death benefits are not
included in the beneficiary’s gross income or the insured’s estate and are
thus tax-free money.87 The policy reason behind the tax exemption is that
the proceeds are meant to protect against death and provides for one’s
family.88 Conversely, based on this policy, if an insured decides to receive
proceeds for his life insurance policy prior to death, then a portion of the
proceeds will be included in his income and consequently taxed.89 With
STOLI, it is unclear how the gains from the sale of the policy and the
proceeds from the policy will be taxed. Further, whether proceeds and
financial gain are taxed as capital or ordinary income makes a significant
difference as capital gains are taxed at a much more favorable rate than
ordinary income.90
There are several possible tax treatments for STOLI transactions, all of
which lack the typically positive treatment life insurance proceeds receive

85. A whole paper could be written on the potential tax consequences of STOLI
transactions. The purpose of this article, however, is to give only an overview of the
problems that make state legislation and regulation of STOLI transactions imperative.
86. See Raymond J Lehman, House Subcommittee Leaders Want Treasury Guidance
on STOLI, BEST WIRE SERVICES (Nov. 28 2007). Lehman reviews a letter to Treasury
Secretary Paulson from several representatives expressing concern about STOLI and stating
that “because tax rules governing settlements can be complex, including regulations on
cancellation of indebtedness income, they raise the potential that an insured or his or her
heirs could face an unexpected tax liability”. Id. “Some transactions may be classified
under federal tax law as ‘split-dollar’ life insurance, while insured also may be unaware of
their tax liability for any cash promotions they receive”. Id.
87. I.R.C. §101(a)(1) (1986).
88. Leimberg, supra note 27, at 819 (quoting Vaughn Henry, “It’s because life
insurance protects widows, widowers, and children from becoming paupers when the
breadwinner dies that it isn’t taxable. But that may change if Congress or the Treasury
Department thinks life insurance is becoming nothing more than a wager.”).
89. I.R.C. §101(a)(2) (1986); I.R.C. §72(e) (1986). The portion subjected to tax is the
amount above the principal paid for the policy. This may be complicated by an annuity or
similar arrangements.
90. Under the IRC capital gains receive much more favorable treatment, being taxed
only at a 15% rate. This is a very low capital gains rate that is subject to change in the
future. The treatment of death benefits, capital versus ordinary gain or the tax rate for
capital gains, under such an investment scheme does make a difference as it directly impacts
the rate of return on the investment. FLAGG, supra note 7, at 29.
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under the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”).91 First, the IRS may treat the
initial loan as an option agreement and payment.92 Traditionally, loans are
not taxed under the IRC.93 By treating the initial loan as a payment option,
however, the IRS could tax the entire amount of the loan which could
potentially exceed any initial financial incentive offered by the investor.94
This creates a liquidity problem for the insured and may result in
unanticipated financial problems. Conversely, if the payments are
considered loans, then any amount the insured is not required to repay may
be taxed as cancellation of indebtness income.95 This means that the
insured will be taxed on the portion of the loan that was forgiven, which
may or may not exceed the price he was paid for the policy. Regardless of
whether the policy is considered a loan, the insured will be taxed to the
extent that cash value received exceeds premiums paid; thereby reducing
the insured’s gain as well.96 Therefore, the same liquidity issues arise
whether the transaction is treated as a payment option, subject to debtforgiveness, or treated as ordinary income.
Further, recent IRS regulations called “split dollar regulations” have
emerged.97 A split dollar arrangement is as:
Any arrangement between an owner and non-owner of a
life insurance contract that satisfies the following criteria:
(i) Either party to the arrangement pays
directly or indirectly all or a portion of the
premiums on the life insurance contract including
91. I.R.C. §101(a)(1) (1986).
92. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 8.
93. This is because a loan is not viewed as income. The debtor has to pay the money
back such that there is no basis in the loan and consequently no taxable gain.
94. Heinrich & Feldman, supra note 12, at 3.
95. I.R.C. §108 (1986).
96. Again the tax analysis gets rather complicated. The idea is simple, the tax
consequences of STOLI transactions are currently uncertain but may result in negating most
and in some cases all of the insured’s gain, leaving the insured with next to nothing and the
investors with millions upon the insured’s death.
97. Margaret Gallagher Thompson, J.D., The Final Split-Dollar Regulations, J. OF
ACCOUNTANCY (February 2004) available at www.aicpa.org (last visited Oct. 10,
2008)(noting a split-dollar arrangement exists when there is one policy between an owner
and non-owner and one of the party pays the premiums and is entitled to recover the
payment through the death benefit). See Joshua E. Husbands & J. Alan Jensen, Split Dollar
Life Insurance Funding: You Mean People Still Do That, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 1, 3
(August 30, 2007).
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a payment by means of a loan to the other party
that is secured by the insurance contracts;
(ii) At least one of the parties to the
arrangement paying premiums under the paragraph
above is entitled to recover (either conditionally or
unconditionally) all or any portion of those
premiums and such recovery is to be made from,
or is secured by, the proceeds of the life insurance
contract.98
If this definition is satisfied, then the death benefit of an insured is
included in the insured’s gross income and taxed accordingly.99 Due to the
broad definition of split dollar arrangements, these regulations potentially
apply to STOLI transactions.100 STOLI transactions typically utilize a nonrecourse loan such that the premiums of the policy are paid by a third party
and the third party is entitled to recover those premiums from the proceeds
of the life insurance which secures the loan.101 Consequently, STOLI
proceeds and profits could face adverse tax treatment under the split dollar
regulations.102
Most importantly, STOLI transactions have the potential to strip all life
insurance of favorable tax treatment. If life insurance primarily becomes
an investment vehicle rather than a means of providing protection and
benefits to one’s family, then the reason for tax free treatment evaporates.
This fundamental shift in the life insurance paradigm threatens the security
most have come to expect by individually investing in life insurance and
results in costs to those who seek life insurance for legitimate purposes and
depend on the corresponding beneficial treatment of its proceeds.103
98. Husbands & Jensen, supra note 97, at 4.
99. FLAGG, supra note 7, at 29.
100. “The definition under the final regulations is so broad that arrangements not
previously considered split-dollar may well be swept within its scope.” Thompson, supra
note 97, at 3.
101. Spilt dollar treatment has a greater impact if a trust is involved. With a trust, the
insured would be taxed on both the death benefit minus premiums paid as well as assessed a
gift tax. FLAGG, supra note 7, at 30.
102. Due to the abusive practices of STOLI the IRS could determine that STOLI
qualifies as a split dollar arrangement in order to deter insureds from entering into these
transactions. See FLAGG, supra note 7, at 67.
103. The risk of allowing STOLI to continue is the potential loss of tax benefits
afforded to life insurance because of its social merits. An Update on Recent Developments
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PART III: STATES’ ROLE IN PREVENTING STOLI
Based on these concerns, states have an interest in eliminating STOLI
transactions. An important role of government is to protect citizens from
fraud, harassment, and abuse. States have a responsibility to prevent the
exploitation of elderly residents by institutional and individual investors
and the brokers who seek them out.104 Another role of government is to
ensure that citizens, both as insureds and investors, do not deceive
insurance companies by circumventing insurable interest laws and
generally concealing their intentions with regard to the transfer and
assignment of policies. As we saw, however, the most important reason the
state has for preventing STOLI is to ensure that citizens have the ability to
purchase necessary life insurance. Given the detrimental consequences of
STOLI, the state has a greater responsibility to its citizens to prevent the
continued use of STOLI.105

Involving Stranger Owned Life Insurance (STOLI), MARKET INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(December 2007). While there are no current proposals to alter the taxation of life insurance
the Treasury has been required to institute an extensive two-year Investor Owed Life
Insurance study. Id. Further, the President’s Tax Advisory Panel’s 2005 report
recommended a plan that “would remove all the favored buildup from life insurance and
annuities.” Id. “With mounting deficits, a PAYGO regime in which all new expenditures
must be offset with new revenue and efforts to pass a permanent [alternative minimum tax]
‘fix’ we must continue to seriously consider the legislative vulnerability of life insurance.”
Id. (citations omitted).
104. Several states have issued alerts to warn residents, especially the elderly about
STOLI. See Matt Brady, Texas Sounds Alarm On Wave Of STOLI Solicitations, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER. LIFE & HEALTH,Vol. 111, Iss. 24 pg. 6 (June 18 2007);Texas Department of
Insurance, COMMISSIONER’S BULLETIN #B-0054-07 (December 21, 2007) available at
http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/bulletins/2007/cc53.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); Consumer
Alert: Stranger-Originated Life Insurance, ILLINOIS DIVISION OF INSURANCE available at
http://www.idfpr.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008)( advising consumers to proceed with
caution regarding STOLI and stating that the Illinois Division of Insurance does not approve
of these transactions); Consumer Alert: Stranger-Originated Life Insurance(STOLI), OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE available at http://www.ohioinsurance.gov (last visited Oct.
10, 2008); North American Securities Administrators Association, State Securities
Regulators Issue Senior Investor Alert (September 10, 2007) available at www.nasaa.org
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
105. Jennifer A. Lann, Viatical Settlements: An Explanation of the Process, An
Analysis of State Regulations, and an Examination of Viatical Settlements as Securities, 46
DRAKE L. REV. 923, 930 (1998). States have the ability to enact licensing and disclosure
requirements, minimum price regulations, general contract provisions, penalties for
violation, and any other provision or regulation the state sees fit. Id. at 931.
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Finally, the state has the power and ability to regulate these
relationships, as they relate to the business of insurance under the
McCarran Ferguson Act (“MFA”).106 The ability of states to regulate life
settlements and consequently STOLI transactions was affirmed in Life
Partners, Inc. v. Morrison et al.107 In Life Partners, the Fourth Circuit held
that state regulation of viaticals regarding price minimums constituted the
business of insurance because the focus of the regulation was on the
insurance contract.108 The Supreme Court has since denied review.109 The
Fourth Circuit opinion reinforces the state’s regulatory power with respect
to the consumer protection side of the secondary life insurance market and
should be equally applicable to the regulation of STOLI.
a.

DO STOLI TRANSACTIONS VIOLATE STATE INSURABLE
INTEREST LAWS?
i. History of Insurable Interest Laws and Wagering
Contracts

Life insurance, historically, has only been enforceable where the
contract includes an insurable interest in the life of the insured.110 Prior to
the creation of the insurable interest requirement in 1774,111 persons were
allowed to take policies out on anyone’s life.112 Thus, life insurance
contracts were viewed not as investments but as bets on another’s life. The
perceived danger in this wager was that a person, with no interest in the
continued life of the insured and who would gain by the insured’s death,
might be induced to kill the insured to make a profit or win a bet.113 When
the United States adopted the English common law system, it adopted the
insurable interest requirement as well. While the initial intent of the
requirement, deterring murder, is important, there are equally important
concerns such as fraud, consumer protection, and maintenance of the
legitimacy of both the primary and secondary life insurance markets.
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-13 (2008).
107. See generally Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison et al, 484 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2007).
108. Id.
109. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 12749 (Dec. 3, 2007).
110. Swisher, supra note 25, at 478.
111. The British Parliament in 1774 passed a statute providing that “any life insurance
contract without an insurable interest in the life of the insured” would be void. Id. at 481
112. Policies could be taken out on persons charged with serious crimes, famous
people, and/or the elderly. Id.
113. Id.
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized the validity of the
insurable interest requirement,114 as have state legislatures and courts.115
Under these statutes and the common law, the general requirements of
insurable interest are: “love and affection” for the insured; that the
applicant be “closely related by blood or law” to the insured; or “in the case
of other persons, a lawful and substantial economic interest in the
continued life, health, or bodily safety” of the insured is present.116 The
existence of an insurable interest is generally only required at the time the
contract is executed, not at the time of the insured’s death.117 The
requirement must be met, however, regardless of who purchases the
insurance but generally only becomes a concern when someone besides the
insured is taking out, acquiring, or inducing the purchase of the policy on
the insured’s life.118
114. See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876)(stating
that “mere wager policies – that is, policies in which the insured party has no interest
whatever in the matter insured, but only an interest in its loss or destruction – are void, as
against public policy…[i]n this country, statutes to the same effect have been passed in
some of the States; but where they have not been, in most cases either the English statutes
have been considered as operative, or the older common law has been followed…[a] man
cannot take out insurance on the life of a total stranger, nor on that of one who is not
connected with him as to make the continuance of the life a matter of some real interest to
him”)
115. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.090(2) (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201104(A)-(C) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103 (WEST 2007); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 280,
10110 (WEST 2007); DE. INS. CODE §§ 2704-05 (WEST 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3
(WEST 2007); HI REV. STAT. § 431:10-204 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1804 (2007); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-450 ( 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 299.150, 304.14-040 (WEST 2007);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2404 ( 2007); MD CODE ANN. INS. § 12-201 (WEST 2007); MI. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 500.2211 (WEST 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-251 (WEST 2007); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 33-15-201 (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-4 (WEST 2007); N.Y. INS. LAW
§3205(B)(MCKINNEY 2007).
116. Swisher, supra note 25, at 480 (citing Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding
Insurance Law 40, at 292-93 (3d ed. 2002).
117. This is of course the provision STOLI transactions exploit to avoid the application
of state insurable interest laws. However, this reality can and should be changed by states’
revision of current insurable interest statutes or through stricter interpretation. See
Leimberg, supra note 27, at 813 (noting that unlike property and casualty insurance the
owner must only have an insurable interest in the insured when the policy is purchased and
need not exist upon collection of the death benefit).
118. Swisher, supra note 25, at 484. “Every person has an unlimited insurable interest
in his or her own life”. Id. Regarding STOLI transactions the focus of insurable interest is
not on whether a person can take out a policy on his own life or designate his own
beneficiary. Rather, it is whether he may do so with the intention to sell the policy and if
that investor has an insurable interest.
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STOLI transactions do not involve relationships characterized by love
or affection, nor do they include family members. The investors are
strangers who may never even meet the insured. Therefore, the only means
of satisfying the insurable interest requirement is if a “lawful and
substantial economic interest in the continued life, health, and bodily safety
of the person insured”119 is demonstrated. The types of relationships that
satisfy this prong are business relationships such as between partners, with
regard to employees whose existence are critical to the operation of a
business,120 or creditors with respect to debtors.121 In contrast, STOLI
investors do not have a substantial interest in the continued life of the
insured; in fact their interest is directly adverse to the health of the insured
and they do not qualify under any of the three exceptional categories.122
Based on this premise, if the STOLI contracts were executed by the
third party investor for his benefit, then they would be void as against
public policy. STOLI transactions, however, are sophisticated enough to
circumvent the requirement of insurable interest upon issuance of the
policy.123 There are several schemes STOLI employs. The most common
are: the insured takes out the policy himself and subsequently assigns the
policy to the investor or names the investor as a beneficiary; an irrevocable
trust is used as the beneficiary of the policy and the investor is the
beneficiary of the trust; or a charity takes a policy out on the insured’s life
with his consent.124 Another alternative is to exploit the creditor/debtor
relationship established by the initial loan. As a creditor, the investor may
be designated as a beneficiary of the policy and thereby entitled to a portion
of the death benefits.125 It is precisely because a majority of states only
require insurable interest at the execution of the contract, and allow for the
119. Id. at 498.
120. This type of insurance is commonly known as key-man or key-woman insurance.
It is an exception to insurable interest laws which most states have accepted. Charity Rush,
Corporate-Owned Life Insurance(A/K/A/ ‘Dead Peasant’ or ‘Dead Janitor’ Policies): Has
Texas Buried The Insurable Interest Requirement?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 135, 140 (2004).
121. Swisher, supra note 25, at 511-20.
122. Id. at 510
123. The use of deceit and technicalities should not be allowed to circumvent the spirit
of insurable interest laws. Such subterfuge should not be rewarded by a windfall. See
Leimberg, supra note 27, at 813 & 817.
124. Many states have modified insurable interest statutes and provided that charities
have an insurable interest in a donor’s life. Leimberg, supra note 27, at 813.
125. Swisher, supra note 25, at 519. There is a question of how much of the proceeds
the creditor is actually able to collect. Most courts limit collection to some reasonable
amount. Id. at 520. What qualifies as a reasonable amount is unclear but courts often look to
the proportion of the death benefit to the amount owed as a guide. Id.
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free transfer and assignment of the policy, that STOLI practitioners have
been able to circumvent insurable interest obligations.
ii. Public Policy Concerns Regarding State Prohibition of
STOLI
All fifty states regulate insurable interest with respect to the purchase,
assignment, or change in beneficiary regarding the life insurance
contract.126 Each state defines insurable interest in conjunction with its
public policies. Some insurable interest laws are stricter than others.127 As
discussed, some states require an insurable interest at inception but not on
assignment based on priorities favoring the insured’s property rights128 and
freedom of contracting and resale.129
Prohibition of STOLI, however, does not necessarily curtail an
insured’s ability to sell his policy if he does so legitimately, within the
scope of the law.130 Prohibition is directed instead at the acquisition of
insurance for the sole purpose of selling it to investors. Further, any
changes to insurable interest laws can carve out exceptions for legitimate
secondary market transactions.131 Therefore, at least in the instance of
STOLI, freedom of property and contract concerns may be accommodated.
STOLI can be prevented through stricter application of insurable interest
126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
127. Rush, supra note 120, at 141.
128. Amick v. Butler, 12 N.E. 518, 520 (Ind. 1887); Grigsby v. Russell, 22 U.S. 149,
156 (1911)(stating that to “deny the right to sell except to persons having such an
[insurable] interest is to diminish appreciably the value of the contract in the owner’s
hands”); Hawley v. Aetna, 125 N.E. 707, 712 (Ill. 1919)(noting that there is no “reasonable
basis” for preventing an insured from selling or assigning his policy to anyone who would
pay more than the cash surrender value “which the company is willing to pay”).
129. This contrasting principle’s objective is to provide the insured with a valuable
liquidity of investment that he otherwise would be deprived of if prevented from assigning
his policy. Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped Worrying
and Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1121 (2000).
130. STOLI transactions occur when a person buys insurance with the intent to sell it to
a third party. See Rylander v. Allen, 53 S.E. 1032, 1034 (Ga. 1906)(stating that evidence of
a “preconceived intent to assign the policy would tend to invalidate the policy); Steinback v.
Diepenbrock, 52 N.E. 662, 664 (N.Y. 1899)(noting that in determining a parties intentions
“all the facts and circumstances may be proven, and if it appears that the parties intended by
the contract to enable a third and uninterested party to speculate on the life of another, the
court will declare such a contract invalid, not because of the assignment, but in spite of it”).
Decisions emphasize that transactions which are a mere cover for wagering contracts or to
circumvent the insurable interest laws will be invalidated. Kreitner, supra note 129, at 1121.
131. See infra note 176-80 and accompanying text.
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laws and the alteration of ineffective insurable interest laws132, while
legitimate viatical and life settlement transactions are preserved.
iii. State Insurable Interest Laws
A minority of states maintain strict insurable interest laws that require
the assignee or beneficiary to have an insurable interest in the insured at the
time of death.133 Assignments have been held void for lack of insurable
interest even if the transfer was made in good faith and was not intended as
a wagering contract.134 This prohibition remains regardless of any
surrounding circumstances that would justify the transaction or render it
valid in other states.135 This rule, that the policy is void if no insurable
interest exists at death, has been affirmed even in cases where the insured
paid all the premiums himself,136 and regardless of the lapse of time
between issuance and assignment,137 or whether assignment was made

132. State insurance departments have begun to define what constitutes STOLI
transactions. New York issued an opinion which defined it as “the procurement of
insurance solely as a speculative investment for the ultimate benefit of a disinterested third
party.” OP. OFF. GEN. COUNSEL (N.Y. Dec. 19, 2005). Utah has defined it as a scheme
“whereby a third party initiates, arranges the transaction, and ultimately expects to receive
the proceeds of the insurance policy” and Louisiana has defined it as a scheme involving
premium financing where the investor “contemporaneous with the initiation of the life
insurance policy, taking an interest in the death benefit above and beyond the repayment of
principal and interest of the loan”. Head, supra note 51.
133. C.T. Drechsler, Validity of assignment of life insurance policy to one who has no
insurable interest in insured, 30 A.L.R.2d 1310 (West 2007)
134. RICHARD A. LORD, 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §49:122 (4th ed. 2008).
135. See e.g., Helmetag’s Adm’r v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183 (Ala. 1884)(stating that a policy
issued to one on his own life could not be assigned by him to a person or entity having no
insurable interest in his life); Missouri Valley L. Ins. Co. v. McCrum, 12 P. 517 (Kan.
1887)(affirming decision that assignment of policy to a person without insurable interest is
void against public policy and stating that such assignment constitutes a fraud upon the
insurance company); Shaw v. M. Livingston & Co., 169 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1943)(noting that
where the transaction constitutes a wagering contract the policy was void and the insurance
company was not required to pay the death benefit); C.T. Drechsler, Validity of assignment
of life insurance policy to one who has no insurable interest in insured, 30 A.L.R.2d 1310
(West 2007)(noting that the minority view has generally prevailed in Kentucky); Mayo v.
Hartford Life Ins. Co.220 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. Tex. 2002)(stating that it is against public
policy “of the State of Texas to allow anyone who has no insurable interest to be the owner
of a policy of insurance upon the life of a human being”); Crismond’s Admrx.v. Jones, 83
S.E. 1045 (Va. 1915)(holding that an assignment is invalid if no insurable interest exists).
136. Schlamp v. Berner, 51 S.W. 312 (Ky. 1899).
137. Missouri Valley L. Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 18 Kan. 93 (Kan. 1877).
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pursuant to a prior agreement.138 States that follow the minority rule
include: Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and
Texas.139
The majority of states allow assignment as long as it is not intended to
circumvent the law and it is not a cover for a wagering contract.140 Fortyfour states follow this rule.141 Here, as with the stricter minority rule, it is
the spirit of the law which is emphasized.142 Majority jurisdictions, like the
minority, will render a policy void if the transaction was made in bad faith,
was fraudulent, or was simply a means of circumventing the wagering
prohibition.143 The majority states, however, focus on the public policy
that an insured should be able to sell his policy on the market for the most
advantageous deal.144 This position, in theory, should prevent STOLI, but
in reality it has not. This reality has been worsened by the loosening of
insurable interest laws in order to accommodate key-man insurance as well
as insurance transfers for charities, and religious or educational
institutions.145 As STOLI becomes increasingly prevalent, however, states
are beginning to pull back on those accommodations and are now trying to
curb the practice of STOLI through stricter enforcement of insurable
interest laws.
b. STATE ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT STOLI UNDER INSURABLE
INTEREST LAWS
138. Bromley’s Amdrs. v. Washington L. Ins. Co., 92 S.W. 17 (Ky. 1906); Thomas v.
Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co., 257 P. 727 (Kan. 1927). It should be noted that under the
majority rule the policy would be void as well.
139. RICHARD A. LORD, 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §49:122 (4th ed. 2008).
140. Drechsler, supra note 133, at 42; RICHARD A. LORD, 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§49:122 (4th ed. 2008).
141. RICHARD A. LORD, 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §49:122 (4th ed. 2008) (noting
that many jurisdictions have permitted assignment where there is no insurable interest).
142. Id.
143. “[I]t should be made clear, an assignment to an assignee devoid of any insurable
interest in the life of the insured is only prima facie valid. Suspicious circumstances will
cause a court to deny validity to colorable assignment as being only a cloak for a wagering
transaction.” Id.
144. Grisby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911).
145. In 2004 several states were poised to enact legislation which would expand
insurable interest laws to accommodate charities, religious institutions and the like. Recent
Developments in Insurable Interest and Investor Owned Life Insurance, SL043 ALI-ABA
339, 376 (West 2007). However, only two states, North Carolina and Tennessee, ended up
enacting such legislation. The states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, New York,
and Oklahoma also proposed similar legislation that was never enacted. Id.
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States have begun to target and address the insurable interest problem
either through legislation or opinions issued by state insurance
departments.146 Several States have issued opinions regarding STOLI in
light of insurable interest requirements.147 The first state to issue an
opinion was New York.148 The opinion addressed N.Y. INS. LAW §3205
and stated: “New York has a strong public policy against speculation on
the death of individuals. Accordingly, one may not, with limited
exceptions, take out a policy of life insurance on the life of another.”149
What is unique about New York’s insurable interest law is that it not only
requires an insurable interest at the time the policy is procured, but it also
prohibits the solicitation or assignment of life insurance policies procured
for the benefit of an investor not having an insurable interest.150 Section
146. Maine will consider a bill regarding STOLI and consumer protection in the
upcoming year. Rep. Brautigam’s Bill to Scrutinize Questionable Trend in Life Insurance
Markets, US STATE NEWS (October 30, 2007). See also OP. OFF. GEN. COUNSEL (N.Y. Jun.
3, 2003)(regarding Insurable Interest, N.Y. Ins. Law §3205); James J. Donelon, Insurance
Commissioner, BULLETIN NO. 06-05 (September 5, 2006); D. Kent Michie, Utah Insurance
Commissioner, BULLETIN 2006-3 (July 10, 2006) available at www.insurance.utah.gov (last
visited May 14, 2008); W.W. Deal, Director of the State of Idaho Department of Insurance,
BULLETIN NO. 07-03 (April 2, 2007). Other states have issued warnings regarding free
insurance offered to senior citizens. See supra note 97.
147. National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, STOLI Alert 1. 3-4
(March 2007) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
148. OP. OFF. GEN. COUNSEL (N.Y. Jun. 3, 2003)(regarding Insurable Interest, N.Y. Ins.
Law §3205). See also, Trevor Thomas, New York Department Bars Investor-Owned Life
Scheme, NAT’L UNDERWRITER. LIFE & HEALTH, Vol. 110, Iss. 7 pg. 1 (February 20, 2006).
Further in an opinion issued in December of 2005 General Counsel found four possible
violations of New York law with respect to STOLI transactions. John Gallo, J.D., Sorry,
SOLI: Good-Bye ILITs?, J. OF FIN. PLANNING Art. 4 (April 2006) available at
www.Fiparent.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). The violations were; whether or not that
insured purchased the policy on his own initiative, whether there was a rebating violation;
whether it violated insurable interest laws, and whether it was against public policy. Id. at 3.
149. OP. OFF. GEN. COUNSEL (N.Y. Jun. 3, 2003) (regarding Insurable Interest, N.Y.
Ins. Law §3205). See N.Y. INS. LAW §3205(a)(1)(McKinney Supp. 2003) defining insurable
interest as:
(a) in the case of persons closely related by blood or by law, a
substantial interest engendered by love and affection;
(b) in the case of other persons, a lawful and substantial economic
interest in the continued life, health or bodily safety of the person
insured, as distinguished from an interest which would arise only
by, or would be enhanced in value by, the death, disablement or
injury of the insured.
150. N.Y. INS. LAW §3205(b)(2), (b)(4)(McKinney Supp. 2003) provides:
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3205(b)(2) prohibits investors or promoters from soliciting consumers to
purchase policies with the intent of later assigning them to either
institutional or individual third parties but does not adversely affect
legitimate secondary market transactions.151 This law combats the
circumvention of the New York insurable interest laws. New York took an
even stronger stance in 2006. The December 2006 opinion of the Office of
the General Counsel banned STOLI contracts entirely as “speculative
investments” pursued for the “ultimate benefit of a disinterested third
party” who lacks an insurable interest.152
Louisiana also specifically addressed STOLI in Louisiana Bulletin No.
06-05.153 The Bulletin not only addresses violations of state insurable
interest laws but also considers whether such transactions are a potential
violation of state anti-rebating laws.154 Further, the Bulletin provides
guidance regarding the types of questions an insurance company may ask
when determining whether to issue policies that may involve STOLI
arrangements.155 Questions regarding whether the applicant has been
offered cash or other inducement to purchase a life insurance policy;
whether the applicant has been offered free insurance; and whether any
finance agreements are in place are all seen as legitimate questions.156
Allowing insurers to ask these questions is important because it establishes

(b)(2) No person shall procure or cause to be procured directly or
by assignment or otherwise any contract of insurance upon the person of
another unless the benefits under such contract are payable to the person
insured or his personal representatives, or to a person having, at the time
when such contract is made, an insurable interest in the person insured.
(b)(4) If the beneficiary, assignee or other payee under any contract made in
violation of this subsection receives from the insurer any benefits thereunder
accruing upon the death, disablement or injury of the person insured, the person
insured or his executor or administrator may maintain an action to recover such
benefits from the person receiving them
151. Id.
152. Gary S. Mogel, Investor-Initiated life may be in jeopardy, INVESTMENT NEWS
(February 27, 2006).
153. Id.; James J. Donelon, Insurance Commissioner, BULLETIN NO. 06-05 (September
5, 2006).
154. “Such arrangements may, depending on the facts, violate some or all of the
following Louisiana Insurance Code provisions, or other Louisiana statutes or jurisprudence,
including, but not limited to, insurable interest; prohibition on wagering policies; rebating;
prohibition on “wet ink” life settlements; premium finance; and usuary.” James J. Donelon,
Insurance Commissioner, BULLETIN NO. 06-05 (September 5, 2006).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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a basis for a fraud action by the insurance company and authorizes a
rescission of the policy if a misrepresentation was made.157
Utah’s insurance department issued a bulletin stating that STOLI
transactions do not comply with the state’s insurable interest
requirements.158 Under Utah law, a “person may not knowingly procure,
directly, by assignment, or otherwise, an interest in the proceeds of an
insurance policy unless that person has or expects to have an insurable
interest in the subject of the insurance.”159 The bulletin continues by
defining STOLI transactions and noting that the entire transaction will be
reviewed to determine whether it complied with insurable interest laws.160
More recently, Idaho issued a Bulletin addressing “stranger or investor
owned life insurance arrangements”.161 The stated purpose of the Bulletin
is to alert licensees and residents that acquiring life insurance with the
intent of “assigning policy benefits to investors” is illegal under Idaho
law.162 The insurance department further notes that formation of a
partnership or other joint arrangement which allows investors to
circumvent state insurable interest laws by allowing the investor to become
a beneficiary also violates Idaho law.163 Generally, such arrangements
violate insurable interest and state anti-rebate laws.164 The Bulletin’s
solution to STOLI requires a review of the transaction by the department of
insurance to see if it was designed to circumvent the state’s insurable
interest laws.165 The department will examine the entire transaction to
157. Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 34, at 115.
158. D. Kent Michie, Utah Insurance Commissioner, BULLETIN 2006-3 (July 10, 2006)
available at www.insurance.utah.gov (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
159. UTAH CODE ANN. 31A-21-104(1)(b)(West 2007).
160. Michie, supra note 146. The comment specifically notes the validity and
necessity of specific viatical and life settlements but emphasizes that these transactions are
separate and distinct and thus will be limited according to Utah law. Id.
161. W.W. Deal, Director of the State of Idaho Department of Insurance, BULLETIN
NO. 07-03 (April 2, 2007).
162. Id. The bulletin then goes on to explain the type of transactions they are referring
to, stating that a typical arrangement involves, loans in order to pay premiums, assignment
of policy to investor after specific period of time. Id.
163. Id.
164. Rebate laws generally prohibit the use of inducements to purchase insurance.
Individual states employ varied approaches. Idaho law specifically prohibits any rebates or
inducements greater then fifty dollars if not included in the policy terms… [t]herefore an
investor offers to pay premiums, provide financing for the insurance or promises future
payment for the policy may violate this law. Deal, supra note 146. In reference to insurable
interest, Idaho law does allow legitimate assignment regarding key-man insurance and
where the irrevocable beneficiary is a charity or religious or educational institution. Id.
165. Id.
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determine the intent of the parties.166 This includes reviewing the
solicitation materials including who initiated the transaction, the terms of
any and all written agreements involved, incentives for assignment,
promises of future compensation, time between the inception of the policy
and the assignment, who pays the premiums, and any other documents or
transactions related to the arrangement.167
The movement of states to either stop liberalizing insurable interest
laws or narrow them through the opinions of state attorney generals or
insurance departments shows that prohibiting STOLI is required. It also
preserves the legitimate secondary market in the process. The many
concerns STOLI transactions raise168 warrant this treatment and parallel
treatment in other states that have yet to address the implications of STOLI
transactions.
c. NAIC MODEL LAW AND THE STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Several organizations have been instrumental in influencing state
regulation of the business of insurance. The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners is such an organization which frequently
promulgates model codes.169 The NAIC was integral in encouraging states
to pass laws regulating viatical settlements. After the creation of its model
viatical settlements act, many states passed similar acts, and the same
process took place regarding life settlements.170 In general the NAIC has
an interest in regulating these types of transactions in order to create greater
uniformity in the law.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See supra Part II.
169. The NAIC was created in 1887 and is one of the oldest and largest “organizations
of state regulatory officials in the country….it has developed more than 200 model laws to
meet the needs of state insurance regulators…It has had a primary goal of creating
uniformity in state insurance regulatory laws.” Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General for the
State of Alaska, Letter to State Senator Dave Donely, n.17 (April 22, 1996) (on file with
author). Another industry organization that establishes model laws is the National
Conference of Insurance Legislators (“NCOIL”). They too have sought to regulate STOLI
transactions but have in force a two year moratorium on the sale of such policies rather than
the five year moratorium imposed by the NAIC model regulation. This note focuses on the
NAIC regulation rather then any upcoming NCOIL regulations because the NAIC
regulations do more to prohibit STOLI transactions.
170. Gary S. Mogul, As Life Settlements gain acceptance, regulators rev up their
security, INVESTMENTNEWS (March 27, 2006) available at www.lisassociation.org (last
visited Oct. 10, 2008).
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With the emergence and growth of STOLI, the NAIC has revised its
viatical and life settlements model act to incorporate and address STOLI
concerns.171 The new model act, adopted by the NAIC on June 4, 2007,
would make STOLI transactions virtually impossible.172
The main objectives of NAIC’s revisions are to increase the regulation
of the secondary life insurance market in general,173 but more importantly
to eliminate STOLI arrangements.174 This is achieved through a five-year
moratorium on policy sales after the purchase and issuance of the policy.175
The moratorium is designed to deter investment in STOLI transactions by
reducing investors’ rates of return. The exceptions to the moratorium are if
the transaction qualifies as a viatical settlement176, if the transaction

171. Recently, the National Conference of Insurance Legislators (“NCOIL”) also
issued standards for regulating STOLI. The NCOIL legislation broadens the definition of
STOLI classifying those transactions as fraudulent, sets forth new reporting requirements,
and increases penalties for those who engage in STOLI. An Update on Recent
Developments Involving Stranger Owned Life Insurance (STOLI), supra note 103, at 2. The
key difference between NCOIL and NAIC regulations is that NCOIL does not call for a five
year moratorium of STOLI but rather focuses on regulation and best practices. These are
positive steps but because of the numerous adverse public policy consequences including,
the ethical and moral implications, as well as economic, elimination of STOLI is more
appropriate. Further without the moratorium it is easier for states to manipulate the language
of the NCOIL model so that while the state looks like it is curbing the practice of STOLI in
actuality it is not. See National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, STOLI
Alert, VOL. 2 ISS. 1 (March 2008) available at www.naifa.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008);
(“In reality, the Kentucky bill [based on the NCOIL model act] guts key provisions of the
NCOIL model, rendering it ineffective”).
172. NAIC Adopts Viatical Settlements Model Act Revisions, National Association of
Insurance, News Release (June 2007) available at www.naic.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
The adoption of the model act has been a fairly contentious process with those opposed
arguing that the model act will negatively and inappropriately limit legitimate life settlement
transactions as well as infringe upon an insured’s property rights. Jim Connolly, Proposed
5-Year Ban Remains Sticking Point On Viatical Draft, NAT’L UNDERWRITER. LIFE &
HEALTH 110, 35 (Sept. 18, 2006). These concerns are largely unfounded as the act contains
specific exceptions which would allow legitimate life and viatical settlements to occur
during the five year moratorium. See supra note 176-180 & accompanying text.
173. New Obstacles to Stranger-Owned Life Insurance Transactions (“SOLI”),
Greenberg Traurig, LLP Special Report (2006) available at www.GTLAW.com (last visited
Oct. 10, 2008). The amendments to the model act create additional disclosure requirements
for brokers as well as advertising and marketing restrictions and strengthen insurance
companies rescission rights. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. This means if the person is terminally or chronically ill. Id.
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qualifies as a legitimate life settlement177, or if the insured’s spouse passes
away.178 Further, certain policies may be sold after two years if premiums
are paid only with “unencumbered assets”, if financing is limited to the
cash surrender value of the policy and a recourse loan is utilized, if there is
no agreement or understanding regarding the liability of the loan used to
purchase the policy179, or if there has been no evaluation of the insured or
the policy for settlement.180
Under this model, legitimate life and viatical settlements, which are
considered beneficial to the secondary life insurance market, are allowed to
continue. The prohibition only applies when there has been no change in
an insured’s circumstances or where premium financing or an agreement
regarding the purchase of the policy is utilized.181 Obviously this catches
the most basic of transactions but it also catches the most egregious and
harmful to those seeking insurance and to the industry.
States have begun to respond by amending their insurance codes, often
based upon the NAIC model act. Legislation has been enacted in Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, North Dakota and West Virginia.182 North
Dakota has adopted the model act put forth by the NAIC.183 Indiana’s
House and Senate adopted House Enrollment Act 1379 which establishes a
statutory definition of STOLI and maintains that it is an unlawful

177. Therefore if there is some change in life circumstance like divorce, disability,
retirement, or bankruptcy the transaction would be legitimate. Id.
178. Id. There is also an exception if the policy was issued based upon the insured’s
conversion rights. Id.
179. This includes the investors assuming the loan upon sale. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Jim Connolly, Pace of Anti-STOLI Legislation Picks Up, NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH (2008) available at www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008). Indiana has adopted the NCOIL definition of STOLI. Id. See
also Indiana Legislation Strong First Step In Battle Against Abuse Of Life Insurance, ACLI
NEWS RELEASE (March 17, 2008) available at www.acli.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008);
Landmark West Virginia Law Protects Seniors; Leads Way For Rest Of Nation, INSURANCE
NEWSNET (March 13, 2008) available at www.insurancenewsnet.com (last visited Oct. 10,
2008).
183. North Dakota S.B. 2268 was unanimously passed by the North Dakota Senate and
closely resembles the NAIC model act with regards to the STOLI amendments. Jim
Connolly, North Dakota Bills Advance, NAT’L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH 7 (March 26,
2007). North Dakota was the first state to enact a statute based on the NAIC Model Act.
Missouri Panel Eyes Abusive Life Insurance Transactions, ACLI PRESS RELEASE
(September 2007).
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practice.184 The legislation is awaiting the approval of the Governor.185
West Virginia has enacted and the Governor has signed into law
legislation, S. 704, which establishes a legal definition of STOLI, identifies
it as a fraudulent act and establishes a five year ban on the settlement of
STOLI policies.186 Other states either close to enacting STOLI legislation
or considering STOLI legislation include Ohio, Oklahoma, Illinois,
Connecticut, California, New York, Florida, Arizona, Hawaii, Louisiana,
North Carolina, and Rhode Island.187 STOLI bills failed to pass in Georgia
and Massachusetts.188 No action has been taken to date in Idaho, Utah,
Wisconsin, Arkansas, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Texas.189
d. HOW STATES SHOULD RESPOND TO STOLI TRANSACTIONS
Regulating the business of insurance is almost entirely the province of
states.190 This means states have a responsibility to fill the regulatory
vacuum that has developed with respect to STOLI transactions. The
responses of state insurance departments are the first important step. A
legislative or judicial response is necessary to support insurance
departments’ declarations. In addition to providing greater authority to
regulate STOLI, states need to actively enforce laws already in place.
Consumers and companies need strong and effective legal remedies in
order to counteract the abusive practices of STOLI.

184. Indiana Legislation Strong First Step in Battle Against Abuse of Life Insurance,
ACLI NEWS RELEASE (March 17, 2008) available at www.acli.com (last visited Oct. 10,
2008).
185. Id.
186. West Virginia S. 704 combines features of both the NAIC and NCOIL model acts.
Landmark West Virginia Law Protects Seniors; Leads Way For Rest of Nation, ACLI News
Release (March 13, 2008) available at www.insurancenewsnet.com (last visited Oct. 10,
2008).
187. Jim Connolly, Pace of Anti-STOLI Legislation Picks Up, NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH (2008) available at www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com
(last visited May 14, 2008). Ohio, Oklahoma and North Carolina all track the NAIC model.
Id. Illinois is considering both the NAIC and the NCOIL models. Id. Arizona,
Connecticut, California, Hawaii, Louisiana and Rhode Island are all considering the NCOIL
model. Id. Further, New York is enacting legislation based on neither model and it is
unclear what Florida is basing their reforms on. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-13 (2008); Life Partners Inc. v. Morrison et al, 484 F.3d 284
(4th Cir. 2007).
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PART IV: CONCLUSION
STOLI transactions do not create beneficial competitive practices but
rather abuse the life insurance market and raise bars to seniors trying to
obtain insurance coverage. Unchecked, STOLI has the potential to
permanently and negatively alter the life insurance paradigm. It creates
dangerous financial and legal risks for purchasers, investors and life
insurance companies, and also raises serious ethical concerns. It would be
insufficient to ensure that all participants are made aware of the risks so
they can make informed judgments. A practice as egregious as STOLI
should be eliminated entirely.
The permanent damage caused by STOLI to both the secondary and
primary life insurance markets is a major issue. STOLI raises potential
solvency issues, increases premiums for those in need of life insurance, and
casts doubt on the legitimacy of the industry as a whole. Moreover, states
have an interest in protecting vulnerable senior citizens from the
misleading promises of free insurance and quick returns.
State legislators and regulators have an “unprecedented opportunity to
take a leading role in protecting consumers from a growing national abuse
that threatens to undermine the social purpose of life insurance.” Only
nineteen states191 have adopted or proposed bills or regulations regarding
STOLI, while the remaining states have not enacted any form of regulation
for the secondary life insurance market or for STOLI specifically.192 These
states should be enforcing their insurable interest laws and should strongly
consider the five-year moratorium promulgated by the NAIC. The
moratorium seeks to diminish the rate of return for investors and thereby
deter the STOLI scheme. Regardless of the method employed, states
should prohibit the use of STOLI transactions. The statutory structure for
doing so is already in place in all 50 states and should be fully utilized.

191. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text. The point remains that a majority
of states are not regulating or preventing STOLI. Because STOLI often involves
transactions across state lines it is important that all states address the abusive practices of
STOLI.
192. David Giust, Scrutinizing Life Settlement Sales, Bank Insurance & Securities
Association (2008) available at http://www.bisanet.org/bism/2008/life_settlements.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
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REGIONAL SHORTCOMINGS AND GLOBAL
SOLUTIONS: KIDNAP, RANSOM AND INSURANCE IN
LATIN AMERICA
Samantha Kenney*
It takes only a few clicks of the mouse while on the internet to realize
the face of insurance in America, and much of the Western world, has
changed dramatically since its inception. Insurance agencies no longer
offer just the traditional auto, health and life insurance policies. Today,
certain types of specialty insurance have become increasingly popular and
are now available from major insurance companies.1 With consumers
having the option to purchase plans that protect their weddings, household
help, college students, “twenty-somethings”, and even their identity from
theft,2 it seems that insurance can protect anyone from anything so long as
they are willing to pay the premium.
As such, it is unsurprising that in today’s increasingly global, and often
volatile, world, the demand for a unique specialty insurance to protect
against kidnap for ransom has grown.3 With boundaries that once created a
marked separation between countries growing more and more obsolete in
the business world,4 kidnap and ransom insurance (“K & R”) is being
purchased by large fortune 500 companies, as well as small to midsized
companies, manufacturing and service firms and financial institutions to
protect their employees.5 This insurance is not limited to companies

* University of Connecticut Juris Doctorate candidate, 2009. I would like to thank
Professsor Angel Oquendo for his help in writing this comment.
1. Three major insurance companies offering specialty insurance are Lloyds of
London, AIG, and Victor O. Schinnerer & Company offer specialty insurance. This can be
found
on
their
websites
at
http://www.lloyds.com/About_Us/What_is_Lloyds/at_a_glance.htm,
http://www.aig.com/specialty_20_7402.html, and http://www.schinnerer.com/index.html
respectively.
2. Insurance Information Institute, Major Types of Specialty Insurance,
http://www.iii.org/individuals/other (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
3. Maria O’Brien, Preparing for the Worst, LATIN FINANCE, June 2001, at 42.
4. V.A. Tommy, Managing Risk While Crossing Treacherous Boarders, GULF
NEWS, May 24, 2006, http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/05/24/10042030.html.
5. Barbara Bowers, Hostage Situations: Kidnappings for Ransom are on the Rise
and Insurers are Selling More Policies to Protect Executives Who Travel in High-Risk
Countries, BEST’S REVIEW, Mar. 2001, at 70, 71.
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though; increasingly more often, individuals are even purchasing plans to
protect themselves and their families.6
Latin America has long held the dubious honor of being the most
dangerous area in the world for kidnappings.7 Of the countries with the
highest risk of kidnapping for ransom or hostage taking, Mexico, Colombia
and Brazil all top today’s list.8 In fact, Colombia has been dubbed “the
kidnapping capital of the world”9 where kidnapping is more than a crime; it
is a business.10 Specifically troubling in Latin America is the kidnapping
activity of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a rebel
group who uses kidnapping as their second largest source of financial
support.11 As such, K & R policies are being purchased more frequently;
providing an abductee’s family the financial means necessary to ensure
their loved one’s safe and reasonably swift return.12
Despite its benefits, K & R insurance has recently come under scrutiny
for providing customers with precisely what they have paid for; the
assurance that if abducted, their families will be able to pay the ransom
demanded and bring them home safe.13 Alleging that K & R plans are
undermining American counterterrorism policies, it has been suggested that
the insurance industry adopt a voluntary no-pay policy, whereby K & R
insurance could continue to exist, but without providing reimbursement for
any ransoms paid.14 Instead of reimbursement, the focus of K & R policies
under a no payment scheme would be enhanced kidnap prevention training
and providing crisis management services.15 This proposal is intended to

6. Id. at 72.
7. In Latin America, a New Breed of Kidnappers is More Brutal, USA TODAY, Aug.
14, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-08-14-samericakidnappings_x.htm.
8. V. A. Tommy, supra note 4.
9. Susan Hansen, High Net Worth Families, Kidnapping Risk, TRUSTS & ESTATES,
April 2003, at 35.
10. Id.
11. O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42.
12. These policies help ensure the return of kidnapping victims by providing the
money necessary to pay the demanded ransom. They have a proofed effective because
kidnappers’ motives are more often than not financially driven. Id.
13. Meadow Clendenin, No Concessions with No Teeth: How Kidnap and Ransom
Insurers and Insureds are Undermining U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, 56 EMORY L. J. 741,
741-42 (2006).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 743.
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bring the insurance industry in line with the U.S. government’s “no
concessions” stance regarding terrorism.16
This Comment takes the position that a necessary element of any K &
R policy is its ability to reimburse an insured’s family or employer for
payment of a demanded ransom. While kidnap prevention training and
crisis management services are valuable and necessary, absent payment,
they are insufficent in the event of abduction. Moreover, if payment
reimbursement is removed from K & R policies, these plans will be
effectively eliminated. Looking at the situation of the Northrop Grumman
employees being held in Colombia,17 this Comment will demonstrate how
the alternatives suggested in a no payment policy would not only be
ineffective in preventing kidnappings but instead, would increase barriers
between kidnap victims and a safe return home. Additionally, this
Comment will demonstrate that, given its international nature, instituting a
no payment policy for the entire insurance industry is simply not possible.
Instead, an international solution ought to be sought through the United
Nations.
Part I of this Comment describes the history of K & R insurance, the
general coverage provided by a policy and the history and law governing
the American insurance industry. Part II discusses the statistical realities of
kidnapping, including data on those groups of individuals most at risk for
abduction worldwide and more specifically, within Latin America. Part II
also addresses the increased rate of kidnapping in Latin America. Part III
discusses how citizens of the most affected Latin American countries are
adapting and dealing with this crisis, and Part IV relates the saga of the
three defense contractors of Northrop Grumman who have been held
hostage in Colombia since 2004.18
Part IV will also assert how it is the “no concessions” policy of the
U.S. and the absence of the ability to make a ransom payment which has
kept these men from a safe return. Lastly, Part V discusses the potential
alternatives to the proven ineffective domestic “no-concession” approach.
16. Id.
17. See infra Part IV A. While this Comment was pending for publication, the three
Northrop Grumman employees, along with former Columbia presidential candidate Ingrid
Bentacourt and eleven other hostages were rescued from the FARC. See Bentacourt, U.S.
Contractors rescued from FARC, CNN.COM, July 3, 2008, available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/07/02/betancourt.colombia/index.html (last
visited Aug. 11, 2008). This was achieved only after the Columbian military secretly
infiltrated the group. Id.
18. See infra Part IV A.
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It discusses why the appropriate way to deal with the Latin American
situation, an international crisis, is through an international system of
accountability and assistance from the United Nations, rather than
unilateral American action.
I.

THE HISTORY AND COVERAGE OF K & R POLICIES
A. HISTORY OF K & R

Kidnapping is a centuries old crime; a crime historically prolific during
times of great social and economic transition.19 Many countries are
currently experiencing this type of social and economic transition.20 Just
as the crime of kidnapping is not new, neither are efforts to protect oneself
and ensure access to necessary means to pay a ransom. The first K & R
policy dates back to 193221 and was offered by Lloyd’s of London.22 This
specialty insurance was first offered shortly after the highly publicized
kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh’s baby son.23
Despite its early entrance on the insurance scene, K & R policies did
not achieve prominence until the 1960’s when a series of bank executives’
wives were kidnapped.24 After that point, the market for K & R insurance
exploded and became Lloyd’s single most important growth area from the
middle of 1970 to the mid-1980s.25 This trend has generally continued. As
recently as 2005 80% of Fortune 500 companies had purchased K & R
policies.26 While a seemingly untraditional corporate investment, these

19. Hansen, supra note 9, at 35.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 36.
22. Lloyd's is the world's leading insurance market providing specialist insurance
services to businesses in over 200 countries and territories. Lloyd’s About Us, available at
http://www.lloyds.com/ About _Us/ (last visited July 9, 2008). In 2007, 66 syndicates were
underwriting insurance at Lloyd's. Id. Lloyd’s has long been a pioneer in the insurance
industry, beginning in 1688 when it was operated in Edward Lloyd’s Coffee House. Lloyd’s
Chronology, available at http://www.lloyds.com/About_Us/History/Chronology.htm (last
visited July 8, 2008). Starting with its roots in marine insurance, Lloyd’s has grown over
300 years to become the world’s leading market for specialty insurance. Id.
23. Hansen, supra note 9, at 36.
24. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 750.
25. Id.
26. Id. The total of the annual premiums paid for those policies was estimated at
more than $250 million. Id. The Lloyd’s of London syndicate, Hiscox, held between 60%
and 70% of these policies. Id. at 751.
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policies have become popular for filling the gaps that other, more
customary forms of insurance do not cover.27
B. MAIN AREAS OF K & R POLICY COVERAGE
Though Lloyd’s of London was the first to offer K & R policies, today,
they are just one among many who offer this specialty insurance.28 A
standard K & R policy has five main components, four of which encompass
These four
reimbursement of money lost from a kidnapping.29
reimbursement components are as follows: (1) reimbursement of any
ransom paid; (2) reimbursement for expenses related to securing the release
of a kidnap victim or resolution of extortion threat;30 (3) reimbursement of
expenses relating to securing the release of a detained or hijacked victim;
and (4) reimbursement of money lost when being delivered as ransom.31
The fifth, non-reimbursement component of a K & R policy is access to
27. Id. at 748-49.
28. While many insurers offer K & R plans, the coverage varies greatly from policy to
policy. Id. at 753. This Comment will be looking at the K & R plan by Victor O. Schinnerer
& Company, carried by Great American Insurance Company and underwriting support
provided by the Lloyd’s of London syndicate Hiscox. Victor O. Schinnerer Policy
Highlights,
available
at
http://www.schinnerer.com/product_info/kidnap_ransom/k_r_program.html (last visited
July 9, 2008). The Schinnerer K & R policy is available for any for profit or non profit
organization, including religious organizations and educational institutions. Victor O.
Schinnerer
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
available
at
http://www.schinnerer.com/product_info/kidnap_ransom/k_r_faq.html (last visited July 9,
2008). It also may be converted to provide coverage for high net worth individuals and
families. Elisabeth Eaves, Most Dangerous Destinations 2007, FORBES.COM, Feb. 1, 2007,
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/travel/2007/01/31/most-dangerous-destinationsforbeslife-ee_0201dangerousdestinations.html (last visited July 9, 2008). Most individual
policies purchased will pay for the cost of dealing with a kidnapping, but unlike the
corporate plans, do not reimburse the amount of the ransom payment. What Does Kidnap
and Ransom Insurance Cover, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE available at
http://www.iii.org/individuals/business/optional/kidnapandransom/ (last visited July 9,
2008).
29. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 751-52.
30. Extortion is defined by the Victor O. Schinnerer & Company policy as the
following types of threats made in conjunction with a ransom demand: “A threat to kill,
injure or abduct, [a] threat to damage property, [a] threat to contaminate products; [a] threat
to divulge trade secrets, [a] threat to introduce a computer virus.” Victor O. Schinnerer
Extortion
Highlighted,
available
at
http://www.schinnerer.com/product_info/kidnap_ransom/pdfs/extortart.pdf (last visited July
9, 2008).
31. Clendenin, supra note 13 at 752–53.
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security consultants for preventative measures as well as access to
individuals experienced in hostage negotiation, risk management and crisis
response in the event of an abduction.32 The “crisis management team” to
whom the insured’s family or employer has access to are often consultants
with military, intelligence and police backgrounds. 33 Specifically, they
have extensive experience dealing with kidnap and extortion situations.34
While the above mentioned are the main components of a K & R
policy, plans can be tailored to an individual or company’s specific needs.
The options for coverage outside the five main areas are expansive and can
cover everything from providing reimbursement of reward money provided
to an informant, reimbursement of fees incurred in securing and employing
an interpreter,35 and reimbursement of lawyers expenses36 to
reimbursement of personal financial loss of a kidnap victim,37 and payment
of a victim’s cosmetic surgery for injuries sustained as a result of kidnap.38
These options, along with the varying level of danger posed in different
countries and an individual clients’ history with kidnap incidents, cause
plan premiums to vary greatly.39 Just as important as the area where the
work is being done, the type of work in which a client is engaged can also
affect the cost of a K & R policy.40
32. Id. at 752.
33. See Victor O. Schinnerer Policy Highlights, supra note 28. These services are
provided by an outside company like the international crisis and response company, Control
Risk. See id. When handling a case, Control Risk has four main objectives: (1),in the event
of a kidnapping, a “safe, timely and secure” victim release, (2) handling extortion within the
interests of their client, (3) for business clients, safeguarding the continued business
operations and (4) to always act within the law. Id.
34. Id.
35. Victor O. Schinnerer Extortion Highlighted, supra note 30.
36. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 752.
37. Victor O. Schinnerer Extortion Highlighted, supra note 30.
38. Victor O. Shinnerer Policy Highlights, supra note 28.
39. See Clendenin, supra note 13, at 753. While the premiums vary dependent upon
the policy limit, the area of the world in which an individual is looking to be covered for is
of greater consequence. See id. For example, a policy with a $1 million limit can be
purchased by some for as little as $700 a year. Monica Perin, Kidnapping for Ransom a
Rising Risk Overseas, HOUSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, (Mar. 4, 2005), available at
http://houston.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2005/03/07/story5.html (last visited July 9,
2008). However, for coverage somewhere with as great a risk as Colombia, for the same $1
million policy limit the premium can be as much as $20,000 a year. Id. This does not mean
that only those able to pay a premium in the tens of thousands can afford a K & R policy for
higher risk areas around the world. Other corporate K & R policies are offered between
$1,500 and $5,000 a year for companies in high risk situations. Id.
40. See Clendenin, supra note 13, at 753.
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C. HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW GOVERNING INSURANCE
American law governing insurance has had a long and complicated
history. The greatest difficulty surrounding insurance law has been the
struggle between the Federal and State governments as to who should
regulate it.41 Until 1944, insurance regulation was left to the sole discretion
of the states, as insurance was not considered “commerce” and thus, was
not subject to federal jurisdiction.42 This distinction was made largely
because insurance was not a tangible good43 and therefore, not commerce.
This left insurance regulation to the discretion of states, rather than
Congress.44
However, in 1944, the case of United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Association, the Supreme Court held that persons engaged in
the insurance business are subject to federal regulation since insurance
involves the transmission of “money, documents, and communications
across dozens of states lines.”45 In 1945, with the passage of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, Congress declared the power
of the states to regulate the insurance industry, but retained Federal
authority over areas of the insurance industry that where unregulated by the
states.46 Within 3 years of the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
states enacted similar anti-trust laws to those passed by the Federal
Government; allowing them to maintain regulatory control of the insurance
industry after July 1, 1948. Consequently, until recently, states have
maintained complete control over the insurance regulation.47
The most recent action in the struggle to balance state and federal
insurance regulation came late in 1999 when President Clinton signed the

41. Who Regulates Insurance, Bayland Insurance
Group, available at
http://www.baylandinsurance.com/regulatinginsurance.html (last visited July 9, 2008).
42. Cornell University Law School Insurance Law: An Overview,
http://www.law.cornell. edu/topics/insurance.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
43. Bayland, supra note 41.
44. Id.
45. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533, 549-553
(1944).
46. Cornell, supra note 42. Specifically, Congress held that the Sherman Act, the
Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act are applicable to insurance business to
the extent it is unregulated by state law. Id.
47. Bayland, supra note 41. There are specific Federal statutes that regulate insurance
other than 15 U.S.C. § 1011, among them are 15 U.S.C. § 6701 and 18 U.S.C. § 1033 (f).
Id.
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Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act.48 This Act
was signed into law as a response to the changes and developments in both
the marketplace and technology that have blurred the lines demarcating
traditional roles of various financial service providers.49 The GrammLeach-Bliley Act removed then existing distinctions between insurance
companies, banks and investment services and as a result, impacted
insurance industry regulation. 50 The probable long term impact of the Act
will be greater federal regulation of the insurance industry.51 However, as
the implications of this Act are still being understood and playing out in
Washington, navigation of both state and federal insurance statutes still
determines whether state or federal law is applicable in a given situation.52
Though state statutes for insurance override most federal laws, some
portions of federal law are always commanding.53 Therefore, when
determining whether state or federal law governs a particular insurance
issue, the inquiry ought to be whether the issue is related to the "business of
insurance", making state law applicable, or whether the issue relates to
issues related to of the insurance industry,54 where federal law governs.55
The essential point of this analysis is that each issue must be looked at
individually to see whether state or federal law applies.56 What makes this
problematic is that when state law is applicable rather than federal, the
same claim could potentially have a different result in every state.57
II. WHERE, WHO AND WHY OF KIDNAPPINGS
The world that we live in today is dramatically different than it was just
a short time ago. As a result of globalization and easy, cheaper travel,
48. Bayland, supra note 41.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Cornell, supra note 42. An example of where portions of federal law are always
commanding is federal tax law. Id.
54. Some examples of peripheral related issues would be labor, tax or securities
issues. Id.
55. Id.
56. Looking at the applicable laws of every state is the only way to determine whether
state or federal law applies. See generally Cornell University Law School Law By Topic,
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/state_statutes3.html#insurance (last visited
July 9, 2008).
57. See id.
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business is expanding into regions once thought too risky to work. 58 This
kind of expansion is occurring so as to allow companies to minimize the
cost of materials and labor in order to maximize profit margins.59 With this
explosion of globalization comes the need to evaluate the areas in which
companies are moving. Particularly important for a company to consider in
selecting an international location is the danger that will result from being
in a foreign and often less developed and volatile country. With many
companies capitalizing on the absence of import tariffs from fellow
NAFTA countries and moving production cites into Latin America, it is
necessary to consider that area’s epidemic of kidnap for ransom; where the
most dangerous countries within Latin America are, who faces the greatest
risk of abduction, and why kidnapping is so problematic in these countries.
A. WHERE: THE MOST DANGEROUS PLACES IN THE WORLD
There are many places in the world which American’s traveling for
both business and pleasure know to be dangerous. The threat of being
mugged or murdered while in a foreign country is not something that
people often forget when traveling abroad and they often take measures to
prevent its occurence. However, being kidnapped and held for a ransom is
not something for which many people plan. This is likely because there is
little concern of being kidnapped while traveling within the United States.60
Here, kidnappings are few and far between and when they do occur, 95%
of all kidnappers are caught and punished.61 However, in other areas of the
world, this is not the case. Those areas where the risk of kidnapping for
extortion is the greatest are the regional trouble spots of Southeast Asia,62
areas of the former Soviet Union, and Latin America.63
It is this last region where kidnapping has reached a point that the
number of abductions are deserving of the term epidemic. Of the known
kidnappings worldwide between 2000 and 2004, 73% were in Latin

58.
59.
60.
61.

Eaves, supra note 28.
Id.
Hansen, supra note 9, at 35.
Steve Macko, Kidnapping: A Latin American Growth Industry…, ENN DAILY
INTELIGENCE
REPORT,
(April
30,
1997),
available
at
http://www.emergency.com/latnkdnp.htm. (last visited July 9, 2008).
62. Specifically, the Philippians has been most problematic area in Southeast Asia. Id.
63. Hansen, supra note 9, at 35; V.A. Tommy, supra note 4.
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America.64 Despite the dynamic and widely publicized videotaped
kidnappings that have recently occurred in Iraq, Latin America has not
received the same media attention for what is a more serious problem than
the Middle East kidnappings.65 In fact, in 2005 that figure continued to
increase, up to 75%.66
It is estimated that 7,500 kidnappings a year occur in Latin America67
and in Colombia and Mexico alone, each year there are between 2,000 and
4,000 kidnappings annually.68 While these statistics are individually
astounding and terrifying, it is even more disconcerting when the following
is considered. The number of annual abductions released is more likely
than not significantly lower than the true number of kidnappings.69 These
numbers are prone to deflation since so few kidnappings are actually
reported.70 Kidnappings may not be reported for a number of reasons.
Mainly because (1) a victim’s fear of re-kidnap if they come forward to
report the crime and (2) a victim’s sensitivity after the trauma they
experienced.71 While Colombia has long held the dubious honor of being
the kidnapping capital of the world,72 in 2007 Mexico saw an increase in
violence and kidnappings that resulted in higher kidnapping rates than
Colombia. This caused Mexico to garner the title of ransom capital of the
world.73
The situation in Mexico has been getting progressively worse since
1994.74 In March of that year, Alfredo Harp Helu, a prominent executive in
Mexico’s largest financial group and close friend to then President Carlos

64. Victor O. Schinnerer Partnering With Experience, available at
http://www.schinnerer.com/product_info/kidnap_ransom/pdfs/kbrochure.pdf (last visited
July 9, 2008).
65. Hansen, supra note 9, at 35.
66. See In Latin America, a New Breed of Kidnappers is More Brutal, supra note 7.
67. Id.
68. Perin, supra note 39.
69. In Latin America, a New Breed of Kidnappers is More Brutal, supra note 7. It is
estimated that 1 in 10 kidnappings go unreported. Id.
70. Id.
71. V.A. Tommy, supra note 4
72. See Hansen, supra note 9, at 35.
73. Jay Root, Mexico Crime Continues to Surge, MCCLATCHY, Sep. 22, 207,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/19879.html.
That Mexico surpassed
Colombia in kidnappings in 2007 may be a result of not only increased violence in Mexico,
but also the spread of kidnapping out of Colombia to neighboring countries such as
Ecuador, Brazil and Venezuela. See Hansen, supra note 9, at 35.
74. Macko, supra note 61.
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Salina, was kidnapped and released after a ransom was paid.75 The $30
million ransom was paid to the kidnappers and Helu’s family announced
it’s payment on television.76 This announcement seemed to inspire other
kidnappers in Mexico and in April of 1994, another prominent
businessman, Angel Losada Moreno, vice president of a Mexican
supermarket chain, was abducted and released for a $50 million ransom.77
After 1994, kidnappings in Mexico became more frequent and kidnappers
were requesting increasingly higher ransoms.78 As a result, kidnapping in
Mexico has grown to be more prominent than anywhere else in the world.
B. WHO: MOST COMMON KIDNAPPING VICTIMS
Between 2000 and 2004, the two most common victims for kidnapping
were dependents79 and business personnel.80 These two groups constituted
one half of the world’s abduction victims.81 The remaining 50% of victims
were made up of non professional employees,82 government officials and
security forces,83 professionals, including journalists,84 ranchers,85 project
workers, including engineers,86 tourists, aid workers, religious staff, and
sports and media personalities.87 At the start of 2006, dependents and
business employees remained the most common victim of kidnapping and
abduction of foreign nationals has increased by over 275% since 1996.88

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. 27% of all kidnappings worldwide were of dependents. Victor O. Schinnerer,
Partnering With Experience, supra note 64.
80. 23% of all kidnappings worldwide were of business personnel. Id.
81. Id.
82. 14% of all kidnappings worldwide were non professional employees. Id.
83. 8% of all kidnappings worldwide were government officials and security forces.
Id.
84. 6% of all kidnappings worldwide were professionals including journalists. Id.
85. 4% of all kidnappings worldwide were ranchers. Id.
86. 3% of all kidnappings worldwide were project workers including engineers. Id.
87. These groups are among those constituting the “other” category of abduction
victims. 15% of all kidnappings worldwide consist of victims that fall into the “other”
category. Id.
88. See Victor O. Schinnerer Why Kidnap, Ransom and Extortion Coverage,
available at http://www.schinnerer.com/product_info/kidnap_ransom/pdfs/why_kr.pdf (last
visited July 9, 2008).
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While important, raw statistics can only tell part of the story in
identifying those at highest risk for kidnapping within Latin America.
When considering who may be a potential victim in Latin America, it is
important to account for where the business, and hence a kidnapping,
would take place. For example, in Guatemala, where only about 100
people a year are kidnapped, the victims tend to be children of wealthy
local or foreign businessmen.89 Kidnappers who “do their homework” on
their victim, following them and learning their habits, are present
everywhere though people with no ties to the area are less likely to be
abducted. These kidnappers will patiently investigate potential targets and
take husbands, wives, children or the elderly from wealthy citizens in order
to garner a large ransom.90 In these kidnappings, the victims are carefully
chosen, the kidnappers are highly sophisticated and they go to great lengths
to get valuable information for selecting their victims.91 Therefore,
tourists, people visiting briefly or those passing through a country generally
are not there long enough to fall prey to this kind of abduction.92
Other kidnappings are kidnappings of opportunity; in the Colombian
cities of Bogata, Medellin, Call and Cartagena, abductions in taxis are
particularly prolific.93 As are abductions late at night, close to midnight,
where a victim is taken and held only long enough to make withdrawals
from an ATM on two separate posting days.94 Anyone alone late at night
could fall victim to this kind of kidnapping.95 These abductions have great
prominence in the big cities of Brazil, Mexico and Colombia96 and even
those passing through the country driving an expensive car or drawing
attention to themselves for their wealth could be taken, even if only in the
country for a few hours.97 On the other hand, also in Brazil, it is usually
local residents, rather than foreigners, that fall victim to the sequestros
relampagos.98 As can readily be seen, the type of kidnappings most
89. Macko, supra note 61.
90. Jennifer Litz, Kidnapped in Mexico, SAN ANGELO LIVE, (June 3, 2007), available
at http://www.sanangelolive.com/node/491 (last visited July 9, 2008).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42.
94. Litz, supra note 90.
95. While anyone is potentially a victim of this kind of kidnapping, executives
visiting the area are more vulnerable to these kinds of random, opportunistic kidnappings.
O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42.
96. Id.
97. Litz, supra note 90.
98. Sequestros relampagos are “lightning kidnappings”. O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42.
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prominent in a given area will influence those most at risk for becoming a
victim of abduction.
C. WHY: KIDNAPPING FOR PROFIT
Kidnapping in Latin America is a business.99 Like any business,
individuals may have different way of accomplishing their work, but their
ends are ultimately the same: to make as great a profit as possible. If
nothing else, kidnapping for profit is certainly profitable in Latin America.
Whether it is the secuestro al paso 100 which are increasing all over Latin
America,101 sequestros relampagos which are particularly prolific in Brazil
and Colombia,102 cross boarder kidnappings, where one group kidnaps a
victim and then sells them to another group,103 virtual kidnappings,104 or a
more traditional kidnap for ransom, where an individual is kidnapped by
one group and held by them until they receive the ransom they desire,
kidnappers are making huge profits.105
A combination of factors has led to the current kidnapping crisis
overtaking Latin America. Drastic social change and an increase in the
economic split between the rich and the poor have both contributed to the
growing problem.106 As discussed, a recent increase in violence and crime
99. In Latin America, a New Breed of Kidnappers is More Brutal, supra note 7.
100. Secuestro el paso are “express kidnappings” where the victim is abducted and held
long enough to be taken to an automatic teller machine where they are instructed to empty
their bank account. O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42. After emptying their accounts to their
kidnappers, they are released. Id.
101. Though increasing all over Latin America, the majority of these kidnappings
occur in the big cities of Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Id.
102. Id.
103. Bowers, supra note 5, at 72. This particular type of abduction is illustrative of the
“business” like nature of kidnappings in Latin America. Some kidnappers have taken on a
division of labor concept that has long been successful in business. Id. In this division of
labor, one group skilled in staking out a victim does just that, while another group does the
actual kidnapping. Id. Then finally, another group altogether holds the victim and
negotiates ransom. Id.
104. Virtual kidnapping occurs when a caller demands money from someone for the
promise that they will not be kidnapped. Anna Cearley, Kidnap Fears Causing Some to
(May
21,
2005),
available
at
Leave
Tijuana,
UNION-TRIBUNE,
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/mexico/tijuana/20050521-9999-1n21kidnap.html
(last visited July 9, 2008).
105. See Schinnerer Kidnap, Ransom and Extortion Protection Insurance,
http://www.schinnerer.com/product_info/kidnap_ransom/pdfs/pol_highlights.pdf
(last
visited June 15, 2008).
106. See V.A. Tommy, supra note 4; Macko, supra note 61.
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can be tied to the present surge in kidnapping in Mexico,107 while in
Colombia, the history of socio-political factors that have made kidnapping
for ransom problematic for so long are still present. With many victims
refusing to cooperate with the local police, few suspects are ever being
caught108 and weak, inefficient and corrupt law enforcement in these
areas109 make Latin America a particularly attractive niche for the kidnap
for ransom industry.
The United States also bears some responsibility for the surge of
kidnappings in Latin America. In 2000, former President Clinton signed
into law Plan Colombia; a $6.7 billion program set to receive $1.7 billion in
U.S. aid110 intending to change the face of Colombia.111 Originally called
the Marshall Plan for Colombia,112 the goals of Plan Colombia were
simple; support the peace process with FARC (who make up the largest
and oldest rebel group within Colombia), reactivate the Colombian
economy, reform the Colombian judicial system, increase respect for
human rights and reduce the drug market by fifty percent.113 While all the
objectives of Plan Colombia seem worthwhile, it was the promise to reduce
cocaine trafficking to the United States by fifty percent over five years that
led the plan to receive the necessary congressional support for passage.114
By 2005, however, Plan Colombia had racked up $10.6 billion in aid,
$3 billion over the stated budget, and achieved none of its stated goals. 115
Analysis showed an increase in both cocaine trafficking and use., as well as

107. Jay Root, Mexico Crime Continues to Surge, MCCLATCHY, Sep. 22, 2007,
http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/19879.html.
108. Macko, supra note 62.
109. Id.
110. The United States agreed to provide $1.7 billion to the project, so long as it had
the power to determine how the money was spent. J. Thomas Ordónez, Plan Colombia,
CENTER FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, UC BERKELEY (October 23, 2006),
http://www.clas.berkeley.edu:7001/Events/fall2006/10-23-06-coronell/ordonez.html.
Another $1 billion was provided by the European Union and the remaining $4 billion was to
be borrowed by Colombia from the Inter-American Development Bank as well as the World
Bank. Id.
111. See Bowers, supra note 5, at 74.
112. Ordónez, supra note 110.
113. Id.
114. DANIEL CORONELL, PLAN COLOMBIA: COCA MOVES TO THE RIGHT,
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/7001/Publications/newsletters/Fall2006/CLASFall2006Coronell.pdf (last visited June 15, 2008).
115. Id.
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a decrease in its street price116 translating into more, cheaper cocaine on
American streets.117 As of 2007, the amount of cocaine trafficked between
Colombia and the U.S. has continued to increase.118 Despite receiving
some of the highest amounts of financial aid from the United States
government, third only to the Middle East and Afghanistan,119 Plan
Colombia seemes to have thus far, failed on all fronts.120 While Congress
has recently taken steps towards improving where the plan has failed,121
until such improvements are put in place and proven effective, Colombia,
Latin America and ultimately the rest of the world, are left to deal with the
consequences of its failure.
By instituting Plan Colombia, the United States has aided in causing
economic upheaval in Colombia.122 This has led to major unanticipated
side effects. One unanticipated side effect of Plan Colombia is the marked
increase in kidnappings.123 It would be easy to think that Plan Colombia
only had an impact on its target country of Colombia. However, the effects
of the plan can be seen all around Latin America. It is particularly notable
with the increase of kidnappings in Colombia’s neighboring Latin
American countries of Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela.124
Another unanticipated effect of Plan Colombia is that as large numbers
of Colombian citizens have fled the country, they export crimes.125 This
phenomenon is known as the Ecuador effect126 and is just another way in
which the plan’s negative effects can be seen around Latin America.
Additionally, it is estimated that the FARC makes between $250 and $300
million each year between protecting and promoting the illegal drug

116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Stephen Heidt, Keep the Freeze on Colombia, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, June 20,
2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4316.
119. Marcela Sanchez, Rethinking ‘Plan Colombia’: U.S. Aid Should Focus on Getting
Justice Done, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 16, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/15/AR2007031501555.html (last visited June 15,
2008).
120. CORONELL, supra note 114
121. June 5, 2007, the House Appropriations Committee released the 2008 draft
foreign aid budget that would make significant changes to President Bush’s request to
merely provide Colombia with continued military assistance. Heidt, supra note 118.
122. CORONELL, supra note 114.
123. See supra Part II C.
124. See Bowers, supra note 5, at 74.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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industry and collecting ransoms from kidnappings.127 Therefore, by
interrupting the FARC’s main source of revenue, drugs, Plan Colombia has
likely been responsible for the increase in the FARC’s kidnap for
ransom.128 While increased kidnappings may have been an unanticipated
side effect of Plan Colombia, the United States failure to take any action to
mitigate this negative and dangerous consequence is short sighted and
irresponsible.
These factors collectively, coupled with the unavoidable fact that
kidnapping is a relatively safe crime to commit in Latin America, 129
provide some insight as to why kidnap for ransom has become so
widespread in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and the rest of Latin America. It
also helps shed some light on America’s shared responsibility for the
increase in kidnap for ransom in Latin America; that despite setting out
with good intentions, American dictation of policy in other parts of the
world does not assure improvement.
III. LATIN AMERICAN OPTIONS
A. DEALING WITH THE KIDNAPPINGS: LOCAL PERSPECTIVES
With the kidnapping industry netting hundreds of millions of dollars
each year, criminals once engaged in Latin America’s more petty crimes,
such as drug smuggling or car theft, have begun to shift their focus.130
Seeing huge ransoms paid, coupled with little success for prosecutors
seeking kidnappings conviction, these criminals have started to move into
what they see as a career with less risk and more reward.131 While
American businesspeople have been targeted for kidnapping, at least within
Mexico, many kidnapping groups seem to avoid such foreigners.132 In
Mexico, for example, only 1 in 10 kidnappings are estimated to be reported
each year,133 the effect on locals is undeniable.
127. Columbia’s Civil War Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, available at
http://cocaine.org/colombia/farc.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
128. See id.
129. Macko, supra note 61.
130. Victor O. Schinnerer Kidnap, supra note 105; Cearley, supra note 104.
131. Victor O. Schinnerer Kidnap, supra note 105.
132. Diane Lindquest & Anna Cearley, U.S. Exec Abducted in Tijuana, UNIONTRIBUNE, Apr. 7, 2006, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/mexico/tijuana/200604079999-7m7kidnap.html. It is speculated that this may be a result of the logistical challenges
posed by an international transaction as well as the risk of attention. Id.
133. Victor O. Schinnerer Kidnap, supra note 105.
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While wealthy Americans and corporations have turned to the
insurance industry for protection, their counter parts in Latin America have
taken a more conventional approach. Guarded by security, they move in
armored cars, rarely traveling anywhere other than to and from work
because the risk of going to or being elsewhere is just too great.134 For
those daring enough to travel outside the armored fortresses equipped with
expensive security systems they call home, security guards are an
indispensable part of their lives.135 They stand watch outside restaurants
and private schools, giving the appearance of protection for those whom
they are protecting.136 They provide a sense of safety in Latin America to
those whose lives have come to be built around fear,137 and a legitimate
fear at that.
However, the presence of these guards, reminiscent in appearance to
the United States Secret Service,138 comes neither cheaply nor with any
assurances. With the bare minimum security measures for a company’s
vice president coming to about $80,000 in the first year,139 and the cost of
armoring a sport utility vehicle being about $70,000,140 it is easy to see why
only the very rich are able to afford the luxuries of such protection. Even
when these security measures are in place, safety is not assured. A notable
instance of this was in August of 1996 when Mamoru Konno, Vice
President of Sanyo Video Components, was kidnapped in Tijuana, Mexico
surrounded by employees at a company picnic and baseball game.141 While
Latin America’s wealthiest citizens are able try and hide behind the
protection their money provides, kidnappers are turning to those citizens in
Latin America’s middle class and as a result, treating victims more brutally.
142

The effect of these actions against Latin America’s citizens is that the
people are calling for government action.143 Taking to the streets, they are
demanding their presidents do something to stop these brutal abductions,
though realistically, in the short term, there is little the government can
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. In Latin America, a New Breed of Kidnappers is More Brutal, supra note 7.
139. Id.
140. Cearley, supra note 104.
141. Lindquest & Cearley, supra note 132.
142. In Latin America, a New Breed of Kidnappers is More Brutal, supra note 7.
143. Id.
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do.144 As stated before, kidnapping in Latin America is a business.145 Just
as with any other industry netting millions of dollars each year, the
business of kidnap for ransom will continue to thrive until it is no longer
profitable.146
With governments unwilling and, truthfully, unable to protect it’s
citizens, many of the middle class living in Latin America are left with only
two choices; stay in the country they have known their entire life and take
their chances at being abducted or killed, or be a “refugee from fear”147 and
start a new life in the safety of America. Those families opting to move to
the United States generally have dual citizenship or achieve United States
residency status though family or marriage.148 But for those unable to meet
the requirements to cross the boarder, the remaining options are limited.
Generally, they have little choice, but to remain in their home country. As
kidnapping increasingly affects the middle class, rather than just the
wealthy, growing numbers of families are desperately trying to emigrate.149
This trend has been noted by both United States law enforcement and
observers of crime trends, as well as real estate agents.150 Agents in San
Diego County claim to be seeing more clients from Tijuana and in affluent
Tijuana neighborhoods, more houses seem to be for sale. 151 Moreover, real
estate agents are capitalizing on this market, traveling to countries such as
Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico to sell properties located in Miami,
Florida,152 and making it that much easier for those inclined to leave Latin
America for the United States to have their lives established here as soon as
they arrive. For Latin American citizens without the means to procure
armored vehicles and a private force of security guards, leaving the country
has become the best and most common course of action. These “refugees
from fear” are clear examples that preventative measures can only take you
so far before more drastic steps must be taken in order to afford one true
protection from abduction.

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Cearley, supra note 105.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. In Latin America, a New Breed of Kidnappers is More Brutal, supra note 7.
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IV. “NO CONCESSIONS”: POLICY ON PAPER ONLY
Like many K & R insurance plans the Schinnerer plan, one of the most
comprehensive of it’s kind, covers more than just the individual insured.153
Included under the plan are all directors, officers and employees of the
assured, relatives154 of the insured, individuals who work or reside in the
insured’s household, guests in the insured’s household, guests and
customers of the assured either on their premises or during transport and
the individual negotiating and/or delivering a ransom.155 However, despite
this extensive coverage, government employees cannot be covered under
such a plan.156 In fact, governmental institutions are specifically noted as
being ineligible for coverage.157
That K & R policies specifically preclude governmental institutions
from taking out plans and covering their employees seems irrelevant, as
most plans providing financial assistance to the insured do so in the form of
reimbursement. In order to be reimbursed, the initial payment must be
made and since the government has been unwilling to make payment for
any abductees, reimbursement would be unnecessary. As reimbursement is
one of the most important features of an effective K & R plan, if
government institutions were permitted to purchase and carry K & R
insurance, it would be unlikely any government institution would find it
worth the price. This isn’t to say however, that the government has not
been using other means at its disposal to undermine its own “no
concessions” policy.
A. NORTHROP GRUMMAN EMPLOYEES ABDUCTED IN COLOMBIA
While abduction of government officials accounts for less than eight
percent of all abductions worldwide,158 there are obviously situations where
K & R plans would be most beneficial to those employed by governmental
institutions and private corporations simultaneously. This point is most
153. Eaves, supra note 28.
154. Relative is broadly defined and includes domestic partners, fiancées, and foster
children. Victor O. Schinnerer Kidnap, supra note 105.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Victor O. Schinnerer, supra note 64. While 8% of kidnappings worldwide is the
estimate for government officials, that number includes security forces, therefore the actual
percentage of abductions that are government officials is somewhere less than 8%. Id.
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readily illustrated by the kidnapped Northrop Grumman employees being
held hostage in Colombia by members of the FARC.
Thomas Howe, Keith Stansell and Marc Gonsalves are three American
citizens employed by the Los Angeles based Northrop Grumman
Corporation.159 Northrop Grumman is the fifth biggest multinational
defense corporation in the United States and has been involved with the
cocaine eradication missions in Colombia.160 In 2003, while in a small
airplane doing drug surveillance over a rural Colombian jungle, these three
Americans were shot down and captured by the FARC.161 Since their
abduction, little progress has been made towards achieving the safe return
of the three men.162 This is because the FARC is designated as a terrorist
group by the United States government and hiding behind their “no
negotiations with terrorists” policy, the government has yet to secure their
release.163 If these men were just employees of a private corporation, they
would likely already be free.164 It is however, the fact that they are
government contractors and it is a direct result of the governments refusal
to negotiate with the FARC which has kept these three men imprisoned for
over 4 years.165
The “no negotiations with terrorists” is the very same justification
given by some as to why insurance companies ought to adopt a voluntary
no payment scheme for K & R policies.166 The allegations are that by
meeting the ransom demands of terrorists, American companies are
undermining United States public policy.167 However, the situation of
Thomas Howe, Keith Stansell and Marc Gonsalves seems to clearly
demonstrate that the “no negotiations” stance does little more than
reinforce that abducted individuals will be held indefinitely by groups like
the FARC until they are paid.
159. Heidt, supra note 118.
160. Max Jourdan, Private War: Protecting People or Profit (BBC Two (UK) radio
broadcast
Dec.
14,
2004),
(transcript
available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/this_world/4079691.stm).
161. Heidt, supra note 118.
162. Anderson
Cooper
Blog
360˚
(June
7,
2007),
http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/anderson.cooper.360/blog/2007/06/key-moment-nearsfor-three-american.html (last visited June 20, 2008).
163. Id.
164. Interview with Joe Fender (ABC 7 KMGH- CO radio broadcast Aug. 27, 2007),
(transcript at WL 16762299).
165. Id.
166. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 741-42.
167. Id.
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Recently, the ineffectiveness of the “no negotiations” approach in the
Colombian situation seems to have reached its peak and come to the
attention of those in the government. In July of 2007, the United States
Justice Department made a move in direct contrast with the “no
negotiations” policy in an attempt to get Howe, Stansell and Gonsalves
home.168 The Justice Department offered the FARC leniency in the
sentencing of Ricardo Palmera, an influential member of the FARC who
was convicted in federal court of helping in the three men’s kidnapping in
exchange for his release.169 The men still remain held captive in Colombia.
This recent action by the Justice Department is an indication that
America’s “no concessions” stance in Colombia is not as inflexible as
initially thought. As such, to say that reimbursement for ransom payments
by insurers to individuals holding K & R policies is contrary to American
policy, is misleading and untrue. The payment of ransom by a private
corporation cannot be held out as contrary to an American governmental
policy when the government itself is not consistent with that policy. The
government seems to have recognized that in order to assure the safe return
of the abductees, they will have to give into the demands of the FARC
somehow; hence the offer for leniency. An offer for leniency to a prisoner
in exchange for a kidnap victim’s release is, however, a luxury to which the
government is privileged but private corporations are not.
Where the government can offer leniency, the only weapon at an
individual or private corporation’s disposal to get kidnap victims back is
payment of the ransom demanded. A non payment scheme would emulate
hundreds of times over the scenario of the Northrop Grumman employees.
Moreover, to hold private corporations to a higher standard, regarding the
government policy, than the government holds itself to is hypocritical and
unjustified.
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF A NO PAYMENT SCHEME
America has yet to find an adequate and effective solution to the
kidnappings epidemic in Latin America. It is sheer American arrogance to
believe that if the United States insurance companies instituted a voluntary
no payment policy in kidnap for ransom situations that kidnappings in
168. A Convicted Colombian Rebel Leader is Offered Leniency as Part of Efforts to
Free Three American Hostages, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN SENTINEL, July 16, 2007, at 22A,
available at 2007 WL 13526075.
169. Id.
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Latin America and around the world would decrease, or even stop. Any
domestic insurance regulation by the United States has no authority over
the insurance industry in other countries. As such, insurance companies in
these other countries will still be selling K & R policies to corporations and
businesspeople, all the while repaying the ransoms the United States
insurance industry will not. Absent a voluntary no payment agreement
from every insurance company in the world that provides K & R policies,
the end result of such a scheme would be to put American citizens at
greater risk.
Further, kidnap victims are 4 times more likely to be killed by their
abductors when they are uninsured than when insured.170 Partially, this is
because insured victims have the benefits of professionals who know how
to handle the abduction properly.171 The benefit of these crisis management
professionals is that, in handling the abduction, they do not make the same
fatal mistakes that relatives of an uninsured victim tend to make.172 While
this seems to lend support to the supposition that a voluntary no payment
policy would be effective, as the professional support a K & R policy can
provide is often highly effective, there are additional factors that warrant
consideration in this situation.
First, as many K & R policies provide crisis management services as
well as reimbursement for ransoms paid,173 it must also be considered that
these numbers reflect a decrease in the likelihood of a victim being killed
when a ransom is paid, as opposed to not paid. Up until 2001, the killing of
kidnap victims was relatively rare.174 However, when seven oil workers
were taken in the northeast Amazon region of Ecuador and one was killed
after the deadline for payment expired,175 this seemed to be the beginning
of an increasingly violent breed of kidnappers.176 This breed of kidnapper
is the kind that will hold oil workers abducted from Colombia in Guerrilla
hideouts for years, rape women after taking them from shopping mall
parking lots in Brazil, torture businessmen in Argentina while negotiating a
multimillion dollar ransom and return children taken in Mexico one finger
at a time to their parents as they await the meeting of their demands.177
170. Macko, supra note 61.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42.
175. Id.
176. In Latin America, a New Breed of Kidnappers is More Brutal, supra note 7.
177. Id.
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This is also the kind of kidnapper that, if their demands are not met, will
simply kill an abducted victim and keep taking others until they get paid.
A no payment policy will put American business people at greater risk
because their families may lack the means necessary to secure their
release.178 In America in 2007, seventy percent of Americans held
mortgages on the homes they lived in,179 and the average household carried
close to $8,500 in credit card debt.180 If the average American is taken
while out of the country on business, there is a good chance his family will
not have the means to obtain the ransom without liquidating their life.
Even then, there is a chance that an abductee’s family will still lack the
necessary funds, as ransoms have in the past been reported to be as high as
over one hundred million dollars.181 And increasingly often, lack of
payment translates out into loss of life.
Because of the secret nature of K & R insurance,182 foreign
businesspeople in Latin America are not taken because it is known that
they have K & R policies.183 In fact, many, if not most, abductees do not
even know that there is a K & R policy in place for them.184 This is
because it is a fundamental condition of most policies that its existence be
kept confidential and a policy can be voided if this is breached.185 Rather,
individuals are taken because, as a fact of life, people will pay whatever
they have to in order to get their family member back.
Kidnappers in Latin America do not care if American law suggests an
insurance company not pay reimbursement. What they know is how to run
their business; they know if they send the fingers of someone’s husband,
wife or child to them, they will do anything to get them back. All a K&R

178. This point is clearly illustrated in the case of Hargrove v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London, where the family of Thomas Hargrove, an American employee of a company in
Colombia kidnapped by the FARC, wanted to pay the ransom demanded by the FARC but
could not afford to pay the multi-million dollar ransom. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 766.
While Thomas Hargrove was eventually released by the FARC, it was only after 11 months
in captivity in addition to two ransom payments by his family totaling $250,000. Id. at 767.
179. Credit Card Debt Statistics, MONEY-ZINE (2007) http://www.moneyzine.com/Financial-Planning/Debt-Consolidation/Credit-Card-Debt-Statistics/ (last visited
June 20, 2008).
180. Id.
181. Victor O. Schinnerer Why Kidnap, supra note 88.
182. See O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42.
ASM,
183. See
Hiscox
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
HISCOX
http://www.hiscox.com/hiscox-asm/41.html (last visited June 20, 2008).
184. O’Brien, supra note 3, at 42.
185. Hiscox, supra note 183.
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policy does is ensure that a family not lose everything of value they have in
trying to get back the one thing they value most.186
Secondly, it is necessary to consider the premiums paid for these plans.
About fifty percent of the world’s K & R policies specifically cover Latin
America,187 and depending on the risk of the country where coverage is
provided, plan premiums vary greatly.188 For example, the annual premium
for a family of 5 ranges between $18,000 to $30,000 for a $1 million
policy.189 For a $5 million policy, the premium would be about $70,000.190
When companies191 pay out such high premiums, they expect results. If a
company pays for a K & R policy that only provides prevention training
and access to security experts in the event of an abduction,192 the need for
the insurance itself is eliminated.
Rather than pay out, conservatively, $25,000 a year for a policy with a
$1 million premium covering an executive living and working in Colombia,
the company would be in a better position to save that money and in the
event an abduction takes place, hire the same security experts the insurance
policy would provide.193 By doing this, the company would pay only for
service when it was needed rather than pay out hundreds of thousands, even
millions, of dollars in premiums over the years.194 While paying such high
186. See id.
187. Macko, supra note 61.
188. Id.
189. Id. The premium of a $1 million policy would be lower somewhere like Brazil,
where the premium for that policy would be only about $9,000 - $10,000. Id. By contrast,
the same plan would be much higher in Colombia. Id.
190. Id.
191. Companies that are wealthy enough to afford a high end K & R plan with a
premium in the tens of thousands of dollars.
192. Macko, supra note 61.
193. The three security companies used by the top K & R insurers are Kroll Associates,
Ackerman Group and Control Risks Group. Id. These security companies can all be readily
found on the internet at their websites, available at http://www.kroll.com;
http://www.ackermangroup.com, and http://www.control-risks.com, respectively.
194. Under the Schinnerer policy, as representative of K & R policies, once a company
receives notification of an abduction, the company then contacts the crisis management
company. Victor O. Schinnerer Extortion Highlighted, supra note 30. A crisis management
team has 4 main objectives; the safe, timely and secure release of the victim, the correct
handling in the interest of the client, of extortion, safeguard the continued operations of a
client, and to act within the law at all times. Id. To achieve these goals they work with
management to develop a strategy and tactical options as well as using the company’s
database and research for support. Id. Also, in the even that the story becomes public, the
crisis management team may act as a media liaison. Id. It is clear that a crisis management
team provides everything that would still be permitted under a non payment scheme, as the
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premiums over time might be worth it to a company who will be
reimbursed for any ransoms paid out, from a financial perspective, it makes
much more sense to, rather than pay premiums, to use that money to pay a
ransom the company would have to pay out on it’s own anyway.
Additionally, the prevention training which is emphasized by the non
payment scheme195 could be provided in the same manner by these private
companies; on an as needed basis. The voluntary no payment scheme is
effectively a complete elimination of K & R policies.
V. AVENUES FOR CHANGE
Having determined that a voluntary non-payment scheme is an
impractical, and potentially dangerous approach to take in an attempt to
improve the kidnapping situation in Latin America, the question becomes
what is the appropriate avenue to make the necessary changes. While the
American infrastructure provides a few different options, none are
particularly suited for this issue and the only way in which Latin America
will make any kind of meaningful change is to deal with the underlying
issues on an international scale.
A. US COURT INVOLVEMENT
The American court system has litigated issues arising from K & R
policies in the past; most notably in Curtis v. Beatrice Foods196 and more
recently in Hargrove v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London.197 It has been
claimed that the court’s decision in Beatrice Foods stands for the
supposition that in general, employees do not have a duty to rescue
employees who have been abducted that were warned they may be a target
of kidnapping.198 That ruling has been taken to say199 that because of
extensive media coverage on international kidnappings in areas like Iraq
and Colombia, it is unreasonable for Americans to claim they are unaware

only link in the abduction process for the insurance company the reimbursement of costs
and fees associated with abduction, including payment of ransom. See id.
195. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 773-774.
196. 481 F. Supp. 1275, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
197. 937 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
198. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 768-69.
199. This case has not been interpreted by the Court since it was decided and the 1980
ruling is still the controlling decision.
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of kidnapping risks and as such, employers have no duty to rescue them if
abducted.200
However, in the Beatrice Foods case, Curtis had been personally
warned by the U.S. Embassy that he might be at risk of kidnapping after his
picture was obtained from an underworld figure.201 Though Curtis attended
a security briefing with Control Risks and another arranged by the State
Department’s Office to Combat Terrorism, he still remained in the country
and made none of the suggested changes to his behavior.202 The only
action he took to change his routine, predictable behavior and to increase
security was investigatory.203 Analogizing the situation of Curtis, who had
extensive warning of his particular personal risk of kidnapping and still
failed to take any meaningful action, to the general knowledge possessed
by Americans that certain areas of the world pose a greater risk of
kidnapping, is to stretch the Beatrice Foods decision beyond it’s practical
limit.
Moreover, to imply that a corporation only pays a ransom because they
fear litigation from a victim’s family if that person is killed or injured, is to
appeal to the lowest common denominator. This assumes the worst of
multinational corporations; that they would chose not to pay a ransom for
financial reasons. It is not unreasonable to believe that a corporation would
go to great lengths to secure the safe return of their employee because they
do not want to see anything happen to them.204 Or, to take a more selfish,
self serving approach to their actions, it is not unreasonable to think that a
corporation would pay out a ransom to avoid negative publicity or to deter
future employees from being willing to take overseas positions.
In essence, the courts have been involved with K & R policies in the
past but only in the role that they were meant to fill; interpretation of the
law. Any action by the courts to limit the scope or application of K & R
policies would amount to judicial activism and be an improper exercise of
their power. Since there is no law regarding K & R policy repayment (or
non repayment), there is nothing for the courts to interpret. Therefore, until
200. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 770.
201. Curtis v. Beatrice Foods, 481 F. Supp. 1275, 1280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
202. Id. at 1280.
203. Id.
204. Particularly this was seen in the Beatrice Foods case. Given that Curtis had clear
personal knowledge he was a target for kidnapping, the court states “Faced with a
staggering demand for $5 million, Beatrice could have washed its hands of the whole affair
without incurring any legal liability. However, it instead took the conscientious course of
hiring a firm it knew to have dealt with kidnap situations previously to master-mind the
negotiations.” Id. at 1293.
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legislative action is taken, the courts do not have a role in the modification
of K & R insurance coverage. Moreover, a voluntary non payment scheme
is not legislative action; it creates no law for the court to interpret. This
lends further weight to the futility of the adoption of a voluntary scheme, as
any insurance company who chooses to reimburse the payment a ransom
could not be brought into court for violation.
B. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
As established above, a necessary precursor to a court response to the
payment of ransom for those taken in Latin America is American
legislative action. However, previous attempts to curb kidnappings through
legislative action by both the United States and Colombia have proven
ineffective.205 Colombia’s failed Anti-Abduction Act of 1993 and the
United States’ Patriot Act and Hostage Taking Act of 1984 illustrate the
many difficulties of a legislative solution to this problem.206
Moreover, American legislation, in the form of Plan Colombia, shares
partial responsibility for pushing kidnapping into its current state.
Congress’ failure to understand the interconnection between Colombian
economics, illegal drugs and kidnappings, as well as their failure to
simultaneously take precautionary measures to ensure United States
citizens and Latin Americans alike were protected from consequences.
This demonstrates that the American legislature is improperly situated to
address and resolve the issue. In fact, as we have seen, unilateral American
action207 has resulted in unanticipated side effects that have only made the
situation worse.
C. INTERNATIONAL ARENA
Having resolved that neither American judicial nor legislative action is
the appropriate avenue to address the kidnap for ransom epidemic ravaging
Latin America and Latin American countries domestic regulation has
proven time and again to be ineffective, it seems that if the kidnap for
205. Clendenin, supra note 13, at 760-763,765, 773.
206. Id. at 773.
207. The action is being categorized as unilateral because even though Plan Colombia
was a bilateral plan between America and Colombia to which the European community
gave financial contribution, America’s resolution that it determine what any money
contributed be spent on makes it’s use the functional equivalent of American unilateral
action.
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ransom problem is going to find resolution, it will come as a result of
international cooperation. This Comment takes the stance that international
assistance and accountability is the only way the cycle of abduction
established in Latin America will ever stop. This Comment takes the
position that it is not the insurance companies selling K & R policies, nor
the United States who ought to be taking the forefront in the battle against
kidnap for ransom.
Instead, it is the United Nations (UN)208 who ought to be taking steps
towards resolving this crisis. Today, there are 192 member states in the
UN, representing almost every nation in the world.209 As such, it is
unsurprising that the two countries where kidnapping for ransom has
reached its peak, Mexico and Colombia, are both UN member states.210
When a country becomes a member to the UN, they agree to accept the
obligations set forth in the UN Charter,211 an international treaty setting out
basic principles of international relations.212 They are also able to take
advantage of the UN to help resolve international conflicts and create new
policies.213
The UN has had involvement in everything from improving
telecommunication to assisting refugees, and despite its efforts in drug
trafficking and terrorism, 214 it has yet to take any specific action directed at
reducing the kidnapping problem in Latin America. While it has created
the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages,215 this was
208. The United Nations, or UN, was established October 24, 1945 by 51 countries.
How the UN Works, http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/chapter1_intro.html, (last
visited July 12, 2008). These 51 countries were committed to preserving peace through
international cooperation and collective security. Id. Though the UN is not a world
government, nor does it make laws, it provides the means to help resolve international
conflicts and help create policies on matters that affect everyone. Id.
209. United Nations Member States, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml#m (last
visited July 12, 2008)
210. Id.
211. The UN charter establishes four basic purposes for the UN; one, to maintain
international peace and security, two, to develop friendly relations among nations, three, to
cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights and
four, to the a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. How the UN Works, supra note
208.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Not So Well Known…, http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/index.html (last
visited July 12, 2008).
215. What the UN does for Justice, Human Rights and International Law,
http://www.un. org/Overview/uninbrief/chapter3_law.html (last visited July 12, 2008).
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aimed at combating terrorism against a country, not an individual.216 The
first step that the UN needs to take is for the Security Council to create the
International Convention against Kidnap for Ransom.
This Convention would be a resolution that member states could either
have the option to sign or the Security Council could require, setting forth
the general expectations for a country experiencing dramatic numbers of
kidnap for ransom. It would include expectations of the average numbers
of cases that ought to be prosecuted each year as well as unannounced
reviews of a given country’s police reports and investigations. It would
also lay out repercussions for countries which fell short in these areas, but
rather than provide negative consequences, their failure to alert to the UN
that further action must be taken on their part to assist governments losing
the battle against kidnappings.
This international agreement would simultaneously further the four
basic goals set forth in the UN charter while giving these countries serious
about resolving their problems with kidnap for ransom the opportunity to
reply to their citizen’s outcry for governmental action.217 It also provides
international accountability for those countries both party to the agreement
and who have not signed. For those who have signed the agreement, it is
an assurance that they are not alone in their fight to improve their citizen’s
lives. For those who have not signed, their failure to is a message to the
world that they are not doing all they can to stop kidnap for ransom in their
country. While this may not seem that devastating, it may serve as a
deterrent for companies that set up manufacturing sites and therefore create
an economic incentive for Latin American governments to sign onto the
agreement.
Another point to address is the reason kidnap for ransom developed.
While poverty in these countries has played a large part, one of the main
reasons kidnap for ransom has flourished in Latin America has been weak,
inefficient and corrupt law enforcement.218 While a kidnapper’s ability to
demand and secure ransom payments has had some effect on their
continued abductions, it is not the payment of ransom alone that has caused
kidnappings to spiral out of control. Rather, it has been kidnappers ability
to abduct people without personal consequences. Because Latin American
kidnappers are rarely caught and prosecuted,219 there is nothing stopping
216. See id.
217. In Latin America, a New Breed of Kidnappers is More Brutal, supra note 7.
218. Macko, supra note 61.
219. See SCHINNERER KIDNAP, supra note 105.
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them from taking people time and again. A key service which the UN
could provide Latin America would be UN Police.
UN Police have become an increasingly important part of the UN.220
First deployed in 1960’s to the Congo, playing a role in the 30 years of UN
presence in Cyprus and in 1988 taking part in the UN mission in Namibia,
the UN Police have been a key element in restoring conditions that create
social, economic and political stability.221 Consisting of 7,000 police
officers from 80 different countries, the UN Police have been proven to
deter, disrupt and prevent criminal activity.222 While the UN Police have
been involved in a number of missions spanning many activities,223 in Latin
America, they would be most effective in their “supervisory”, monitoring
local police services, and training roles.
By bringing UN Police officers to these countries to monitor local
police, corruption would be more apt to become discovered and reported.
Since these UN Police officers would be there specifically to monitor the
local police, they would not face the moral challenge of reporting a fellow
officer in the way another Latin American officer would. Additionally,
where police are simply weak or inefficient, UN Police would be able to
work with existing officers to improve their skills and help train new
recruits. Given time, with the improved Latin American officers leading
the forces, the training provided by the UN Police could be continually
passed on.
By taking the necessary actions to improve the police forces in Latin
America, absent corruption, the domestic laws and legal system within
these countries could operate as they are supposed to. When this is
realized, kidnappers will be prosecuted and convicted, much as they are in
the United States, and this ought to effectively curb kidnapping. The UN
also plays a role around the world reducing poverty.224 As poverty does
play a part in this epidemic, many of the countries where kidnap for ransom
is so profound are already benefiting from the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP).225 The UNDP, coupled with the UN Police and an
220. The Growing Role of the UN Police, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko
/civpol/2.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
221. Id.
222. United Nations Police, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/civpol/civpol1.html
(last visited July 12, 2008).
223. Id.
224. Not so Well Known, supra note 214.
225. To name a few of these countries, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Panama are all
receiving aid under the UNDP. Countries, http://www.undp.org/countries/ (last visited July
12, 2008).
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International Convention against Kidnap for Ransom would address the
causes of the kidnap for ransom epidemic and as such, be a much more
effective remedy than adoption of a voluntary no payment scheme by the
American insurance industry.
There are of course potential draw backs to the involvement of the
United Nations in Latin America. The first is that the Security Counsel
may not consider the Latin American situation an appropriate arena in
which it should get involved. As the Security Counsel generally resolves
issues of armed conflict, 226 they may consider the kidnapping issues in
Latin America too trivial to warrant UN involvement. Even if a resolution
or an optional agreement were passed, it may receive no member state
signatures and then, it has as little effect on the problem as a voluntary no
payment scheme.
Assuming the UN were willing to get involved, a possible problem to
the placement of UN Police in the affected countries would be twofold.
First, there is the potential that local police would resist the UN Police’s
involvement or worse, refuse their assistance. There is an element of insult
in sending another police force to monitor the Latin American police
departments. Given that, there is a chance that the local officers would not
be receptive to the help offered by the UN and their cooperation and
willingness to learn is crucial to the success of the UN Police in Latin
America.
Finally, there is the problem that the UN Police will not be sufficient to
meet the needs of police forces in Latin America. While there are 7,000
police officers in the UN Police,227 they are currently spread across 13
missions. The number of officers needed to achieve any real results may
number greater than those available. Moreover, the involvement of the UN
Police in Latin America may have the unanticipated effect of worsening
other situations around the world. This could happen if UN Police are
taken out of other places around the world where they are just as needed to
fill the demand in Latin America. However, despite any potential problems
and difficulties, the fact remains that the UN is the single body most
appropriately situated body to handle this crisis and they could, and should,
take action to reduce or stop its occurrence.

226. See
The
Security
Counsel,
http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/chapter1_sc.html (last visited July 12, 2008).
227. United Nations Police, supra note 222.

588

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL
VI.

[Vol. 14:2

CONCLUSION

Kidnap for ransom in Latin America is a growing problem and
something needs to be done to stop it. United States and Latin American
policies alike have been ineffective in creating change and a voluntary no
payment policy will serve no purpose other than to take a spot on the list of
actions proven to provide no results. International intervention by the
United Nations is the best option available to make real improvements to
the kidnap for ransom issue and effect the kind of change needed to save
lives and restore order in Latin America.
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